From 3b512b3127b2ad733460d30bf8def2b5553bc648 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 14:28:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Remove or backport OpenSSL features
Signed-off-by: rpm-build <rpm-build>
---
src/node_constants.cc | 12 +-
src/node_crypto.cc | 268 ++++++++++++++++--
src/node_crypto.h | 22 ++
test/parallel/test-crypto-authenticated.js | 4 +-
test/parallel/test-crypto-keygen.js | 8 +-
test/parallel/test-crypto-pbkdf2.js | 18 --
.../test-tls-client-getephemeralkeyinfo.js | 1 -
test/parallel/test-tls-passphrase.js | 2 +-
8 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/node_constants.cc b/src/node_constants.cc
index 9cd50fe..65f3159 100644
--- a/src/node_constants.cc
+++ b/src/node_constants.cc
@@ -951,8 +951,12 @@ void DefineOpenSSLConstants(Local<Object> target) {
NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, ENGINE_METHOD_RAND);
# endif
-# ifdef ENGINE_METHOD_EC
- NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, ENGINE_METHOD_EC);
+# ifdef ENGINE_METHOD_ECDH
+ NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, ENGINE_METHOD_ECDH);
+# endif
+
+# ifdef ENGINE_METHOD_ECDSA
+ NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, ENGINE_METHOD_ECDSA);
# endif
# ifdef ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS
@@ -963,6 +967,10 @@ void DefineOpenSSLConstants(Local<Object> target) {
NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS);
# endif
+# ifdef ENGINE_METHOD_STORE
+ NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, ENGINE_METHOD_STORE);
+# endif
+
# ifdef ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS
NODE_DEFINE_CONSTANT(target, ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS);
# endif
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.cc b/src/node_crypto.cc
index 1d9214f..17c6d77 100644
--- a/src/node_crypto.cc
+++ b/src/node_crypto.cc
@@ -109,6 +109,137 @@ struct OpenSSLBufferDeleter {
};
using OpenSSLBuffer = std::unique_ptr<char[], OpenSSLBufferDeleter>;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+static void RSA_get0_key(const RSA* r, const BIGNUM** n, const BIGNUM** e,
+ const BIGNUM** d) {
+ if (n != nullptr) {
+ *n = r->n;
+ }
+ if (e != nullptr) {
+ *e = r->e;
+ }
+ if (d != nullptr) {
+ *d = r->d;
+ }
+}
+
+static void DH_get0_pqg(const DH* dh, const BIGNUM** p, const BIGNUM** q,
+ const BIGNUM** g) {
+ if (p != nullptr) {
+ *p = dh->p;
+ }
+ if (q != nullptr) {
+ *q = dh->q;
+ }
+ if (g != nullptr) {
+ *g = dh->g;
+ }
+}
+
+static int DH_set0_pqg(DH* dh, BIGNUM* p, BIGNUM* q, BIGNUM* g) {
+ if ((dh->p == nullptr && p == nullptr) ||
+ (dh->g == nullptr && g == nullptr)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (p != nullptr) {
+ BN_free(dh->p);
+ dh->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != nullptr) {
+ BN_free(dh->q);
+ dh->q = q;
+ }
+ if (g != nullptr) {
+ BN_free(dh->g);
+ dh->g = g;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void DH_get0_key(const DH* dh, const BIGNUM** pub_key,
+ const BIGNUM** priv_key) {
+ if (pub_key != nullptr) {
+ *pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+ }
+ if (priv_key != nullptr) {
+ *priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+ }
+}
+
+static int DH_set0_key(DH* dh, BIGNUM* pub_key, BIGNUM* priv_key) {
+ if (pub_key != nullptr) {
+ BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+ dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+ }
+ if (priv_key != nullptr) {
+ BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+ dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const SSL_METHOD* TLS_method() { return SSLv23_method(); }
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION* s,
+ const unsigned char** tick, size_t* len) {
+ *len = s->tlsext_ticklen;
+ if (tick != nullptr) {
+ *tick = s->tlsext_tick;
+ }
+}
+
+#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(ssl) (ssl->tlsext_status_type)
+
+static int X509_STORE_up_ref(X509_STORE* store) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int X509_up_ref(X509* cert) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX* HMAC_CTX_new() {
+ HMAC_CTX* ctx = Malloc<HMAC_CTX>(1);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+// Disable all TLS version lower than the version argument
+int SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, int version) {
+ switch (version) {
+ [[gnu::fallthrough]] case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1);
+ [[gnu::fallthrough]] case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1);
+ [[gnu::fallthrough]] case TLS1_VERSION:
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0; // unsupported
+ }
+}
+// Disable all TLS version higher than the version argument
+int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, int version) {
+ switch (version) {
+ [[gnu::fallthrough]] case TLS1_VERSION:
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1);
+ [[gnu::fallthrough]] case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2);
