Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/Makefile
===================================================================
--- qemu-kvm-0.10.orig/qemu/Makefile
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/Makefile
@@ -152,6 +152,9 @@ OBJS+=vnc.o d3des.o
ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
OBJS+=vnc-tls.o vnc-auth-vencrypt.o
endif
+ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+OBJS+=vnc-auth-sasl.o
+endif
ifdef CONFIG_COCOA
OBJS+=cocoa.o
@@ -175,7 +178,7 @@ sdl.o: sdl.c keymaps.h sdl_keysym.h
sdl.o audio/sdlaudio.o: CFLAGS += $(SDL_CFLAGS)
-vnc.h: vnc-tls.h vnc-auth-vencrypt.h keymaps.h
+vnc.h: vnc-tls.h vnc-auth-vencrypt.h vnc-auth-sasl.h keymaps.h
vnc.o: vnc.c vnc.h vnc_keysym.h vnchextile.h d3des.c d3des.h
@@ -185,6 +188,8 @@ vnc-tls.o: vnc-tls.c vnc.h
vnc-auth-vencrypt.o: vnc-auth-vencrypt.c vnc.h
+vnc-auth-sasl.o: vnc-auth-sasl.c vnc.h
+
curses.o: curses.c keymaps.h curses_keys.h
bt-host.o: CFLAGS += $(CONFIG_BLUEZ_CFLAGS)
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/Makefile.target
===================================================================
--- qemu-kvm-0.10.orig/qemu/Makefile.target
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/Makefile.target
@@ -613,6 +613,11 @@ CPPFLAGS += $(CONFIG_VNC_TLS_CFLAGS)
LIBS += $(CONFIG_VNC_TLS_LIBS)
endif
+ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+CPPFLAGS += $(CONFIG_VNC_SASL_CFLAGS)
+LIBS += $(CONFIG_VNC_SASL_LIBS)
+endif
+
ifdef CONFIG_BLUEZ
LIBS += $(CONFIG_BLUEZ_LIBS)
endif
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/configure
===================================================================
--- qemu-kvm-0.10.orig/qemu/configure
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/configure
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ fmod_lib=""
fmod_inc=""
oss_lib=""
vnc_tls="yes"
+vnc_sasl="yes"
bsd="no"
linux="no"
solaris="no"
@@ -404,6 +405,8 @@ for opt do
;;
--disable-vnc-tls) vnc_tls="no"
;;
+ --disable-vnc-sasl) vnc_sasl="no"
+ ;;
--disable-slirp) slirp="no"
;;
--disable-vde) vde="no"
@@ -563,6 +566,7 @@ echo " Availab
echo " --enable-mixemu enable mixer emulation"
echo " --disable-brlapi disable BrlAPI"
echo " --disable-vnc-tls disable TLS encryption for VNC server"
+echo " --disable-vnc-sasl disable SASL encryption for VNC server"
echo " --disable-curses disable curses output"
echo " --disable-bluez disable bluez stack connectivity"
echo " --disable-kvm disable KVM acceleration support"
@@ -890,6 +894,25 @@ EOF
fi
##########################################
+# VNC SASL detection
+if test "$vnc_sasl" = "yes" ; then
+cat > $TMPC <<EOF
+#include <sasl/sasl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(void) { sasl_server_init(NULL, "qemu"); return 0; }
+EOF
+ # Assuming Cyrus-SASL installed in /usr prefix
+ vnc_sasl_cflags=""
+ vnc_sasl_libs="-lsasl2"
+ if $cc $ARCH_CFLAGS -o $TMPE ${OS_CFLAGS} $vnc_sasl_cflags $TMPC \
+ $vnc_sasl_libs 2> /dev/null ; then
+ :
+ else
+ vnc_sasl="no"
+ fi
+fi
+
+##########################################
# vde libraries probe
if test "$vde" = "yes" ; then
cat > $TMPC << EOF
@@ -1224,6 +1247,11 @@ if test "$vnc_tls" = "yes" ; then
echo " TLS CFLAGS $vnc_tls_cflags"
echo " TLS LIBS $vnc_tls_libs"
fi
+echo "VNC SASL support $vnc_sasl"
+if test "$vnc_sasl" = "yes" ; then
+ echo " SASL CFLAGS $vnc_sasl_cflags"
+ echo " SASL LIBS $vnc_sasl_libs"
+fi
if test -n "$sparc_cpu"; then
echo "Target Sparc Arch $sparc_cpu"
fi
@@ -1467,6 +1495,12 @@ if test "$vnc_tls" = "yes" ; then
echo "CONFIG_VNC_TLS_LIBS=$vnc_tls_libs" >> $config_mak
echo "#define CONFIG_VNC_TLS 1" >> $config_h
fi
+if test "$vnc_sasl" = "yes" ; then
+ echo "CONFIG_VNC_SASL=yes" >> $config_mak
+ echo "CONFIG_VNC_SASL_CFLAGS=$vnc_sasl_cflags" >> $config_mak
+ echo "CONFIG_VNC_SASL_LIBS=$vnc_sasl_libs" >> $config_mak
+ echo "#define CONFIG_VNC_SASL 1" >> $config_h
+fi
qemu_version=`head $source_path/VERSION`
echo "VERSION=$qemu_version" >>$config_mak
echo "#define QEMU_VERSION \"$qemu_version\"" >> $config_h
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/qemu-doc.texi
===================================================================
--- qemu-kvm-0.10.orig/qemu/qemu-doc.texi
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/qemu-doc.texi
@@ -624,6 +624,21 @@ path following this option specifies whe
be loaded from. See the @ref{vnc_security} section for details on generating
certificates.
