diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ kexgssc.o \
sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
sshbuf-io.o
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
return 1;
break;
case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
@@ -724,99 +725,6 @@ fakepw(void)
return (&fake);
}
-/*
- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
- * called.
- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
- */
-
-static char *
-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /*
- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
- name, ntop);
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
- lowercase(name);
-
- /*
- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
- * the domain).
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
- break;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
- if (ai == NULL) {
- /* Address not found for the host name. */
- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- return xstrdup(name);
-}
-
/*
* Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
* connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+/*
+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ int r, authenticated = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ u_char *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ mic.value = p;
+ mic.length = len;
+
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
+
+ if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
+ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+
+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->pw, 1));
+
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(mic.value);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
/*
* We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
* how to check local user kuserok and the like)
@@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->pw, 1));
if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
(displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
@@ -306,7 +349,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->pw, 0));
else
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
@@ -326,6 +370,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
return 0;
}
+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+ "gssapi-keyex",
+ userauth_gsskeyex,
+ &options.gss_authentication
+};
+
Authmethod method_gssapi = {
"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
#ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
#endif
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
&method_none,
&method_pubkey,
#ifdef GSSAPI
+ &method_gsskeyex,
&method_gssapi,
#endif
&method_passwd,
diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+ * called.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+ */
+
+char *
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+ name, ntop);
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+ lowercase(name);
+
+ /*
+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+ * the domain).
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+ if (ai == NULL) {
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+ return xstrdup(name);
+}
+
void
ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
{
diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
--- a/canohost.h
+++ b/canohost.h
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
#ifndef _CANOHOST_H
#define _CANOHOST_H
+struct ssh;
+
+char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
int get_peer_port(int);
char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
/* import options */
extern Options options;
@@ -1379,9 +1383,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
break;
/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
+ need_rekeying = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
/* Buffer input from the connection. */
client_process_net_input(ssh, readset);
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -674,6 +674,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
+ [cc_context_t c;
+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
+ fi],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
+ )
m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
--- a/gss-genr.c
+++ b/gss-genr.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "packet.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
+typedef struct {
+ char *encoded;
+ gss_OID oid;
+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
+
+/*
+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
+ */
+
+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
+
+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
+}
+
/* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
int
ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
return 0;
}
+/* sshpkt_get of gss_buffer_desc */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_char *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ g->value = p;
+ g->length = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
+ *
+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
+ */
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client,
+ const char *kex) {
+ gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
+ OM_uint32 min_status;
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+ host, client, kex);
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+ const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) {
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ int oidpos, enclen;
+ char *mechs, *encoded;
+ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ char deroid[2];
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md = NULL;
+ char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
+ free(gss_enc2oid);
+ }
+
+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ oidpos = 0;
+ s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+
+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
+
+ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+ (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_digest_update(md,
+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+ gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
+ ssh_digest_free(md);
+ md = NULL;
+
+ encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)
+ * 2);
+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+
+ cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 error");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put error");
+ }
+
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+ oidpos++;
+ }
+ }
+ free(s);
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+
+ if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+
+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
+ free(mechs);
+ mechs = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (mechs);
+}
+
+gss_OID
+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
+ int i = 0;
+
+#define SKIP_KEX_NAME(type) \
+ case type: \
+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(type##_ID)) \
+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; \
+ name += sizeof(type##_ID) - 1; \
+ break;
+
+ switch (kex_type) {
+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1)
+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1)
+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256)
+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512)
+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1)
+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256)
+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256)
+ default:
+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ }
+
+#undef SKIP_KEX_NAME
+
+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
+ i++;
+
+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
+
+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
+}
+
/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
int
ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
@@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
}
ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
@@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
return (ctx->major);
}
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ gss_name_t gssname;
+ OM_uint32 status;
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
+
+ if (!ctx->major)
+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
+
+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+
+ if (ctx->major)
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ return(ctx->major);
+}
+
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
@@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
return (ctx->major);
}
+/* Priviledged when used by server */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
void
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
}
int
-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
+ const char *client)
{
gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ ctx = &intctx;
/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
@@ -287,6 +519,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
+
if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
NULL);
@@ -296,10 +532,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
}
+int
+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ static gss_name_t name;
+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
+ int equal;
+
+ now = time(NULL);
+
+ if (ctxt) {
+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
+
+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
+
+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
+ saved_lifetime+= now;
+ } else {
+ /* Handle the error */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (now - last_call < 10)
+ return 0;
+
+ last_call = now;
+
+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+ return 0;
+
+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
+ return 0;
+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return 0;
+
+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
krb5_error_code problem;
krb5_principal princ;
OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- int len;
+ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
const char *errmsg;
if (client->creds == NULL) {
@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
return;
}
- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+
