diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e5ebb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
+
+GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
+fail somewhere.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
+     xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
+     status = Success;
+     str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
+-    if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status))  /* keymap, unsupported */
+-        return BadMatch;
++    {
++        char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);  /* keymap, unsupported */
++        if (keymap) {
++            free(keymap);
++            return BadMatch;
++        }
++    }
+     names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+     names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+-    if (status != Success)
++    if (status == Success) {
++        len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
++        if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
++            status = BadLength;
++    }
++
++    if (status != Success) {
++        free(names.keycodes);
++        free(names.types);
++        free(names.compat);
++        free(names.symbols);
++        free(names.geometry);
+         return status;
+-    len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
+-    if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
+-        return BadLength;
++    }
+ 
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+-- 
+2.38.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d358a32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length
+ attacks
+
+GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
+request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
+field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
+swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
+     CARD16 len;
+ 
+     wire = *wire_inout;
++
++    if (client->req_len <
++        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
++        return BadValue;
++
+     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
+     if (client->swapped) {
+         swaps(&len);
+-- 
+2.38.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/xorg-x11-server.spec b/SPECS/xorg-x11-server.spec
index e1fcf92..64b1b8e 100644
--- a/SPECS/xorg-x11-server.spec
+++ b/SPECS/xorg-x11-server.spec
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 Summary:   X.Org X11 X server
 Name:      xorg-x11-server
 Version:   1.20.4
-Release:   18%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}}%{?dist}
+Release:   19%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}}%{?dist}
 URL:       http://www.x.org
 License:   MIT
 Group:     User Interface/X
@@ -164,6 +164,10 @@ Patch10012: 0004-render-Fix-out-of-bounds-access-in-SProcRenderCompos.patch
 Patch10013: 0001-xkb-switch-to-array-index-loops-to-moving-pointers.patch
 Patch10014: 0002-xkb-swap-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck.patch
 Patch10015: 0003-xkb-add-request-length-validation-for-XkbSetGeometry.patch
+# CVE-2022-3550
+Patch10016: 0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
+# CVE-2022-3551
+Patch10017: 0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
 
 %global moduledir	%{_libdir}/xorg/modules
 %global drimoduledir	%{_libdir}/dri
@@ -646,6 +650,10 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %{xserver_source_dir}
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Nov  9 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 1.20.4-19
+- CVE fix for: CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551
+  Resolves: rhbz#2140765, rhbz#2140770
+
 * Mon Jul 25 2022 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 1.20.4-18
 - CVE fix for: CVE-2022-2319/ZDI-CAN-16062, CVE-2022-2320/ZDI-CAN-16070
   Resolves: rhbz#2109031, rhbz#2109033