From 9fa7f77c5a3d92fe03d6eec8384043555ea16dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 12:12:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] coredump: do not allow user to access coredumps with changed
uid/gid/capabilities
When the user starts a program which elevates its permissions via setuid,
setgid, or capabilities set on the file, it may access additional information
which would then be visible in the coredump. We shouldn't make the the coredump
visible to the user in such cases.
Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
This reads the /proc/<pid>/auxv file and attaches it to the process metadata as
PROC_AUXV. Before the coredump is submitted, it is parsed and if either
at_secure was set (which the kernel will do for processes that are setuid,
setgid, or setcap), or if the effective uid/gid don't match uid/gid, the file
is not made accessible to the user. If we can't access this data, we assume the
file should not be made accessible either. In principle we could also access
the auxv data from a note in the core file, but that is much more complex and
it seems better to use the stand-alone file that is provided by the kernel.
Attaching auxv is both convient for this patch (because this way it's passed
between the stages along with other fields), but I think it makes sense to save
it in general.
We use the information early in the core file to figure out if the program was
32-bit or 64-bit and its endianness. This way we don't need heuristics to guess
whether the format of the auxv structure. This test might reject some cases on
fringe architecutes. But the impact would be limited: we just won't grant the
user permissions to view the coredump file. If people report that we're missing
some cases, we can always enhance this to support more architectures.
I tested auxv parsing on amd64, 32-bit program on amd64, arm64, arm32, and
ppc64el, but not the whole coredump handling.
(cherry picked from commit 3e4d0f6cf99f8677edd6a237382a65bfe758de03)
Resolves: #2155519
---
src/coredump/coredump.c | 190 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 182 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c
index ebc56d8342..d8acd2d3a7 100644
--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c
+++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio_ext.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -88,11 +89,13 @@ enum {
CONTEXT_COMM,
CONTEXT_EXE,
CONTEXT_UNIT,
+ CONTEXT_PROC_AUXV,
_CONTEXT_MAX
};
typedef struct Context {
const char *meta[_CONTEXT_MAX];
+ size_t meta_size[_CONTEXT_MAX];
} Context;
typedef enum CoredumpStorage {
@@ -148,8 +151,7 @@ static inline uint64_t storage_size_max(void) {
return 0;
}
-static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid) {
-
+static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid, bool allow_user) {
#if HAVE_ACL
_cleanup_(acl_freep) acl_t acl = NULL;
acl_entry_t entry;
@@ -157,6 +159,11 @@ static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid) {
int r;
assert(fd >= 0);
+ assert(uid_is_valid(uid));
+
+ /* We don't allow users to read coredumps if the uid or capabilities were changed. */
+ if (!allow_user)
+ return 0;
if (uid_is_system(uid) || uid_is_dynamic(uid) || uid == UID_NOBODY)
return 0;
@@ -235,7 +242,8 @@ static int fix_permissions(
const char *filename,
const char *target,
const Context *context,
- uid_t uid) {
+ uid_t uid,
+ bool allow_user) {
int r;
@@ -245,7 +253,7 @@ static int fix_permissions(
/* Ignore errors on these */
(void) fchmod(fd, 0640);
- (void) fix_acl(fd, uid);
+ (void) fix_acl(fd, uid, allow_user);
(void) fix_xattr(fd, context);
if (fsync(fd) < 0)
@@ -316,6 +324,154 @@ static int make_filename(const Context *context, char **ret) {
return 0;
}
+static int parse_auxv64(
+ const uint64_t *auxv,
+ size_t size_bytes,
+ int *at_secure,
+ uid_t *uid,
+ uid_t *euid,
+ gid_t *gid,
+ gid_t *egid) {
+
+ assert(auxv || size_bytes == 0);
+