+@item sasl
+
+Require that the client use SASL to authenticate with the VNC server.
+The exact choice of authentication method used is controlled from the
+system / user's SASL configuration file for the 'qemu' service. This
+is typically found in /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. If running QEMU as an
+unprivileged user, an environment variable SASL_CONF_PATH can be used
+to make it search alternate locations for the service config.
+While some SASL auth methods can also provide data encryption (eg GSSAPI),
+it is recommended that SASL always be combined with the 'tls' and
+'x509' settings to enable use of SSL and server certificates. This
+ensures a data encryption preventing compromise of authentication
+credentials. See the @ref{vnc_security} section for details on using
+SASL authentication.
+
@end table
@end table
@@ -2069,7 +2084,10 @@ considerations depending on the deployme
* vnc_sec_certificate::
* vnc_sec_certificate_verify::
* vnc_sec_certificate_pw::
+* vnc_sec_sasl::
+* vnc_sec_certificate_sasl::
* vnc_generate_cert::
+* vnc_setup_sasl::
@end menu
@node vnc_sec_none
@subsection Without passwords
@@ -2152,6 +2170,41 @@ Password: ********
(qemu)
@end example
+
+@node vnc_sec_sasl
+@subsection With SASL authentication
+
+The SASL authentication method is a VNC extension, that provides an
+easily extendable, pluggable authentication method. This allows for
+integration with a wide range of authentication mechanisms, such as
+PAM, GSSAPI/Kerberos, LDAP, SQL databases, one-time keys and more.
+The strength of the authentication depends on the exact mechanism
+configured. If the chosen mechanism also provides a SSF layer, then
+it will encrypt the datastream as well.
+
+Refer to the later docs on how to choose the exact SASL mechanism
+used for authentication, but assuming use of one supporting SSF,
+then QEMU can be launched with:
+
+@example
+qemu [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,sasl -monitor stdio
+@end example
+
+@node vnc_sec_certificate_sasl
+@subsection With x509 certificates and SASL authentication
+
+If the desired SASL authentication mechanism does not supported
+SSF layers, then it is strongly advised to run it in combination
+with TLS and x509 certificates. This provides securely encrypted
+data stream, avoiding risk of compromising of the security
+credentials. This can be enabled, by combining the 'sasl' option
+with the aforementioned TLS + x509 options:
+
+@example
+qemu [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,tls,x509,sasl -monitor stdio
+@end example
+
+
@node vnc_generate_cert
@subsection Generating certificates for VNC
@@ -2263,6 +2316,50 @@ EOF
The @code{client-key.pem} and @code{client-cert.pem} files should now be securely
copied to the client for which they were generated.
+
+@node vnc_setup_sasl
+
+@subsection Configuring SASL mechanisms
+
+The following documentation assumes use of the Cyrus SASL implementation on a
+Linux host, but the principals should apply to any other SASL impl. When SASL
+is enabled, the mechanism configuration will be loaded from system default
+SASL service config /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. If running QEMU as an
+unprivileged user, an environment variable SASL_CONF_PATH can be used
+to make it search alternate locations for the service config.
+
+The default configuration might contain
+
+@example
+mech_list: digest-md5
+sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db
+@end example
+
+This says to use the 'Digest MD5' mechanism, which is similar to the HTTP
+Digest-MD5 mechanism. The list of valid usernames & passwords is maintained
+in the /etc/qemu/passwd.db file, and can be updated using the saslpasswd2
+command. While this mechanism is easy to configure and use, it is not
+considered secure by modern standards, so only suitable for developers /
+ad-hoc testing.
+
+A more serious deployment might use Kerberos, which is done with the 'gssapi'
+mechanism
+
+@example
+mech_list: gssapi
+keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab
+@end example
+
+For this to work the administrator of your KDC must generate a Kerberos
+principal for the server, with a name of 'qemu/somehost.example.com@@EXAMPLE.COM'
+replacing 'somehost.example.com' with the fully qualified host name of the
+machine running QEMU, and 'EXAMPLE.COM' with the Keberos Realm.
+
+Other configurations will be left as an exercise for the reader. It should
+be noted that only Digest-MD5 and GSSAPI provides a SSF layer for data
+encryption. For all other mechanisms, VNC should always be configured to
+use TLS and x509 certificates to protect security credentials from snooping.
+
@node gdb_usage
@section GDB usage
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/qemu.sasl
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/qemu.sasl
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# If you want to use the non-TLS socket, then you *must* include
+# the GSSAPI or DIGEST-MD5 mechanisms, because they are the only
+# ones that can offer session encryption as well as authentication.
+#
+# If you're only using TLS, then you can turn on any mechanisms
+# you like for authentication, because TLS provides the encryption
+#
+# Default to a simple username+password mechanism
+# NB digest-md5 is no longer considered secure by current standards
+mech_list: digest-md5
+
+# Before you can use GSSAPI, you need a service principle on the
+# KDC server for libvirt, and that to be exported to the keytab
+# file listed below
+#mech_list: gssapi
+#
+# You can also list many mechanisms at once, then the user can choose
+# by adding '?auth=sasl.gssapi' to their libvirt URI, eg
+# qemu+tcp://hostname/system?auth=sasl.gssapi
+#mech_list: digest-md5 gssapi
+
+# Some older builds of MIT kerberos on Linux ignore this option &
+# instead need KRB5_KTNAME env var.