client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+ client->store.filename = NULL;
+#else
+ if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
+ new_ccname++;
+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
+ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
+ char *p;
+ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
+ if (p)
+ *p = '\0';
+ }
+ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ client->store.data = krb_context;
+
return;
}
+int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
+ &principal))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+
+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+
+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
+ ccache))) {
+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
"Kerberos",
@@ -203,7 +285,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
NULL,
&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
};
#endif /* KRB5 */
diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -44,17 +44,19 @@
#include "session.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
#ifdef KRB5
extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
@@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
}
+/* Unprivileged */
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
+ if (supported_oids == NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
+ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL,
+ options.gss_kex_algorithms));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
+ const char *dummy) {
+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
+ int res;
+
+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+
+ return (res);
+}
+
/* Unprivileged */
void
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
gss_OID_set supported;
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
+ return;
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
@@ -276,8 +303,48 @@ OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
{
int i = 0;
+ int equal = 0;
+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
- gss_buffer_desc ename;
+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
+ new_name, &equal);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if (!equal) {
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+
+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+ client->name = new_name;
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ client->updated = 1;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
client->mech = NULL;
@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
if (client->mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
&client->displayname, NULL))) {
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
return (ctx->major);
}
+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+
/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
void
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
{
- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
- gssapi_client.store.filename);
- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+
+ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
+ debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
+ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
+ debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
+ } else {
+ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
+ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
+ }
}
}
@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
/* Privileged */
int
-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
{
OM_uint32 lmin;
+ (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
+
if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
debug("No suitable client data");
return 0;
}
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
return 1;
- else {
+ } else {
/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
@@ -382,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
return (0);
}
-/* Privileged */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
+ *
+ * In the child, we want to :
+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
+ */
+
+/* Stuff for PAM */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+#endif
- return (ctx->major);
+void
+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ int ok;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ int ret;
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+ char *envstr;
+#endif
+
+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return;
+
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
+
+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
+ */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
+ &pamconv, &pamh);
+ if (ret)
+ return;
+
+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
+
+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
+ if (!ret)
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
+ return 0;
+
+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
+ else
+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return ok;
}
/* Privileged */
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -57,11 +57,16 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
/* prototype */
static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -115,15 +120,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
};
+static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+ { KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ { KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+#endif
+ { NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+};
-char *
-kex_alg_list(char sep)
+static char *
+kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct kexalg *k;
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
@@ -138,6 +156,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
return ret;
}
+char *
+kex_alg_list(char sep)
+{
+ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs);
+}
+
+char *
+kex_gss_alg_list(char sep)
+{
+ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs);
+}
+
static const struct kexalg *
kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
@@ -147,6 +177,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
return k;
}
+ for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
+ return k;
+ }
return NULL;
}
@@ -315,6 +349,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
return r;
}
+/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
+int
+kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names)
+{
+ char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0')
+ return 0;
+ s = cp = xstrdup(names);
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0
+ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ free(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names);
+ free(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
int
kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ free(kex->gss_host);
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
free(kex->failed_choice);
free(kex->hostkey_alg);
free(kex->name);
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
KEX_C25519_SHA256,
KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256,
+ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512,
+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
+ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256,
+#endif
KEX_MAX
};
@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex {
u_int flags;
int hash_alg;
int ec_nid;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ int gss_deleg_creds;
+ int gss_trust_dns;
+ char *gss_host;
+ char *gss_client;
+#endif
char *failed_choice;
int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex {
int kex_names_valid(const char *);
char *kex_alg_list(char);
+char *kex_gss_alg_list(char);
char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
+int kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
int kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+int kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *);
+int kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *);
+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
+#endif
int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
@@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
u_char *, size_t *);
+int kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
+ const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
+ const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub,
+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen);
+
void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
--- a/kexdh.c
+++ b/kexdh.c
@@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
{
switch (kex->kex_type) {
case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+#endif
kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
break;
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
+#endif
kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
break;
case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
+#endif
kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
break;
case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
--- a/kexgen.c
+++ b/kexgen.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
-static int
+int
kex_gen_hash(
int hash_alg,
const struct sshbuf *client_version,
diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f6e1405e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgssc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+int
+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+ recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+ gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
+ u_char *msg;
+ int type = 0;
+ int first = 1;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t hashlen;
+ u_char c;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
+
+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
+
+ if (kex->gss_client &&
+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
+
+ /* Step 1 */
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
+ r = kex_dh_keypair(kex);
+ break;
+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
+ r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex);
+ break;
+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
+ r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
+ }
+ if (r != 0) {