+ if (size_bytes % (2 * sizeof(uint64_t)) != 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(-EIO, "Incomplete auxv structure (%zu bytes).", size_bytes);
+
+ size_t words = size_bytes / sizeof(uint64_t);
+
+ /* Note that we set output variables even on error. */
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < words; i += 2)
+ switch (auxv[i]) {
+ case AT_SECURE:
+ *at_secure = auxv[i + 1] != 0;
+ break;
+ case AT_UID:
+ *uid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_EUID:
+ *euid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_GID:
+ *gid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_EGID:
+ *egid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_NULL:
+ if (auxv[i + 1] != 0)
+ goto error;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error:
+ return log_warning_errno(-ENODATA,
+ "AT_NULL terminator not found, cannot parse auxv structure.");
+}
+
+static int parse_auxv32(
+ const uint32_t *auxv,
+ size_t size_bytes,
+ int *at_secure,
+ uid_t *uid,
+ uid_t *euid,
+ gid_t *gid,
+ gid_t *egid) {
+
+ assert(auxv || size_bytes == 0);
+
+ size_t words = size_bytes / sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+ if (size_bytes % (2 * sizeof(uint32_t)) != 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(-EIO, "Incomplete auxv structure (%zu bytes).", size_bytes);
+
+ /* Note that we set output variables even on error. */
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < words; i += 2)
+ switch (auxv[i]) {
+ case AT_SECURE:
+ *at_secure = auxv[i + 1] != 0;
+ break;
+ case AT_UID:
+ *uid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_EUID:
+ *euid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_GID:
+ *gid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_EGID:
+ *egid = auxv[i + 1];
+ break;
+ case AT_NULL:
+ if (auxv[i + 1] != 0)
+ goto error;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ error:
+ return log_warning_errno(-ENODATA,
+ "AT_NULL terminator not found, cannot parse auxv structure.");
+}
+
+static int grant_user_access(int core_fd, const Context *context) {
+ int at_secure = -1;
+ uid_t uid = UID_INVALID, euid = UID_INVALID;
+ uid_t gid = GID_INVALID, egid = GID_INVALID;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(core_fd >= 0);
+ assert(context);
+
+ if (!context->meta[CONTEXT_PROC_AUXV])
+ return log_warning_errno(-ENODATA, "No auxv data, not adjusting permissions.");
+
+ uint8_t elf[EI_NIDENT];
+ errno = 0;
+ if (pread(core_fd, &elf, sizeof(elf), 0) != sizeof(elf))
+ return log_warning_errno(errno > 0 ? -errno : -EIO,
+ "Failed to pread from coredump fd: %s",
+ errno > 0 ? STRERROR(errno) : "Unexpected EOF");
+
+ if (elf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0 ||
+ elf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 ||
+ elf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 ||
+ elf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3 ||
+ elf[EI_VERSION] != EV_CURRENT)
+ return log_info_errno(-EUCLEAN,
+ "Core file does not have ELF header, not adjusting permissions.");
+ if (!IN_SET(elf[EI_CLASS], ELFCLASS32, ELFCLASS64) ||
+ !IN_SET(elf[EI_DATA], ELFDATA2LSB, ELFDATA2MSB))
+ return log_info_errno(-EUCLEAN,
+ "Core file has strange ELF class, not adjusting permissions.");
+
+ if ((elf[EI_DATA] == ELFDATA2LSB) != (__BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN))
+ return log_info_errno(-EUCLEAN,
+ "Core file has non-native endianness, not adjusting permissions.");
+
+ if (elf[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64)
+ r = parse_auxv64((const uint64_t*) context->meta[CONTEXT_PROC_AUXV],
+ context->meta_size[CONTEXT_PROC_AUXV],
+ &at_secure, &uid, &euid, &gid, &egid);
+ else
+ r = parse_auxv32((const uint32_t*) context->meta[CONTEXT_PROC_AUXV],
+ context->meta_size[CONTEXT_PROC_AUXV],
+ &at_secure, &uid, &euid, &gid, &egid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* We allow access if we got all the data and at_secure is not set and