+# For modern Linux, and other OS, this should be sufficient
+keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab
+
+# If using digest-md5 for username/passwds, then this is the file
+# containing the passwds. Use 'saslpasswd2 -a qemu [username]'
+# to add entries, and 'sasldblistusers2 -a qemu' to browse it
+sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db
+
+
+auxprop_plugin: sasldb
+
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc-auth-sasl.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc-auth-sasl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,626 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU VNC display driver: SASL auth protocol
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
+ * THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "vnc.h"
+
+/* Max amount of data we send/recv for SASL steps to prevent DOS */
+#define SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN (1024 * 1024)
+
+
+void vnc_sasl_client_cleanup(VncState *vs)
+{
+ if (vs->sasl.conn) {
+ vs->sasl.runSSF = vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF = vs->sasl.wantSSF = 0;
+ vs->sasl.encodedLength = vs->sasl.encodedOffset = 0;
+ vs->sasl.encoded = NULL;
+ free(vs->sasl.username);
+ free(vs->sasl.mechlist);
+ vs->sasl.username = vs->sasl.mechlist = NULL;
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+
+long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Write SASL: Pending output %p size %d offset %d Encoded: %p size %d offset %d\n",
+ vs->output.buffer, vs->output.capacity, vs->output.offset,
+ vs->sasl.encoded, vs->sasl.encodedLength, vs->sasl.encodedOffset);
+
+ if (!vs->sasl.encoded) {
+ int err;
+ err = sasl_encode(vs->sasl.conn,
+ (char *)vs->output.buffer,
+ vs->output.offset,
+ (const char **)&vs->sasl.encoded,
+ &vs->sasl.encodedLength);
+ if (err != SASL_OK)
+ return vnc_client_io_error(vs, -1, EIO);
+
+ vs->sasl.encodedOffset = 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = vnc_client_write_buf(vs,
+ vs->sasl.encoded + vs->sasl.encodedOffset,
+ vs->sasl.encodedLength - vs->sasl.encodedOffset);
+ if (!ret)
+ return 0;
+
+ vs->sasl.encodedOffset += ret;
+ if (vs->sasl.encodedOffset == vs->sasl.encodedLength) {
+ vs->output.offset = 0;
+ vs->sasl.encoded = NULL;
+ vs->sasl.encodedOffset = vs->sasl.encodedLength = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Can't merge this block with one above, because
+ * someone might have written more unencrypted
+ * data in vs->output while we were processing
+ * SASL encoded output
+ */
+ if (vs->output.offset == 0) {
+ qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vnc_client_read, NULL, vs);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+long vnc_client_read_sasl(VncState *vs)
+{
+ long ret;
+ uint8_t encoded[4096];
+ const char *decoded;
+ unsigned int decodedLen;
+ int err;
+
+ ret = vnc_client_read_buf(vs, encoded, sizeof(encoded));
+ if (!ret)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = sasl_decode(vs->sasl.conn,
+ (char *)encoded, ret,
+ &decoded, &decodedLen);
+
+ if (err != SASL_OK)
+ return vnc_client_io_error(vs, -1, -EIO);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Read SASL Encoded %p size %ld Decoded %p size %d\n",
+ encoded, ret, decoded, decodedLen);
+ buffer_reserve(&vs->input, decodedLen);
+ buffer_append(&vs->input, decoded, decodedLen);
+ return decodedLen;
+}
+
+
+static int vnc_auth_sasl_check_access(VncState *vs)
+{
+ const void *val;
+ int err;
+
+ err = sasl_getprop(vs->sasl.conn, SASL_USERNAME, &val);
+ if (err != SASL_OK) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("cannot query SASL username on connection %d (%s)\n",
+ err, sasl_errstring(err, NULL, NULL));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (val == NULL) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("no client username was found\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ VNC_DEBUG("SASL client username %s\n", (const char *)val);
+
+ vs->sasl.username = qemu_strdup((const char*)val);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int vnc_auth_sasl_check_ssf(VncState *vs)
+{
+ const void *val;
+ int err, ssf;
+
+ if (!vs->sasl.wantSSF)
+ return 1;
+
+ err = sasl_getprop(vs->sasl.conn, SASL_SSF, &val);
+ if (err != SASL_OK)
+ return 0;
+
+ ssf = *(const int *)val;
+ VNC_DEBUG("negotiated an SSF of %d\n", ssf);
+ if (ssf < 56)
+ return 0; /* 56 is good for Kerberos */
+
+ /* Only setup for read initially, because we're about to send an RPC
+ * reply which must be in plain text. When the next incoming RPC
+ * arrives, we'll switch on writes too
+ *
+ * cf qemudClientReadSASL in qemud.c
+ */
+ vs->sasl.runSSF = 1;
+
+ /* We have a SSF that's good enough */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Step Msg
+ *
+ * Input from client:
+ *
+ * u32 clientin-length
+ * u8-array clientin-string
+ *
+ * Output to client:
+ *
+ * u32 serverout-length
+ * u8-array serverout-strin
+ * u8 continue
+ */
+
+static int protocol_client_auth_sasl_step_len(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len);
+
+static int protocol_client_auth_sasl_step(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t datalen = len;
+ const char *serverout;
+ unsigned int serveroutlen;
+ int err;
+ char *clientdata = NULL;
+
+ /* NB, distinction of NULL vs "" is *critical* in SASL */
+ if (datalen) {
+ clientdata = (char*)data;
+ clientdata[datalen-1] = '\0'; /* Wire includes '\0', but make sure */
+ datalen--; /* Don't count NULL byte when passing to _start() */
+ }
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Step using SASL Data %p (%d bytes)\n",
+ clientdata, datalen);
+ err = sasl_server_step(vs->sasl.conn,
+ clientdata,
+ datalen,
+ &serverout,
+ &serveroutlen);
+ if (err != SASL_OK &&
+ err != SASL_CONTINUE) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("sasl step failed %d (%s)\n",
+ err, sasl_errdetail(vs->sasl.conn));
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+
+ if (serveroutlen > SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("sasl step reply data too long %d\n",
+ serveroutlen);
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("SASL return data %d bytes, nil; %d\n",
+ serveroutlen, serverout ? 0 : 1);
+
+ if (serveroutlen) {
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, serveroutlen + 1);
+ vnc_write(vs, serverout, serveroutlen + 1);
+ } else {
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Whether auth is complete */
+ vnc_write_u8(vs, err == SASL_CONTINUE ? 0 : 1);
+
+ if (err == SASL_CONTINUE) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("%s", "Authentication must continue\n");
