diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.034337746 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.042337793 +0100
@@ -485,4 +485,10 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.042337793 +0100
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
@@ -274,5 +280,15 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
(unsigned)uid);
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
+ */
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.043337799 +0100
@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ void audit_unsupported(int);
void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.043337799 +0100
@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
#endif
}
+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+
void
audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
uid_t uid)
@@ -301,7 +303,6 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
int audit_fd, audit_ok;
- const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
char *s;
@@ -327,4 +328,32 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
#endif
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+ char *s;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ get_remote_port(),
+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+ get_local_port());
+ xfree(s);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.043337799 +0100
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
* Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
*/
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
void
audit_unsupported(int n)
{
@@ -37,3 +39,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
{
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+}
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/kex.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/kex.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/kex.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.036337758 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/kex.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.044337804 +0100
@@ -640,3 +640,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
+
+static void
+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
+{
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (enc->key) {
+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+ xfree(enc->key);
+ }
+
+ if (enc->iv) {
+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
+ xfree(enc->iv);
+ }
+
+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
+}
+
+void
+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
+ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
+ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+}
+
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/kex.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/kex.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/kex.h.audit4 2013-01-09 06:12:19.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/kex.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.044337804 +0100
@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *);
void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
+void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
+
void
kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/mac.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/mac.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/mac.c.audit4 2012-12-12 01:00:37.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/mac.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.044337804 +0100
@@ -199,6 +199,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
}
+void
+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (mac->key) {
+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+ xfree(mac->key);
+ }
+
+ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
+}
+
/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
#define MAC_SEP ","
int
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/mac.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/mac.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/mac.h.audit4 2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.2p1/mac.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.045337810 +0100
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
int mac_init(Mac *);
u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
void mac_clear(Mac *);
+void mac_destroy(Mac *);
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.037337763 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.046337816 +0100
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer
int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
@@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -314,6 +317,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -328,6 +332,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -1957,11 +1962,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
@@ -2007,6 +2014,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
}
buffer_free(&m);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (compat20) {
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
}
@@ -2451,4 +2473,22 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
return 0;
}
+int
+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int ctos;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.046337816 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h 2013-03-25 17:35:01.408602217 +0100
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123
};
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.038337769 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.047337822 +0100
@@ -654,12 +654,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
@@ -1523,4 +1525,19 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
buffer_free(&m);
}
+
+void
+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
+ &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.039337775 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.047337822 +0100
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/packet.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/packet.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/packet.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.014337629 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/packet.c 2013-03-25 17:42:26.519176337 +0100
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include <signal.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "crc32.h"
@@ -470,6 +471,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
return active_state->connection_out;
}
+static int
+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
+{
+ return state != NULL &&
+ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
+}
+
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
void
@@ -478,13 +486,6 @@ packet_close(void)
if (!active_state->initialized)
return;
active_state->initialized = 0;
- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- } else {
- close(active_state->connection_in);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- }
buffer_free(&active_state->input);
buffer_free(&active_state->output);
buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
@@ -493,8 +494,18 @@ packet_close(void)
buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
buffer_compress_uninit();
}
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ }
+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ } else {
+ close(active_state->connection_in);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ }
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
@@ -729,6 +740,23 @@ packet_send1(void)
*/
}
+static void
+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ xfree(newkeys->enc.name);
+
+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+ xfree(newkeys->mac.name);
+
+ xfree(newkeys->comp.name);
+
+ newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
+ xfree(newkeys);
+}
+
void
set_newkeys(int mode)
{
@@ -754,21 +782,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
}
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
+ audit_session_key_free(mode);
cipher_cleanup(cc);
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
- mac_clear(mac);
- memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len);
- memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
- memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
- xfree(enc->name);
- xfree(enc->iv);
- xfree(enc->key);
- xfree(mac->name);
- xfree(mac->key);
- xfree(comp->name);
- xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
}
active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
@@ -1971,6 +1987,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
}
+static void
+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
+{
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
+
+ buffer_free(&state->input);
+ buffer_free(&state->output);
+ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
+// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+void
+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
+{
+ if (audit_it)
+ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
+ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(active_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ if (audit_it) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (privsep)
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ else
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
* resuming a suspended connection.
@@ -1978,18 +2035,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
void
packet_backup_state(void)
{
- struct session_state *tmp;
-
close(active_state->connection_in);
active_state->connection_in = -1;
close(active_state->connection_out);
active_state->connection_out = -1;
- if (backup_state)
- tmp = backup_state;
- else
- tmp = alloc_session_state();
backup_state = active_state;
- active_state = tmp;
+ active_state = alloc_session_state();
}
/*
@@ -2006,9 +2057,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
backup_state = active_state;
active_state = tmp;
active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
- backup_state->connection_in = -1;
active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
- backup_state->connection_out = -1;
len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
if (len > 0) {
buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
@@ -2016,4 +2065,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
add_recv_bytes(len);
}
+ backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+ backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ xfree(backup_state);
+ backup_state = NULL;
}
+
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/packet.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/packet.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/packet.h.audit4 2012-02-10 22:19:21.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/packet.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.049337834 +0100
@@ -123,4 +123,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void);
void *packet_get_input(void);
void *packet_get_output(void);
+void packet_destroy_all(int, int);
#endif /* PACKET_H */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/session.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.023337682 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/session.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.050337839 +0100
@@ -1642,6 +1642,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data();
+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.039337775 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.050337839 +0100
@@ -701,6 +701,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
}
}
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+
static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
@@ -725,6 +727,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
@@ -2033,6 +2039,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
*/
if (use_privsep) {
mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
exit(0);
}
@@ -2085,6 +2092,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
do_authenticated(authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
@@ -2402,6 +2411,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
+ static int in_cleanup = 0;
+ int is_privsep_child;
+
+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
+ indefinitely. */
+ if (in_cleanup)
+ _exit(i);
+ in_cleanup = 1;
+
if (the_authctxt) {
do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
@@ -2412,6 +2431,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&