## <module name="userdomain" layer="system">
## <summary>Policy for user domains</summary>
########################################
#
# Base user domain template
#
# This is common to user and admin domain
define(`base_user_domain',`
attribute $1_file_type;
type $1_t, userdomain;
domain_type($1_t)
corecmd_shell_entry_type($1_t)
role $1_r types $1_t;
allow system_r $1_r;
# user pseudoterminal
type $1_devpts_t;
term_user_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
# type for contents of home directory
type $1_home_t, $1_file_type, home_type;
files_file_type($1_home_t)
# type of home directory
type $1_home_dir_t, home_dir_type, home_type;
files_file_type($1_home_t)
type $1_tmp_t, $1_file_type;
files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
type $1_tmpfs_t;
files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t)
type $1_tty_device_t;
term_tty($1_t,$1_tty_device_t)
##############################
#
# Local policy
#
allow $1_t self:capability { setgid chown fowner };
dontaudit $1_t self:capability { sys_nice fsetid };
allow $1_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow $1_t self:process { ptrace setfscreate };
allow $1_t self:fd use;
allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $1_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow $1_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow $1_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow $1_t self:msg { send receive };
dontaudit $1_t self:socket create;
# Irrelevant until we have labeled networking.
#allow $1_t self:udp_socket { sendto recvfrom };
# evolution and gnome-session try to create a netlink socket
dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown };
dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
# execute files in the home directory
allow $1_t $1_home_t:file { rx_file_perms execute_no_trans };
# full control of the home directory
allow $1_t $1_home_t:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
allow $1_t $1_home_t:lnk_file { create_lnk_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
allow $1_t $1_home_t:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
allow $1_t $1_home_t:sock_file { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
allow $1_t $1_home_t:fifo_file { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
allow $1_t $1_home_dir_t:dir create_dir_perms;
type_transition $1_t $1_home_dir_t:{ dir notdevfile_class_set } $1_home_t;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file { rx_file_perms execute_no_trans };
# Bind to a Unix domain socket in /tmp.
# cjp: this is combination is not checked and should be removed
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind;
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
fs_create_tmpfs_data($1_t,$1_tmpfs_t, { dir notdevfile_class_set } )
allow $1_t $1_tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
allow $1_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
# Instantiate derived domains for a number of programs.
# These derived domains encode both information about the calling
# user domain and the program, and allow us to maintain separation
# between different instances of the program being run by different
# user domains.
per_userdomain_templates($1)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point($1_t)
# Very permissive allowing every domain to see every type:
kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_t)
# Find CDROM devices:
kernel_read_device_sysctl($1_t)
# GNOME checks for usb and other devices:
kernel_rw_usb_hardware_config_option($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_t)
# allow port_t name binding for UDP because it is not very usable otherwise
corenet_udp_bind_generic_port($1_t)
dev_read_input($1_t)
dev_read_misc($1_t)
dev_write_misc($1_t)
dev_write_snd_dev($1_t)
dev_read_snd_dev($1_t)
dev_read_snd_mixer_dev($1_t)
dev_write_snd_mixer_dev($1_t)
dev_read_rand($1_t)
dev_read_urand($1_t)
# open office is looking for the following
dev_getattr_agp_dev($1_t)
dev_dontaudit_rw_dri_dev($1_t)
fs_get_all_fs_quotas($1_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t)
# for eject
storage_getattr_fixed_disk($1_t)
auth_read_login_records($1_t)
auth_dontaudit_write_login_records($1_t)
auth_run_pam($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_tty_device_t $1_devpts_t })
auth_run_utempter($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_tty_device_t $1_devpts_t })
corecmd_exec_bin($1_t)
corecmd_exec_sbin($1_t)
corecmd_exec_ls($1_t)
domain_exec_all_entry_files($1_t)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
files_exec_generic_etc_files($1_t)
files_read_usr_src($1_t)
# Caused by su - init scripts
init_dontaudit_use_script_pty($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
libs_exec_ld_so($1_t)
libs_exec_lib_files($1_t)
logging_dontaudit_getattr_all_logs($1_t)
miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
miscfiles_rw_man_cache($1_t)
selinux_run_newrole($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t })
mta_rw_spool($1_t)
tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',`
# Allow loading DSOs that require executable stack.
allow $1_t self:process execmem;
')
tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_t)
fs_manage_nfs_files($1_t)
fs_manage_nfs_symlinks($1_t)
fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets($1_t)
fs_manage_nfs_named_pipes($1_t)
fs_execute_nfs_files($1_t)
')
tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_t)
fs_manage_cifs_files($1_t)
fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_t)
fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets($1_t)
fs_manage_cifs_named_pipes($1_t)
fs_execute_cifs_files($1_t)
')
tunable_policy(`user_direct_mouse',`
dev_read_mouse($1_t)
')
tunable_policy(`user_ttyfile_stat',`
term_getattr_all_user_ttys($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`usermanage.te',`
usermanage_run_chfn($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t })
usermanage_run_passwd($1_t,$1_r,{ $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t })
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
# When the user domain runs ps, there will be a number of access
# denials when ps tries to search /proc. Do not audit these denials.
dontaudit $1_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;
dontaudit $1_t domain:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
dontaudit $1_t domain:process { getattr getsession };
#
# Cups daemon running as user tries to write /etc/printcap
#
dontaudit $1_t usr_t:file setattr;
# Access the power device.
allow $1_t power_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Check to see if cdrom is mounted
allow $1_t mnt_t:dir { getattr search };
#
# Added to allow reading of cdrom
#
allow $1_t rpc_pipefs_t:dir getattr;
allow $1_t nfsd_fs_t:dir getattr;
allow $1_t binfmt_misc_fs_t:dir getattr;
# /initrd is left mounted, various programs try to look at it
dontaudit $1_t ramfs_t:dir getattr;
tunable_policy(`read_default_t',`
allow $1_t default_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
')
#
# Running ifconfig as a user generates the following
#
dontaudit $1_t sysctl_net_t:dir search;
dontaudit $1_t default_context_t:dir search;
r_dir_file($1_t, usercanread)
can_ypbind($1_t)
tunable_policy(`allow_execmod',`
# Allow text relocations on system shared libraries, e.g. libGL.
allow $1_t texrel_shlib_t:file execmod;
')
allow $1_t fs_type:dir getattr;
# old "file_browse_domain":
# Regular files/directories that are not security sensitive
dontaudit $1_t file_type - secure_file_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
dontaudit $1_t file_type - secure_file_type:dir { read search };
# /dev
dontaudit $1_t dev_fs:dir_file_class_set getattr;
dontaudit $1_t dev_fs:dir { read search };
# /proc
dontaudit $1_t sysctl_t:dir_file_class_set getattr;
dontaudit $1_t proc_fs:dir { read search };
allow $1_t autofs_t:dir { getattr search };
can_exec($1_t, { removable_t noexattrfile } )
tunable_policy(`user_rw_noexattrfile',`
create_dir_file($1_t, noexattrfile)
create_dir_file($1_t, removable_t)
# Write floppies
allow $1_t removable_device_t:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file write;
',`
r_dir_file($1_t, noexattrfile)
r_dir_file($1_t, removable_t)
allow $1_t removable_device_t:blk_file r_file_perms;
')
allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file read;
can_exec($1_t, noexattrfile)
# for running TeX programs
r_dir_file($1_t, tetex_data_t)
can_exec($1_t, tetex_data_t)
# Run programs developed by other users in the same domain.
can_resmgrd_connect($1_t)
can_ypbind($1_t)
allow $1_t var_lock_t:dir search;
# Grant permissions to access the system DBus
ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
dbusd_client(system, $1)
can_network_server_tcp($1_dbusd_t)
allow $1_dbusd_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
allow $1_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
dbusd_client($1, $1)
allow $1_t $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
dbusd_domain($1)
ifdef(`hald.te', `
allow $1_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;
allow hald_t $1_t:dbus send_msg;
')
')
# Gnome pannel binds to the following
ifdef(`cups.te', `
allow $1_t { cupsd_etc_t cupsd_rw_etc_t }:file r_file_perms;
')
# Connect to inetd.
ifdef(`inetd.te', `
can_tcp_connect($1_t, inetd_t)
can_udp_send($1_t, inetd_t)
can_udp_send(inetd_t, $1_t)
')
# Connect to portmap.
ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_tcp_connect($1_t, portmap_t)')
# Inherit and use sockets from inetd
ifdef(`inetd.te', `
allow $1_t inetd_t:fd use;
allow $1_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
')
ifdef(`xserver.te', `
# for /tmp/.ICE-unix
file_type_auto_trans($1_t, xdm_xserver_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t, sock_file)
allow $1_t xserver_misc_device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;
')
