| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| +int |
| +audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) |
| +{ |
| + /* not implemented */ |
| + return 0; |
| +} |
| + |
| void |
| -audit_run_command(const char *command) |
| +audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) |
| { |
| /* not implemented */ |
| } |
| |
| void |
| +audit_count_session_open(void) |
| +{ |
| + /* not necessary */ |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) |
| { |
| /* not implemented */ |
| @@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li |
| /* not implemented */ |
| } |
| |
| +int |
| +audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) |
| +{ |
| + /* not implemented */ |
| +} |
| + |
| void |
| audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) |
| { |
| @@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e |
| debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); |
| } |
| } |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) |
| +{ |
| + /* not implemented */ |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + /* not implemented */ |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh * ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + /* not implemented */ |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + /* not implemented */ |
| +} |
| #endif /* BSM */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "hostfile.h" |
| #include "auth.h" |
| +#include "ssh-gss.h" |
| +#include "monitor_wrap.h" |
| +#include "xmalloc.h" |
| +#include "misc.h" |
| +#include "servconf.h" |
| +#include "ssherr.h" |
| |
| /* |
| * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when |
| @@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ |
| * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. |
| */ |
| extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; |
| +extern ServerOptions options; |
| |
| /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ |
| ssh_audit_event_t |
| @@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) |
| const char * |
| audit_username(void) |
| { |
| - static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; |
| - static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; |
| + static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; |
| |
| - if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) |
| + if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) |
| return (unknownuser); |
| - if (!the_authctxt->valid) |
| - return (invaliduser); |
| return (the_authctxt->user); |
| } |
| |
| @@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) |
| return(event_lookup[i].name); |
| } |
| |
| +void |
| +audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key) |
| +{ |
| + char *fp; |
| + |
| + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); |
| + if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0) |
| + *rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| + free(fp); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what) |
| +{ |
| + PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what)); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) |
| +{ |
| + PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos) |
| +{ |
| + PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid())); |
| +} |
| + |
| # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| /* |
| * Null implementations of audit functions. |
| @@ -138,6 +171,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| + * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, |
| + * audit_session_open. |
| + */ |
| +void |
| +audit_count_session_open(void) |
| +{ |
| + debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), |
| + audit_username()); |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* |
| * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to |
| * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. |
| * |
| @@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li |
| /* |
| * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that |
| * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows |
| - * multiple sessions within a single connection. |
| + * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for |
| + * audit_end_command. |
| */ |
| -void |
| -audit_run_command(const char *command) |
| +int |
| +audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) |
| { |
| debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), |
| audit_username(), command); |
| + return 0; |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* |
| + * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that |
| + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows |
| + * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from |
| + * the corresponding audit_run_command. |
| + */ |
| +void |
| +audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) |
| +{ |
| + debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), |
| + audit_username(), command); |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* |
| + * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. |
| + * |
| + * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. |
| + */ |
| +int |
| +audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) |
| +{ |
| + debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d", |
| + host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), |
| + fp, rv); |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* |
| + * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. |
| + */ |
| +void |
| +audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) |
| +{ |
| + debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* |
| + * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. |
| + */ |
| +void |
| +audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, |
| + uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", |
| + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, |
| + (unsigned)uid); |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* |
| + * This will be called on succesfull session key discard |
| + */ |
| +void |
| +audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", |
| + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); |
| +} |
| + |
| +/* |
| + * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key |
| + */ |
| +void |
| +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", |
| + geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); |
| } |
| # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ |
| #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ |
| # define _SSH_AUDIT_H |
| |
| #include "loginrec.h" |
| +#include "sshkey.h" |
| |
| struct ssh; |
| |
| @@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { |
| SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */ |
| SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN |
| }; |
| + |
| +enum ssh_audit_kex { |
| + SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER, |
| + SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC, |
| + SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION |
| +}; |
| typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; |
| |
| +int listening_for_clients(void); |
| + |
| void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); |
| void audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); |
| +void audit_count_session_open(void); |
| void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); |
| void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); |
| -void audit_run_command(const char *); |
| +int audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *); |
| +void audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *); |
| ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); |
| +int audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); |
| +void audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *); |
| +void audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int); |
| +void audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *); |
| +void audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int); |
| +void audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); |
| +void audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos); |
| +void audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); |
| +void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); |
| |
| #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -33,27 +33,40 @@ |
| |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "audit.h" |
| +#include "sshkey.h" |
| +#include "hostfile.h" |
| +#include "auth.h" |
| +#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ |
| +#include "servconf.h" |
| #include "canohost.h" |
| #include "packet.h" |
| - |
| +#include "cipher.h" |
| +#include "channels.h" |
| +#include "session.h" |
| + |
| +#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 |
| + |
| +extern ServerOptions options; |