+ /* Wait for step length */
+ vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_sasl_step_len, 4);
+ } else {
+ if (!vnc_auth_sasl_check_ssf(vs)) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Authentication rejected for weak SSF %d\n", vs->csock);
+ goto authreject;
+ }
+
+ /* Check username whitelist ACL */
+ if (vnc_auth_sasl_check_access(vs) < 0) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Authentication rejected for ACL %d\n", vs->csock);
+ goto authreject;
+ }
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Authentication successful %d\n", vs->csock);
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, 0); /* Accept auth */
+ /*
+ * Delay writing in SSF encoded mode until pending output
+ * buffer is written
+ */
+ if (vs->sasl.runSSF)
+ vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF = vs->output.offset;
+ start_client_init(vs);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ authreject:
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, 1); /* Reject auth */
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof("Authentication failed"));
+ vnc_write(vs, "Authentication failed", sizeof("Authentication failed"));
+ vnc_flush(vs);
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+
+ authabort:
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int protocol_client_auth_sasl_step_len(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t steplen = read_u32(data, 0);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Got client step len %d\n", steplen);
+ if (steplen > SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Too much SASL data %d\n", steplen);
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (steplen == 0)
+ return protocol_client_auth_sasl_step(vs, NULL, 0);
+ else
+ vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_sasl_step, steplen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start Msg
+ *
+ * Input from client:
+ *
+ * u32 clientin-length
+ * u8-array clientin-string
+ *
+ * Output to client:
+ *
+ * u32 serverout-length
+ * u8-array serverout-strin
+ * u8 continue
+ */
+
+#define SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN (1024 * 1024)
+
+static int protocol_client_auth_sasl_start(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t datalen = len;
+ const char *serverout;
+ unsigned int serveroutlen;
+ int err;
+ char *clientdata = NULL;
+
+ /* NB, distinction of NULL vs "" is *critical* in SASL */
+ if (datalen) {
+ clientdata = (char*)data;
+ clientdata[datalen-1] = '\0'; /* Should be on wire, but make sure */
+ datalen--; /* Don't count NULL byte when passing to _start() */
+ }
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Start SASL auth with mechanism %s. Data %p (%d bytes)\n",
+ vs->sasl.mechlist, clientdata, datalen);
+ err = sasl_server_start(vs->sasl.conn,
+ vs->sasl.mechlist,
+ clientdata,
+ datalen,
+ &serverout,
+ &serveroutlen);
+ if (err != SASL_OK &&
+ err != SASL_CONTINUE) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("sasl start failed %d (%s)\n",
+ err, sasl_errdetail(vs->sasl.conn));
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+ if (serveroutlen > SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("sasl start reply data too long %d\n",
+ serveroutlen);
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("SASL return data %d bytes, nil; %d\n",
+ serveroutlen, serverout ? 0 : 1);
+
+ if (serveroutlen) {
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, serveroutlen + 1);
+ vnc_write(vs, serverout, serveroutlen + 1);
+ } else {
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Whether auth is complete */
+ vnc_write_u8(vs, err == SASL_CONTINUE ? 0 : 1);
+
+ if (err == SASL_CONTINUE) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("%s", "Authentication must continue\n");
+ /* Wait for step length */
+ vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_sasl_step_len, 4);
+ } else {
+ if (!vnc_auth_sasl_check_ssf(vs)) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Authentication rejected for weak SSF %d\n", vs->csock);
+ goto authreject;
+ }
+
+ /* Check username whitelist ACL */
+ if (vnc_auth_sasl_check_access(vs) < 0) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Authentication rejected for ACL %d\n", vs->csock);
+ goto authreject;
+ }
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Authentication successful %d\n", vs->csock);
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, 0); /* Accept auth */
+ start_client_init(vs);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ authreject:
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, 1); /* Reject auth */
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof("Authentication failed"));
+ vnc_write(vs, "Authentication failed", sizeof("Authentication failed"));
+ vnc_flush(vs);
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+
+ authabort:
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int protocol_client_auth_sasl_start_len(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t startlen = read_u32(data, 0);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Got client start len %d\n", startlen);
+ if (startlen > SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Too much SASL data %d\n", startlen);
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (startlen == 0)
+ return protocol_client_auth_sasl_start(vs, NULL, 0);
+
+ vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_sasl_start, startlen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int protocol_client_auth_sasl_mechname(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ char *mechname = malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!mechname) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Out of memory reading mechname\n");
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ }
+ strncpy(mechname, (char*)data, len);
+ mechname[len] = '\0';
+ VNC_DEBUG("Got client mechname '%s' check against '%s'\n",
+ mechname, vs->sasl.mechlist);
+
+ if (strncmp(vs->sasl.mechlist, mechname, len) == 0) {
+ if (vs->sasl.mechlist[len] != '\0' &&
+ vs->sasl.mechlist[len] != ',') {
+ VNC_DEBUG("One %d", vs->sasl.mechlist[len]);
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ char *offset = strstr(vs->sasl.mechlist, mechname);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Two %p\n", offset);
+ if (!offset) {
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ VNC_DEBUG("Two '%s'\n", offset);
+ if (offset[-1] != ',' ||
+ (offset[len] != '\0'&&
+ offset[len] != ',')) {
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free(vs->sasl.mechlist);
+ vs->sasl.mechlist = mechname;
