diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83e1e1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2
diff --git a/.shadow-utils.metadata b/.shadow-utils.metadata
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a736791
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.shadow-utils.metadata
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+81f38720b953ef9c2c100c43d02dfe19cafd6c30 SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0e7897f..0000000
--- a/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-The master branch has no content
-
-Look at the c7 branch if you are working with CentOS-7, or the c4/c5/c6 branch for CentOS-4, 5 or 6
-
-If you find this file in a distro specific branch, it means that no content has been checked in yet
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-2ndskip.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-2ndskip.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a9cf68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-2ndskip.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c.2ndskip shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c.2ndskip 2012-06-18 13:08:34.438910815 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c 2012-06-18 13:12:51.270764552 +0200
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ struct group grent;
+ const struct sgrp *sg;
+ struct sgrp sgent;
++ char *np;
+
+ Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+
+@@ -184,20 +185,25 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ * Remove /etc/gshadow entries for groups not in /etc/group.
+ */
+ (void) sgr_rewind ();
+- while ((sg = sgr_next ()) != NULL) {
+- if (gr_locate (sg->sg_name) != NULL) {
+- continue;
+- }
+-
+- if (sgr_remove (sg->sg_name) == 0) {
+- /*
+- * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
+- */
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
+- Prog, sg->sg_name, sgr_dbname ());
+- fail_exit (3);
++ sg = sgr_next ();
++ np=NULL;
++ while (sg != NULL) {
++ np = strdup(sg->sg_name);
++ sg = sgr_next ();
++
++ if(gr_locate (np) == NULL) {
++ if (sgr_remove (np) == 0) {
++ /*
++ * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
++ */
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
++ Prog, np, sgr_dbname ());
++ free(np);
++ fail_exit (3);
++ }
+ }
++ free(np);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c.2ndskip shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c.2ndskip 2012-06-18 11:23:33.938511797 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c 2012-06-18 12:57:18.396426194 +0200
+@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ struct passwd pwent;
+ const struct spwd *sp;
+ struct spwd spent;
++ char *np;
+
+ Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+
+@@ -223,20 +224,25 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ * Remove /etc/shadow entries for users not in /etc/passwd.
+ */
+ (void) spw_rewind ();
+- while ((sp = spw_next ()) != NULL) {
+- if (pw_locate (sp->sp_namp) != NULL) {
+- continue;
+- }
+-
+- if (spw_remove (sp->sp_namp) == 0) {
+- /*
+- * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
+- */
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
+- Prog, sp->sp_namp, spw_dbname ());
+- fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
++ sp = spw_next ();
++ np = NULL;
++ while (sp != NULL) {
++ np = strdup(sp->sp_namp);
++ sp = spw_next ();
++
++ if (pw_locate (np) == NULL) {
++ if (spw_remove (np) == 0) {
++ /*
++ * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
++ */
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
++ Prog, np, spw_dbname ());
++ free(np);
++ fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
++ }
+ }
++ free(np);
+ }
+
+ /*
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-redhat.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-redhat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a785b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-redhat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5/man/useradd.8.redhat shadow-4.1.5/man/useradd.8
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c.redhat shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c.redhat 2011-12-09 23:23:15.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c 2012-03-19 09:50:05.227588669 +0100
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ const char *Prog;
+ static gid_t def_group = 100;
+ static const char *def_gname = "other";
+ static const char *def_home = "/home";
+-static const char *def_shell = "";
++static const char *def_shell = "/sbin/nologin";
+ static const char *def_template = SKEL_DIR;
+ static const char *def_create_mail_spool = "no";
+
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static const char *def_expire = "";
+ #define VALID(s) (strcspn (s, ":\n") == strlen (s))
+
+ static const char *user_name = "";
+-static const char *user_pass = "!";
++static const char *user_pass = "!!";
+ static uid_t user_id;
+ static gid_t user_gid;
+ static const char *user_comment = "";
+@@ -1011,9 +1011,9 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ };
+ while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
++ "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
+ #else /* !WITH_SELINUX */
+- "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
++ "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:s:u:U",
+ #endif /* !WITH_SELINUX */
+ long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ switch (c) {
+@@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ case 'M':
+ Mflg = true;
+ break;
++ case 'n':
+ case 'N':
+ Nflg = true;
+ break;
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-uflg.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-uflg.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f72bca3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5-uflg.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.uflg shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.uflg 2011-07-30 01:10:27.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c 2012-03-19 12:51:46.090554116 +0100
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+- gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
++ gid_min = (gid_t) 1;
+ gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
+ gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MAX", (unsigned long) gid_max);
+ if (gid_max < gid_min) {
+@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++ /* if we did not find free preffered system gid, we start to look for
++ * one in the range assigned to dynamic system IDs */
++ if (sys_group)
++ gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
+
+ /*
+ * Search the entire group file,
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-owner.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-owner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fbbdbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-owner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.audit shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.audit 2011-11-21 23:02:16.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c 2013-06-14 14:54:20.237026550 +0200
+@@ -1513,6 +1513,14 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ if (uflg || gflg) {
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "changing home directory owner",
++ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (rename (user_home, user_newhome) == 0) {
+ /* FIXME: rename above may have broken symlinks
+ * pointing to the user's home directory
+@@ -1947,6 +1955,13 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ * ownership.