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
# Connect to the X server run by the X Display Manager.
can_unix_connect($1_t, xdm_t)
allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:file r_file_perms;
allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
allow $1_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
r_dir_file($1_t, xdm_var_run_t)
allow $1_t xdm_var_lib_t:file r_file_perms;
allow xdm_t $1_home_dir_t:dir getattr;
ifdef(`xauth.te', `
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_xauth_home_t, file)
')
# for shared memory
allow xdm_xserver_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { read write };
')
ifdef(`rpcd.te', `
create_dir_file($1_t, nfsd_rw_t)
')
ifdef(`cardmgr.te', `
# to allow monitoring of pcmcia status
allow $1_t cardmgr_var_run_t:file r_file_perms;
')
#
# Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan
#
ifdef(`apmd.te', `
allow $1_t apmd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $1_t apmd_var_run_t:sock_file write;
')
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow $1_t autofs_t:dir { getattr search };
')
ifdef(`pamconsole.te', `
allow $1_t pam_var_console_t:dir search;
')
') dnl endif TODO
')dnl end base_user_domain macro
########################################
#
# User domain template
#
define(`user_domain_template', `
##############################
#
# Declarations
#
# Inherit rules for ordinary users.
base_user_domain($1)
typeattribute $1_t unpriv_userdomain; #, web_client_domain, nscd_client_domain;
domain_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
#typeattribute $1_devpts_t userpty_type, user_tty_type;
#typeattribute $1_home_dir_t user_home_dir_type;
#typeattribute $1_home_t user_home_type;
#typeattribute $1_tmp_t, user_tmpfile;
#typeattribute $1_tty_device_t user_tty_type;
##############################
#
# Local policy
#
allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append };
term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
# Rules used to associate a homedir as a mountpoint
allow $1_home_t self:filesystem associate;
allow $1_file_type $1_home_t:filesystem associate;
# user temporary files
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { dir notdevfile_class_set })
# privileged home directory writers
allow privhome $1_home_t:file create_file_perms;
allow privhome $1_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
allow privhome $1_home_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow privhome $1_home_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
allow privhome $1_home_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
type_transition privhome $1_home_dir_t:{ dir notdevfile_class_set } $1_home_t;
kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
kernel_read_hardware_state($1_t)
# cjp: why?
bootloader_read_kernel_symbol_table($1_t)
# port access is audited even if dac would not have allowed it, so dontaudit it here
corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports($1_t)
files_read_generic_etc_files($1_t)
files_list_home($1_t)
files_read_usr_files($1_t)
init_read_script_pid($1_t)
# The library functions always try to open read-write first,
# then fall back to read-only if it fails.
init_dontaudit_write_script_pid($1_t)
# Stop warnings about access to /dev/console
init_dontaudit_use_fd($1_t)
init_dontaudit_use_script_fd($1_t)
miscfiles_read_man_pages($1_t)
selinux_read_config($1_t)
# Allow users to execute checkpolicy without a domain transition
# so it can be used without privilege to write real binary policy file
selinux_exec_checkpol($1_t)
tunable_policy(`user_dmesg',`
kernel_read_ring_buffer($1_t)
',`
kernel_dontaudit_read_ring_buffer($1_t)
')
# Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from
# the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode
# and may change other protocols
tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',`
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1_t)
')
# for running depmod as part of the kernel packaging process
optional_policy(`modutils.te',`
modutils_read_module_conf($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`selinux.te',`
# for when the network connection is killed
selinux_dontaudit_newrole_signal($1_t)
')
# Need the following rule to allow users to run vpnc
optional_policy(`xserver.te', `
corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_xserver_port($1_t)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
dontaudit $1_t boot_t:lnk_file read;
dontaudit $1_t boot_t:file read;
can_kerberos($1_t)
# do not audit read on disk devices
dontaudit $1_t { removable_device_t fixed_disk_device_t }:blk_file read;
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search;
#
# Changing this to dontaudit should cause the .xsession-errors file to be written to /tmp
#
dontaudit xdm_t $1_home_t:file rw_file_perms;
')
ifdef(`ftpd.te', `
tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir',`
file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t)
')
')
tunable_policy(`read_default_t',`
allow $1 default_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
')
can_exec($1_t, usr_t)
# Read directories and files with the readable_t type.
# This type is a general type for "world"-readable files.
allow $1_t readable_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t readable_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
# Stat lost+found.
allow $1_t lost_found_t:dir getattr;
# Read /var, /var/spool, /var/run.
allow $1_t var_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t var_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
allow $1_t var_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t var_spool_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
allow $1_t var_run_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t var_run_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
allow $1_t var_lib_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
# Allow users to rw usb devices
tunable_policy(`user_rw_usb',`
rw_dir_create_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t)
',`
r_dir_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t)
')
# Do not audit write denials to /etc/ld.so.cache.
dontaudit $1_t ld_so_cache_t:file write;
dontaudit $1_t sysadm_home_t:file { read append };