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Validated mechname '%s'\n", mechname);
+ vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_sasl_start_len, 4);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int protocol_client_auth_sasl_mechname_len(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t mechlen = read_u32(data, 0);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Got client mechname len %d\n", mechlen);
+ if (mechlen > 100) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Too long SASL mechname data %d\n", mechlen);
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (mechlen < 1) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Too short SASL mechname %d\n", mechlen);
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_sasl_mechname,mechlen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define USES_X509_AUTH(vs) \
+ ((vs)->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE || \
+ (vs)->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC || \
+ (vs)->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN || \
+ (vs)->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL)
+
+
+void start_auth_sasl(VncState *vs)
+{
+ const char *mechlist = NULL;
+ sasl_security_properties_t secprops;
+ int err;
+ char *localAddr, *remoteAddr;
+ int mechlistlen;
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Initialize SASL auth %d\n", vs->csock);
+
+ /* Get local & remote client addresses in form IPADDR;PORT */
+ if (!(localAddr = vnc_socket_local_addr("%s;%s", vs->csock)))
+ goto authabort;
+
+ if (!(remoteAddr = vnc_socket_remote_addr("%s;%s", vs->csock))) {
+ free(localAddr);
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+
+ err = sasl_server_new("vnc",
+ NULL, /* FQDN - just delegates to gethostname */
+ NULL, /* User realm */
+ localAddr,
+ remoteAddr,
+ NULL, /* Callbacks, not needed */
+ SASL_SUCCESS_DATA,
+ &vs->sasl.conn);
+ free(localAddr);
+ free(remoteAddr);
+ localAddr = remoteAddr = NULL;
+
+ if (err != SASL_OK) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("sasl context setup failed %d (%s)",
+ err, sasl_errstring(err, NULL, NULL));
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
+ /* Inform SASL that we've got an external SSF layer from TLS/x509 */
+ if (vs->vd->auth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT &&
+ vs->vd->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL) {
+ gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
+ sasl_ssf_t ssf;
+
+ cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(vs->tls.session);
+ if (!(ssf = (sasl_ssf_t)gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher))) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("%s", "cannot TLS get cipher size\n");
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+ ssf *= 8; /* tls key size is bytes, sasl wants bits */
+
+ err = sasl_setprop(vs->sasl.conn, SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL, &ssf);
+ if (err != SASL_OK) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("cannot set SASL external SSF %d (%s)\n",
+ err, sasl_errstring(err, NULL, NULL));
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
+ vs->sasl.wantSSF = 1;
+
+ memset (&secprops, 0, sizeof secprops);
+ /* Inform SASL that we've got an external SSF layer from TLS */
+ if (strncmp(vs->vd->display, "unix:", 5) == 0
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
+ /* Disable SSF, if using TLS+x509+SASL only. TLS without x509
+ is not sufficiently strong */
+ || (vs->vd->auth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT &&
+ vs->vd->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL)
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
+ ) {
+ /* If we've got TLS or UNIX domain sock, we don't care about SSF */
+ secprops.min_ssf = 0;
+ secprops.max_ssf = 0;
+ secprops.maxbufsize = 8192;
+ secprops.security_flags = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Plain TCP, better get an SSF layer */
+ secprops.min_ssf = 56; /* Good enough to require kerberos */
+ secprops.max_ssf = 100000; /* Arbitrary big number */
+ secprops.maxbufsize = 8192;
+ /* Forbid any anonymous or trivially crackable auth */
+ secprops.security_flags =
+ SASL_SEC_NOANONYMOUS | SASL_SEC_NOPLAINTEXT;
+ }
+
+ err = sasl_setprop(vs->sasl.conn, SASL_SEC_PROPS, &secprops);
+ if (err != SASL_OK) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("cannot set SASL security props %d (%s)\n",
+ err, sasl_errstring(err, NULL, NULL));
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+
+ err = sasl_listmech(vs->sasl.conn,
+ NULL, /* Don't need to set user */
+ "", /* Prefix */
+ ",", /* Separator */
+ "", /* Suffix */
+ &mechlist,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
+ if (err != SASL_OK) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("cannot list SASL mechanisms %d (%s)\n",
+ err, sasl_errdetail(vs->sasl.conn));
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+ VNC_DEBUG("Available mechanisms for client: '%s'\n", mechlist);
+
+ if (!(vs->sasl.mechlist = strdup(mechlist))) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Out of memory");
+ sasl_dispose(&vs->sasl.conn);
+ vs->sasl.conn = NULL;
+ goto authabort;
+ }
+ mechlistlen = strlen(mechlist);
+ vnc_write_u32(vs, mechlistlen);
+ vnc_write(vs, mechlist, mechlistlen);
+ vnc_flush(vs);
+
+ VNC_DEBUG("Wait for client mechname length\n");
+ vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_sasl_mechname_len, 4);
+
+ return;
+
+ authabort:
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
+ return;
+}
+
+
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc-auth-sasl.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc-auth-sasl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU VNC display driver: SASL auth protocol
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+ * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+ * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+ * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+ * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
+ * THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+
+#ifndef __QEMU_VNC_AUTH_SASL_H__
+#define __QEMU_VNC_AUTH_SASL_H__
+
+
+#include <sasl/sasl.h>
+
+typedef struct VncStateSASL VncStateSASL;
+
+struct VncStateSASL {
+ sasl_conn_t *conn;
+ /* If we want to negotiate an SSF layer with client */
+ int wantSSF :1;
+ /* If we are now running the SSF layer */
+ int runSSF :1;
+ /*
+ * If this is non-zero, then wait for that many bytes
+ * to be written plain, before switching to SSF encoding
+ * This allows the VNC auth result to finish being
+ * written in plain.
