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% container-signature(5) Container signature format
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% Miloslav Trmač
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% March 2017
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# Container signature format
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This document describes the format of container signatures,
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as implemented by the `github.com/containers/image/signature` package.
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Most users should be able to consume these signatures by using the `github.com/containers/image/signature` package
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(preferably through the higher-level `signature.PolicyContext` interface)
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without having to care about the details of the format described below.
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This documentation exists primarily for maintainers of the package
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and to allow independent reimplementations.
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## High-level overview
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The signature provides an end-to-end authenticated claim that a container image
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has been approved by a specific party (e.g. the creator of the image as their work,
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an automated build system as a result of an automated build,
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a company IT department approving the image for production) under a specified _identity_
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(e.g. an OS base image / specific application, with a specific version).
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A container signature consists of a cryptographic signature which identifies
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and authenticates who signed the image, and carries as a signed payload a JSON document.
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The JSON document identifies the image being signed, claims a specific identity of the
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image and if applicable, contains other information about the image.
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The signatures do not modify the container image (the layers, configuration, manifest, …);
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e.g. their presence does not change the manifest digest used to identify the image in
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docker/distribution servers; rather, the signatures are associated with an immutable image.
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An image can have any number of signatures so signature distribution systems SHOULD support
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associating more than one signature with an image.
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## The cryptographic signature
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As distributed, the container signature is a blob which contains a cryptographic signature
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in an industry-standard format, carrying a signed JSON payload (i.e. the blob contains both the
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JSON document and a signature of the JSON document; it is not a “detached signature” with
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independent blobs containing the JSON document and a cryptographic signature).
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Currently the only defined cryptographic signature format is an OpenPGP signature (RFC 4880),
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but others may be added in the future.  (The blob does not contain metadata identifying the
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cryptographic signature format. It is expected that most formats are sufficiently self-describing
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that this is not necessary and the configured expected public key provides another indication
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of the expected cryptographic signature format. Such metadata may be added in the future for
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newly added cryptographic signature formats, if necessary.)
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Consumers of container signatures SHOULD verify the cryptographic signature
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against one or more trusted public keys
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(e.g. defined in a [policy.json signature verification policy file](policy.json.md))
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before parsing or processing the JSON payload in _any_ way,
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in particular they SHOULD stop processing the container signature
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if the cryptographic signature verification fails, without even starting to process the JSON payload.
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(Consumers MAY extract identification of the signing key and other metadata from the cryptographic signature,
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and the JSON payload, without verifying the signature, if the purpose is to allow managing the signature blobs,
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e.g. to list the authors and image identities of signatures associated with a single container image;
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if so, they SHOULD design the output of such processing to minimize the risk of users considering the output trusted
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or in any way usable for making policy decisions about the image.)
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### OpenPGP signature verification
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When verifying a cryptographic signature in the OpenPGP format,
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the consumer MUST verify at least the following aspects of the signature
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(like the `github.com/containers/image/signature` package does):
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- The blob MUST be a “Signed Message” as defined RFC 4880 section 11.3.
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  (e.g. it MUST NOT be an unsigned “Literal Message”, or any other non-signature format).
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- The signature MUST have been made by an expected key trusted for the purpose (and the specific container image).
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- The signature MUST be correctly formed and pass the cryptographic validation.
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- The signature MUST correctly authenticate the included JSON payload
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  (in particular, the parsing of the JSON payload MUST NOT start before the complete payload has been cryptographically authenticated).
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- The signature MUST NOT be expired.
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The consumer SHOULD have tests for its verification code which verify that signatures failing any of the above are rejected.
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## JSON processing and forward compatibility
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The payload of the cryptographic signature is a JSON document (RFC 7159).
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Consumers SHOULD parse it very strictly,
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refusing any signature which violates the expected format (e.g. missing members, incorrect member types)
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or can be interpreted ambiguously (e.g. a duplicated member in a JSON object).
