From adc6a92ae92647c9b098ffb5ff257c8ab685411e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>

Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 16:43:48 -0400

Subject: [PATCH] man: update MemoryDenyWriteExecute description for executable

 stacks

Without going into details, mention that libraries are also covered by the

filters, and that executable stacks are a no no.

Closes #5970.

(cherry picked from commit 03c3c520402db803cffd5abc7ea0c55fba95fbb3)

---

 man/systemd.exec.xml | 4 ++--

 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml

index fb64cd6d8e..9a9387b798 100644

--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml

+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml

@@ -1655,8 +1655,8 @@

         <citerefentry><refentrytitle>mprotect</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> system calls with

         <constant>PROT_EXEC</constant> set and

         <citerefentry><refentrytitle>shmat</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> system calls with

-        <constant>SHM_EXEC</constant> set. Note that this option is incompatible with programs that generate program

-        code dynamically at runtime, such as JIT execution engines, or programs compiled making use of the code

+        <constant>SHM_EXEC</constant> set. Note that this option is incompatible with programs and libraries that

+        generate program code dynamically at runtime, including JIT execution engines, executable stacks, and code

         "trampoline" feature of various C compilers. This option improves service security, as it makes harder for

         software exploits to change running code dynamically. Note that this feature is fully available on x86-64, and

         partially on x86. Specifically, the <function>shmat()</function> protection is not available on x86. Note that