| +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; |
| +extern u_int utmp_len; |
| const char *audit_username(void); |
| |
| -int |
| -linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, |
| - const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) |
| +static void |
| +linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, |
| + const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) |
| { |
| int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; |
| |
| if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) { |
| if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || |
| errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) |
| - return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ |
| + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ |
| else |
| - return 0; /* Must prevent login */ |
| + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ |
| } |
| - rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, |
| + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, |
| NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", |
| - username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); |
| + username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success); |
| saved_errno = errno; |
| close(audit_fd); |
| |
| @@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const |
| rc = 0; |
| errno = saved_errno; |
| |
| - return rc >= 0; |
| + if (rc < 0) { |
| +fatal_report: |
| + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| + } |
| +} |
| + |
| +static void |
| +linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, |
| + const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) |
| +{ |
| + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; |
| + static const char *event_name[] = { |
| + "maxtries exceeded", |
| + "root denied", |
| + "success", |
| + "none", |
| + "password", |
| + "challenge-response", |
| + "pubkey", |
| + "hostbased", |
| + "gssapi", |
| + "invalid user", |
| + "nologin", |
| + "connection closed", |
| + "connection abandoned", |
| + "unknown" |
| + }; |
| + |
| + audit_fd = audit_open(); |
| + if (audit_fd < 0) { |
| + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || |
| + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) |
| + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ |
| + else |
| + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ |
| + } |
| + |
| + if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) |
| + event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; |
| + |
| + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, |
| + NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", |
| + username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success); |
| + saved_errno = errno; |
| + close(audit_fd); |
| + /* |
| + * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non |
| + * root user. |
| + */ |
| + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) |
| + rc = 0; |
| + errno = saved_errno; |
| + if (rc < 0) { |
| +fatal_report: |
| + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| + } |
| +} |
| + |
| +int |
| +audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) |
| +{ |
| + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; |
| + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; |
| + |
| + audit_fd = audit_open(); |
| + if (audit_fd < 0) { |
| + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || |
| + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) |
| + return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ |
| + else |
| + return 0; /* Must prevent login */ |
| + } |
| + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased"); |
| + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, |
| + buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); |
| + if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) |
| + goto out; |
| + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp); |
| + rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL, |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); |
| +out: |
| + saved_errno = errno; |
| + audit_close(audit_fd); |
| + errno = saved_errno; |
| + /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ |
| + return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); |
| } |
| |
| +static int user_login_count = 0; |
| + |
| /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ |
| |
| void |
| @@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, |
| /* not implemented */ |
| } |
| |
| +int |
| +audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) |
| +{ |
| + if (!user_login_count++) |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), |
| + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), |
| + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); |
| + return 0; |
| +} |
| + |
| void |
| -audit_run_command(const char *command) |
| +audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) |
| { |
| - /* not implemented */ |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), |
| + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); |
| + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), |
| + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_count_session_open(void) |
| +{ |
| + user_login_count++; |
| } |
| |
| void |
| audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) |
| { |
| - if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL, |
| - li->line, 1) == 0) |
| - fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| + if (!user_login_count++) |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, |
| + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, |
| + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) |
| { |
| - /* not implemented */ |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, |
| + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); |
| + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, |
| + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) |
| { |
| switch(event) { |
| - case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: |
| - case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: |
| case SSH_NOLOGIN: |
| - case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: |
| case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: |
| + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event); |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); |
| break; |
| - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: |
| case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: |
| + if (options.use_pam) |
| + break; |
| + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: |
| case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: |
| case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: |
| case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: |
| case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: |
| + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event); |
| + break; |
| + |
| + case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: |
| + if (user_login_count) { |
| + while (user_login_count--) |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), |
| + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), |
| + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); |
| + } |
| + break; |
| + |
| + case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: |
| case SSH_INVALID_USER: |
| - linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, |
| - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0); |
| + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), |
| + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); |
| break; |
| default: |
| debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) |
| +{ |
| +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION |
| + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; |
| + const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; |
| + char *s; |
| + int audit_fd; |
| + |
| + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", |
| + name[what], ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), |
| + ssh_local_port(ssh)); |
| + free(s); |
| + audit_fd = audit_open(); |
| + if (audit_fd < 0) |
| + /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ |
| + return; |
| + audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, |
| + buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 0); |
| + audit_close(audit_fd); |
| +#endif |
| +} |
| + |
| +const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, |
| + char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION |
| + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; |
| + int audit_fd, audit_ok; |
| + const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); |
| + char *s; |
| + |
| + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", |
| + direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, |
| + (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, |
| + ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ssh_local_port(ssh)); |
| + free(s); |
| + audit_fd = audit_open(); |
| + if (audit_fd < 0) { |
| + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || |
| + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) |
| + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ |
| + else |
| + fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ |
| + } |
| + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, |
| + buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1); |
| + audit_close(audit_fd); |
| + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ |
| + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) |
| + fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ |
| +#endif |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; |
| + int audit_fd, audit_ok; |
| + char *s; |
| + |
| + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", |
| + direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, |
| + ssh_remote_port(ssh), |
| + (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), |
| + ssh_local_port(ssh)); |
| + free(s); |
| + audit_fd = audit_open(); |
| + if (audit_fd < 0) { |
| + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && |
| + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) |
| + error("cannot open audit"); |
| + return; |
| + } |
| + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, |
| + buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1); |
| + audit_close(audit_fd); |
| + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ |
| + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) |
| + error("cannot write into audit"); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; |
| + int audit_fd, audit_ok; |
| + |
| + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", |
| + fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); |
| + audit_fd = audit_open(); |
| + if (audit_fd < 0) { |
| + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && |
| + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) |
| + error("cannot open audit"); |
| + return; |
| + } |
| + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, |
| + buf, NULL, |
| + listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), |
| + NULL, 1); |
| + audit_close(audit_fd); |
| + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ |
| + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) |
| + error("cannot write into audit"); |
| +} |
| #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ |
| +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ |
| + |
| +/* |
| + * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. |
| + * Use is subject to license terms. |
| + * |
| + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| + * are met: |
| + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| + * |
| + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR |
| + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES |
| + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. |
| + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, |
| + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, |
| + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY |
| + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT |
| + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF |
| + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| + * |
| + * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> |
| + */ |
| + |
| +#include <sys/types.h> |
| + |
| +struct ssh; |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int n) |
| +{ |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) |
| +{ |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos) |
| +{ |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| +} |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 |
| } else { |
| /* Invalid user, fake password information */ |
| authctxt->pw = fakepw(); |
| -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| - PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER)); |
| -#endif |
| } |
| #ifdef USE_PAM |
| if (options.use_pam) |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) |
| authenticated = 0; |
| if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser, |
| chost, key)) && |
| - PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, |
| + PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen, |
| sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0) |
| authenticated = 1; |
| |
| @@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done: |
| return authenticated; |
| } |
| |
| +int |
| +hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, |
| + size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, |
| + struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) |
| +{ |
| + int rv; |
| + |
| + rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + audit_key(ssh, 0, &rv, key); |
| +#endif |
| + return rv; |
| +} |
| + |
| /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ |
| int |
| hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) |
| /* test for correct signature */ |
| authenticated = 0; |
| if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) && |
| - PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, |
| + PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen, |
| sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), |
| (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL, |
| ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) { |
| @@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done: |
| return authenticated; |
| } |
| |
| +int |
| +user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, |
| + size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, |
| + struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) |
| +{ |
| + int rv; |
| + |
| + rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + audit_key(ssh, 1, &rv, key); |
| +#endif |
| + return rv; |
| +} |
| + |
| static int |
| match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) |
| { |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha |
| record_failed_login(ssh, user, |
| auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); |
| #endif |
| -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| - audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER); |
| -#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ |
| return (NULL); |
| } |
| if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw)) |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh |
| |
| char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); |
| char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); |
| +int user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, |
| + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); |
| |
| FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); |
| FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); |
| @@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_ty |
| int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); |
| int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, |
| u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *); |
| +int hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, |
| + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); |
| |
| /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */ |
| const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *); |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx { |
| const struct sshcipher *cipher; |
| }; |
| |
| -struct sshcipher { |
| - char *name; |
| - u_int block_size; |
| - u_int key_len; |
| - u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ |
| - u_int auth_len; |
| - u_int flags; |
| -#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) |
| -#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) |
| -#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) |
| -#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) |
| -#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ |
| -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL |
| - const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); |
| -#else |
| - void *ignored; |
| -#endif |
| -}; |
| - |
| static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { |
| #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES |
| @@ -422,7 +403,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx * |
| void |
| cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) |
| { |
| - if (cc == NULL) |
| + if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) |
| return; |
| if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { |
| chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx); |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -47,7 +47,25 @@ |
| #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 |
| #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 |
| |
| -struct sshcipher; |
| +struct sshcipher { |
| + char *name; |
| + u_int block_size; |
| + u_int key_len; |
| + u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ |
| + u_int auth_len; |
| + u_int flags; |
| +#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) |
| +#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) |
| +#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) |
| +#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) |
| +#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ |
| +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL |
| + const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); |
| +#else |
| + void *ignored; |
| +#endif |
| +}; |
| + |
| struct sshcipher_ctx; |
| |
| const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ |
| #include "ssherr.h" |
| #include "sshbuf.h" |
| #include "digest.h" |
| +#include "audit.h" |
| |
| #ifdef GSSAPI |
| #include "ssh-gss.h" |
| @@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| -choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) |
| +choose_enc(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) |
| { |
| char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); |
| |
| - if (name == NULL) |
| + if (name == NULL) { |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); |
| +#endif |
| return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; |
| + } |
| if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) { |
| error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name); |
| free(name); |
| @@ -842,8 +847,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma |
| { |
| char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); |
| |
| - if (name == NULL) |
| + if (name == NULL) { |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC); |
| +#endif |
| return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; |
| + } |
| if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) { |
| error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name); |
| free(name); |
| @@ -856,12 +865,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| -choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) |
| +choose_comp(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) |
| { |
| char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); |
| |
| - if (name == NULL) |
| + if (name == NULL) { |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION); |
| +#endif |
| return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; |
| + } |
| #ifdef WITH_ZLIB |
| if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { |
| comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; |
| @@ -1002,7 +1015,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) |
| nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; |
| nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; |
| ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; |
| - if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], |
| + if ((r = choose_enc(ssh, &newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], |
| sprop[nenc])) != 0) { |
| kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; |
| peer[nenc] = NULL; |
| @@ -1017,7 +1030,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) |
| peer[nmac] = NULL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| - if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], |
| + if ((r = choose_comp(ssh, &newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], |
| sprop[ncomp])) != 0) { |
| kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp]; |
| peer[ncomp] = NULL; |
| @@ -1040,6 +1053,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) |
| dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); |
| dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); |
| dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); |
| + debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + audit_kex(ssh, mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); |
| +#endif |
| } |
| /* XXX need runden? */ |
| kex->we_need = need; |
| @@ -1297,6 +1314,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_cha |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| +static void |
| +enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc) |
| +{ |
| + if (enc == NULL) |
| + return; |
| + |
| + if (enc->key) { |
| + memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); |
| + free(enc->key); |
| + } |
| + |
| + if (enc->iv) { |
| + memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len); |
| + free(enc->iv); |
| + } |
| + |
| + memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys) |
| +{ |
| + if (newkeys == NULL) |
| + return; |
| + |
| + enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); |
| + mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); |
| + memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); |
| +} |
| + |
| /* |
| * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n. |
| * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server. |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); |
| int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); |
| #endif |
| |
| +void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys); |
| + |
| int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); |
| int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, |
| struct sshbuf **); |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) |
| mac->umac_ctx = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| +void |
| +mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac) |
| +{ |
| + if (mac == NULL) |
| + return; |
| + |
| + if (mac->key) { |
| + memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); |
| + free(mac->key); |
| + } |
| + |
| + memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); |
| +} |
| + |
| /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ |
| #define MAC_SEP "," |
| int |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3 |
| int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t, |
| const u_char *, size_t); |
| void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); |
| +void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *); |
| |
| #endif /* SSHMAC_H */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in |
| |
| |
| @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ |
| kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ |
| kexgssc.o \ |
| sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ |
| - sshbuf-io.o |
| + sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o |
| |
| SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o |
| |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ |
| #include "compat.h" |
| #include "ssh2.h" |
| #include "authfd.h" |
| +#include "audit.h" |
| #include "match.h" |
| #include "ssherr.h" |
| #include "sk-api.h" |
| @@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; |
| extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; |
| extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ |
| |
| +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int); |
| + |
| /* State exported from the child */ |
| static struct sshbuf *child_state; |
| |
| @@ -157,6 +160,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh |
| #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); |
| int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); |
| +int mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); |
| +int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); |
| +int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); |
| +int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); |
| +int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); |
| #endif |
| |
| static Authctxt *authctxt; |
| @@ -215,6 +223,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] |
| #endif |
| #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, |
| #endif |
| #ifdef BSD_AUTH |
| {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, |
| @@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 |
| #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, |
| {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, |
| + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, |
| #endif |
| {0, 0, NULL} |
| }; |
| @@ -1444,8 +1461,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int |
| int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0; |
| int encoded_ret; |
| struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; |
| + int type = 0; |
| |
| - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0) |
| @@ -1454,6 +1473,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int |
| if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || |
| !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) |
| fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed"); |
| + if (type != key_blobtype) |
| + fatal_f("bad key type"); |
| |
| /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */ |
| if (*sigalg == '\0') { |
