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From 713d4d69d84774949c7306289724c2463dbeab1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 13:36:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/12] vmstate_xhci_event: bug compat with RHEL-7.0 (RHEL only)

Message-id: <1409578613-11909-3-git-send-email-lersek@redhat.com>
Patchwork-id: 60782
O-Subject: [PATCH RHEL-7.0.z/RHEL-7.1.0 qemu-kvm 2/2] vmstate_xhci_event: bug compat with RHEL-7.0 (RHEL only)
Bugzilla: 1122147
RH-Acked-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git) <dgilbert@redhat.com>
RH-Acked-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
RH-Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The "vmstate_xhci_event.fields" member is a pointer to an array of
VMStateField elements. The unnamed array (of static storage duration)
comes from a compound literal. The previous patch fixed the undefined
behavior by adding a terminator element to this array, but in RHEL-7 we
also need to look into the practical details of that undefined behavior.

In debug builds (./configure --enable-debug), the compiler places the
"vmstate_xhci_intr.fields" member's unnamed initializer array right after
the "vmstate_xhci_event.fields" member's. This leads to infinite recursion
(see the previous patch for details), but in RHEL-7 we don't ship debug
builds.

In a normal (optimized, official) build, the layout changes. The
"vmstate_xhci_event.fields" member's unterminated initializer array is
followed by the one of the "vmstate_xhci_slot.fields" member:

  (gdb) print (intptr_t)&vmstate_xhci_event.fields[7] - \
              (intptr_t)&vmstate_xhci_slot.fields[0]
  $3 = 0

where "vmstate_xhci_slot.fields" is initialized from

    .fields = (VMStateField[]) {
        VMSTATE_BOOL(enabled,   XHCISlot),
        VMSTATE_BOOL(addressed, XHCISlot),
        VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
    }

The elements of this array are (only relevant members quoted):

  (gdb) print vmstate_xhci_slot.fields[0].offset
  $16 = 0
  (gdb) print vmstate_xhci_slot.fields[0].size
  $17 = 1
  (gdb) print vmstate_xhci_slot.fields[1].offset
  $18 = 1
  (gdb) print vmstate_xhci_slot.fields[1].size
  $19 = 1

This means that the wire format for "vmstate_xhci_event" will include the
byte at offset 0 and the byte at offset 1 from XHCIEvent, corresponding to
part of the "XHCIEvent.type" member:

  (gdb) print vmstate_xhci_event.fields[0].name
  $23 = 0x5555558b12e7 "type"
  (gdb) print vmstate_xhci_event.fields[0].offset
  $24 = 0
  (gdb) print vmstate_xhci_event.fields[0].size
  $25 = 4

In order to accommodate these bogus bytes, coming from an unpatched source
side, we introduce two dummy XHCIEvent fields; otherwise the patched
destination would reject the migration stream.

For the reverse direction, we explicitly set the dummy bytes to the values
that they used to take in an unpatched source, so that when the unpatched
destination deserializes them into part of "XHCIEvent.type", said victim
member still receives a correct value.

The dummy fields have type uint8_t, not bool. The reason is that
assignment to bool (in xhci_event_pre_save()) would entail conversion to
bool, hence result in values 0 or 1. (See _Bool conversion rules and
<stdbool.h>.)

RHEL-only because we control the compiler version and the build flags only
in RHEL.

This is for CVE-2014-5263.

Suggested-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
---
 hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
index 0ef2bc4..2c9e36a 100644
--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
@@ -420,6 +420,8 @@ typedef struct XHCIEvent {
     uint32_t flags;
     uint8_t slotid;
     uint8_t epid;
+    uint8_t cve_2014_5263_a;
+    uint8_t cve_2014_5263_b;
 } XHCIEvent;
 
 typedef struct XHCIInterrupter {
@@ -3515,17 +3517,28 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_xhci_slot = {
     }
 };
 
+static void xhci_event_pre_save(void *opaque)
+{
+    XHCIEvent *s = opaque;
+
+    s->cve_2014_5263_a = ((uint8_t *)&s->type)[0];
+    s->cve_2014_5263_b = ((uint8_t *)&s->type)[1];
+}
+
 static const VMStateDescription vmstate_xhci_event = {
     .name = "xhci-event",
     .version_id = 1,
+    .pre_save = xhci_event_pre_save,
     .fields = (VMStateField[]) {
-        VMSTATE_UINT32(type,   XHCIEvent),
-        VMSTATE_UINT32(ccode,  XHCIEvent),
-        VMSTATE_UINT64(ptr,    XHCIEvent),
-        VMSTATE_UINT32(length, XHCIEvent),
-        VMSTATE_UINT32(flags,  XHCIEvent),
-        VMSTATE_UINT8(slotid,  XHCIEvent),
-        VMSTATE_UINT8(epid,    XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT32(type,           XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT32(ccode,          XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT64(ptr,            XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT32(length,         XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT32(flags,          XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT8(slotid,          XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT8(epid,            XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT8(cve_2014_5263_a, XHCIEvent),
+        VMSTATE_UINT8(cve_2014_5263_b, XHCIEvent),
         VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
     }
 };
-- 
1.7.1