diff --git a/SOURCES/sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part1.patch b/SOURCES/sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c8a0bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From 4b6de608c25a6ffbdb507be958e12f814b43077c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 12:38:22 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Only update the time stamp entry after the approval function
+ has succeeded. Bug #910
+
+---
+ plugins/sudoers/check.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/check.c b/plugins/sudoers/check.c
+index db8e05161..ea1d89085 100644
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/check.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/check.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static bool display_lecture(int);
+ static struct passwd *get_authpw(int);
+ 
+ struct getpass_closure {
++    int tstat;
+     void *cookie;
+     struct passwd *auth_pw;
+ };
+@@ -89,27 +90,20 @@ getpass_resume(int signo, void *vclosure)
+  * or -1 on fatal error.
+  */
+ static int
+-check_user_interactive(int validated, int mode, struct passwd *auth_pw)
++check_user_interactive(int validated, int mode, struct getpass_closure *closure)
+ {
+     struct sudo_conv_callback cb, *callback = NULL;
+-    struct getpass_closure closure;
+-    int status = TS_ERROR;
+     int ret = -1;
+     char *prompt;
+     bool lectured;
+     debug_decl(check_user_interactive, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH)
+ 
+-    /* Setup closure for getpass_{suspend,resume} */
+-    closure.auth_pw = auth_pw;
+-    closure.cookie = NULL;
+-    sudo_pw_addref(closure.auth_pw);
+-
+     /* Open, lock and read time stamp file if we are using it. */
+     if (!ISSET(mode, MODE_IGNORE_TICKET)) {
+ 	/* Open time stamp file and check its status. */
+-	closure.cookie = timestamp_open(user_name, user_sid);
+-	if (timestamp_lock(closure.cookie, closure.auth_pw))
+-	    status = timestamp_status(closure.cookie, closure.auth_pw);
++	closure->cookie = timestamp_open(user_name, user_sid);
++	if (timestamp_lock(closure->cookie, closure->auth_pw))
++	    closure->tstat = timestamp_status(closure->cookie, closure->auth_pw);
+ 
+ 	/* Construct callback for getpass function. */
+ 	memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
+@@ -120,7 +114,7 @@ check_user_interactive(int validated, int mode, struct passwd *auth_pw)
+ 	callback = &cb;
+     }
+ 
+-    switch (status) {
++    switch (closure->tstat) {
+     case TS_FATAL:
+ 	/* Fatal error (usually setuid failure), unsafe to proceed. */
+ 	goto done;
+@@ -144,32 +138,22 @@ check_user_interactive(int validated, int mode, struct passwd *auth_pw)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* XXX - should not lecture if askpass helper is being used. */
+-	lectured = display_lecture(status);
++	lectured = display_lecture(closure->tstat);
+ 
+ 	/* Expand any escapes in the prompt. */
+ 	prompt = expand_prompt(user_prompt ? user_prompt : def_passprompt,
+-	    closure.auth_pw->pw_name);
++	    closure->auth_pw->pw_name);
+ 	if (prompt == NULL)
+ 	    goto done;
+ 
+-	ret = verify_user(closure.auth_pw, prompt, validated, callback);
++	ret = verify_user(closure->auth_pw, prompt, validated, callback);
+ 	if (ret == true && lectured)
+ 	    (void)set_lectured();	/* lecture error not fatal */
+ 	free(prompt);
+ 	break;
+     }
+ 
+-    /*
+-     * Only update time stamp if user was validated.
+-     * Failure to update the time stamp is not a fatal error.
+-     */
+-    if (ret == true && ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS) && status != TS_ERROR)
+-	(void)timestamp_update(closure.cookie, closure.auth_pw);
+ done:
+-    if (closure.cookie != NULL)
+-	timestamp_close(closure.cookie);
+-    sudo_pw_delref(closure.auth_pw);
+-
+     debug_return_int(ret);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -180,7 +164,7 @@ done:
+ int
+ check_user(int validated, int mode)
+ {
+-    struct passwd *auth_pw;
++    struct getpass_closure closure = { TS_ERROR };
+     int ret = -1;
+     bool exempt = false;
+     debug_decl(check_user, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH)
+@@ -189,9 +173,9 @@ check_user(int validated, int mode)
+      * Init authentication system regardless of whether we need a password.
+      * Required for proper PAM session support.
+      */
+-    if ((auth_pw = get_authpw(mode)) == NULL)