| @@ -1469,14 +1490,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int |
| case MM_USERKEY: |
| valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen); |
| auth_method = "publickey"; |
| + ret = user_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data, |
| + datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); |
| break; |
| case MM_HOSTKEY: |
| valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, |
| hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); |
| auth_method = "hostbased"; |
| + ret = hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data, |
| + datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); |
| break; |
| default: |
| valid_data = 0; |
| + ret = 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (!valid_data) |
| @@ -1488,8 +1514,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int |
| SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) |
| fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); |
| |
| - ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, |
| - sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); |
| debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key), |
| (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified", |
| (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : ""); |
| @@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| -mm_session_close(Session *s) |
| +mm_session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) |
| { |
| debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); |
| if (s->ttyfd != -1) { |
| debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd); |
| session_pty_cleanup2(s); |
| } |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + if (s->command != NULL) { |
| + debug3_f("command %d", s->command_handle); |
| + session_end_command2(ssh, s); |
| + } |
| +#endif |
| session_unused(s->self); |
| } |
| |
| @@ -1649,7 +1679,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, |
| |
| error: |
| if (s != NULL) |
| - mm_session_close(s); |
| + mm_session_close(ssh, s); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0) |
| fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0"); |
| mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); |
| @@ -1668,7 +1698,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, i |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0) |
| fatal_fr(r, "parse tty"); |
| if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) |
| - mm_session_close(s); |
| + mm_session_close(ssh, s); |
| sshbuf_reset(m); |
| free(tty); |
| return (0); |
| @@ -1690,6 +1720,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock |
| sshpam_cleanup(); |
| #endif |
| |
| + destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); |
| + |
| while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) |
| if (errno != EINTR) |
| exit(1); |
| @@ -1736,12 +1768,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, |
| { |
| char *cmd; |
| int r; |
| + Session *s; |
| |
| debug3("%s entering", __func__); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| + |
| /* sanity check command, if so how? */ |
| - audit_run_command(cmd); |
| + s = session_new(); |
| + if (s == NULL) |
| + fatal_f("error allocating a session"); |
| + s->command = cmd; |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + s->command_handle = audit_run_command(ssh, cmd); |
| +#endif |
| + |
| + sshbuf_reset(m); |
| + sshbuf_put_u32(m, s->self); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); |
| + |
| + return (0); |
| +} |
| + |
| +int |
| +mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) |
| +{ |
| + int handle, r; |
| + size_t len; |
| + u_char *cmd = NULL; |
| + Session *s; |
| + |
| + debug3_f("entering"); |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cmd, &len)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + |
| + s = session_by_id(handle); |
| + if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || |
| + strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) |
| + fatal_f("invalid handle"); |
| + mm_session_close(ssh, s); |
| free(cmd); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| @@ -1813,6 +1880,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, |
| void |
| mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) |
| { |
| + struct sshbuf *m; |
| debug3_f("Waiting for new keys"); |
| |
| if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| @@ -1820,6 +1888,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct |
| mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, |
| child_state); |
| debug3_f("GOT new keys"); |
| + |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + m = sshbuf_new(); |
| + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); |
| + mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); |
| + sshbuf_free(m); |
| +#endif |
| + |
| + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ |
| + while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) |
| + ; |
| + |
| } |
| |
| |
| @@ -2111,3 +2192,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ss |
| |
| #endif /* GSSAPI */ |
| |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| +int |
| +mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) |
| +{ |
| + int what, r; |
| + |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &what)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + |
| + audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what); |
| + |
| + sshbuf_reset(m); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); |
| + return 0; |
| +} |
| + |
| +int |
| +mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) |
| +{ |
| + int ctos, r; |
| + char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; |
| + u_int64_t tmp; |
| + pid_t pid; |
| + uid_t uid; |
| + |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &mac, NULL)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &compress, NULL)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pfs, NULL)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + pid = (pid_t) tmp; |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + uid = (pid_t) tmp; |
| + |
| + audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); |
| + |
| + free(cipher); |
| + free(mac); |
| + free(compress); |
| + free(pfs); |
| + sshbuf_reset(m); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); |
| + return 0; |
| +} |
| + |
| +int |
| +mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) |
| +{ |
| + int ctos, r; |
| + u_int64_t tmp; |
| + pid_t pid; |
| + uid_t uid; |
| + |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + pid = (pid_t) tmp; |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + uid = (uid_t) tmp; |
| + |
| + audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, pid, uid); |
| + |
| + sshbuf_reset(m); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); |
| + return 0; |
| +} |
| + |
| +int |
| +mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) |
| +{ |
| + size_t len, r; |
| + char *fp; |
| + u_int64_t tmp; |
| + pid_t pid; |
| + uid_t uid; |
| + |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &fp, &len)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + pid = (pid_t) tmp; |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + uid = (uid_t) tmp; |
| + |
| + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid); |
| + |
| + free(fp); |
| + sshbuf_reset(m); |
| + |
| + return 0; |
| +} |
| +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { |
| MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, |
| MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, |
| MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, |
| - MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, |
| + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, |
| |
| MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151, |
| MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153, |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con |
| */ |
| |
| int |
| -mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, |
| +mm_sshkey_verify(enum mm_keytype type, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, |
| const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat, |
| struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp) |
| { |
| @@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke |
| *sig_detailsp = NULL; |
| if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); |
| - if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0) |
| @@ -569,6 +570,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| +int |
| +mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, |
| + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, |
| + struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) |
| +{ |
| + return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); |
| +} |
| + |
| +int |
| +mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, |
| + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, |
| + struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) |
| +{ |
| + return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); |
| +} |
| + |
| void |
| mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor) |
| { |
| @@ -921,11 +938,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audi |
| sshbuf_free(m); |
| } |
| |
| -void |
| -mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) |
| +int |
| +mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) |
| { |
| struct sshbuf *m; |
| int r; |
| + int handle; |
| |
| debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); |
| |
| @@ -935,6 +953,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command |
| fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| |
| mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); |
| + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); |
| + |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + sshbuf_free(m); |
| + |
| + return (handle); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) |
| +{ |
| + int r; |
| + struct sshbuf *m; |
| + |
| + debug3_f("entering command %s", command); |
| + |
| + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, handle)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, m); |
| sshbuf_free(m); |
| } |
| #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ |
| @@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* GSSAPI */ |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| +void |
| +mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) |
| +{ |
| + int r; |
| + struct sshbuf *m; |
| + |
| + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, what)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); |
| + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, |
| + m); |
| + |
| + sshbuf_free(m); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, |
| + uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + int r; |
| + struct sshbuf *m; |
| + |
| + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, cipher)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, (mac ? mac : "<implicit>"))) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, compress)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fps)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, m); |
| + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, |
| + m); |
| + |
| + sshbuf_free(m); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + int r; |
| + struct sshbuf *m; |
| + |
| + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); |
| + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, |
| + m); |
| + sshbuf_free(m); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) |
| +{ |
| + int r; |
| + struct sshbuf *m; |
| + |
| + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); |
| + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fp)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || |
| + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) |
| + fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); |
| + |
| + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); |
| + sshbuf_free(m); |
| +} |
| +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st |
| struct sshauthopt **); |
| int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *, |
| const char *, struct sshkey *); |
| -int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, |
| +int mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, |
| + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); |
| +int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, |
| const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); |
| |
| #ifdef GSSAPI |
| @@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); |
| #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| #include "audit.h" |
| void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); |
| -void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); |
| +int mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *); |
| +void mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int, const char *); |
| +void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int); |
| +void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); |
| +void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t); |
| +void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); |
| #endif |
| |
| struct Session; |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "xmalloc.h" |
| +#include "audit.h" |
| #include "compat.h" |
| #include "ssh2.h" |
| #include "cipher.h" |
| @@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh |
| return ssh->state->connection_out; |
| } |
| |
| +static int |
| +packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) |
| +{ |
| + return state != NULL && |
| + (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); |
| +} |
| + |
| /* |
| * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned |
| * string must not be freed. |
| @@ -583,22 +591,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss |
| { |
| struct session_state *state = ssh->state; |
| u_int mode; |
| + u_int had_keys = packet_state_has_keys(state); |
| |
| if (!state->initialized) |
| return; |
| state->initialized = 0; |
| - if (do_close) { |
| - if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { |
| - close(state->connection_out); |
| - } else { |
| - close(state->connection_in); |
| - close(state->connection_out); |
| - } |
| - } |
| sshbuf_free(state->input); |
| + state->input = NULL; |
| sshbuf_free(state->output); |
| + state->output = NULL; |
| sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); |
| + state->outgoing_packet = NULL; |
| sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); |
| + state->incoming_packet = NULL; |
| for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { |
| kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */ |
| state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; |
| @@ -634,8 +639,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss |
| #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ |
| cipher_free(state->send_context); |
| cipher_free(state->receive_context); |
| + if (had_keys && state->server_side) { |
| + /* Assuming this is called only from privsep child */ |
| + audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX); |
| + } |
| state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; |
| if (do_close) { |
| + if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { |
| + close(state->connection_out); |
| + } else { |
| + close(state->connection_in); |
| + close(state->connection_out); |
| + } |
| free(ssh->local_ipaddr); |
| ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL; |
| free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); |
| @@ -892,6 +907,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod |
| (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, |
| (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); |
| kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); |
| + audit_session_key_free(ssh, mode); |
| state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; |
| } |
| /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */ |
| @@ -2173,6 +2189,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) |
| return (void *)ssh->state->output; |
| } |
| |
| +static void |
| +newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys) |
| +{ |
| + if (newkeys == NULL) |
| + return; |
| + |
| + free(newkeys->enc.name); |
| + |
| + if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { |
| + mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); |
| + free(newkeys->mac.name); |
| + } |
| + |
| + free(newkeys->comp.name); |
| + |
| + newkeys_destroy(newkeys); |
| + free(newkeys); |
| +} |
| + |
| +static void |
| +packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) |
| +{ |
| + if (state == NULL) |
| + return; |
| + |
| + cipher_free(state->receive_context); |
| + cipher_free(state->send_context); |
| + state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; |
| + |
| + sshbuf_free(state->input); |
| + state->input = NULL; |
| + sshbuf_free(state->output); |
| + state->output = NULL; |
| + sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); |
| + state->outgoing_packet = NULL; |
| + sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); |
| + state->incoming_packet = NULL; |
| + if (state->compression_buffer) { |
| + sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); |
| + state->compression_buffer = NULL; |
| + } |
| + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); |
| + state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; |
| + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); |
| + state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; |
| + mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); |
| +// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; |