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+
+ do {
+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
+
+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
+ &ret_flags);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
+ }
+
+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
+
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
+
+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
+ */
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if (first) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0)
+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ first = 0;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+
+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
+ do {
+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+ if (server_host_key_blob)
+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
+ }
+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
+ if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
+ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &msg_tok)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* Is there a token included? */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if (c) {
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
+ ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
+ } else {
+ /* No token included */
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
+ debug("Received Error");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
+ default:
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+ type);
+ }
+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+ } else {
+ /* No data, and not complete */
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
+ }
+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ /*
+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
+ * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok
+ */
+
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
+
+ /* compute shared secret */
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
+ r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
+ if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80)
+ fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!");
+ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
+ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65)
+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match"
+ "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob));
+
+ if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04");
+
+ r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->my,
+ kex->peer,
+ (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
+ kex->client_pub,
+ server_blob,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+ else
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+
+out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
+ sshbuf_free(empty);
+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
+ kex->client_pub = NULL;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+ recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf,
+ msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
+ u_char *msg;
+ int type = 0;
+ int first = 1;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t hashlen;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
+ u_char c;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
+
+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
+
+ if (kex->gss_client &&
+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
+
+ debug("Doing group exchange");
+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
+
+ kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ kex->nbits = nbits;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0)
+ fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+ if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL)
+ fatal("dn_new_group() failed");
+ p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+
+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+
+ do {
+ /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */
+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
+
+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
+ &ret_flags);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
+ }
+
+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
+
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
+
+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
+ */
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if (first) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ first = 0;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+
+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
+ do {
+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+ if (server_host_key_blob)
+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
+ }
+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
+ if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
+ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &msg_tok)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* Is there a token included? */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if (c) {
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
+ ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
+ } else {
+ /* No token included */
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
+ debug("Received Error");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
+ default:
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+ type);
+ }
+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+ } else {
+ /* No data, and not complete */
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
+ }
+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ /*
+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
+ */
+
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
+
+ /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */
+ /* 8. C computes shared secret */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ buf = NULL;
+
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kexgex_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->my,
+ kex->peer,
+ (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
+ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
+ dh_p, dh_g,
+ pub_key,
+ dh_server_pub,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+ else
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(empty);
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..60bc02de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgsss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+int
+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+ /*
+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+ */
+
+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
+ int type = 0;
+ gss_OID oid;
+ char *mechs;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t hashlen;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+ * into life
+ */
+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+ free(mechs);
+ }
+
+ debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+ debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+ do {
+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ switch(type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+ if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
+ r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+ &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
+ r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+ &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
+ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+ &shared_secret);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
+ }
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+
+ /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
+ * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
+ * buffer state->incoming_packet
+ */
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->peer,
+ kex->my,
+ empty,
+ client_pubkey,
+ server_pubkey,
+ shared_secret,
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
+ client_pubkey = NULL;
+
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ break;
+ default:
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+ type);
+ }
+
+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
+
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+ if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
+ fatal("No client public key");
+
+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ }
+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
+ }
+
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+ else
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+
+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+ * just exchanged. */
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
+out:
+ sshbuf_free(empty);
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
+ sshbuf_free(server_pubkey);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+ /*
+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+ */
+
+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+ int type = 0;
+ gss_OID oid;
+ char *mechs;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t hashlen;
+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
+ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
+ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
+ int r;
+
+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+ * into life
+ */
+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
+ free(mechs);
+
+ debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+ debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+ /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
+ debug("Doing group exchange");
+ ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+ /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ kex->nbits = nbits;
+ kex->min = cmin;
+ kex->max = cmax;
+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin);
+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax);
+ nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+ nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+ min, nbits, max);
+ kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+ if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
+ fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+ }
+
