diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a64c75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 96798fc1967491c80a4d0c8d9e0a80586cb2152b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:51:45 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Xi: ProcXIGetSelectedEvents needs to use unswapped length
+ to send reply
+
+CVE-2024-31080
+
+Reported-by: https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=69762
+Fixes: 53e821ab4 ("Xi: add request processing for XIGetSelectedEvents.")
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
+---
+ Xi/xiselectev.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiselectev.c b/Xi/xiselectev.c
+index edcb8a0d3..ac1494987 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiselectev.c
++++ b/Xi/xiselectev.c
+@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client)
+ InputClientsPtr others = NULL;
+ xXIEventMask *evmask = NULL;
+ DeviceIntPtr dev;
++ uint32_t length;
+
+ REQUEST(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq);
+ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq);
+@@ -418,10 +419,12 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client)
+ }
+ }
+
++ /* save the value before SRepXIGetSelectedEvents swaps it */
++ length = reply.length;
+ WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xXIGetSelectedEventsReply), &reply);
+
+ if (reply.num_masks)
+- WriteToClient(client, reply.length * 4, buffer);
++ WriteToClient(client, length * 4, buffer);
+
+ free(buffer);
+ return Success;
+--
+2.44.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e061f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 3e77295f888c67fc7645db5d0c00926a29ffecee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:56:27 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Xi: ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice needs to use unswapped length
+ to send reply
+
+CVE-2024-31081
+
+Fixes: d220d6907 ("Xi: add GrabButton and GrabKeysym code.")
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
+---
+ Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+index c9ac2f855..896233bec 100644
+--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
++++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+ GrabParameters param;
+ void *tmp;
+ int mask_len;
++ uint32_t length;
+
+ REQUEST(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq);
+ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq,
+@@ -247,9 +248,11 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
+ }
+ }
+
++ /* save the value before SRepXIPassiveGrabDevice swaps it */
++ length = rep.length;
+ WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
+ if (rep.num_modifiers)
+- WriteToClient(client, rep.length * 4, modifiers_failed);
++ WriteToClient(client, length * 4, modifiers_failed);
+
+ out:
+ free(modifiers_failed);
+--
+2.44.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df0a498
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 6c684d035c06fd41c727f0ef0744517580864cef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 19:07:34 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Xquartz: ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap needs to use unswapped
+ length to send reply
+
+CVE-2024-31082
+
+Fixes: 14205ade0 ("XQuartz: appledri: Fix byte swapping in replies")
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
+---
+ hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c b/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c
+index 77574655b..40422b61a 100644
+--- a/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c
++++ b/hw/xquartz/xpr/appledri.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
+ xAppleDRICreatePixmapReply rep;
+ int width, height, pitch, bpp;
+ void *ptr;
++ CARD32 stringLength;
+
+ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xAppleDRICreatePixmapReq);
+
+@@ -307,6 +308,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
+ if (sizeof(rep) != sz_xAppleDRICreatePixmapReply)
+ ErrorF("error sizeof(rep) is %zu\n", sizeof(rep));
+
++ stringLength = rep.stringLength; /* save unswapped value */
+ if (client->swapped) {
+ swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
+ swapl(&rep.length);
+@@ -319,7 +321,7 @@ ProcAppleDRICreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
+ }
+
+ WriteToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
+- WriteToClient(client, rep.stringLength, path);
++ WriteToClient(client, stringLength, path);
+
+ return Success;
+ }
+--
+2.44.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..549f90a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 337d8d48b618d4fc0168a7b978be4c3447650b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 15:24:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] render: Avoid possible double-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs()
+
+ProcRenderAddGlyphs() adds the glyph to the glyphset using AddGlyph() and
+then frees it using FreeGlyph() to decrease the reference count, after
+AddGlyph() has increased it.
+
+AddGlyph() however may chose to reuse an existing glyph if it's already
+in the glyphSet, and free the glyph that was given, in which case the
+caller function, ProcRenderAddGlyphs() will call FreeGlyph() on an
+already freed glyph, as reported by ASan:
+
+ READ of size 4 thread T0
+ #0 in FreeGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:252
+ #1 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1174
+ #2 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
+ #3 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
+ #4 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
+ #5 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
+ #6 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
+ #7 (/usr/bin/Xwayland+0x44fe4)
+ Address is located 0 bytes inside of 64-byte region
+ freed by thread T0 here:
+ #0 in __interceptor_free libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:52
+ #1 in _dixFreeObjectWithPrivates xserver/dix/privates.c:538
+ #2 in AddGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:295
+ #3 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1173
+ #4 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
+ #5 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
+ #6 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
+ #7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
+ previously allocated by thread T0 here:
+ #0 in __interceptor_malloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
+ #1 in AllocateGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:355
+ #2 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1085
+ #3 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
+ #4 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
+ #5 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
+ #6 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
+ SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free xserver/render/glyph.c:252 in FreeGlyph
+
+To avoid that, make sure not to free the given glyph in AddGlyph().