+ [[gnu::fallthrough]] case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0; // unsupported
+ }
+}
+
+#endif // OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+
static const char* const root_certs[] = {
#include "node_root_certs.h" // NOLINT(build/include_order)
};
@@ -125,11 +256,19 @@ template void SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::AddMethods(Environment* env,
template void SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::ConfigureSecureContext(SecureContext* sc);
template void SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::SetSNIContext(SecureContext* sc);
template int SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::SetCACerts(SecureContext* sc);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+template SSL_SESSION* SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::GetSessionCallback(
+ SSL* s,
+ unsigned char* key,
+ int len,
+ int* copy);
+#else
template SSL_SESSION* SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::GetSessionCallback(
SSL* s,
const unsigned char* key,
int len,
int* copy);
+#endif
template int SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::NewSessionCallback(SSL* s,
SSL_SESSION* sess);
template void SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::OnClientHello(
@@ -148,6 +287,34 @@ template int SSLWrap<TLSWrap>::SelectALPNCallback(
void* arg);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+static Mutex* mutexes;
+
+static void crypto_threadid_cb(CRYPTO_THREADID* tid) {
+ static_assert(sizeof(uv_thread_t) <= sizeof(void*),
+ "uv_thread_t does not fit in a pointer");
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(tid, reinterpret_cast<void*>(uv_thread_self()));
+}
+
+
+static void crypto_lock_init(void) {
+ mutexes = new Mutex[CRYPTO_num_locks()];
+}
+
+
+static void crypto_lock_cb(int mode, int n, const char* file, int line) {
+ CHECK(!(mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) ^ !(mode & CRYPTO_UNLOCK));
+ CHECK(!(mode & CRYPTO_READ) ^ !(mode & CRYPTO_WRITE));
+
+ auto mutex = &mutexes[n];
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
+ mutex->Lock();
+ else
+ mutex->Unlock();
+}
+#endif
+
+
static int PasswordCallback(char* buf, int size, int rwflag, void* u) {
if (u) {
size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
@@ -401,7 +568,7 @@ void SecureContext::Init(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
int min_version = args[1].As<Int32>()->Value();
int max_version = args[2].As<Int32>()->Value();
- const SSL_METHOD* method = TLS_method();
+ const SSL_METHOD* method = SSLv23_method();
if (args[0]->IsString()) {
const node::Utf8Value sslmethod(env->isolate(), args[0]);
@@ -425,9 +592,9 @@ void SecureContext::Init(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "SSLv23_method") == 0) {
// noop
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "SSLv23_server_method") == 0) {
- method = TLS_server_method();
+ method = SSLv23_server_method();
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "SSLv23_client_method") == 0) {
- method = TLS_client_method();
+ method = SSLv23_client_method();
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLS_method") == 0) {
min_version = 0;
max_version = 0;
@@ -437,33 +604,33 @@ void SecureContext::Init(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_server_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
- method = TLS_server_method();
+ method = SSLv23_server_method();
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_client_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
- method = TLS_client_method();
+ method = SSLv23_client_method();
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_1_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_1_server_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- method = TLS_server_method();
+ method = SSLv23_server_method();
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_1_client_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- method = TLS_client_method();
+ method = SSLv23_client_method();
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_2_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_2_server_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- method = TLS_server_method();
+ method = SSLv23_server_method();
} else if (strcmp(*sslmethod, "TLSv1_2_client_method") == 0) {
min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- method = TLS_client_method();
+ method = SSLv23_client_method();
} else {
return env->ThrowError("Unknown method");
}
@@ -498,6 +665,7 @@ void SecureContext::Init(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
}
SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(sc->ctx_.get(), max_version);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
// OpenSSL 1.1.0 changed the ticket key size, but the OpenSSL 1.0.x size was
// exposed in the public API. To retain compatibility, install a callback
// which restores the old algorithm.
