diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99625dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From a31ba141824a7649e11f0ef7673718ce559d6337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend
+
+The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
+least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
+part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
+existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
+instead of N + P.
+
+Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
+values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
+uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
+For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
+result in this 8 value array:
+ [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
+ ^OOB write
+
+The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
+both.
+
+CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+index 6ec419e870..563c4f31a5 100644
+--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
+@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
+ XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop);
+ return BadAlloc;
+ }
+- new_value.size = len;
++ new_value.size = total_len;
+ new_value.type = type;
+ new_value.format = format;
+
+@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type,
+ case PropModePrepend:
+ new_data = new_value.data;
+ old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
+- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
++ (len * size_in_bytes));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (new_data)
+diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c
+index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644
+--- a/randr/rrproperty.c
++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
+ RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop);
+ return BadAlloc;
+ }
+- new_value.size = len;
++ new_value.size = total_len;
+ new_value.type = type;
+ new_value.format = format;
+
+@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type,
+ case PropModePrepend:
+ new_data = new_value.data;
+ old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) +
+- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes));
++ (len * size_in_bytes));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (new_data)
+--
+2.41.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbe9804
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From 004f461c440cb6611eefb48fbbb4fa53a6d49f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen
+ switch
+
+PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite
+entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion().
+
+If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our
+dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window.
+If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will
+trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips
+that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for
+the device still refers to the previous window.
+
+If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will
+eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy
+later.
+
+To trigger this, we require:
+- two protocol screens
+- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window
+- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window
+
+This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the
+PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This
+doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't
+either.
+
+CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
+---
+ dix/enterleave.h | 2 --
+ include/eventstr.h | 3 +++
+ mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h
+index 4b833d8a3b..e8af924c68 100644
+--- a/dix/enterleave.h
++++ b/dix/enterleave.h
+@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev,
+
+ extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode);
+
+-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
+-
+ extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd,
+ int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin);
+
+diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h
+index bf3b95fe4a..2bae3b0767 100644
+--- a/include/eventstr.h
++++ b/include/eventstr.h
+@@ -296,4 +296,7 @@ union _InternalEvent {
+ #endif
+ };
+
++extern void
++LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev);
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c
+index 75be1aeeb8..b12ae9be1d 100644
+--- a/mi/mipointer.c
++++ b/mi/mipointer.c
+@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y)
+ #ifdef PANORAMIX
+ && noPanoramiXExtension
+ #endif
+- )
+- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
++ ) {
++ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER);
++ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving
++ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the
++ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF
++ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window
++ * to the root window on the other screen.
++ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but
++ * too niche to fix.
++ */
++ LeaveWindow(pDev);
++ if (master)
++ LeaveWindow(master);
++ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+--
+2.41.0
+
diff --git a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec
index f7c2978..5c255b3 100644
--- a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec
+++ b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: tigervnc
Version: 1.8.0
-Release: 25%{?dist}
+Release: 26%{?dist}
Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
Group: User Interface/Desktops
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch
# 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start
Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch
+Patch110: xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch
+Patch111: xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch
+
# Security fixes
Patch200: tigervnc-CVE-2019-15691.patch
Patch201: tigervnc-encapsulate-pixelbuffer-internal-details.patch
@@ -183,6 +186,8 @@ for all in `find . -type f -perm -001`; do
done
%patch100 -p1 -b .xserver120
%patch101 -p1 -b .rpath
+%patch110 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5367.patch
+%patch111 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2023-5380.patch
popd
# Don't use shebang in vncserver script.
@@ -412,6 +417,12 @@ fi
%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/*/apps/*
%changelog
+* Wed Nov 01 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-26
+- Fix CVE-2023-5380 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Use-after-free bug in DestroyWindow
+ Resolves: RHEL-15235
+- Fix CVE-2023-5367 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-bounds write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty
+ Resolves: RHEL-15223
+
* Mon Mar 27 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-25
- CVE fix for: CVE-2023-1393
Resolves: bz#2180291