| +// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); |
| +} |
| + |
| +void |
| +packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, int audit_it, int privsep) |
| +{ |
| + if (audit_it) |
| + audit_it = packet_state_has_keys(ssh->state); |
| + packet_destroy_state(ssh->state); |
| + if (audit_it) { |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + if (privsep) |
| + audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX); |
| + else |
| + audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, MODE_MAX, getpid(), getuid()); |
| +#endif |
| + } |
| +} |
| + |
| /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ |
| static int |
| ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s |
| # undef EC_POINT |
| #endif |
| |
| +void packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int); |
| #endif /* PACKET_H */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname; |
| extern int debug_flag; |
| extern u_int utmp_len; |
| extern int startup_pipe; |
| -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); |
| +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int); |
| extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; |
| extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; |
| extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */ |
| @@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, |
| /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ |
| close(ttyfd); |
| |
| +#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) && defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS) |
| + /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, |
| + compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely |
| + ugly. */ |
| + if (command != NULL) |
| + audit_count_session_open(); |
| +#endif |
| + |
| /* Enter interactive session. */ |
| s->ptymaster = ptymaster; |
| ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1, |
| @@ -736,15 +744,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con |
| s->self); |
| |
| #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) |
| + fatal("do_exec: command already set"); |
| if (command != NULL) |
| - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); |
| + s->command = xstrdup(command); |
| else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { |
| char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; |
| |
| if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ |
| shell =_PATH_BSHELL; |
| - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); |
| + s->command = xstrdup(shell); |
| } |
| + if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) |
| + s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command)); |
| #endif |
| if (s->ttyfd != -1) |
| ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); |
| @@ -1550,8 +1562,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co |
| sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); |
| |
| /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ |
| - destroy_sensitive_data(); |
| + destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1); |
| ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); |
| + /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the |
| + monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ |
| + packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1); |
| |
| /* Force a password change */ |
| if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { |
| @@ -1763,6 +1778,9 @@ session_unused(int id) |
| sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; |
| sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; |
| sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + sessions[id].command_handle = -1; |
| +#endif |
| sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; |
| sessions_first_unused = id; |
| } |
| @@ -1843,6 +1861,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha |
| } |
| |
| Session * |
| +session_by_id(int id) |
| +{ |
| + if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { |
| + Session *s = &sessions[id]; |
| + if (s->used) |
| + return s; |
| + } |
| + debug_f("unknown id %d", id); |
| + session_dump(); |
| + return NULL; |
| +} |
| + |
| +Session * |
| session_by_tty(char *tty) |
| { |
| int i; |
| @@ -2450,6 +2481,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se |
| chan_write_failed(ssh, c); |
| } |
| |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| +void |
| +session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) |
| +{ |
| + if (s->command != NULL) { |
| + if (s->command_handle != -1) |
| + audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command); |
| + free(s->command); |
| + s->command = NULL; |
| + s->command_handle = -1; |
| + } |
| +} |
| + |
| +static void |
| +session_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) |
| +{ |
| + if (s->command != NULL) { |
| + if (s->command_handle != -1) |
| + PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command)); |
| + free(s->command); |
| + s->command = NULL; |
| + s->command_handle = -1; |
| + } |
| +} |
| +#endif |
| + |
| void |
| session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) |
| { |
| @@ -2463,6 +2520,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session * |
| |
| if (s->ttyfd != -1) |
| session_pty_cleanup(s); |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + if (s->command) |
| + session_end_command(ssh, s); |
| +#endif |
| free(s->term); |
| free(s->display); |
| free(s->x11_chanids); |
| @@ -2537,14 +2598,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh |
| } |
| |
| void |
| -session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *)) |
| +session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(struct ssh *ssh, Session *)) |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { |
| Session *s = &sessions[i]; |
| if (s->used) { |
| if (closefunc != NULL) |
| - closefunc(s); |
| + closefunc(ssh, s); |
| else |
| session_close(ssh, s); |
| } |
| @@ -2671,6 +2732,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc |
| server_loop2(ssh, authctxt); |
| } |
| |
| +static void |
| +do_cleanup_one_session(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) |
| +{ |
| + session_pty_cleanup2(s); |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + session_end_command2(ssh, s); |
| +#endif |
| +} |
| + |
| void |
| do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) |
| { |
| @@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au |
| * or if running in monitor. |
| */ |
| if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) |
| - session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2); |
| + session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session); |
| } |
| |
| /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */ |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session { |
| char *name; |
| char *val; |
| } *env; |
| + |
| + /* exec */ |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + int command_handle; |
| + char *command; |
| +#endif |
| }; |
| |
| void do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); |
| @@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void session_unused(int); |
| int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *); |
| void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int); |
| void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *); |
| -void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *)); |
| +void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *)); |
| void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); |
| +void session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *); |
| |
| Session *session_new(void); |
| +Session *session_by_id(int); |
| Session *session_by_tty(char *); |
| void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *); |
| void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ |
| #include "ssh-gss.h" |
| #endif |
| #include "monitor_wrap.h" |
| +#include "audit.h" |
| #include "ssh-sandbox.h" |
| #include "auth-options.h" |
| #include "version.h" |
| @@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg; |
| struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; |
| |
| /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ |
| -void destroy_sensitive_data(void); |
| -void demote_sensitive_data(void); |
| +void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int); |
| +void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *); |
| static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *); |
| |
| static char *listener_proctitle; |
| @@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) |
| num_listen_socks = -1; |
| } |
| |
| +/* |
| + * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific |
| + * client connection?) |
| + */ |
| +int listening_for_clients(void) |
| +{ |
| + return num_listen_socks >= 0; |
| +} |
| + |
| static void |
| close_startup_pipes(void) |
| { |