ifdef(`syslogd.te', `
# Some programs that are left in $1_t will try to connect
# to syslogd, but we do not want to let them generate log messages.
# Do not audit.
dontaudit $1_t devlog_t:sock_file { read write };
dontaudit $1_t syslogd_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
')
allow $1_t initrc_t:fifo_file write;
ifdef(`user_can_mount', `
#
# Allow users to mount file systems like floppies and cdrom
#
mount_domain($1, $1_mount, `, fs_domain')
r_dir_file($1_t, mnt_t)
allow $1_mount_t device_t:lnk_file read;
allow $1_mount_t removable_device_t:blk_file read;
allow $1_mount_t iso9660_t:filesystem relabelfrom;
allow $1_mount_t removable_t:filesystem { mount relabelto };
allow $1_mount_t removable_t:dir mounton;
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
allow $1_mount_t xdm_t:fd use;
allow $1_mount_t xdm_t:fifo_file { read write };
')
')
') dnl end TODO
')
########################################
#
# Admin domain template
#
define(`admin_domain_template',`
##############################
#
# Declarations
#
# Inherit rules for ordinary users.
base_user_domain($1)
typeattribute $1_t privhome; #, admin, web_client_domain, nscd_client_domain;
kernel_obj_id_change_exempt($1_t)
role system_r types $1_t;
#ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon', `, priv_system_role')
#; dnl end of sysadm_t type declaration
typeattribute $1_devpts_t admin_terminal;
typeattribute $1_tty_device_t admin_terminal;
##############################
#
# $1_t local policy
#
allow $1_t self:capability ~sys_module;
allow $1_t self:process { setexec setfscreate };
# Set password information for other users.
allow $1_t self:passwd { passwd chfn chsh };
# Skip authentication when pam_rootok is specified.
allow $1_t self:passwd rootok;
# Manipulate other users crontab.
allow $1_t self:passwd crontab;
# for the administrator to run TCP servers directly
allow $1_t self:tcp_socket { acceptfrom connectto recvfrom };
allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append };
term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:lnk_file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { dir notdevfile_class_set })
kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_t)
kernel_getattr_core($1_t)
kernel_getattr_message_if($1_t)
kernel_change_ring_buffer_level($1_t)
kernel_clear_ring_buffer($1_t)
kernel_read_ring_buffer($1_t)
kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_t)
kernel_rw_all_sysctl($1_t)
kernel_set_enforcement_mode($1_t)
kernel_set_boolean($1_t)
kernel_set_security_parameters($1_t)
# Get security policy decisions:
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point($1_t)
kernel_validate_context($1_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector($1_t)
kernel_compute_create_context($1_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context($1_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts($1_t)
# signal unlabeled processes:
kernel_kill_unlabeled($1_t)
kernel_signal_unlabeled($1_t)
kernel_sigstop_unlabeled($1_t)
kernel_signull_unlabeled($1_t)
kernel_sigchld_unlabeled($1_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1_t)
dev_getattr_generic_blk_file($1_t)
dev_getattr_generic_chr_file($1_t)
dev_getattr_all_blk_files($1_t)
dev_getattr_all_chr_files($1_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t)
fs_set_all_quotas($1_t)
storage_raw_read_removable_device($1_t)
storage_raw_write_removable_device($1_t)
term_use_console($1_t)
term_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys($1_t)
term_use_all_user_ttys($1_t)
# Manage almost all files
auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow($1_t)
# Relabel almost all files
auth_relabel_all_files_except_shadow($1_t)
domain_setpriority_all_domains($1_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state($1_t)
# signal all domains:
domain_kill_all_domains($1_t)
domain_signal_all_domains($1_t)
domain_signull_all_domains($1_t)
domain_sigstop_all_domains($1_t)
domain_sigstop_all_domains($1_t)
domain_sigchld_all_domains($1_t)
files_exec_usr_files($1_t)
init_use_initctl($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
modutils_domtrans_insmod($1_t)
selinux_read_config($1_t)
# The following rule is temporary until such time that a complete
# policy management infrastructure is in place so that an administrator
# cannot directly manipulate policy files with arbitrary programs.
selinux_manage_src_pol($1_t)
# Violates the goal of limiting write access to checkpolicy.
# But presently necessary for installing the file_contexts file.
selinux_manage_binary_pol($1_t)
optional_policy(`cron.te',`
cron_admin_template($1)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
# Let admin stat the shadow file.
allow $1_t shadow_t:file getattr;
# for lsof
allow $1_t mtrr_device_t:file getattr;
allow $1_t serial_device:chr_file setattr;
# allow setting up tunnels
allow $1_t tun_tap_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t ptyfile:chr_file getattr;