+ * the uid/gid matches euid/egid. */
+ bool ret =
+ at_secure == 0 &&
+ uid != UID_INVALID && euid != UID_INVALID && uid == euid &&
+ gid != GID_INVALID && egid != GID_INVALID && gid == egid;
+ log_debug("Will %s access (uid="UID_FMT " euid="UID_FMT " gid="GID_FMT " egid="GID_FMT " at_secure=%s)",
+ ret ? "permit" : "restrict",
+ uid, euid, gid, egid, yes_no(at_secure));
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int save_external_coredump(
const Context *context,
int input_fd,
@@ -395,6 +551,8 @@ static int save_external_coredump(
goto fail;
}
+ bool allow_user = grant_user_access(fd, context) > 0;
+
#if HAVE_XZ || HAVE_LZ4
/* If we will remove the coredump anyway, do not compress. */
if (arg_compress && !maybe_remove_external_coredump(NULL, st.st_size)) {
@@ -420,7 +578,7 @@ static int save_external_coredump(
goto fail_compressed;
}
- r = fix_permissions(fd_compressed, tmp_compressed, fn_compressed, context, uid);
+ r = fix_permissions(fd_compressed, tmp_compressed, fn_compressed, context, uid, allow_user);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_compressed;
@@ -443,7 +601,7 @@ static int save_external_coredump(
uncompressed:
#endif
- r = fix_permissions(fd, tmp, fn, context, uid);
+ r = fix_permissions(fd, tmp, fn, context, uid, allow_user);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
@@ -842,6 +1000,7 @@ static void map_context_fields(const struct iovec *iovec, Context *context) {
[CONTEXT_HOSTNAME] = "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=",
[CONTEXT_COMM] = "COREDUMP_COMM=",
[CONTEXT_EXE] = "COREDUMP_EXE=",
+ [CONTEXT_PROC_AUXV] = "COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV=",
};
unsigned i;
@@ -862,6 +1021,7 @@ static void map_context_fields(const struct iovec *iovec, Context *context) {
/* Note that these strings are NUL terminated, because we made sure that a trailing NUL byte is in the
* buffer, though not included in the iov_len count. (see below) */
context->meta[i] = p;
+ context->meta_size[i] = iovec->iov_len - strlen(context_field_names[i]);
break;
}
}
@@ -1070,7 +1230,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(
char **comm_fallback,
struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec) {
- /* We need 27 empty slots in iovec!
+ /* We need 28 empty slots in iovec!
*
* Note that if we fail on oom later on, we do not roll-back changes to the iovec structure. (It remains valid,
* with the first n_iovec fields initialized.) */
@@ -1078,6 +1238,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(
uid_t owner_uid;
pid_t pid;
char *t;
+ size_t size;
const char *p;
int r, signo;
@@ -1187,6 +1348,19 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(
if (read_full_file(p, &t, NULL) >=0)
set_iovec_field_free(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PROC_MOUNTINFO=", t);
+ /* We attach /proc/auxv here. ELF coredumps also contain a note for this (NT_AUXV), see elf(5). */
+ p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "auxv");
+ if (read_full_file(p, &t, &size) >= 0) {
+ char *buf = malloc(strlen("COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV=") + size + 1);
+ if (buf) {
+ /* Add a dummy terminator to make save_context() happy. */
+ *((uint8_t*) mempcpy(stpcpy(buf, "COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV="), t, size)) = '\0';
+ iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE(buf, size + strlen("COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV="));
+ }
+
+ free(t);
+ }
+
if (get_process_cwd(pid, &t) >= 0)
set_iovec_field_free(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_CWD=", t);
@@ -1219,7 +1393,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(
static int process_kernel(int argc, char* argv[]) {
Context context = {};
- struct iovec iovec[29 + SUBMIT_COREDUMP_FIELDS];
+ struct iovec iovec[30 + SUBMIT_COREDUMP_FIELDS];
size_t i, n_iovec, n_to_free = 0;
int r;