diff --git a/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..226b35a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 9ef80b3..c741b5f 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ char ZCONST Far TruncNTSD[] = + #ifndef SFX + static ZCONST char Far InconsistEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ + EF block length (%u bytes) exceeds remaining EF data (%u bytes)\n"; ++ static ZCONST char Far TooSmallEBlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ ++ EF block length (%u bytes) invalid (< %d)\n"; + static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] = + " invalid compressed data for EAs\n"; + # if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS)) +@@ -2020,7 +2022,8 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len) + ebID = makeword(ef); + ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN); + +- if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { ++ if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { + /* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ + if (uO.qflag) + Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ", +@@ -2155,11 +2158,29 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len) + } + break; + case EF_PKVMS: +- if (makelong(ef+EB_HEADSIZE) != +- crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ef+(EB_HEADSIZE+4), +- (extent)(ebLen-4))) +- Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs))); ++ /* 2015-01-30 SMS. Added sufficient-bytes test/message ++ * here. (Removed defective ebLen test above.) ++ * ++ * If sufficient bytes (EB_PKVMS_MINLEN) are available, ++ * then compare the stored CRC value with the calculated ++ * CRC for the remainder of the data (and complain about ++ * a mismatch). ++ */ ++ if (ebLen < EB_PKVMS_MINLEN) ++ { ++ /* Insufficient bytes available. */ ++ Info( slide, 1, ++ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString( TooSmallEBlength), ++ ebLen, EB_PKVMS_MINLEN)); ++ } ++ else if (makelong(ef+ EB_HEADSIZE) != ++ crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ++ (ef+ EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_PKVMS_MINLEN), ++ (extent)(ebLen- EB_PKVMS_MINLEN))) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs))); ++ } + break; + case EF_PKW32: + case EF_PKUNIX: +diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h +index 005cee0..5c83a6e 100644 +--- a/unzpriv.h ++++ b/unzpriv.h +@@ -1806,6 +1806,8 @@ + #define EB_NTSD_VERSION 4 /* offset of NTSD version byte */ + #define EB_NTSD_MAX_VER (0) /* maximum version # we know how to handle */ + ++#define EB_PKVMS_MINLEN 4 /* minimum data length of PKVMS extra block */ ++ + #define EB_ASI_CRC32 0 /* offset of ASI Unix field's crc32 checksum */ + #define EB_ASI_MODE 4 /* offset of ASI Unix permission mode field */ + + diff --git a/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9eba92 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index c741b5f..e4a4c7b 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2240,10 +2240,17 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ + ++ /* Return no/bad-data error status if any problem is found: ++ * 1. eb_size is too small to hold the uncompressed size ++ * (eb_ucsize). (Else extract eb_ucsize.) ++ * 2. eb_ucsize is zero (invalid). 2014-12-04 SMS. ++ * 3. eb_ucsize is positive, but eb_size is too small to hold ++ * the compressed data header. ++ */ + if ((eb_size < (EB_UCSIZE_P + 4)) || +- ((eb_ucsize = makelong(eb+(EB_HEADSIZE+EB_UCSIZE_P))) > 0L && +- eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) +- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ ++ ((eb_ucsize = makelong( eb+ (EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_UCSIZE_P))) == 0L) || ++ ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))) ++ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */ + + method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); + if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize)) diff --git a/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d730766 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c +index 03fc4be..2a61a30 100644 +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTrunc[] = + #endif + static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] = + "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] = ++ "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n"; + + #ifdef WINDLL + static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] = +@@ -2295,7 +2295,13 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* return PK-type error code */ + if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0) + return PK_EOF; + /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */ +- getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length); ++ if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64)); ++ error = PK_WARN; ++ } ++ + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT + G.unipath_filename = NULL; + if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) { +diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index be6e006..0d57ab4 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -1894,48 +1894,83 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + and a 4-byte version of disk start number. + Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever, + but it means that this procedure is only called in one place. ++ ++ 2014-12-05 SMS. ++ Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling ++ makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with ++ simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend ++ on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now ++ stay within the buffer. + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + ++#define Z64FLGS 0xffff ++#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff ++ + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; + + Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n", + ef_len)); + +- while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) { ++ while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) ++ { + eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf); + eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf); + +- if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { +- /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ ++ if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { ++ /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */ + Trace((stderr, + "getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len, + ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)); + break; + } +- if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) { + ++ if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) ++ { + int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; + +- if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize); ++ if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize); ++ ++ if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 4 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start); ++ offset += 4; + } ++#if 0 ++ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */ ++#endif /* 0 */ + } + +- /* Skip this extra field block */ ++ /* Skip this extra field block. */ + ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-9636.patch b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-9636.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..228c283 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-9636.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index a0a4929..9ef80b3 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) + ulg eb_ucsize; + uch *eb_ucptr; + int r; ++ ush method; + + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ +@@ -2223,6 +2224,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) + eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) + return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ + ++ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); ++ if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize)) ++ return PK_ERR; /* compressed & uncompressed ++ * should match in STORED ++ * method */ ++ + if ( + #ifdef INT_16BIT + (((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) || diff --git a/SPECS/unzip.spec b/SPECS/unzip.spec index e17de65..017ae2a 100644 --- a/SPECS/unzip.spec +++ b/SPECS/unzip.spec @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ Summary: A utility for unpacking zip files Name: unzip Version: 6.0 -Release: 14%{?dist} +Release: 15%{?dist} License: BSD Group: Applications/Archiving Source: http://downloads.sourceforge.net/infozip/unzip60.tar.gz @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ Patch7: unzip-6.0-fix-recmatch.patch Patch8: unzip-6.0-manpageandusage.patch # downstream patch - repair file mach.c Patch9: unzip-6.0-caseinsensitive.patch +Patch10: unzip-6.0-cve-2014-9636.patch +Patch11: unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch +Patch12: unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch +Patch13: unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch URL: http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html BuildRequires: bzip2-devel @@ -51,6 +55,11 @@ a zip archive. %patch7 -p1 -b .recmatch %patch8 -p1 -b .usage %patch9 -p1 -b .caseinsensitive +%patch10 -p1 -b .cve-2014-9636.patch +%patch11 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8139.patch +%patch12 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8140.patch +%patch13 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8141.patch + %build make -f unix/Makefile CF_NOOPT="-I. -DUNIX $RPM_OPT_FLAGS" generic_gcc %{?_smp_mflags} @@ -66,6 +75,10 @@ make -f unix/Makefile prefix=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix} MANDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{ %{_mandir}/*/* %changelog +* Wed Feb 25 2015 Petr Stodulka - 6.0-15 +- Fix CVE-2014-9636 CVE-2014-8139 CVE-2014-8140 CVE-2014-8141 + Resolves: #1196134 #1196122 #1196126 #1196130 + * Tue Jul 22 2014 Petr Stodulka - 6.0-14 - Fix caseinsensitive bug Resolves: #1104018