# Run programs from staff home directories.
# Not ideal, but typical if users want to login as both sysadm_t or staff_t.
can_exec($1_t, staff_home_t)
# Run admin programs that require different permissions in their own domain.
# These rules were moved into the appropriate program domain file.
ifdef(`startx.te', `
ifdef(`xserver.te', `
# Create files in /tmp/.X11-unix with our X servers derived
# tmp type rather than user_xserver_tmp_t.
file_type_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xserver_tmpfile, $1_xserver_tmp_t, sock_file)
')
')
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
ifdef(`xauth.te', `
tunable_policy(`xdm_sysadm_login',`
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search;
')
allow $1_t xdm_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
')
')
#
# A user who is authorized for sysadm_t may nonetheless have
# a home directory labeled with user_home_t if the user is expected
# to login in either user_t or sysadm_t. Hence, the derived domains
# for programs need to be able to access user_home_t.
#
# Allow our gph domain to write to .xsession-errors.
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `
allow $1_gph_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms;
')
# for the administrator to run TCP servers directly
allow $1_t kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;
# Connect data port to ftpd.
ifdef(`ftpd.te', `can_tcp_connect(ftpd_t, $1_t)')
# Connect second port to rshd.
ifdef(`rshd.te', `can_tcp_connect(rshd_t, $1_t)')
# Allow MAKEDEV to work
allow $1_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1_t device_type:{ blk_file chr_file } { create unlink rename };
allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file { create read };
# for lsof
allow $1_t domain:socket_class_set getattr;
allow $1_t eventpollfs_t:file getattr;
') dnl endif TODO
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users">
## <description>
## Execute a shell in all user domains. This
## is an explicit transition, requiring the
## caller to use setexeccon().
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
corecmd_shell_spec_domtrans($1,userdomain)
')
define(`userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users_depend',`
type sysadm_t;
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_shell_domtrans_sysadm">
## <description>
## Execute a shell in the sysadm domain.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_shell_domtrans_sysadm',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
corecmd_domtrans_shell($1,sysadm_t)
')
define(`userdom_shell_domtrans_sysadm_depend',`
type sysadm_t;
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_use_sysadm_terms">
## <description>
## Read and write administrative users
## physical and pseudo terminals.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_use_sysadm_terms',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1)
term_list_ptys($1)
allow $1 admin_terminal:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
')
define(`userdom_use_sysadm_terms_depend',`
attribute admin_terminal;
class chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_dontaudit_use_sysadm_terms">
## <description>
## Do not audit attempts to use admin ttys and ptys.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_dontaudit_use_sysadm_terms',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
dontaudit $1 admin_terminal:chr_file { read write };
')
define(`userdom_dontaudit_use_sysadm_terms_depend',`
attribute admin_terminal;
class chr_file { read write };
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_search_all_users_home">
## <description>
## Search all users home directories.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_search_all_users_home',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
files_list_home($1)
allow $1 { home_dir_type home_type }:dir search;
')
define(`userdom_search_all_users_home_depend',`
attribute home_dir_type, home_type;
class dir search;
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_read_all_user_data">
## <description>
## Read all files in all users home directories.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_read_all_user_data',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
files_list_home($1)
allow $1 home_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 home_type:file r_file_perms;
')
define(`userdom_read_all_user_data_depend',`
attribute home_type;
class dir r_dir_perms;
class file r_file_perms;
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_use_all_user_fd">
## <description>
## Inherit the file descriptors from all user domains
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_use_all_user_fd',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
allow $1 userdomain:fd use;
')
define(`userdom_use_all_user_fd_depend',`
attribute userdomain;
class fd use;
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_signal_all_users">
## <description>
## Send general signals to all user domains.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_signal_all_users',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
allow $1 userdomain:process signal;
')
define(`userdom_signal_all_users_depend',`
attribute userdomain;
class process signal;
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd">
## <description>
## Inherit the file descriptors from all user domains.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
')
define(`userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd_depend',`
attribute unpriv_userdomain;
class fd use;
')
########################################
## <interface name="userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd">
## <description>
## Do not audit attempts to inherit the
## file descriptors from all user domains.
## </description>
## <parameter name="domain">
## The type of the process performing this action.
## </parameter>
## </interface>
#
define(`userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd',`
gen_require(`$0'_depend)
dontaudit $1 unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
')
define(`userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd_depend',`
attribute unpriv_userdomain;
class fd use;
')
## </module>