+
+v2: Simplify the test using the boolean returned from AddGlyph() (Michel)
+v3: Simplify even more by not freeing the glyph in AddGlyph() (Peter)
+
+Fixes: bdca6c3d1 - render: fix refcounting of glyphs during ProcRenderAddGlyphs
+Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/issues/1659
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1476>
+---
+ render/glyph.c | 2 --
+ 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c
+index 13991f8a1..5fa7f3b5b 100644
+--- a/render/glyph.c
++++ b/render/glyph.c
+@@ -291,8 +291,6 @@ AddGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, GlyphPtr glyph, Glyph id)
+ gr = FindGlyphRef(&globalGlyphs[glyphSet->fdepth], signature,
+ TRUE, glyph->sha1);
+ if (gr->glyph && gr->glyph != DeletedGlyph && gr->glyph != glyph) {
+- FreeGlyphPicture(glyph);
+- dixFreeObjectWithPrivates(glyph, PRIVATE_GLYPH);
+ glyph = gr->glyph;
+ }
+ else if (gr->glyph != glyph) {
+--
+2.44.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcbf337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From bdca6c3d1f5057eeb31609b1280fc93237b00c77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:13:35 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] render: fix refcounting of glyphs during
+ ProcRenderAddGlyphs
+
+Previously, AllocateGlyph would return a new glyph with refcount=0 and a
+re-used glyph would end up not changing the refcount at all. The
+resulting glyph_new array would thus have multiple entries pointing to
+the same non-refcounted glyphs.
+
+AddGlyph may free a glyph, resulting in a UAF when the same glyph
+pointer is then later used.
+
+Fix this by returning a refcount of 1 for a new glyph and always
+incrementing the refcount for a re-used glyph, followed by dropping that
+refcount back down again when we're done with it.
+
+CVE-2024-31083, ZDI-CAN-22880
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
+---
+ render/glyph.c | 5 +++--
+ render/glyphstr_priv.h | 1 +
+ render/render.c | 15 +++++++++++----
+ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c
+index 850ea8440..13991f8a1 100644
+--- a/render/glyph.c
++++ b/render/glyph.c
+@@ -245,10 +245,11 @@ FreeGlyphPicture(GlyphPtr glyph)
+ }
+ }
+
+-static void
++void
+ FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format)
+ {
+ CheckDuplicates(&globalGlyphs[format], "FreeGlyph");
++ BUG_RETURN(glyph->refcnt == 0);
+ if (--glyph->refcnt == 0) {
+ GlyphRefPtr gr;
+ int i;
+@@ -354,7 +355,7 @@ AllocateGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi, int fdepth)
+ glyph = (GlyphPtr) malloc(size);
+ if (!glyph)
+ return 0;
+- glyph->refcnt = 0;
++ glyph->refcnt = 1;
+ glyph->size = size + sizeof(xGlyphInfo);
+ glyph->info = *gi;
+ dixInitPrivates(glyph, (char *) glyph + head_size, PRIVATE_GLYPH);
+diff --git a/render/glyphstr.h b/render/glyphstr.h
+index 2f51bd244..3b1d806d1 100644
+--- a/render/glyphstr.h
++++ b/render/glyphstr.h
+@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ extern Bool
+ extern GlyphPtr FindGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, Glyph id);
+
+ extern GlyphPtr AllocateGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi, int format);
++extern void FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format);
+
+ extern Bool
+ ResizeGlyphSet(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, CARD32 change);
+diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
+index 29c5055c6..fe5e37dd9 100644
+--- a/render/render.c
++++ b/render/render.c
+@@ -1076,6 +1076,7 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
+
+ if (glyph_new->glyph && glyph_new->glyph != DeletedGlyph) {
+ glyph_new->found = TRUE;
++ ++glyph_new->glyph->refcnt;
+ }
+ else {
+ GlyphPtr glyph;
+@@ -1168,8 +1169,10 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
+ err = BadAlloc;
+ goto bail;
+ }
+- for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
++ for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) {
+ AddGlyph(glyphSet, glyphs[i].glyph, glyphs[i].id);
++ FreeGlyph(glyphs[i].glyph, glyphSet->fdepth);
++ }
+
+ if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
+ free(glyphsBase);
+@@ -1179,9 +1182,13 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
+ FreePicture((void *) pSrc, 0);
+ if (pSrcPix)
+ FreeScratchPixmapHeader(pSrcPix);
+- for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
+- if (glyphs[i].glyph && !glyphs[i].found)
+- free(glyphs[i].glyph);
++ for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) {
++ if (glyphs[i].glyph) {
++ --glyphs[i].glyph->refcnt;
++ if (!glyphs[i].found)
++ free(glyphs[i].glyph);
++ }
++ }
+ if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
+ free(glyphsBase);
+ return err;
+--
+2.44.0
+
diff --git a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec
index a935c5c..3f4b677 100644
--- a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec
+++ b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: tigervnc
Version: 1.8.0
-Release: 31%{?dist}
+Release: 33%{?dist}
Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
Group: User Interface/Desktops
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ Patch119: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1.patch
Patch120: xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2.patch
# Related to CVE-2024-21886
Patch121: xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown.patch
+Patch122: xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch
+Patch123: xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch
+Patch124: xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch
+Patch125: xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch
+Patch126: xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch
# Security fixes
Patch200: tigervnc-CVE-2019-15691.patch
@@ -213,6 +218,11 @@ done
%patch119 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-1
%patch120 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-21886-2
%patch121 -p1 -b .xorg-dix-fix-use-after-free-in-input-device-shutdown
+%patch122 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31080.patch
+%patch123 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31081.patch
+%patch124 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31082.patch
+%patch125 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31083.patch
+%patch126 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup
popd
# Don't use shebang in vncserver script.
@@ -446,6 +456,18 @@ fi
%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/*/apps/*
%changelog
+* Thu Apr 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-33
+- Fix crash caused by fix for CVE-2024-31083
+ Resolves: RHEL-30976
+
+* Thu Apr 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-32
+- Fix CVE-2024-31080 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIGetSelectedEvents
+ Resolves: RHEL-31006
+- Fix CVE-2024-31083 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: User-after-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs
+ Resolves: RHEL-30976
+- Fix CVE-2024-31081 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice
+ Resolves: RHEL-30993
+
* Thu Jan 25 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-31
- Fix use after free related to CVE-2024-21886
Resolves: RHEL-20436