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ do {
+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ switch(type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ break;
+ default:
+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+ type);
+ }
+
+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
+
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+ fatal("No client public key");
+
+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ }
+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
+ }
+
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+
+ /* calculate shared secret */
+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+ if ((r = kexgex_hash(
+ kex->hash_alg,
+ kex->client_version,
+ kex->server_version,
+ kex->peer,
+ kex->my,
+ empty,
+ cmin, nbits, cmax,
+ dh_p, dh_g,
+ dh_client_pub,
+ pub_key,
+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+ fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ } else {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+ else
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */
+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+
+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+ * just exchanged. */
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
+out:
+ sshbuf_free(empty);
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ DH_free(kex->dh);
+ kex->dh = NULL;
+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
+# ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+ }
+# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
u_char *p;
int r;
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse");
@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
int r;
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
}
return (0);
}
@@ -1871,8 +1900,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
OM_uint32 ret;
int r;
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
@@ -1898,13 +1927,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
int
mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- int r, authenticated;
+ int r, authenticated, kex;
const char *displayname;
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
- auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+ if (kex) {
+ auth_method = "gssapi-keyex";
+ } else {
+ auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+ }
if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc data;
+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+ data.value = p;
+ data.length = len;
+ /* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */
+ if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64)
+ fatal_f("data length incorrect: %d", (int) data.length);
+
+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+ session_id2_len = data.length;
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+ }
+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+ free(data.value);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) {
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ int r, ok;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+ free(store.filename);
+ free(store.envvar);
+ free(store.envval);
+
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
};
struct ssh;
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -993,13 +993,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
}
int
-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
@@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+
+ return (major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+ int r, ok;
+
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+ store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+ store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+ store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+
+ return (ok);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index f3cac6b3..da8022dd 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
/* Format of the configuration file:
@@ -160,6 +161,8 @@ typedef enum {
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+ oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
@@ -204,10 +207,22 @@ static struct {
/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms },
# else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported },
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
@@ -1029,10 +1044,42 @@ parse_time:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
+ case oGssKeyEx:
+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oGssDelegateCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
goto parse_flag;
+ case oGssTrustDns:
+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oGssClientIdentity:
+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oGssServerIdentity:
+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oGssKexAlgorithms:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -1911,7 +1958,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
@@ -2059,8 +2112,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+#endif
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -2702,7 +2765,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssTrustDns, o->gss_trust_dns);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssRenewalRekey, o->gss_renewal_rekey);
+ dump_cfg_string(oGssClientIdentity, o->gss_client_identity);
+ dump_cfg_string(oGssServerIdentity, o->gss_server_identity);
+ dump_cfg_string(oGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms ?
+ o->gss_kex_algorithms : GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
#endif /* GSSAPI */
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index feedb3d2..a8a8870d 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -41,7 +41,13 @@ typedef struct {
int challenge_response_authentication;
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
+ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include "auth.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
@@ -133,8 +134,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
@@ -375,10 +379,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+#endif
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -531,6 +543,7 @@ typedef enum {
sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
@@ -607,12 +620,22 @@ static struct {
#ifdef GSSAPI
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1548,6 +1571,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sGssKeyEx:
+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sGssCleanupCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -1556,6 +1583,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sGssStoreRekey:
+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sGssKexAlgorithms:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -2777,6 +2820,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ typedef struct {
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ int gss_store_rekey;
+ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -2678,13 +2678,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
- authctxt->krb5_ctx)
+ authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+ restore_uid();
+ }
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
- if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+ if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
+ restore_uid();
+ }
#endif
/* remove agent socket */
diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@
#define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "gss-nistp256-sha256-"
+#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "gss-curve25519-sha256-"
+
+#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+
typedef struct {
char *filename;
char *envvar;
char *envval;
+ struct passwd *owner;
void *data;
} ssh_gssapi_ccache;
@@ -72,8 +92,11 @@ typedef struct {
gss_buffer_desc displayname;
gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
gss_cred_id_t creds;
+ gss_name_t name;
struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ int used;
+ int updated;
} ssh_gssapi_client;
typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
@@ -84,6 +107,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
} ssh_gssapi_mech;
typedef struct {
@@ -94,10 +118,11 @@ typedef struct {
gss_OID oid; /* client */
gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
gss_name_t client; /* server */
- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
} Gssctxt;
extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
struct sshbuf;
int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
+int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
@@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
/* In the server */
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+ const char *, const char *);
+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
+
+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -503,7 +503,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.It GatewayPorts
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIKeyExchange
+.It GSSAPIClientIdentity
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+.It GSSAPIServerIdentity
+.It GSSAPITrustDns
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
.It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag),
(supported message integrity codes),
.Ar kex
(key exchange algorithms),
+.Ar kex-gss
+(GSSAPI key exchange algorithms),
.Ar key
(key types),
.Ar key-cert
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex-gss") == 0)
+ cp = kex_gss_alg_list('\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
@@ -772,8 +774,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
cp = xstrdup(
"cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
- "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
- "protocol-version\nsig");
+ "kex-gss\nkey\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\n"
+ "key-sig\nmac\nprotocol-version\nsig");
}
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
# HostbasedAuthentication no
# GSSAPIAuthentication no
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
# BatchMode no
# CheckHostIP yes
# AddressFamily any
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -766,10 +766,68 @@ The default is
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is
.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
+identity will be used.