@@ -507,6 +675,7 @@ void SecureContext::Init(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
return env->ThrowError("Error generating ticket keys");
}
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(sc->ctx_.get(), TicketCompatibilityCallback);
+#endif
}
@@ -937,6 +1106,11 @@ void SecureContext::SetECDHCurve(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
node::Utf8Value curve(env->isolate(), args[0]);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(sc->ctx_.get(), SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+ SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(sc->ctx_.get(), 1);
+#endif
+
if (strcmp(*curve, "auto") == 0)
return;
@@ -1191,9 +1365,17 @@ void SecureContext::GetTicketKeys(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&wrap, args.Holder());
Local<Object> buff = Buffer::New(wrap->env(), 48).ToLocalChecked();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
memcpy(Buffer::Data(buff), wrap->ticket_key_name_, 16);
memcpy(Buffer::Data(buff) + 16, wrap->ticket_key_hmac_, 16);
memcpy(Buffer::Data(buff) + 32, wrap->ticket_key_aes_, 16);
+#else
+ if (SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(wrap->ctx_.get(),
+ Buffer::Data(buff),
+ Buffer::Length(buff)) != 1) {
+ return wrap->env()->ThrowError("Failed to fetch tls ticket keys");
+ }
+#endif
args.GetReturnValue().Set(buff);
#endif // !def(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && def(SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys)
@@ -1217,9 +1399,17 @@ void SecureContext::SetTicketKeys(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
env, "Ticket keys length must be 48 bytes");
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
memcpy(wrap->ticket_key_name_, Buffer::Data(args[0]), 16);
memcpy(wrap->ticket_key_hmac_, Buffer::Data(args[0]) + 16, 16);
memcpy(wrap->ticket_key_aes_, Buffer::Data(args[0]) + 32, 16);
+#else
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(wrap->ctx_.get(),
+ Buffer::Data(args[0]),
+ Buffer::Length(args[0])) != 1) {
+ return env->ThrowError("Failed to fetch tls ticket keys");
+ }
+#endif
args.GetReturnValue().Set(true);
#endif // !def(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && def(SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys)
@@ -1227,6 +1417,14 @@ void SecureContext::SetTicketKeys(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
void SecureContext::SetFreeListLength(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ // |freelist_max_len| was removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0. In that version OpenSSL
+ // mallocs and frees buffers directly, without the use of a freelist.
+ SecureContext* wrap;
+ ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&wrap, args.Holder());
+
+ wrap->ctx_->freelist_max_len = args[0]->Int32Value();
+#endif
}
@@ -1323,6 +1521,7 @@ int SecureContext::TicketKeyCallback(SSL* ssl,
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
int SecureContext::TicketCompatibilityCallback(SSL* ssl,
unsigned char* name,
unsigned char* iv,
@@ -1357,6 +1556,7 @@ int SecureContext::TicketCompatibilityCallback(SSL* ssl,
}
return 1;
}
+#endif
void SecureContext::CtxGetter(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& info) {
@@ -1433,11 +1633,19 @@ void SSLWrap<Base>::ConfigureSecureContext(SecureContext* sc) {
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+template <class Base>
+SSL_SESSION* SSLWrap<Base>::GetSessionCallback(SSL* s,
+ unsigned char* key,
+ int len,
+ int* copy) {
+#else
template <class Base>
SSL_SESSION* SSLWrap<Base>::GetSessionCallback(SSL* s,
const unsigned char* key,
int len,
int* copy) {
+#endif
Base* w = static_cast<Base*>(SSL_get_app_data(s));
*copy = 0;
@@ -2094,6 +2302,7 @@ void SSLWrap<Base>::GetEphemeralKeyInfo(
Integer::New(env->isolate(), EVP_PKEY_bits(key))).FromJust();
break;
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
// TODO(shigeki) Change this to EVP_PKEY_X25519 and add EVP_PKEY_X448
// after upgrading to 1.1.1.
case NID_X25519:
@@ -2114,9 +2323,24 @@ void SSLWrap<Base>::GetEphemeralKeyInfo(
curve_name)).FromJust();
info->Set(context, env->size_string(),
Integer::New(env->isolate(),
- EVP_PKEY_bits(key))).FromJust();
+ EVP_PKEY_bits(key))).FromJust();
}
break;
+#else
+ {
+ EC_KEY* ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key);
+ int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ EC_KEY_free(ec);
+ info->Set(context, env->type_string(),
+ FIXED_ONE_BYTE_STRING(env->isolate(), "ECDH")).FromJust();
+ info->Set(context, env->name_string(),
+ OneByteString(args.GetIsolate(),
+ OBJ_nid2sn(nid))).FromJust();
+ info->Set(context, env->size_string(),
+ Integer::New(env->isolate(),
+ EVP_PKEY_bits(key))).FromJust();
+ }
+#endif
}
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
@@ -2776,10 +3000,10 @@ bool CipherBase::InitAuthenticated(const char* cipher_type, int iv_len,
CHECK(IsAuthenticatedMode());
MarkPopErrorOnReturn mark_pop_error_on_return;
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(),
- EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
- iv_len,
- nullptr)) {
+ // TODO(tniessen) Use EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN when migrating to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+ static_assert(EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN == EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN,
+ "OpenSSL constants differ between GCM and CCM");
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv_len, nullptr)) {
env()->ThrowError("Invalid IV length");
return false;
}
@@ -2910,6 +3134,7 @@ void CipherBase::SetAuthTag(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
"Valid GCM tag lengths are 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.", tag_len);
ProcessEmitDeprecationWarning(cipher->env(), msg, "DEP0090");
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
} else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE) {
// At this point, the tag length is already known and must match the
// length of the given authentication tag.