+ */
+ unsigned int waitWriteSSF;
+
+ /*
+ * Buffering encoded data to allow more clear data
+ * to be stuffed onto the output buffer
+ */
+ const uint8_t *encoded;
+ unsigned int encodedLength;
+ unsigned int encodedOffset;
+ char *username;
+ char *mechlist;
+};
+
+void vnc_sasl_client_cleanup(VncState *vs);
+
+long vnc_client_read_sasl(VncState *vs);
+long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs);
+
+void start_auth_sasl(VncState *vs);
+
+#endif /* __QEMU_VNC_AUTH_SASL_H__ */
+
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc-auth-vencrypt.c
===================================================================
--- qemu-kvm-0.10.orig/qemu/vnc-auth-vencrypt.c
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc-auth-vencrypt.c
@@ -43,8 +43,15 @@ static void start_auth_vencrypt_subauth(
start_auth_vnc(vs);
break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL:
+ case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL:
+ VNC_DEBUG("Start TLS auth SASL\n");
+ return start_auth_sasl(vs);
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
+
default: /* Should not be possible, but just in case */
- VNC_DEBUG("Reject auth %d\n", vs->vd->auth);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Reject subauth %d server bug\n", vs->vd->auth);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1);
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
static const char err[] = "Unsupported authentication type";
@@ -105,7 +112,8 @@ static void vnc_tls_handshake_io(void *o
#define NEED_X509_AUTH(vs) \
((vs)->vd->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE || \
(vs)->vd->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC || \
- (vs)->vd->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN)
+ (vs)->vd->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN || \
+ (vs)->vd->subauth == VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL)
static int protocol_client_vencrypt_auth(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc.c
===================================================================
--- qemu-kvm-0.10.orig/qemu/vnc.c
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc.c
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ static char *addr_to_string(const char *
return addr;
}
-static char *vnc_socket_local_addr(const char *format, int fd) {
+
+char *vnc_socket_local_addr(const char *format, int fd) {
struct sockaddr_storage sa;
socklen_t salen;
@@ -79,7 +80,8 @@ static char *vnc_socket_local_addr(const
return addr_to_string(format, &sa, salen);
}
-static char *vnc_socket_remote_addr(const char *format, int fd) {
+
+char *vnc_socket_remote_addr(const char *format, int fd) {
struct sockaddr_storage sa;
socklen_t salen;
@@ -125,12 +127,18 @@ static const char *vnc_auth_name(VncDisp
return "vencrypt+x509+vnc";
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN:
return "vencrypt+x509+plain";
+ case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL:
+ return "vencrypt+tls+sasl";
+ case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL:
+ return "vencrypt+x509+sasl";
default:
return "vencrypt";
}
#else
return "vencrypt";
#endif
+ case VNC_AUTH_SASL:
+ return "sasl";
}
return "unknown";
}
@@ -278,7 +286,7 @@ static void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncSt
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
}
-static void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffer, size_t len)
+void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffer, size_t len)
{
if ((buffer->capacity - buffer->offset) < len) {
buffer->capacity += (len + 1024);
@@ -290,22 +298,22 @@ static void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffe
}
}
-static int buffer_empty(Buffer *buffer)
+int buffer_empty(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->offset == 0;
}
-static uint8_t *buffer_end(Buffer *buffer)
+uint8_t *buffer_end(Buffer *buffer)
{
return buffer->buffer + buffer->offset;
}
-static void buffer_reset(Buffer *buffer)
+void buffer_reset(Buffer *buffer)
{
buffer->offset = 0;
}
-static void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, size_t len)
+void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, size_t len)
{
memcpy(buffer->buffer + buffer->offset, data, len);
buffer->offset += len;
@@ -821,7 +829,8 @@ static void audio_del(VncState *vs)
}
}
-static int vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, int ret, int last_errno)
+
+int vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, int ret, int last_errno)
{
if (ret == 0 || ret == -1) {
if (ret == -1) {
@@ -847,6 +856,9 @@ static int vnc_client_io_error(VncState
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
vnc_tls_client_cleanup(vs);
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ vnc_sasl_client_cleanup(vs);
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
audio_del(vs);
VncState *p, *parent = NULL;
@@ -877,14 +889,28 @@ void vnc_client_error(VncState *vs)
vnc_client_io_error(vs, -1, EINVAL);
}
-void vnc_client_write(void *opaque)
+
+/*
+ * Called to write a chunk of data to the client socket. The data may
+ * be the raw data, or may have already been encoded by SASL.
