From 4cec495e1641ffc0681c2a9bc14092715b31cd5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johnny Hughes Date: Mar 16 2022 14:43:30 +0000 Subject: add patch files --- diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25235.patch b/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25235.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac495b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25235.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +diff -up thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok.c.expat-CVE-2022-25235 thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok.c +--- thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok.c.expat-CVE-2022-25235 2022-03-02 17:57:38.364361168 +0100 ++++ thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok.c 2022-03-02 17:58:22.235512399 +0100 +@@ -65,13 +65,6 @@ + + ((((byte)[2]) >> 5) & 1)] \ + & (1u << (((byte)[2]) & 0x1F))) + +-#define UTF8_GET_NAMING(pages, p, n) \ +- ((n) == 2 \ +- ? UTF8_GET_NAMING2(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) \ +- : ((n) == 3 \ +- ? UTF8_GET_NAMING3(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) \ +- : 0)) +- + /* Detection of invalid UTF-8 sequences is based on Table 3.1B + of Unicode 3.2: http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr28/ + with the additional restriction of not allowing the Unicode +diff -up thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c.expat-CVE-2022-25235 thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c +--- thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c.expat-CVE-2022-25235 2022-03-02 17:57:38.365361172 +0100 ++++ thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c 2022-03-02 18:04:51.240853247 +0100 +@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ + case BT_LEAD ## n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ +- if (!IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ + return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ + } \ +@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ + case BT_LEAD ## n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ +- if (!IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ + return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ + } \ +@@ -1090,6 +1090,10 @@ PREFIX(prologTok)(const ENCODING *enc, c + case BT_LEAD ## n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ ++ return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ ++ } \ + if (IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + ptr += n; \ + tok = XML_TOK_NAME; \ diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25236.patch b/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25236.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..84cafd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25236.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +diff -up thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c.expat-CVE-2022-25236 thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c +--- thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c.expat-CVE-2022-25236 2022-03-02 18:08:40.085642028 +0100 ++++ thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c 2022-03-02 18:13:31.838667958 +0100 +@@ -700,8 +700,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodin + XML_Parser XMLCALL + XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) + { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = nsSep; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0}; + return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp); + } + #endif +@@ -1276,8 +1275,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parse + would be otherwise. + */ + if (ns) { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = namespaceSeparator; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0}; + parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd); + } + else { +@@ -3667,6 +3665,16 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *pr + if (!mustBeXML && isXMLNS + && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len])) + isXMLNS = XML_FALSE; ++ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986, ++ // we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of ++ // Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into ++ // 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused ++ // by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters ++ // into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to ++ // be expected. ++ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) { ++ return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX; ++ } + } + isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen; + isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen; diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25315.patch b/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25315.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d4efb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/expat-CVE-2022-25315.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +diff -up thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c.expat-CVE-2022-25315 thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c +--- thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c.expat-CVE-2022-25315 2022-03-02 18:17:50.966583254 +0100 ++++ thunderbird-91.7.0/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c 2022-03-02 18:19:27.636924735 +0100 +@@ -2479,6 +2479,7 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) + while (tag) { + int bufSize; + int nameLen = sizeof(XML_Char) * (tag->name.strLen + 1); ++ size_t rawNameLen; + char *rawNameBuf = tag->buf + nameLen; + /* Stop if already stored. Since tagStack is a stack, we can stop + at the first entry that has already been copied; everything +@@ -2490,7 +2491,11 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) + /* For re-use purposes we need to ensure that the + size of tag->buf is a multiple of sizeof(XML_Char). + */ +- bufSize = nameLen + ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char)); ++ rawNameLen = ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char)); ++ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow. */ ++ if (rawNameLen > (size_t)INT_MAX - nameLen) ++ return XML_FALSE; ++ bufSize = nameLen + (int)rawNameLen; + if (bufSize > tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) { + char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(tag->buf, bufSize); + if (temp == NULL)