.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
The default is
.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this will delegate the renewed
+credentials to a session on the server.
+.Pp
+Checks are made to ensure that credentials are only propagated when the new
+credentials match the old ones on the originating client and where the
+receiving server still has the old set in its cache.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+For this to work
+.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
+hostname.
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
+Set to
+.Dq yes
+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+the name of the host being connected to. If
+.Dq no ,
+the hostname entered on the
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
+key exchange. Possible values are
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+gss-gex-sha1-,
+gss-group1-sha1-,
+gss-group14-sha1-,
+gss-group14-sha256-,
+gss-group16-sha512-,
+gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+gss-curve25519-sha256-
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Xr ssh 1
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
#endif
/* import */
-extern char *client_version_string;
-extern char *server_version_string;
extern Options options;
/*
@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
char *s, *all_key;
int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
+ char *gss_host = NULL;
+#endif
+
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
}
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+ * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+ free(gss_host);
+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ }
+ } else {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ }
+
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ if (gss) {
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "%s,null", orig);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
@@ -224,16 +256,46 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
-#endif
+# ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_client;
+ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_client;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+ ssh->kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+ ssh->kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+ ssh->kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+ }
+#endif
+
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
+ /* ext-info removal above */
+ if (gss) {
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+ free(gss);
+ }
+#endif
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *);
#endif
void userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
@@ -346,6 +409,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {"gssapi-keyex",
+ userauth_gsskeyex,
+ NULL,
+ &options.gss_keyex,
+ NULL},
{"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
@@ -716,12 +784,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
OM_uint32 min;
int r, ok = 0;
gss_OID mech = NULL;
+ char *gss_host = NULL;
+
+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+ * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+ free(gss_host);
+ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
+ }
+ } else {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
+ }
/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
* once. */
if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL)
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min,
+ &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs))) {
+ authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
+ free(gss_host);
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
@@ -730,13 +811,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
- mech, authctxt->host)) {
+ mech, gss_host, options.gss_client_identity)) {
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
} else {
authctxt->mech_tried++;
}
}
+ free(gss_host);
+
if (!ok || mech == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -976,6 +1059,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
free(lang);
return r;
}
+
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 ms;
+ int r;
+
+ static int attempt = 0;
+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
+
+ if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
+ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
+
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
static int
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
}
debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0)
- fatal_f("no hostkeys");
- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ debug3_f("no hostkeys");
+ else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
free(fp);
}
accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
- if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
}
@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
ssh, list_hostkey_types());
+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ {
+ char *orig;
+ char *gss = NULL;
+ char *newstr = NULL;
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
+ * the other key exchange algorithms
+ */
+
+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ orig = NULL;
+
+ if (options.gss_keyex)
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+ else
+ gss = NULL;
+
+ if (gss && orig)
+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+ else if (gss)
+ newstr = gss;
+ else if (orig)
+ newstr = orig;
+
+ /*
+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
+ * host key algorithm we support
+ */
+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
+
+ if (newstr)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+ else
+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
+ }
+#endif
+
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
-#endif
+# ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# GSSAPI options
#GSSAPIAuthentication no
#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
a client authenticates against.
@@ -660,6 +665,32 @@ machine's default store.
This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
The default is
.Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+For this to work
+.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
+.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
+key exchange. Possible values are
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+gss-gex-sha1-,
+gss-group1-sha1-,
+gss-group14-sha1-,
+gss-group14-sha256-,
+gss-group16-sha512-,
+gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+gss-curve25519-sha256-
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
};
@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->name == NULL)
+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
continue;
if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
continue;
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
KEY_ED25519_SK,
KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
+ KEY_NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC
};