From baf93c9bdfcb761ab469efdb2a1ba4ae8485f165 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 19:02:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] upgrade: upgrade existing trust agreements to new layout
Existing trust agreements will lack required Kerberos principals and
POSIX attributes expected to allow Active Directory domain controllers
to query IPA master over LSA and NETLOGON RPC pipes.
Upgrade code is split into two parts:
- upgrade trusted domain object to have proper POSIX attributes
- generate required Kerberos principals for AD DC communication
Fixes: https://pagure.io/freeipa/issue/6077
(cherry picked from commit 090e09df130f27fb30a986529ef0944383e668e1)
Reviewed-By: Christian Heimes <cheimes@redhat.com>
---
ipaserver/install/plugins/adtrust.py | 371 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 329 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipaserver/install/plugins/adtrust.py b/ipaserver/install/plugins/adtrust.py
index 1f50bef891770c53a9086c7aa36d0ee1f088fbe6..1461e000dc855a21665eb5ea0cfe4a47df419344 100644
--- a/ipaserver/install/plugins/adtrust.py
+++ b/ipaserver/install/plugins/adtrust.py
@@ -1,30 +1,27 @@
-# Authors:
-# Martin Kosek <mkosek@redhat.com>
-#
-# Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat
-# see file 'COPYING' for use and warranty information
-#
-# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-# (at your option) any later version.
-#
-# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
-# GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+# Copyright (C) 2012-2019 FreeIPA Contributors see COPYING for license
+from __future__ import absolute_import
import logging
from ipalib import Registry, errors
from ipalib import Updater
from ipapython.dn import DN
+from ipapython import ipautil
+from ipaplatform.paths import paths
from ipaserver.install import sysupgrade
from ipaserver.install.adtrustinstance import (
ADTRUSTInstance, map_Guests_to_nobody)
+from ipaserver.dcerpc_common import TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL
+
+try:
+ from samba.ndr import ndr_unpack
+ from samba.dcerpc import lsa, drsblobs
+except ImportError:
+ # If samba.ndr is not available, this machine is not provisioned
+ # for serving a trust to Active Directory. As result, it does
+ # not matter what ndr_unpack does but we save on pylint checks
+ def ndr_unpack(x):
+ raise NotImplementedError
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -325,6 +322,28 @@ class update_sids(Updater):
return False, ()
+def get_gidNumber(ldap, env):
+ # Read the gidnumber of the fallback group and returns a list with it
+ dn = DN(('cn', ADTRUSTInstance.FALLBACK_GROUP_NAME),
+ env.container_group,
+ env.basedn)
+
+ try:
+ entry = ldap.get_entry(dn, ['gidnumber'])
+ gidNumber = entry.get('gidnumber')
+ except errors.NotFound:
+ logger.error("%s not found",
+ ADTRUSTInstance.FALLBACK_GROUP_NAME)
+ return None
+
+ if gidNumber is None:
+ logger.error("%s does not have a gidnumber",
+ ADTRUSTInstance.FALLBACK_GROUP_NAME)
+ return None
+
+ return gidNumber
+
+
@register()
class update_tdo_gidnumber(Updater):
"""
@@ -340,43 +359,55 @@ class update_tdo_gidnumber(Updater):
logger.debug('AD Trusts are not enabled on this server')
return False, []
- # Read the gidnumber of the fallback group
- dn = DN(('cn', ADTRUSTInstance.FALLBACK_GROUP_NAME),
- self.api.env.container_group,
- self.api.env.basedn)
-
- try:
- entry = ldap.get_entry(dn, ['gidnumber'])
- gidNumber = entry.get('gidnumber')
- except errors.NotFound:
- logger.error("%s not found",
- ADTRUSTInstance.FALLBACK_GROUP_NAME)
- return False, ()
-
+ gidNumber = get_gidNumber(ldap, self.api.env)
if not gidNumber:
logger.error("%s does not have a gidnumber",
ADTRUSTInstance.FALLBACK_GROUP_NAME)
return False, ()
- # For each trusted domain object, add gidNumber
+ # For each trusted domain object, add posix attributes
+ # to allow use of a trusted domain account by AD DCs
+ # to authenticate against our Samba instance
try:
tdos = ldap.get_entries(
DN(self.api.env.container_adtrusts, self.api.env.basedn),
scope=ldap.SCOPE_ONELEVEL,
- filter="(objectclass=ipaNTTrustedDomain)",
- attrs_list=['gidnumber'])
+ filter="(&(objectclass=ipaNTTrustedDomain)"
+ "(objectclass=ipaIDObject))",
+ attrs_list=['gidnumber', 'uidnumber', 'objectclass',
+ 'ipantsecurityidentifier',
+ 'ipaNTTrustDirection'
+ 'uid', 'cn', 'ipantflatname'])
for tdo in tdos:
# if the trusted domain object does not contain gidnumber,
# add the default fallback group gidnumber
if not tdo.get('gidnumber'):
- try:
- tdo['gidnumber'] = gidNumber
- ldap.update_entry(tdo)
- logger.debug("Added gidnumber %s to %s",
- gidNumber, tdo.dn)
- except Exception:
- logger.warning(
- "Failed to add gidnumber to %s", tdo.dn)
+ tdo['gidnumber'] = gidNumber
+
+ # Generate uidNumber and ipaNTSecurityIdentifier if
+ # uidNumber is missing. We rely on sidgen plugin here
+ # to generate ipaNTSecurityIdentifier.