@@ -2921,6 +3146,7 @@ void CipherBase::SetAuthTag(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
"Invalid authentication tag length: %u", tag_len);
return cipher->env()->ThrowError(msg);
}
+#endif // OPENSSL_NO_OCB
}
// Note: we don't use std::min() here to work around a header conflict.
@@ -3140,8 +3366,10 @@ bool CipherBase::Final(unsigned char** out, int* out_len) {
CHECK(mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE);
auth_tag_len_ = sizeof(auth_tag_);
}
- CHECK_EQ(1, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(), EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
- auth_tag_len_,
+ // TOOD(tniessen) Use EVP_CTRL_AEAP_GET_TAG in OpenSSL 1.1.0
+ static_assert(EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG == EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
+ "OpenSSL constants differ between GCM and CCM");
+ CHECK_EQ(1, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx_.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, auth_tag_len_,
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(auth_tag_)));
}
}
@@ -3417,12 +3645,14 @@ void Hash::HashDigest(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
SignBase::Error SignBase::Init(const char* sign_type) {
CHECK_NULL(mdctx_);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
// Historically, "dss1" and "DSS1" were DSA aliases for SHA-1
// exposed through the public API.
if (strcmp(sign_type, "dss1") == 0 ||
strcmp(sign_type, "DSS1") == 0) {
sign_type = "SHA1";
}
+#endif
const EVP_MD* md = EVP_get_digestbyname(sign_type);
if (md == nullptr)
return kSignUnknownDigest;
@@ -5587,6 +5817,12 @@ void InitCryptoOnce() {
SSL_library_init();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ crypto_lock_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(crypto_lock_cb);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(crypto_threadid_cb);
+#endif
+
#ifdef NODE_FIPS_MODE
/* Override FIPS settings in cnf file, if needed. */
unsigned long err = 0; // NOLINT(runtime/int)
diff --git a/src/node_crypto.h b/src/node_crypto.h
index b64a8c2..2e6042f 100644
--- a/src/node_crypto.h
+++ b/src/node_crypto.h
@@ -44,8 +44,10 @@
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
// TODO(shigeki) Remove this after upgrading to 1.1.1
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -53,6 +55,26 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+// OpenSSL backport shims
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
+#define EVP_MD_CTX_free EVP_MD_CTX_destroy
+#define EVP_MD_CTX_new EVP_MD_CTX_create
+
+#define OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE 0x0
+
+inline void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); }
+inline void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX* ctx) { if (ctx == nullptr) { return; } HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx); free(ctx); }
+inline void OPENSSL_clear_free(void* ptr, size_t len) { OPENSSL_cleanse(ptr, len); OPENSSL_free(ptr); }
+
+inline int BN_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM* a, unsigned char *to, int tolen) {
+ if (tolen < 0) { return -1; }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(to, tolen);
+ return BN_bn2bin(a, to);
+}
+#endif // OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
namespace node {
namespace crypto {
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-crypto-authenticated.js b/test/parallel/test-crypto-authenticated.js
index dc19a7b..5e94d41 100644
--- a/test/parallel/test-crypto-authenticated.js
+++ b/test/parallel/test-crypto-authenticated.js
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ for (const test of TEST_CASES) {
// Test that create(De|C)ipher(iv)? throws if the mode is CCM or OCB and no
// authentication tag has been specified.