+ * The data will be written either straight onto the socket, or
+ * written via the GNUTLS wrappers, if TLS/SSL encryption is enabled
+ *
+ * NB, it is theoretically possible to have 2 layers of encryption,
+ * both SASL, and this TLS layer. It is highly unlikely in practice
+ * though, since SASL encryption will typically be a no-op if TLS
+ * is active
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
+ * the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
+ * -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
+ */
+long vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
{
long ret;
- VncState *vs = opaque;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
if (vs->tls.session) {
- ret = gnutls_write(vs->tls.session, vs->output.buffer, vs->output.offset);
+ ret = gnutls_write(vs->tls.session, data, datalen);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN)
errno = EAGAIN;
@@ -894,10 +920,42 @@ void vnc_client_write(void *opaque)
}
} else
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
- ret = send(vs->csock, vs->output.buffer, vs->output.offset, 0);
- ret = vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, socket_error());
+ ret = send(vs->csock, data, datalen, 0);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Wrote wire %p %d -> %ld\n", data, datalen, ret);
+ return vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, socket_error());
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Called to write buffered data to the client socket, when not
+ * using any SASL SSF encryption layers. Will write as much data
+ * as possible without blocking. If all buffered data is written,
+ * will switch the FD poll() handler back to read monitoring.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
+ * the buffered output data if the socket would block. Returns
+ * -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
+ */
+static long vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ VNC_DEBUG("Write Plain: Pending output %p size %d offset %d. Wait SSF %d\n",
+ vs->output.buffer, vs->output.capacity, vs->output.offset,
+ vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF);
+
+ if (vs->sasl.conn &&
+ vs->sasl.runSSF &&
+ vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF) {
+ ret = vnc_client_write_buf(vs, vs->output.buffer, vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF);
+ if (ret)
+ vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF -= ret;
+ } else
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
+ ret = vnc_client_write_buf(vs, vs->output.buffer, vs->output.offset);
if (!ret)
- return;
+ return 0;
memmove(vs->output.buffer, vs->output.buffer + ret, (vs->output.offset - ret));
vs->output.offset -= ret;
@@ -905,6 +963,29 @@ void vnc_client_write(void *opaque)
if (vs->output.offset == 0) {
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vnc_client_read, NULL, vs);
}
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * First function called whenever there is data to be written to
+ * the client socket. Will delegate actual work according to whether
+ * SASL SSF layers are enabled (thus requiring encryption calls)
+ */
+void vnc_client_write(void *opaque)
+{
+ long ret;
+ VncState *vs = opaque;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ if (vs->sasl.conn &&
+ vs->sasl.runSSF &&
+ !vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF)
+ ret = vnc_client_write_sasl(vs);
+ else
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
+ ret = vnc_client_write_plain(vs);
}
void vnc_read_when(VncState *vs, VncReadEvent *func, size_t expecting)
@@ -913,16 +994,28 @@ void vnc_read_when(VncState *vs, VncRead
vs->read_handler_expect = expecting;
}
-void vnc_client_read(void *opaque)
+
+/*
+ * Called to read a chunk of data from the client socket. The data may
+ * be the raw data, or may need to be further decoded by SASL.
+ * The data will be read either straight from to the socket, or
+ * read via the GNUTLS wrappers, if TLS/SSL encryption is enabled
+ *
+ * NB, it is theoretically possible to have 2 layers of encryption,
+ * both SASL, and this TLS layer. It is highly unlikely in practice
+ * though, since SASL encryption will typically be a no-op if TLS
+ * is active
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes read, which may be less than
+ * the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
+ * -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
+ */
+long vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
{
- VncState *vs = opaque;
long ret;
-
- buffer_reserve(&vs->input, 4096);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
if (vs->tls.session) {
- ret = gnutls_read(vs->tls.session, buffer_end(&vs->input), 4096);
+ ret = gnutls_read(vs->tls.session, data, datalen);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN)
errno = EAGAIN;
@@ -932,12 +1025,52 @@ void vnc_client_read(void *opaque)
}
} else
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
- ret = recv(vs->csock, buffer_end(&vs->input), 4096, 0);
- ret = vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, socket_error());
- if (!ret)
- return;
+ ret = recv(vs->csock, data, datalen, 0);
+ VNC_DEBUG("Read wire %p %d -> %ld\n", data, datalen, ret);
+ return vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, socket_error());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called to read data from the client socket to the input buffer,
+ * when not using any SASL SSF encryption layers. Will read as much
+ * data as possible without blocking.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of bytes read. Returns -1 on error, and
+ * disconnects the client socket.