+ if not tdo.get('uidnumber'):
+ tdo['uidnumber'] = ['-1']
+
+ if 'posixAccount' not in tdo.get('objectclass'):
+ tdo['objectclass'].extend(['posixAccount'])
+ # Based on the flat name of a TDO,
+ # add user name FLATNAME$ (note dollar sign)
+ # to allow SSSD to map this TDO to a POSIX account
+ if not tdo.get('uid'):
+ tdo['uid'] = ["{flatname}$".format(
+ flatname=tdo.single_value['ipantflatname'])]
+ if not tdo.get('homedirectory'):
+ tdo['homedirectory'] = ['/dev/null']
+
+ # Store resulted entry
+ try:
+ ldap.update_entry(tdo)
+ except errors.ExecutionError as e:
+ logger.warning(
+ "Failed to update trusted domain object %s", tdo.dn)
+ logger.debug("Exception during TDO update: %s", str(e))
except errors.NotFound:
logger.debug("No trusted domain object to update")
@@ -400,3 +431,259 @@ class update_mapping_Guests_to_nobody(Updater):
map_Guests_to_nobody()
return False, []
+
+
+@register()
+class update_tdo_to_new_layout(Updater):
+ """
+ Transform trusted domain objects into a new layout
+
+ There are now two Kerberos principals per direction of trust:
+
+ INBOUND:
+ - krbtgt/<OUR REALM>@<REMOTE REALM>, enabled by default
+
+ - <OUR FLATNAME$>@<REMOTE REALM>, disabled by default on our side
+ as it is only used by SSSD to retrieve TDO creds when operating
+ as an AD Trust agent across IPA topology
+
+ OUTBOUND:
+ - krbtgt/<REMOTE REALM>@<OUR REALM>, enabled by default
+
+ - <REMOTE FLATNAME$>@<OUR REALM>, enabled by default and
+ used by remote trusted DCs to authenticate against us
+
+ This principal also has krbtgt/<REMOTE FLATNAME>@<OUR REALM> defined
+ as a Kerberos principal alias. This is due to how Kerberos
+ key salt is derived for cross-realm principals on AD side
+
+ Finally, Samba requires <REMOTE FLATNAME$> account to also possess POSIX
+ and SMB identities. We ensure this by making the trusted domain object to
+ be this account with 'uid' and 'cn' attributes being '<REMOTE FLATNAME$>'
+ and uidNumber/gidNumber generated automatically. Also, we ensure the
+ trusted domain object is given a SID.
+
+ The update to <REMOTE FLATNAME$> POSIX/SMB identities is done through
+ the update plugin update_tdo_gidnumber.
+ """
+ tgt_principal_template = "krbtgt/{remote}@{local}"
+ nbt_principal_template = "{nbt}$@{realm}"
+ trust_filter = \
+ "(&(objectClass=ipaNTTrustedDomain)(objectClass=ipaIDObject))"
+ trust_attrs = ("ipaNTFlatName", "ipaNTTrustPartner", "ipaNTTrustDirection",
+ "cn", "ipaNTTrustAttributes", "ipaNTAdditionalSuffixes",
+ "ipaNTTrustedDomainSID", "ipaNTTrustType",
+ "ipaNTTrustAuthIncoming", "ipaNTTrustAuthOutgoing")
+ change_password_template = \
+ "change_password -pw {password} " \
+ "-e aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96,aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 " \
+ "{principal}"
+
+ KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DEFAULT = 0x00000000
+ KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DISABLED = 0x00000001
+ KRB_PRINC_CREATE_AGENT_PERMISSION = 0x00000002
+ KRB_PRINC_CREATE_IDENTITY = 0x00000004
+ KRB_PRINC_MUST_EXIST = 0x00000008
+
+ # This is a flag for krbTicketFlags attribute
+ # to disallow creating any tickets using this principal
+ KRB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX = 0x00000040
+
+ def retrieve_trust_password(self, packed):
+ # The structure of the trust secret is described at
+ # https://github.com/samba-team/samba/blob/master/
+ # librpc/idl/drsblobs.idl#L516-L569
+ # In our case in LDAP TDO object stores
+ # `struct trustAuthInOutBlob` that has `count` and
+ # the `current` of `AuthenticationInformationArray` struct
+ # which has own `count` and `array` of `AuthenticationInformation`
+ # structs that have `AuthType` field which should be equal to
+ # `LSA_TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR`.
+ # Then AuthInfo field would contain a password as an array of bytes
+ assert(packed.count != 0)
+ assert(packed.current.count != 0)
+ assert(packed.current.array[0].AuthType == lsa.TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR)
+ clear_value = packed.current.array[0].AuthInfo.password
+
+ return ''.join(map(chr, clear_value))
+
+ def set_krb_principal(self, principals, password, trustdn, flags=None):
+
+ ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
+
+ if isinstance(principals, (list, tuple)):
+ trust_principal = principals[0]
+ aliases = principals[1:]
+ else:
+ trust_principal = principals
+ aliases = []
+
+ try:
+ entry = ldap.get_entry(
+ DN(('krbprincipalname', trust_principal), trustdn))
+ dn = entry.dn
+ action = ldap.update_entry
+ logger.debug("Updating Kerberos principal entry for %s",
+ trust_principal)
+ except errors.NotFound:
+ # For a principal that must exist, we re-raise the exception
+ # to let the caller to handle this situation
+ if flags & self.KRB_PRINC_MUST_EXIST:
+ raise
+
+ dn = DN(('krbprincipalname', trust_principal), trustdn)
+ entry = ldap.make_entry(dn)
+ logger.debug("Adding Kerberos principal entry for %s",
+ trust_principal)
+ action = ldap.add_entry
+
+ entry_data = {
+ 'objectclass':
+ ['krbPrincipal', 'krbPrincipalAux',
+ 'krbTicketPolicyAux', 'top'],
+ 'krbcanonicalname': [trust_principal],
+ 'krbprincipalname': [trust_principal],
+ }
+
+ entry_data['krbprincipalname'].extend(aliases)
+
+ if flags & self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DISABLED:
+ flg = int(entry.single_value.get('krbticketflags', 0))
+ entry_data['krbticketflags'] = flg | self.KRB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX
+
+ if flags & self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_AGENT_PERMISSION:
+ entry_data['objectclass'].extend(['ipaAllowedOperations'])
+
+ entry.update(entry_data)
+ try:
+ action(entry)
+ except errors.EmptyModlist:
+ logger.debug("No update was required for Kerberos principal %s",
+ trust_principal)
+
+ # If entry existed, no need to set Kerberos keys on it
+ if action == ldap.update_entry:
+ logger.debug("No need to update Kerberos keys for "
+ "existing Kerberos principal %s",
+ trust_principal)
+ return
+
+ # Now that entry is updated, set its Kerberos keys.
+ #
+ # It would be a complication to use ipa-getkeytab LDAP extended control
+ # here because we would need to encode the request in ASN.1 sequence
+ # and we don't have the code to do so exposed in Python bindings.
+ # Instead, as we run on IPA master, we can use kadmin.local for that
+ # directly.
