
=head1 НАЗВА

guestfs-security - security of libguestfs

=head1 ОПИС

This manual page discusses security implications of using libguestfs,
particularly with untrusted or malicious guests or disk images.

=head1 ЗВІТУВАННЯ ЩОДО ПРОБЛЕМ ІЗ БЕЗПЕКОЮ

If you wish to privately report a security issue, please follow the Red Hat
security procedure at L<https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact>

If the security problem is not so serious, you can simply file a bug (see
L</BUGS> below), or send an email to our mailing list
(L<https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libguestfs>).  You do not need to
subscribe to the mailing list to send email, but there will be a delay while
the message is moderated.

=head1 ЗАГАЛЬНІ ВАДИ

=head2 Захист змонтованих файлових систем

You should never mount an untrusted guest filesystem directly on your host
kernel (eg. using loopback or kpartx).

When you mount a filesystem, mistakes in the kernel filesystem (VFS)  can be
escalated into exploits by attackers creating a malicious filesystem.  These
exploits are very severe for two reasons.  Firstly there are very many
filesystem drivers in the kernel, and many of them are infrequently used and
not much developer attention has been paid to the code.  Linux userspace
helps potential crackers by detecting the filesystem type and automatically
choosing the right VFS driver, even if that filesystem type is unexpected.
Secondly, a kernel-level exploit is like a local root exploit (worse in some
ways), giving immediate and total access to the system right down to the
hardware level.

Ці вразливості могли бути присутніми у ядрі доволі довго
(L<https://lwn.net/Articles/538898/>).

Libguestfs provides a layered approach to protecting you from exploits:

   untrusted filesystem
 --------------------------------------
   appliance kernel
 --------------------------------------
   qemu process running as non-root
 --------------------------------------
   sVirt [if using libvirt + SELinux]
 --------------------------------------
   host kernel

We run a Linux kernel inside a qemu virtual machine, usually running as a
non-root user.  The attacker would need to write a filesystem which first
exploited the kernel, and then exploited either qemu virtualization (eg. a
faulty qemu driver) or the libguestfs protocol, and finally to be as serious
as the host kernel exploit it would need to escalate its privileges to
root.  Additionally if you use the libvirt back end and SELinux, sVirt is
used to confine the qemu process.  This multi-step escalation, performed by
a static piece of data, is thought to be extremely hard to do, although we
never say 'never' about security issues.

Callers can also reduce the attack surface by forcing the filesystem type
when mounting (use L<guestfs(3)/guestfs_mount_vfs>).

=head2 Загальні зауваження щодо захисту

Be careful with any files or data that you download from a guest (by
"download" we mean not just the L<guestfs(3)/guestfs_download> command but
any command that reads files, filenames, directories or anything else from a
disk image).  An attacker could manipulate the data to fool your program
into doing the wrong thing.  Consider cases such as:

=over 4

=item *

the data (file etc) not being present

=item *

being present but empty

=item *

being much larger than normal

=item *

containing arbitrary 8 bit data

=item *

being in an unexpected character encoding

=item *

containing homoglyphs.

=back

=head2 Захист протоколу

The protocol is designed to be secure, being based on RFC 4506 (XDR)  with a
defined upper message size.  However a program that uses libguestfs must
also take care - for example you can write a program that downloads a binary
from a disk image and executes it locally, and no amount of protocol
security will save you from the consequences.

=head2 Inspection security

Parts of the inspection API (see L<guestfs(3)/INSPECTION>) return untrusted
strings directly from the guest, and these could contain any 8 bit data.
Callers should be careful to escape these before printing them to a
structured file (for example, use HTML escaping if creating a web page).

Guest configuration may be altered in unusual ways by the administrator of
the virtual machine, and may not reflect reality (particularly for untrusted
or actively malicious guests).  For example we parse the hostname from
configuration files like F</etc/sysconfig/network> that we find in the
guest, but the guest administrator can easily manipulate these files to
provide the wrong hostname.

The inspection API parses guest configuration using two external libraries:
Augeas (Linux configuration) and hivex (Windows Registry).  Both are
designed to be robust in the face of malicious data, although denial of
service attacks are still possible, for example with oversized configuration
files.

=head2 Запуск незахищених команд гостьової системи

Be very cautious about running commands from the guest.  By running a
command in the guest, you are giving CPU time to a binary that you do not
control, under the same user account as the library, albeit wrapped in qemu
virtualization.  More information and alternatives can be found in
L<guestfs(3)/RUNNING COMMANDS>.