{
- for (const mode of ['ccm', 'ocb']) {
+ for (const mode of ['ccm']) {
assert.throws(() => {
crypto.createCipheriv(`aes-256-${mode}`,
'FxLKsqdmv0E9xrQhp0b1ZgI0K7JFZJM8',
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ for (const test of TEST_CASES) {
const key = Buffer.from('0123456789abcdef', 'utf8');
const iv = Buffer.from('0123456789ab', 'utf8');
- for (const mode of ['gcm', 'ocb']) {
+ for (const mode of ['gcm']) {
for (const authTagLength of mode === 'gcm' ? [undefined, 8] : [8]) {
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(`aes-128-${mode}`, key, iv, {
authTagLength
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-crypto-keygen.js b/test/parallel/test-crypto-keygen.js
index 0ffaa1c..7c567f3 100644
--- a/test/parallel/test-crypto-keygen.js
+++ b/test/parallel/test-crypto-keygen.js
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ function convertDERToPEM(label, der) {
// Since the private key is encrypted, signing shouldn't work anymore.
assert.throws(() => {
testSignVerify(publicKey, privateKey);
- }, /bad decrypt|asn1 encoding routines/);
+ }, /bad decrypt|bad password read|asn1 encoding routines/);
const key = { key: privateKey, passphrase: 'secret' };
testEncryptDecrypt(publicKey, key);
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ function convertDERToPEM(label, der) {
// Since the private key is encrypted, signing shouldn't work anymore.
assert.throws(() => {
testSignVerify(publicKey, privateKey);
- }, /bad decrypt|asn1 encoding routines/);
+ }, /bad decrypt|bad password read|asn1 encoding routines/);
// Signing should work with the correct password.
testSignVerify(publicKey, {
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ function convertDERToPEM(label, der) {
// Since the private key is encrypted, signing shouldn't work anymore.
assert.throws(() => {
testSignVerify(publicKey, privateKey);
- }, /bad decrypt|asn1 encoding routines/);
+ }, /bad decrypt|bad password read|asn1 encoding routines/);
testSignVerify(publicKey, { key: privateKey, passphrase: 'secret' });
}));
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ function convertDERToPEM(label, der) {
// Since the private key is encrypted, signing shouldn't work anymore.
assert.throws(() => {
testSignVerify(publicKey, privateKey);
- }, /bad decrypt|asn1 encoding routines/);
+ }, /bad decrypt|bad password read|asn1 encoding routines/);
testSignVerify(publicKey, {
key: privateKey,
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-crypto-pbkdf2.js b/test/parallel/test-crypto-pbkdf2.js
index 0f5d461..8701d10 100644
--- a/test/parallel/test-crypto-pbkdf2.js
+++ b/test/parallel/test-crypto-pbkdf2.js
@@ -216,21 +216,3 @@ crypto.pbkdf2Sync(new Float32Array(10), 'salt', 8, 8, 'sha256');
crypto.pbkdf2Sync('pass', new Float32Array(10), 8, 8, 'sha256');
crypto.pbkdf2Sync(new Float64Array(10), 'salt', 8, 8, 'sha256');
crypto.pbkdf2Sync('pass', new Float64Array(10), 8, 8, 'sha256');
-
-assert.throws(
- () => crypto.pbkdf2('pass', 'salt', 8, 8, 'md55', common.mustNotCall()),
- {
- code: 'ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_DIGEST',
- name: 'TypeError [ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_DIGEST]',
- message: 'Invalid digest: md55'
- }
-);
-
-assert.throws(
- () => crypto.pbkdf2Sync('pass', 'salt', 8, 8, 'md55'),
- {
- code: 'ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_DIGEST',
- name: 'TypeError [ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_DIGEST]',
- message: 'Invalid digest: md55'
- }
-);
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-tls-client-getephemeralkeyinfo.js b/test/parallel/test-tls-client-getephemeralkeyinfo.js
index a5db18a..277d36c 100644
--- a/test/parallel/test-tls-client-getephemeralkeyinfo.js
+++ b/test/parallel/test-tls-client-getephemeralkeyinfo.js
@@ -55,4 +55,3 @@ test(1024, 'DH', undefined, 'DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256');
test(2048, 'DH', undefined, 'DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256');
test(256, 'ECDH', 'prime256v1', 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256');
test(521, 'ECDH', 'secp521r1', 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256');
-test(253, 'ECDH', 'X25519', 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256');
diff --git a/test/parallel/test-tls-passphrase.js b/test/parallel/test-tls-passphrase.js
index 6ed19c7..b183309 100644
--- a/test/parallel/test-tls-passphrase.js
+++ b/test/parallel/test-tls-passphrase.js
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ server.listen(0, common.mustCall(function() {
}, common.mustCall());
})).unref();
-const errMessagePassword = /bad decrypt/;
+const errMessagePassword = /bad password read/;
// Missing passphrase
assert.throws(function() {
--
2.21.0