+ # We pass the command as a stdin to both avoid shell interpolation
+ # of the passwords and also to avoid its exposure to other processes
+ # Since we don't want to record the output, make also a redacted log
+ change_password = self.change_password_template.format(
+ password=password,
+ principal=trust_principal)
+
+ redacted = self.change_password_template.format(
+ password='<REDACTED OUT>',
+ principal=trust_principal)
+ logger.debug("Updating Kerberos keys for %s with the following "
+ "kadmin command:\n\t%s", trust_principal, redacted)
+
+ ipautil.run([paths.KADMIN_LOCAL, "-x",
+ "ipa-setup-override-restrictions"],
+ stdin=change_password, skip_output=True)
+
+ def execute(self, **options):
+ # First, see if trusts are enabled on the server
+ if not self.api.Command.adtrust_is_enabled()['result']:
+ logger.debug('AD Trusts are not enabled on this server')
+ return False, []
+
+ ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2
+ gidNumber = get_gidNumber(ldap, self.api.env)
+ if gidNumber is None:
+ return False, []
+
+ result = self.api.Command.trustconfig_show()['result']
+ our_nbt_name = result.get('ipantflatname', [None])[0]
+ if not our_nbt_name:
+ return False, []
+
+ trusts_dn = self.api.env.container_adtrusts + self.api.env.basedn
+
+ trusts = ldap.get_entries(
+ base_dn=trusts_dn,
+ scope=ldap.SCOPE_ONELEVEL,
+ filter=self.trust_filter,
+ attrs_list=self.trust_attrs)
+
+ # For every trust, retrieve its principals and convert
+ for t_entry in trusts:
+ t_dn = t_entry.dn
+ logger.debug('Processing trust domain object %s', str(t_dn))
+ t_realm = t_entry.single_value.get('ipaNTTrustPartner').upper()
+ direction = int(t_entry.single_value.get('ipaNTTrustDirection'))
+ passwd_incoming = self.retrieve_trust_password(
+ ndr_unpack(drsblobs.trustAuthInOutBlob,
+ t_entry.single_value.get('ipaNTTrustAuthIncoming')))
+ passwd_outgoing = self.retrieve_trust_password(
+ ndr_unpack(drsblobs.trustAuthInOutBlob,
+ t_entry.single_value.get('ipaNTTrustAuthOutgoing')))
+ # For outbound and inbound trusts, process four principals total
+ if (direction & TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL) == TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL:
+ # 1. OUTBOUND: krbtgt/<REMOTE REALM>@<OUR REALM> must exist
+ trust_principal = self.tgt_principal_template.format(
+ remote=t_realm, local=self.api.env.realm)
+ try:
+ self.set_krb_principal(trust_principal,
+ passwd_outgoing,
+ t_dn,
+ flags=self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DEFAULT)
+ except errors.NotFound:
+ # It makes no sense to convert this one, skip the trust
+ # completely, better to re-establish one
+ logger.error(
+ "Broken trust to AD: %s not found, "
+ "please re-establish the trust to %s",
+ trust_principal, t_realm)
+ continue
+
+ # 2. Create <REMOTE FLATNAME$>@<OUR REALM>
+ nbt_name = t_entry.single_value.get('ipaNTFlatName')
+ nbt_principal = self.nbt_principal_template.format(
+ nbt=nbt_name, realm=self.api.env.realm)
+ tgt_principal = self.tgt_principal_template.format(
+ remote=nbt_name, local=self.api.env.realm)
+ self.set_krb_principal([nbt_principal, tgt_principal],
+ passwd_incoming,
+ t_dn,
+ flags=self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DEFAULT)
+
+ # 3. INBOUND: krbtgt/<OUR REALM>@<REMOTE REALM> must exist
+ trust_principal = self.tgt_principal_template.format(
+ remote=self.api.env.realm, local=t_realm)
+ try:
+ self.set_krb_principal(trust_principal, passwd_outgoing,
+ t_dn,
+ flags=self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DEFAULT)
+ except errors.NotFound:
+ # It makes no sense to convert this one, skip the trust
+ # completely, better to re-establish one
+ logger.error(
+ "Broken trust to AD: %s not found, "
+ "please re-establish the trust to %s",
+ trust_principal, t_realm)
+ continue
+
+ # 4. Create <OUR FLATNAME$>@<REMOTE REALM>, disabled
+ nbt_principal = self.nbt_principal_template.format(
+ nbt=our_nbt_name, realm=t_realm)
+ tgt_principal = self.tgt_principal_template.format(
+ remote=our_nbt_name, local=t_realm)
+ self.set_krb_principal([nbt_principal, tgt_principal],
+ passwd_incoming,
+ t_dn,
+ flags=self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DEFAULT |
+ self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_AGENT_PERMISSION |
+ self.KRB_PRINC_CREATE_DISABLED)
+
+ return False, []
--
2.20.1