=head1 HISTORICAL SECURITY ISSUES IN LIBGUESTFS

=head2 CVE-2010-3851

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/642934>

This security bug concerns the automatic disk format detection that qemu
does on disk images.

A raw disk image is just the raw bytes, there is no header.  Other disk
images like qcow2 contain a special header.  Qemu deals with this by looking
for one of the known headers, and if none is found then assuming the disk
image must be raw.

This allows a guest which has been given a raw disk image to write some
other header.  At next boot (or when the disk image is accessed by
libguestfs) qemu would do autodetection and think the disk image format was,
say, qcow2 based on the header written by the guest.

This in itself would not be a problem, but qcow2 offers many features, one
of which is to allow a disk image to refer to another image (called the
"backing disk").  It does this by placing the path to the backing disk into
the qcow2 header.  This path is not validated and could point to any host
file (eg. "/etc/passwd").  The backing disk is then exposed through "holes"
in the qcow2 disk image, which of course is completely under the control of
the attacker.

In libguestfs this is rather hard to exploit except under two circumstances:

=over 4

=item 1.

You have enabled the network or have opened the disk in write mode.

=item 2.

You are also running untrusted code from the guest (see L<guestfs(3)/RUNNING
COMMANDS>).

=back

The way to avoid this is to specify the expected disk format when adding
disks (the optional C<format> option to
L<guestfs(3)/guestfs_add_drive_opts>).  You should always do this if the
disk is raw format, and it's a good idea for other cases too.  (See also
L<guestfs(3)/DISK IMAGE FORMATS>).

For disks added from libvirt using calls like
L<guestfs(3)/guestfs_add_domain>, the format is fetched from libvirt and
passed through.

For libguestfs tools, use the I<--format> command line parameter as
appropriate.

=head2 CVE-2011-4127

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/752375>

This is a bug in the kernel which allowed guests to overwrite parts of the
host's drives which they should not normally have access to.

It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version E<ge> 1.16 which
contains a change that mitigates the problem.

=head2 CVE-2012-2690

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/831117>

Old versions of both virt-edit and the guestfish C<edit> command created a
new file containing the changes but did not set the permissions, etc of the
new file to match the old one.  The result of this was that if you edited a
security sensitive file such as F</etc/shadow> then it would be left
world-readable after the edit.

It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version E<ge> 1.16.

=head2 CVE-2013-2124

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/968306>

This security bug was a flaw in inspection where an untrusted guest using a
specially crafted file in the guest OS could cause a double-free in the C
library (denial of service).

It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not vulnerable:
libguestfs E<ge> 1.20.8, E<ge> 1.22.2 or E<ge> 1.23.2.

=head2 CVE-2013-4419

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1016960>

When using the L<guestfish(1)> I<--remote> or guestfish I<--listen> options,
guestfish would create a socket in a known location
(F</tmp/.guestfish-$UID/socket-$PID>).

The location has to be a known one in order for both ends to communicate.
However no checking was done that the containing directory
(F</tmp/.guestfish-$UID>) is owned by the user.  Thus another user could
create this directory and potentially hijack sockets owned by another user's
guestfish client or server.

It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not vulnerable:
libguestfs E<ge> 1.20.12, E<ge> 1.22.7 or E<ge> 1.24.

=head2 Denial of service when inspecting disk images with corrupt btrfs volumes

It was possible to crash libguestfs (and programs that use libguestfs as a
library) by presenting a disk image containing a corrupt btrfs volume.

This was caused by a NULL pointer dereference causing a denial of service,
and is not thought to be exploitable any further.

See commit d70ceb4cbea165c960710576efac5a5716055486 for the fix.  This fix
is included in libguestfs stable branches S<E<ge> 1.26.0>, S<E<ge> 1.24.6>
and S<E<ge> 1.22.8>, and also in RHEL S<E<ge> 7.0>.  Earlier versions of
libguestfs are not vulnerable.

=head2 CVE-2014-0191

Libguestfs previously used unsafe libxml2 APIs for parsing libvirt XML.
These APIs defaulted to allowing network connections to be made when certain
XML documents were presented.  Using a malformed XML document it was also
possible to exhaust all CPU, memory or file descriptors on the machine.

Since the libvirt XML comes from a trusted source (the libvirt daemon)  it
is not thought that this could have been exploitable.