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Any violations of the JSON format or of other requirements in this document MAY be accepted if the JSON document can be recognized
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to have been created by a known-incorrect implementation (see [`optional.creator`](#optionalcreator) below)
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and if the semantics of the invalid document, as created by such an implementation, is clear.
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The top-level value of the JSON document MUST be a JSON object with exactly two members, `critical` and `optional`,
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each a JSON object.
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The `critical` object MUST contain a `type` member identifying the document as a container signature
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(as defined [below](#criticaltype))
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and signature consumers MUST reject signatures which do not have this member or in which this member does not have the expected value.
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To ensure forward compatibility (allowing older signature consumers to correctly
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accept or reject signatures created at a later date, with possible extensions to this format),
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consumers MUST reject the signature if the `critical` object, or _any_ of its subobjects,
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contain _any_ member or data value which is unrecognized, unsupported, invalid, or in any other way unexpected.
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At a minimum, this includes unrecognized members in a JSON object, or incorrect types of expected members.
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For the same reason, consumers SHOULD accept any members with unrecognized names in the `optional` object,
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and MAY accept signatures where the object member is recognized but unsupported, or the value of the member is unsupported.
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Consumers still SHOULD reject signatures where a member of an `optional` object is supported but the value is recognized as invalid.
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## JSON data format
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An example of the full format follows, with detailed description below.
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To reiterate, consumers of the signature SHOULD perform successful cryptographic verification,
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and MUST reject unexpected data in the `critical` object, or in the top-level object, as described above.
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```json
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{
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    "critical": {
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        "type": "atomic container signature",
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        "image": {
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            "docker-manifest-digest": "sha256:817a12c32a39bbe394944ba49de563e085f1d3c5266eb8e9723256bc4448680e"
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        },
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        "identity": {
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            "docker-reference": "docker.io/library/busybox:latest"
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        }
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    },
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    "optional": {
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        "creator": "some software package v1.0.1-35",
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        "timestamp": 1483228800,
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    }
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}
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```
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### `critical`
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This MUST be a JSON object which contains data critical to correctly evaluating the validity of a signature.
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Consumers MUST reject any signature where the `critical` object contains any unrecognized, unsupported, invalid or in any other way unexpected member or data.
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### `critical.type`
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This MUST be a string with a string value exactly equal to `atomic container signature` (three words, including the spaces).
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Signature consumers MUST reject signatures which do not have this member or this member does not have exactly the expected value.
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(The consumers MAY support signatures with a different value of the `type` member, if any is defined in the future;
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if so, the rest of the JSON document is interpreted according to rules defining that value of `critical.type`,
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not by this document.)
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### `critical.image`
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This MUST be a JSON object which identifies the container image this signature applies to.
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Consumers MUST reject any signature where the `critical.image` object contains any unrecognized, unsupported, invalid or in any other way unexpected member or data.
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(Currently only the `docker-manifest-digest` way of identifying a container image is defined;
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alternatives to this may be defined in the future,
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but existing consumers are required to reject signatures which use formats they do not support.)
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### `critical.image.docker-manifest-digest`
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This MUST be a JSON string, in the `github.com/opencontainers/go-digest.Digest` string format.
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The value of this member MUST match the manifest of the signed container image, as implemented in the docker/distribution manifest addressing system.
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The consumer of the signature SHOULD verify the manifest digest against a fully verified signature before processing the contents of the image manifest in any other way
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(e.g. parsing the manifest further or downloading layers of the image).
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Implementation notes:
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* A single container image manifest may have several valid manifest digest values, using different algorithms.
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* For “signed” [docker/distribution schema 1](https://github.com/docker/distribution/blob/master/docs/spec/manifest-v2-1.md) manifests,
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the manifest digest applies to the payload of the JSON web signature, not to the raw manifest blob.
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### `critical.identity`
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This MUST be a JSON object which identifies the claimed identity of the image (usually the purpose of the image, or the application, along with a version information),
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as asserted by the author of the signature.
