From 3a3ec08f25e2b53e9de256fcb3a4f951c4b1e871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Fabiano=20Fid=C3=AAncio?= Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 01:04:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Don't set SpiceLinkReply::pub_key if client advertises SASL cap If the client advertises the SASL cap, it means it guarantees it will be able to use SASL if the server supports, and that it does not need a valid SpiceLinkReply::pub_key field when using SASL. When the client cap is set, we thus don't need to create a RSA public key if SASL is enabled server side. The reason for needing client guarantees about not looking at the pub_key field is that its presence and size is hardcoded in the protocol, but in some hardened setups (using fips mode), generating a RSA 1024 bit key as expected is forbidden and fails. With this new capability, the server knows the client will be able to handle SASL if needed, and can skip the generation of the key altogether. This means that on the setups described above, SASL authentication has to be used. --- server/reds.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c index c1edf67..9521416 100644 --- a/server/reds.c +++ b/server/reds.c @@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ static int reds_send_link_ack(RedLinkInfo *link) RedChannel *channel; RedChannelCapabilities *channel_caps; BUF_MEM *bmBuf; - BIO *bio; + BIO *bio = NULL; int ret = FALSE; header.magic = SPICE_MAGIC; @@ -1494,24 +1494,45 @@ static int reds_send_link_ack(RedLinkInfo *link) ack.num_channel_caps = channel_caps->num_caps; header.size += (ack.num_common_caps + ack.num_channel_caps) * sizeof(uint32_t); ack.caps_offset = sizeof(SpiceLinkReply); + if (!sasl_enabled + || !red_link_info_test_capability(link, SPICE_COMMON_CAP_AUTH_SASL)) { + if (!(link->tiTicketing.rsa = RSA_new())) { + spice_warning("RSA new failed"); + return FALSE; + } - if (!(link->tiTicketing.rsa = RSA_new())) { - spice_warning("RSA nes failed"); - return FALSE; - } - - if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { - spice_warning("BIO new failed"); - return FALSE; - } + if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { + spice_warning("BIO new failed"); + return FALSE; + } - RSA_generate_key_ex(link->tiTicketing.rsa, SPICE_TICKET_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH, link->tiTicketing.bn, - NULL); - link->tiTicketing.rsa_size = RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa); + if (RSA_generate_key_ex(link->tiTicketing.rsa, + SPICE_TICKET_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH, + link->tiTicketing.bn, + NULL) != 1) { + spice_warning("Failed to generate %d bits RSA key: %s", + SPICE_TICKET_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH, + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + goto end; + } + link->tiTicketing.rsa_size = RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa); - i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(bio, link->tiTicketing.rsa); - BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &bmBuf); - memcpy(ack.pub_key, bmBuf->data, sizeof(ack.pub_key)); + i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(bio, link->tiTicketing.rsa); + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &bmBuf); + memcpy(ack.pub_key, bmBuf->data, sizeof(ack.pub_key)); + } else { + /* if the client sets the AUTH_SASL cap, it indicates that it + * supports SASL, and will use it if the server supports SASL as + * well. Moreover, a client setting the AUTH_SASL cap also + * indicates that it will not try using the RSA-related content + * in the SpiceLinkReply message, so we don't need to initialize + * it. Reason to avoid this is to fix auth in fips mode where + * the generation of a 1024 bit RSA key as we are trying to do + * will fail. + */ + spice_warning("not initialising RSA key"); + memset(ack.pub_key, '\0', sizeof(ack.pub_key)); + } if (!sync_write(link->stream, &header, sizeof(header))) goto end; @@ -1525,7 +1546,8 @@ static int reds_send_link_ack(RedLinkInfo *link) ret = TRUE; end: - BIO_free(bio); + if (bio != NULL) + BIO_free(bio); return ret; } -- 2.4.4