++    if ((closure.auth_pw = get_authpw(mode)) == NULL)
+ 	goto done;
+-    if (sudo_auth_init(auth_pw) == -1)
++    if (sudo_auth_init(closure.auth_pw) == -1)
+ 	goto done;
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -222,15 +206,26 @@ check_user(int validated, int mode)
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = check_user_interactive(validated, mode, auth_pw);
++    ret = check_user_interactive(validated, mode, &closure);
+ 
+ done:
+     if (ret == true) {
+ 	/* The approval function may disallow a user post-authentication. */
+-	ret = sudo_auth_approval(auth_pw, validated, exempt);
++	ret = sudo_auth_approval(closure.auth_pw, validated, exempt);
++
++	/*
++	 * Only update time stamp if user validated and was approved.
++	 * Failure to update the time stamp is not a fatal error.
++	 */
++	if (ret == true && closure.tstat != TS_ERROR) {
++	    if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS))
++		(void)timestamp_update(closure.cookie, closure.auth_pw);
++	}
+     }
+-    sudo_auth_cleanup(auth_pw);
+-    sudo_pw_delref(auth_pw);
++    timestamp_close(closure.cookie);
++    sudo_auth_cleanup(closure.auth_pw);
++    if (closure.auth_pw != NULL)
++	sudo_pw_delref(closure.auth_pw);
+ 
+     debug_return_int(ret);
+ }
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part2.patch b/SOURCES/sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47f94d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 5472b1751645f750e42a0ba6daac667983b1a56c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 11:13:55 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash in sudo 1.8.30 when suspending sudo at the password
+ prompt. The closure pointer in sudo_conv_callback was being filled in with a
+ struct getpass_closure ** instead of a struct getpass_closure *. The bug was
+ introduced in the fix for Bug #910; previously the closure variable was a
+ struct getpass_closure, not a pointer. Fix from Michael Norton; Bug #914.
+
+---
+ plugins/sudoers/check.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/check.c b/plugins/sudoers/check.c
+index 72e87eef6..9b03c7a05 100644
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/check.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/check.c
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ check_user_interactive(int validated, int mode, struct getpass_closure *closure)
+ 	/* Construct callback for getpass function. */
+ 	memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
+ 	cb.version = SUDO_CONV_CALLBACK_VERSION;
+-	cb.closure = &closure;
++	cb.closure = closure;
+ 	cb.on_suspend = getpass_suspend;
+ 	cb.on_resume = getpass_resume;
+ 	callback = &cb;
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/sudo.spec b/SPECS/sudo.spec
index ce0645b..7dfc84d 100644
--- a/SPECS/sudo.spec
+++ b/SPECS/sudo.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Summary: Allows restricted root access for specified users
 Name: sudo
 Version: 1.8.23
-Release: 9%{?dist}
+Release: 10%{?dist}
 License: ISC
 Group: Applications/System
 URL: http://www.courtesan.com/sudo/
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ Patch14: sudo-1.8.28-CVE-strtouid-test.patch
 Patch15: sudo-1.8.29-CVE-2019-18634-part1.patch
 Patch16: sudo-1.8.29-CVE-2019-18634-part2.patch
 
+# 1788196 - sudo allows privilege escalation with expire password
+Patch17: sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part1.patch
+Patch18: sudo-1.8.29-expired-password-part2.patch
+
 %description
 Sudo (superuser do) allows a system administrator to give certain
 users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands
@@ -114,6 +118,9 @@ plugins that use %{name}.
 %patch15 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-18634-part1
 %patch16 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-18634-part2
 
+%patch17 -p1 -b .expired-password-part1
+%patch18 -p1 -b .expired-password-part2
+
 %build
 autoreconf -I m4 -fv --install
 
@@ -249,6 +256,11 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
 %{_mandir}/man8/sudo_plugin.8*
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Mar 25 2020 Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com> - 1.8.23-10
+- RHEL-7.9
+- sudo allows privilege escalation with expire password
+  Resolves: rhbz#1788196
+
 * Wed Feb 05 2020 Radovan Sroka <rsroka@redhat.com> - 1.8.23-9
 - RHEL-7.8
 - CVE-2019-18634