--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm
+++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pm
@@ -124,10 +124,10 @@ my %DEFAULT_SSL_ARGS = (
SSL_npn_protocols => undef, # meaning depends whether on server or client side
SSL_alpn_protocols => undef, # list of protocols we'll accept/send, for example ['http/1.1','spdy/3.1']
- # https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS, 2016/04/20
- # "Old backward compatibility" for best compatibility
- # .. "Most ciphers that are not clearly broken and dangerous to use are supported"
- SSL_cipher_list => 'ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES:DES-CBC3-SHA:HIGH:SEED:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!MD5:!PSK:!RSAPSK:!aDH:!aECDH:!EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:!KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:!SRP',
+ # Use system-wide default cipher list to support use of system-wide
+ # crypto policy (#1076390, #1127577, CPAN RT#97816)
+ # https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy
+ SSL_cipher_list => 'DEFAULT',
);
my %DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT_ARGS = (
@@ -137,63 +137,6 @@ my %DEFAULT_SSL_CLIENT_ARGS = (
SSL_ca_file => undef,
SSL_ca_path => undef,
- # older versions of F5 BIG-IP hang when getting SSL client hello >255 bytes
- # http://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/13000/000/sol13037.html
- # http://guest:guest@rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2771
- # Ubuntu worked around this by disabling TLSv1_2 on the client side for
- # a while. Later a padding extension was added to OpenSSL to work around
- # broken F5 but then IronPort croaked because it did not understand this
- # extension so it was disabled again :(
- # Firefox, Chrome and IE11 use TLSv1_2 but use only a few ciphers, so
- # that packet stays small enough. We try the same here.
-
- SSL_cipher_list => join(" ",
-
- # SSLabs report for Chrome 48/OSX.
- # This also includes the fewer ciphers Firefox uses.
- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
- 'DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305',
- 'ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305',
- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA',
- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA',
- 'DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA',
- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA',
- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA',
- 'DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA',
- 'AES128-GCM-SHA256',
- 'AES256-SHA',
- 'AES128-SHA',
- 'DES-CBC3-SHA',
-
- # IE11/Edge has some more ciphers, notably SHA384 and DSS
- # we don't offer the *-AES128-SHA256 and *-AES256-SHA384 non-GCM
- # ciphers IE/Edge offers because they look like a large mismatch
- # between a very strong HMAC and a comparably weak (but sufficient)
- # encryption. Similar all browsers which do SHA384 can do ECDHE
- # so skip the DHE*SHA384 ciphers.
- 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
- 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
- # 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384',
- # 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384',
- # 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256',
- # 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256',
- # 'DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
- # 'AES256-GCM-SHA384',
- 'AES256-SHA256',
- # 'AES128-SHA256',
- 'DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256',
- # 'DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256',
- 'DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA',
- 'DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA',
- 'EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA',
-
- # Just to make sure, that we don't accidentally add bad ciphers above.
- # This includes dropping RC4 which is no longer supported by modern
- # browsers and also excluded in the SSL libraries of Python and Ruby.
- "!EXP !MEDIUM !LOW !eNULL !aNULL !RC4 !DES !MD5 !PSK !SRP"
- )
);
# set values inside _init to work with perlcc, RT#95452
--- lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod
+++ lib/IO/Socket/SSL.pod
@@ -1019,12 +1019,8 @@ documentation (L<http://www.openssl.org/
for more details.
Unless you fail to contact your peer because of no shared ciphers it is
-recommended to leave this option at the default setting. The default setting
-prefers ciphers with forward secrecy, disables anonymous authentication and
-disables known insecure ciphers like MD5, DES etc. This gives a grade A result
-at the tests of SSL Labs.
-To use the less secure OpenSSL builtin default (whatever this is) set
-SSL_cipher_list to ''.
+recommended to leave this option at the default setting, which honors the
+system-wide DEFAULT cipher list.
In case different cipher lists are needed for different SNI hosts a hash can be
given with the host as key and the cipher suite as value, similar to