+ */
+static long vnc_client_read_plain(VncState *vs)
+{
+ int ret;
+ VNC_DEBUG("Read plain %p size %d offset %d\n",
+ vs->input.buffer, vs->input.capacity, vs->input.offset);
+ buffer_reserve(&vs->input, 4096);
+ ret = vnc_client_read_buf(vs, buffer_end(&vs->input), 4096);
+ if (!ret)
+ return 0;
vs->input.offset += ret;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * First function called whenever there is more data to be read from
+ * the client socket. Will delegate actual work according to whether
+ * SASL SSF layers are enabled (thus requiring decryption calls)
+ */
+void vnc_client_read(void *opaque)
+{
+ VncState *vs = opaque;
+ long ret;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ if (vs->sasl.conn && vs->sasl.runSSF)
+ ret = vnc_client_read_sasl(vs);
+ else
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
+ ret = vnc_client_read_plain(vs);
+ if (!ret)
+ return;
while (vs->read_handler && vs->input.offset >= vs->read_handler_expect) {
size_t len = vs->read_handler_expect;
@@ -1722,6 +1855,13 @@ static int protocol_client_auth(VncState
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ case VNC_AUTH_SASL:
+ VNC_DEBUG("Accept SASL auth\n");
+ start_auth_sasl(vs);
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
+
default: /* Should not be possible, but just in case */
VNC_DEBUG("Reject auth %d\n", vs->vd->auth);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1);
@@ -1923,6 +2063,10 @@ int vnc_display_open(DisplayState *ds, c
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
int tls = 0, x509 = 0;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ int sasl = 0;
+ int saslErr;
+#endif
if (!vnc_display)
return -1;
@@ -1942,6 +2086,10 @@ int vnc_display_open(DisplayState *ds, c
reverse = 1;
} else if (strncmp(options, "to=", 3) == 0) {
to_port = atoi(options+3) + 5900;
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ } else if (strncmp(options, "sasl", 4) == 0) {
+ sasl = 1; /* Require SASL auth */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
} else if (strncmp(options, "tls", 3) == 0) {
tls = 1; /* Require TLS */
@@ -1978,6 +2126,22 @@ int vnc_display_open(DisplayState *ds, c
}
}
+ /*
+ * Combinations we support here:
+ *
+ * - no-auth (clear text, no auth)
+ * - password (clear text, weak auth)
+ * - sasl (encrypt, good auth *IF* using Kerberos via GSSAPI)
+ * - tls (encrypt, weak anonymous creds, no auth)
+ * - tls + password (encrypt, weak anonymous creds, weak auth)
+ * - tls + sasl (encrypt, weak anonymous creds, good auth)
+ * - tls + x509 (encrypt, good x509 creds, no auth)
+ * - tls + x509 + password (encrypt, good x509 creds, weak auth)
+ * - tls + x509 + sasl (encrypt, good x509 creds, good auth)
+ *
+ * NB1. TLS is a stackable auth scheme.
+ * NB2. the x509 schemes have option to validate a client cert dname
+ */
if (password) {
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
if (tls) {
@@ -1990,13 +2154,34 @@ int vnc_display_open(DisplayState *ds, c
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSVNC;
}
} else {
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with password auth\n");
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ } else if (sasl) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
+ if (tls) {
+ vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
+ if (x509) {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 SASL auth\n");
+ vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL;
+ } else {
+ VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with TLS SASL auth\n");
+ vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL;
+ }
+ } else {
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
+ VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with SASL auth\n");
+ vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_SASL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
+ vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
+#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
} else {
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
if (tls) {
@@ -2018,6 +2203,16 @@ int vnc_display_open(DisplayState *ds, c
#endif
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ if ((saslErr = sasl_server_init(NULL, "qemu")) != SASL_OK) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize SASL auth %s",
+ sasl_errstring(saslErr, NULL, NULL));
+ free(vs->display);
+ vs->display = NULL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (reverse) {
/* connect to viewer */
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0)
Index: qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc.h
===================================================================
--- qemu-kvm-0.10.orig/qemu/vnc.h
+++ qemu-kvm-0.10/qemu/vnc.h
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ typedef struct VncDisplay VncDisplay;
#include "vnc-tls.h"
#include "vnc-auth-vencrypt.h"
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+#include "vnc-auth-sasl.h"
+#endif
+
struct VncDisplay
{
@@ -118,10 +122,12 @@ struct VncState
int minor;
char challenge[VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE];
-
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
VncStateTLS tls;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
+ VncStateSASL sasl;
+#endif
Buffer output;
Buffer input;
@@ -160,8 +166,9 @@ enum {
VNC_AUTH_RA2NE = 6,
VNC_AUTH_TIGHT = 16,
VNC_AUTH_ULTRA = 17,
- VNC_AUTH_TLS = 18,
- VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT = 19
+ VNC_AUTH_TLS = 18, /* Supported in GTK-VNC & VINO */
+ VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT = 19, /* Supported in GTK-VNC & VeNCrypt */
+ VNC_AUTH_SASL = 20, /* Supported in GTK-VNC & VINO */
};
enum {
@@ -172,6 +179,8 @@ enum {
VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE = 260,
VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC = 261,
VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN = 262,
+ VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL = 263,
+ VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL = 264,
};
@@ -255,6 +264,8 @@ enum {
void vnc_client_read(void *opaque);
void vnc_client_write(void *opaque);
+long vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen);
+long vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen);
/* Protocol I/O functions */
void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len);
@@ -274,8 +285,22 @@ uint32_t read_u32(uint8_t *data, size_t
/* Protocol stage functions */
void vnc_client_error(VncState *vs);
+int vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, int ret, int last_errno);
void start_client_init(VncState *vs);
void start_auth_vnc(VncState *vs);
+/* Buffer management */
+void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffer, size_t len);
+int buffer_empty(Buffer *buffer);
+uint8_t *buffer_end(Buffer *buffer);
+void buffer_reset(Buffer *buffer);
+void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+
+/* Misc helpers */
+
+char *vnc_socket_local_addr(const char *format, int fd);
+char *vnc_socket_remote_addr(const char *format, int fd);
+
#endif /* __QEMU_VNC_H */