| @@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| -/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ |
| +/* |
| + * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, |
| + * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. |
| + */ |
| void |
| -destroy_sensitive_data(void) |
| +destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep) |
| { |
| u_int i; |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + pid_t pid; |
| + uid_t uid; |
| |
| + pid = getpid(); |
| + uid = getuid(); |
| +#endif |
| for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
| if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { |
| + char *fp; |
| + |
| + if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) |
| + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); |
| + else |
| + fp = NULL; |
| sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); |
| sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; |
| + if (fp != NULL) { |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + if (privsep) |
| + PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, |
| + pid, uid)); |
| + else |
| + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, |
| + pid, uid); |
| +#endif |
| + free(fp); |
| + } |
| } |
| - if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { |
| + if (sensitive_data.host_certificates |
| + && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { |
| sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); |
| sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; |
| } |
| @@ -397,20 +434,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void) |
| |
| /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ |
| void |
| -demote_sensitive_data(void) |
| +demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh) |
| { |
| struct sshkey *tmp; |
| u_int i; |
| int r; |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + pid_t pid; |
| + uid_t uid; |
| |
| + pid = getpid(); |
| + uid = getuid(); |
| +#endif |
| for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
| if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { |
| + char *fp; |
| + |
| + if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) |
| + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); |
| + else |
| + fp = NULL; |
| if ((r = sshkey_from_private( |
| sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0) |
| fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key", |
| sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])); |
| sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); |
| sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; |
| + if (fp != NULL) { |
| +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid); |
| +#endif |
| + free(fp); |
| + } |
| } |
| /* Certs do not need demotion */ |
| } |
| @@ -438,7 +493,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void) |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| -privsep_preauth_child(void) |
| +privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh) |
| { |
| gid_t gidset[1]; |
| |
| @@ -453,7 +508,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) |
| reseed_prngs(); |
| |
| /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ |
| - demote_sensitive_data(); |
| + demote_sensitive_data(ssh); |
| |
| #ifdef WITH_SELINUX |
| sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(); |
| @@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) |
| |
| if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) |
| box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); |
| - pid = fork(); |
| + pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); |
| if (pid == -1) { |
| fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); |
| } else if (pid != 0) { |
| @@ -537,7 +592,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) |
| /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ |
| set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); |
| |
| - privsep_preauth_child(); |
| + privsep_preauth_child(ssh); |
| setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); |
| if (box != NULL) |
| ssh_sandbox_child(box); |
| @@ -589,7 +644,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct |
| set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); |
| |
| /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ |
| - demote_sensitive_data(); |
| + demote_sensitive_data(ssh); |
| |
| reseed_prngs(); |
| |
| @@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void) |
| * from this function are in a forked subprocess. |
| */ |
| static void |
| -server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) |
| +server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) |
| { |
| fd_set *fdset; |
| int i, j, ret, maxfd; |
| @@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so |
| if (received_sigterm) { |
| logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", |
| (int) received_sigterm); |
| + destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); |
| close_listen_socks(); |
| if (options.pid_file != NULL) |
| unlink(options.pid_file); |
| @@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ |
| - server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, |
| + server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out, |
| &newsock, config_s); |
| } |
| |
| @@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) |
| do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); |
| |
| /* The connection has been terminated. */ |
| + packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1); |
| + destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1); |
| + |
| ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); |
| verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", |
| (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); |
| @@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) |
| void |
| cleanup_exit(int i) |
| { |
| + static int in_cleanup = 0; |
| + int is_privsep_child; |
| + |
| + /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep |
| + wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse |
| + indefinitely. */ |
| + if (in_cleanup) |
| + _exit(i); |
| + in_cleanup = 1; |
| if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { |
| do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt); |
| if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && |
| @@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| + is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; |
| + if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL) |
| + destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child); |
| + if (the_active_state != NULL) |
| + packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child); |
| #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS |
| /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ |
| - if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) |
| + if (the_active_state != NULL && |
| + (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && |
| + (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) |
| audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); |
| #endif |
| _exit(i); |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c |
| |
| |
| @@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) |
| } |
| |
| int |
| +sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) |
| +{ |
| + switch (k->type) { |
| +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL |
| + case KEY_RSA_CERT: |
| + case KEY_RSA: { |
| + const BIGNUM *d; |
| + RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); |
| + return d != NULL; |
| + } |
| + case KEY_DSA_CERT: |
| + case KEY_DSA: { |
| + const BIGNUM *priv_key; |
| + DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); |
| + return priv_key != NULL; |
| + } |
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC |
| + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: |
| + case KEY_ECDSA: |
| + return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; |
| +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ |
| +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ |
| + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: |
| + case KEY_ED25519: |
| + return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); |
| + default: |
| + /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ |
| + return 0; |
| + } |
| +} |
| + |
| +int |
| sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) |
| { |
| if (k == NULL) |
| diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h |
| |
| |
| @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke |
| int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *); |
| |
| int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); |
| +int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); |
| int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); |
| int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *); |
| int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); |