This was fixed in libguestfs E<ge> 1.27.9 and the fix was backported to
stable versions E<ge> 1.26.2, E<ge> 1.24.9, E<ge> 1.22.10 and E<ge> 1.20.13.

=head2 Shellshock (bash CVE-2014-6271)

This bash bug indirectly affects libguestfs.  For more information see:
L<https://www.redhat.com/archives/libguestfs/2014-September/msg00252.html>

=head2 CVE-2014-8484

=head2 CVE-2014-8485

These two bugs in binutils affect the GNU L<strings(1)> program, and thus
the L<guestfs(3)/guestfs_strings> and L<guestfs(3)/guestfs_strings_e> APIs
in libguestfs.  Running strings on an untrusted file could cause arbitrary
code execution (confined to the libguestfs appliance).

In libguestfs E<ge> 1.29.5 and E<ge> 1.28.3, libguestfs uses the C<strings>
I<-a> option to avoid BFD parsing on the file.

=head2 CVE-2015-5745

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1251157>

This is not a vulnerability in libguestfs, but because we always give a
virtio-serial port to each guest (since that is how guest-host communication
happens), an escalation from the appliance to the host qemu process is
possible.  This could affect you if:

=over 4

=item *

your libguestfs program runs untrusted programs out of the guest (using
L<guestfs(3)/guestfs_sh> etc), or

=item *

another exploit was found in (for example) kernel filesystem code that
allowed a malformed filesystem to take over the appliance.

=back

If you use sVirt to confine qemu, that would thwart some attacks.

=head2 Права доступу до F<.ssh> і F<.ssh/authorized_keys>

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1260778>

The tools L<virt-customize(1)>, L<virt-sysprep(1)> and L<virt-builder(1)>
have an I<--ssh-inject> option for injecting an SSH key into virtual machine
disk images.  They may create a F<~user/.ssh> directory and
F<~user/.ssh/authorized_keys> file in the guest to do this.

In libguestfs E<lt> 1.31.5 and libguestfs E<lt> 1.30.2, the new directory
and file would get mode C<0755> and mode C<0644> respectively.  However
these permissions (especially for F<~user/.ssh>) are wider than the
permissions that OpenSSH uses.  In current libguestfs, the directory and
file are created with mode C<0700> and mode C<0600>.

=head2 CVE-2015-8869

L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2015-8869>

This vulnerability in OCaml might affect virt tools written in the OCaml
programming language.  It affects only 64 bit platforms.  Because this bug
affects code generation it is difficult to predict which precise software
could be affected, and therefore our recommendation is that you recompile
libguestfs using a version of the OCaml compiler where this bug has been
fixed (or ask your Linux distro to do the same).

=head2 CVE-2017-5208, CVE-2017-5331, CVE-2017-5332, CVE-2017-5333, CVE-2017-6009,
CVE-2017-6010, CVE-2017-6011

Multiple vulnerabilities in the L<wrestool(1)> program in the C<icoutils>
package can be exploited for local code execution on the host.

When libguestfs inspection (see L</Inspection security> above) detects a
Windows XP or Windows 7 guest and is asked to find an associated icon for
the guest, it will download an untrusted file from the guest and run
C<wrestool -x> on that file.  This can lead to local code execution on the
host.  Any disk image or guest can be crafted to look like a Windows guest
to libguestfs inspection, so just because you do not have Windows guests
does not help.

Any program calling the libguestfs API C<guestfs_inspect_get_icon> could be
vulnerable.  This includes L<virt-inspector(1)> and L<virt-manager(1)>.

The solution is to update to the non-vulnerable version of icoutils (at
least 0.31.1).

=head2 CVE-2017-7244, CVE-2017-7245, CVE-2017-7246

Multiple vulnerabilities in PCRE could be exploited to crash libguestfs
(ie. cause a denial of service) when performing inspection on an untrusted
virtual machine.

The solution is to update to a version of PCRE with these bugs fixed
(upstream version E<ge> 8.41).

=head1 ТАКОЖ ПЕРЕГЛЯНЬТЕ

L<guestfs(3)>, L<guestfs-internals(1)>, L<guestfs-release-notes(1)>,
L<guestfs-testing(1)>, L<http://libguestfs.org/>.

=head1 АВТОРИ

Richard W.M. Jones (C<rjones at redhat dot com>)

=head1 АВТОРСЬКІ ПРАВА

Copyright (C) 2009-2017 Red Hat Inc.

