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From 897d1f7fd515b828e4b198d8b8bef76c6faf03ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Lightsey <jd@cpanel.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 20:02:45 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] regcomp.c: Prevent integer overflow from nested regex
 quantifiers.
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(CVE-2020-10543) On 32bit systems the size calculations for nested regular
expression quantifiers could overflow causing heap memory corruption.

Fixes: Perl/perl5-security#125
(cherry picked from commit bfd31397db5dc1a5c5d3e0a1f753a4f89a736e71)
Signed-off-by: Petr Písař <ppisar@redhat.com>
---
 regcomp.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/regcomp.c b/regcomp.c
index 93c8d98fbb..5f86be8086 100644
--- a/regcomp.c
+++ b/regcomp.c
@@ -5489,6 +5489,12 @@ S_study_chunk(pTHX_ RExC_state_t *pRExC_state, regnode **scanp,
 				  RExC_precomp)));
                 }
 
+                if ( ( minnext > 0 && mincount >= SSize_t_MAX / minnext )
+                    || min >= SSize_t_MAX - minnext * mincount )
+                {
+                    FAIL("Regexp out of space");
+                }
+
 		min += minnext * mincount;
 		is_inf_internal |= deltanext == SSize_t_MAX
                          || (maxcount == REG_INFTY && minnext + deltanext > 0);
-- 
2.25.4