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From 573e86d7e9f0038044d5cba2a1a543e24b063a79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aleksander Adamowski <olo@fb.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:26:41 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix miscalculated buffer size and uses of size-unlimited
 sprintf() function.

Not sure if this results in an exploitable buffer overflow, probably not
since the the int value is likely sanitized somewhere earlier and it's
being put through a bit mask shortly before being used.

Cherry-picked from: 13f5402c6b734ed4c2b3e8b7c3d3bf6d815e7661
Related: #1318994
---
 src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
index 8602b4a95d..b499a0d381 100644
--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ void server_process_syslog_message(
         size_t label_len) {
 
         char syslog_priority[sizeof("PRIORITY=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)],
-             syslog_facility[sizeof("SYSLOG_FACILITY") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
+             syslog_facility[sizeof("SYSLOG_FACILITY=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
         const char *message = NULL, *syslog_identifier = NULL, *syslog_pid = NULL;
         struct iovec iovec[N_IOVEC_META_FIELDS + 6];
         unsigned n = 0;
@@ -348,11 +348,11 @@ void server_process_syslog_message(
 
         IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], "_TRANSPORT=syslog");
 
-        sprintf(syslog_priority, "PRIORITY=%i", priority & LOG_PRIMASK);
+        snprintf(syslog_priority, sizeof(syslog_priority), "PRIORITY=%i", priority & LOG_PRIMASK);
         IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], syslog_priority);
 
         if (priority & LOG_FACMASK) {
-                sprintf(syslog_facility, "SYSLOG_FACILITY=%i", LOG_FAC(priority));
+                snprintf(syslog_facility, sizeof(syslog_facility), "SYSLOG_FACILITY=%i", LOG_FAC(priority));
                 IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], syslog_facility);
         }