From 1151cdcad3f4b68478b076832843338256b94644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2009 12:07:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix save and restore with non-privileged guests and SELinux
When running qemu:///system instance, libvirtd runs as root,
but QEMU may optionally be configured to run non-root. When
then saving a guest to a state file, the file is initially
created as root, and thus QEMU cannot write to it. It is also
missing labelling required to allow access via SELinux.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Set ownership on save image before
running migrate command in virDomainSave impl. Call out to
security driver to set save image labelling
* src/security/security_driver.h: Add driver APIs for setting
and restoring saved state file labelling
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Implement saved state file
labelling for SELinux
(cherry picked from commit bc0010b3d149df00406b82c37eb59874d8525af4)
Fedora-patch: libvirt-qemu-save-restore.patch
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
src/security/security_driver.h | 7 +++++++
src/security/security_selinux.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index c544c4b..171ac8f 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -3146,6 +3146,7 @@ static int qemudDomainSave(virDomainPtr dom,
char *xml = NULL;
struct qemud_save_header header;
int ret = -1;
+ int rc;
virDomainEventPtr event = NULL;
memset(&header, 0, sizeof(header));
@@ -3226,9 +3227,22 @@ static int qemudDomainSave(virDomainPtr dom,
}
fd = -1;
+ if (driver->privileged &&
+ chown(path, driver->user, driver->group) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(NULL, errno,
+ _("unable to set ownership of '%s' to user %d:%d"),
+ path, driver->user, driver->group);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (driver->securityDriver &&
+ driver->securityDriver->domainSetSavedStateLabel &&
+ driver->securityDriver->domainSetSavedStateLabel(dom->conn, vm, path) == -1)
+ goto cleanup;
+
if (header.compressed == QEMUD_SAVE_FORMAT_RAW) {
const char *args[] = { "cat", NULL };
- ret = qemuMonitorMigrateToCommand(vm, 0, args, path);
+ rc = qemuMonitorMigrateToCommand(vm, 0, args, path);
} else {
const char *prog = qemudSaveCompressionTypeToString(header.compressed);
const char *args[] = {
@@ -3236,12 +3250,27 @@ static int qemudDomainSave(virDomainPtr dom,
"-c",
NULL
};
- ret = qemuMonitorMigrateToCommand(vm, 0, args, path);
+ rc = qemuMonitorMigrateToCommand(vm, 0, args, path);
}
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (rc < 0)
goto cleanup;
+ if (driver->privileged &&
+ chown(path, 0, 0) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(NULL, errno,
+ _("unable to set ownership of '%s' to user %d:%d"),
+ path, 0, 0);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (driver->securityDriver &&
+ driver->securityDriver->domainRestoreSavedStateLabel &&
+ driver->securityDriver->domainRestoreSavedStateLabel(dom->conn, path) == -1)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
/* Shut it down */
qemudShutdownVMDaemon(dom->conn, driver, vm);
event = virDomainEventNewFromObj(vm,
diff --git a/src/security/security_driver.h b/src/security/security_driver.h
index fde2978..5514962 100644
--- a/src/security/security_driver.h
+++ b/src/security/security_driver.h
@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ typedef int (*virSecurityDomainRestoreHostdevLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
typedef int (*virSecurityDomainSetHostdevLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
virDomainHostdevDefPtr dev);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDomainSetSavedStateLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
+ const char *savefile);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDomainRestoreSavedStateLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
+ const char *savefile);
typedef int (*virSecurityDomainGenLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
virDomainObjPtr sec);
typedef int (*virSecurityDomainReserveLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
@@ -71,6 +76,8 @@ struct _virSecurityDriver {
virSecurityDomainRestoreLabel domainRestoreSecurityLabel;
virSecurityDomainRestoreHostdevLabel domainRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel;
virSecurityDomainSetHostdevLabel domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel;
+ virSecurityDomainSetSavedStateLabel domainSetSavedStateLabel;
+ virSecurityDomainRestoreSavedStateLabel domainRestoreSavedStateLabel;
/*
* This is internally managed driver state and should only be accessed
diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
index 7e0f71a..4f2d1d3 100644
--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
+++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ done:
return ret;
}
+
static int
SELinuxRestoreSecurityPCILabel(virConnectPtr conn,
pciDevice *dev ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
@@ -625,6 +626,26 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
return rc;
}
+
+static int
+SELinuxSetSavedStateLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
+ const char *savefile)
+{
+ const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+
+ return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, savefile, secdef->imagelabel);
+}
+
+
+static int
+SELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
+ const char *savefile)
+{
+ return SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(conn, savefile);
+}
+
+
static int
SELinuxSecurityVerify(virConnectPtr conn, virDomainDefPtr def)
{
@@ -694,4 +715,6 @@ virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver = {
.domainSetSecurityLabel = SELinuxSetSecurityLabel,
.domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel = SELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabel,
.domainRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel = SELinuxRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel,
+ .domainSetSavedStateLabel = SELinuxSetSavedStateLabel,
+ .domainRestoreSavedStateLabel = SELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel,
};
--
1.6.5.2