diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 9a36f1d..420a85b 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
case 1:
revoked:
/* Key revoked */
- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
- "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
+ "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
free(key_fp);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
index 488008f..eca0069 100644
--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -206,16 +206,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+ SSH_FP_HEX);
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
- "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
+ "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
cuser, lookup);
} else {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
- key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",
+ key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
+ fp, cuser, lookup);
}
free(fp);
}
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 0fd27bb..749b11a 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -365,10 +365,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
continue;
if (!key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",
+ file, linenum, key_type(found),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
/*
* If the user has specified a list of principals as
* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
@@ -406,9 +406,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
if (key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
found_key = 1;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
+ key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
free(fp);
break;
}
@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
return 0;
- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
- debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+ debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index 168e1b7..eb98ea8 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -628,6 +628,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
return retval;
}
+enum fp_type
+key_fingerprint_selection(void)
+{
+ static enum fp_type rv;
+ static char rv_defined = 0;
+ char *env;
+
+ if (!rv_defined) {
+ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
+ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
+ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ rv_defined = 1;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+char *
+key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
+{
+ return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);
+}
+
+char *
+key_fingerprint_prefix(void)
+{
+ return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";
+}
+
/*
* Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
* the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index d8ad13d..0e3eea5 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *);
int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
+enum fp_type key_fingerprint_selection(void);
+char *key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
+char *key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
const char *key_type(const Key *);
const char *key_cert_type(const Key *);
int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index 3421452..691949f 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -330,10 +330,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
had_identities = 1;
if (do_fp) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_HEX);
- printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
- key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",
+ key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
+ fp, comment, key_type(key));
free(fp);
} else {
if (!key_write(key, stdout))
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
index ba24612..117fdde 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
char *p;
int ret = -1;
- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
- id->comment, p))
+ p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",
+ id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))
ret = 0;
free(p);
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 2a316bc..482dc1c 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -783,13 +783,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f;
Key *public;
- char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
+ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;
int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
enum fp_rep rep;
enum fp_type fptype;
struct stat st;
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
+ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
if (!have_identity)
@@ -801,8 +802,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
if (public != NULL) {
fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,
key_type(public));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
@@ -867,8 +868,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
}
comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,
comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
@@ -986,13 +987,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)
if (print_fingerprint) {
enum fp_rep rep;
enum fp_type fptype;
- char *fp, *ra;
+ char *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
+ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+
fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,
key_type(public));
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
@@ -1878,16 +1881,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
key_cert_type(key));
- printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
- printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n",
- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
+ printf(" Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
+ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",
+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);
printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
if (!v00) {
printf(" Serial: %llu\n",
@@ -2686,13 +2690,12 @@ passphrase_again:
fclose(f);
if (!quiet) {
- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
identity_file);
printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
- printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+ printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);
printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 573d7a8..394cca8 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -914,10 +914,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
"key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
"of known hosts.", type, ip);
} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
@@ -955,9 +955,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
else
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
/* The default */
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
msg2[0] = '\0';
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
if (matching_host_key_dns)
@@ -972,10 +971,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
"established%s\n"
- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
+ "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"
"Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
"(yes/no)? ",
- host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+ host, ip, msg1, type,
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
msg2);
@@ -1220,8 +1220,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
int flags = 0;
char *fp;
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
free(fp);
/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
@@ -1327,14 +1328,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)
continue;
if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
continue;
- fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
"in %s:%lu\n"
- "%s key fingerprint %s.",
+ "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",
key_type(found->key),
found->host, found->file, found->line,
- key_type(found->key), fp);
+ key_type(found->key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
if (options.visual_host_key)
logit("%s", ra);
free(ra);
@@ -1349,7 +1351,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
{
char *fp;
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
@@ -1357,8 +1359,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
- key_type(host_key), fp);
+ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",
+ key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
error("Please contact your system administrator.");
free(fp);
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 7f4ff41..adbbfc7 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
free(fp);
/*
@@ -986,8 +987,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
int have_sig = 1;
char *fp;
- fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
free(fp);
if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {