Blob Blame History Raw
diff -ur b/credential.c a/credential.c
--- b/credential.c	2020-04-09 09:53:10.568938942 +0200
+++ a/credential.c	2020-04-09 12:34:56.735418779 +0200
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@
 {
 	if (!value)
 		return;
+	if (strchr(value, '\n'))
+		die("credential value for %s contains newline", key);
 	fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value);
 }
 
@@ -321,8 +323,21 @@
 	FREE_AND_NULL(c->password);
 	c->approved = 0;
 }
-
-void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
+static int check_url_component(const char *url, int quiet,
+				const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+	if (!value)
+		return 0;
+	if (!strchr(value, '\n'))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!quiet)
+		warning(_("url contains a newline in its %s component: %s"),
+			name, url);
+    return -1;
+}
+int credential_from_url_gently(struct credential *c, const char *url,
+				int quiet)
 {
 	const char *at, *colon, *cp, *slash, *host, *proto_end;
 
@@ -336,7 +351,7 @@
 	 */
 	proto_end = strstr(url, "://");
 	if (!proto_end)
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	cp = proto_end + 3;
 	at = strchr(cp, '@');
 	colon = strchr(cp, ':');
@@ -371,4 +386,21 @@
 		while (p > c->path && *p == '/')
 			*p-- = '\0';
 	}
+
+    if (check_url_component(url, quiet, "username", c->username) < 0 ||
+            check_url_component(url, quiet, "password", c->password) < 0 ||
+            check_url_component(url, quiet, "protocol", c->protocol) < 0 ||
+            check_url_component(url, quiet, "host", c->host) < 0 ||
+            check_url_component(url, quiet, "path", c->path) < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
+{
+    if (credential_from_url_gently(c, url, 0) < 0) {
+        warning(_("skipping credential lookup for url: %s"), url);
+        credential_clear(c);
+    }
 }
diff -ur b/credential.h a/credential.h
--- b/credential.h	2020-04-09 09:53:10.568938942 +0200
+++ a/credential.h	2020-04-09 10:06:07.467159059 +0200
@@ -28,7 +28,23 @@
 
 int credential_read(struct credential *, FILE *);
 void credential_write(const struct credential *, FILE *);
+
+/*
+ * Parse a url into a credential struct, replacing any existing contents.
+ *
+ * Ifthe url can't be parsed (e.g., a missing "proto://" component), the
+ * resulting credential will be empty but we'll still return success from the
+ * "gently" form.
+ *
+ * If we encounter a component which cannot be represented as a credential
+ * value (e.g., because it contains a newline), the "gently" form will return
+ * an error but leave the broken state in the credential object for further
+ * examination.  The non-gentle form will issue a warning to stderr and return
+ * an empty credential.
+*/
 void credential_from_url(struct credential *, const char *url);
+int credential_from_url_gently(struct credential *, const char *url, int quiet);
+
 int credential_match(const struct credential *have,
 		     const struct credential *want);
 
diff -ur b/fsck.c a/fsck.c
--- b/fsck.c	2020-04-09 09:53:10.569938954 +0200
+++ a/fsck.c	2020-04-09 12:29:42.713615414 +0200
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include "packfile.h"
 #include "submodule-config.h"
 #include "config.h"
+#include "credential.h"
 
 static struct oidset gitmodules_found = OIDSET_INIT;
 static struct oidset gitmodules_done = OIDSET_INIT;
@@ -945,6 +946,19 @@
 	return fsck_tag_buffer(tag, data, size, options);
 }
 
+static int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
+{
+	struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
+		return -1;
+
+	ret = credential_from_url_gently(&c, url, 1);
+	credential_clear(&c);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 struct fsck_gitmodules_data {
 	struct object *obj;
 	struct fsck_options *options;
@@ -969,8 +983,8 @@
 				    "disallowed submodule name: %s",
 				    name);
 	if (!strcmp(key, "url") && value &&
-	    looks_like_command_line_option(value))
-		data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
+		check_submodule_url(value) < 0)
+        data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
 				    FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_URL,
 				    "disallowed submodule url: %s",
 				    value);
diff -ur b/t/lib-credential.sh a/t/lib-credential.sh
--- b/t/lib-credential.sh	2020-04-09 09:53:10.501938148 +0200
+++ a/t/lib-credential.sh	2020-04-09 12:28:10.369496961 +0200
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 		false
 	fi &&
 	test_cmp expect-stdout stdout &&
-	test_cmp expect-stderr stderr
+	test_i18ncmp expect-stderr stderr
 }
 
 read_chunk() {
diff -ur b/t/t0300-credentials.sh a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
--- b/t/t0300-credentials.sh	2020-04-09 09:53:10.506938208 +0200
+++ a/t/t0300-credentials.sh	2020-04-09 12:26:42.660434645 +0200
@@ -309,4 +309,18 @@
 	EOF
 '
 
+test_expect_success 'url parser ignores embedded newlines' '
+	check fill <<-EOF
+	url=https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
+	--
+	username=askpass-username
+	password=askpass-password
+	--
+	warning: url contains a newline in its host component: https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
+	warning: skipping credential lookup for url: https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
+	askpass: Username:
+	askpass: Password:
+	EOF
+'
+
 test_done
diff -ur b/t/t7416-submodule-dash-url.sh a/t/t7416-submodule-dash-url.sh
--- b/t/t7416-submodule-dash-url.sh	2020-04-09 09:53:10.528938468 +0200
+++ a/t/t7416-submodule-dash-url.sh	2020-04-09 12:27:15.594833539 +0200
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 
-test_description='check handling of .gitmodule url with dash'
+test_description='check handling of disallowed .gitmodule urls'
 . ./test-lib.sh
 
 test_expect_success 'create submodule with protected dash in url' '
@@ -60,4 +60,19 @@
 	test_i18ngrep ! "unknown option" err
 '
 
+test_expect_success 'fsck rejects embedded newline in url' '
+	git checkout --orphan newline &&
+	cat >.gitmodules <<-\EOF &&
+	[submodule "foo"]
+	url = "https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/foo.git"
+	EOF
+	git add .gitmodules &&
+	git commit -m "gitmodules with newline" &&
+	test_when_finished "rm -rf dst" &&
+	git init --bare dst &&
+	git -C dst config transfer.fsckObjects true &&
+	test_must_fail git push dst HEAD 2>err &&
+	grep gitmodulesUrl err
+'
+
 test_done