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Consumers MUST reject any signature where the `critical.identity` object contains any unrecognized, unsupported, invalid or in any other way unexpected member or data.
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(Currently only the `docker-reference` way of claiming an image identity/purpose is defined;
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alternatives to this may be defined in the future,
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but existing consumers are required to reject signatures which use formats they do not support.)
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### `critical.identity.docker-reference`
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This MUST be a JSON string, in the `github.com/docker/distribution/reference` string format,
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and using the same normalization semantics (where e.g. `busybox:latest` is equivalent to `docker.io/library/busybox:latest`).
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If the normalization semantics allows multiple string representations of the claimed identity with equivalent meaning,
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the `critical.identity.docker-reference` member SHOULD use the fully explicit form (including the full host name and namespaces).
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The value of this member MUST match the image identity/purpose expected by the consumer of the image signature and the image
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(again, accounting for the `docker/distribution/reference` normalization semantics).
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In the most common case, this means that the `critical.identity.docker-reference` value must be equal to the docker/distribution reference used to refer to or download the image.
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However, depending on the specific application, users or system administrators may accept less specific matches
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(e.g. ignoring the tag value in the signature when pulling the `:latest` tag or when referencing an image by digest),
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or they may require `critical.identity.docker-reference` values with a completely different namespace to the reference used to refer to/download the image
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(e.g. requiring a `critical.identity.docker-reference` value which identifies the image as coming from a supplier when fetching it from a company-internal mirror of approved images).
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The software performing this verification SHOULD allow the users to define such a policy using the [policy.json signature verification policy file format](policy.json.md).
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The `critical.identity.docker-reference` value SHOULD contain either a tag or digest;
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in most cases, it SHOULD use a tag rather than a digest.  (See also the default [`matchRepoDigestOrExact` matching semantics in `policy.json`](policy.json.md#signedby).)
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### `optional`
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This MUST be a JSON object.
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Consumers SHOULD accept any members with unrecognized names in the `optional` object,
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and MAY accept a signature where the object member is recognized but unsupported, or the value of the member is valid but unsupported.
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Consumers still SHOULD reject any signature where a member of an `optional` object is supported but the value is recognized as invalid.
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### `optional.creator`
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If present, this MUST be a JSON string, identifying the name and version of the software which has created the signature.
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The contents of this string is not defined in detail; however each implementation creating container signatures:
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- SHOULD define the contents to unambiguously define the software in practice (e.g. it SHOULD contain the name of the software, not only the version number)
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- SHOULD use a build and versioning process which ensures that the contents of this string (e.g. an included version number)
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  changes whenever the format or semantics of the generated signature changes in any way;
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  it SHOULD not be possible for two implementations which use a different format or semantics to have the same `optional.creator` value
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- SHOULD use a format which is reasonably easy to parse in software (perhaps using a regexp),
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  and which makes it easy enough to recognize a range of versions of a specific implementation
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  (e.g. the version of the implementation SHOULD NOT be only a git hash, because they don’t have an easily defined ordering;
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  the string should contain a version number, or at least a date of the commit).
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Consumers of container signatures MAY recognize specific values or sets of values of `optional.creator`
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(perhaps augmented with `optional.timestamp`),
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and MAY change their processing of the signature based on these values
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(usually to acommodate violations of this specification in past versions of the signing software which cannot be fixed retroactively),
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as long as the semantics of the invalid document, as created by such an implementation, is clear.
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If consumers of signatures do change their behavior based on the `optional.creator` value,
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they SHOULD take care that the way they process the signatures is not inconsistent with
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strictly validating signature consumers.
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(I.e. it is acceptable for a consumer to accept a signature based on a specific `optional.creator` value
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if other implementations would completely reject the signature,
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but it would be very undesirable for the two kinds of implementations to accept the signature in different
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and inconsistent situations.)
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### `optional.timestamp`
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If present, this MUST be a JSON number, which is representable as a 64-bit integer, and identifies the time when the signature was created
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as the number of seconds since the UNIX epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00 UTC).