+ *
+ */
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ if (uflg || gflg) {
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "changing home directory owner",
++ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
++ }
++#endif
+ if (chown_tree (dflg ? user_newhome : user_home,
+ user_id,
+ uflg ? user_newid : (uid_t)-1,
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-update.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-update.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17930bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-update.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2250 @@
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/lib/prototypes.h shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/lib/prototypes.h 2014-09-13 15:45:54.953829562 -0400
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h 2014-10-14 08:39:23.785884075 -0400
+@@ -195,12 +195,21 @@ extern int audit_fd;
+ extern void audit_help_open (void);
+ /* Use AUDIT_NO_ID when a name is provided to audit_logger instead of an ID */
+ #define AUDIT_NO_ID ((unsigned int) -1)
++#ifndef AUDIT_GRP_MGMT
++#define AUDIT_GRP_MGMT 1132 /* Group account was modified */
++#endif
++#ifndef AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK
++#define AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK 1133 /* Group account password was changed */
++#endif
+ typedef enum {
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE = 0,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS = 1} shadow_audit_result;
+ extern void audit_logger (int type, const char *pgname, const char *op,
+ const char *name, unsigned int id,
+ shadow_audit_result result);
++void audit_logger_with_group (int type, unused const char *pgname,
++ const char *op, const char *name, unsigned int id,
++ const char *grp, shadow_audit_result result);
+ void audit_logger_message (const char *message, shadow_audit_result result);
+ #endif
+
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/libmisc/audit_help.c shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/audit_help.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/libmisc/audit_help.c 2010-08-21 07:41:28.000000000 -0400
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/audit_help.c 2014-10-14 08:39:23.785884075 -0400
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void audit_help_open (void)
+ * This function will log a message to the audit system using a predefined
+ * message format. Parameter usage is as follows:
+ *
+- * type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK for changing any account
++ * type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_MGMT for changing any account
+ * attributes.
+ * pgname - program's name
+ * op - operation. "adding user", "changing finger info", "deleting group"
+@@ -88,6 +88,39 @@ void audit_logger (int type, unused cons
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * This function will log a message to the audit system using a predefined
++ * message format. Parameter usage is as follows:
++ *
++ * type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_MGMT for changing any account
++ * attributes.
++ * pgname - program's name
++ * op - operation. "adding user", "changing finger info", "deleting group"
++ * name - user's account or group name. If not available use NULL.
++ * id - uid or gid that the operation is being performed on. This is used
++ * only when user is NULL.
++ * grp - group name associated with event
++ */
++void audit_logger_with_group (int type, unused const char *pgname,
++ const char *op, const char *name, unsigned int id,
++ const char *grp, shadow_audit_result result)
++{
++ int len;
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1], buf[1024];
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ return;
++ }
++ len = strnlen(grp, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(grp, len)) {
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s grp=%s", op,
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group, grp, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s grp=\"%s\"", op, grp);
++ }
++ audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd, type, NULL, buf, name, id,
++ NULL, NULL, NULL, (int) result);
++}
++
+ void audit_logger_message (const char *message, shadow_audit_result result)
+ {
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/libmisc/cleanup_group.c shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/cleanup_group.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/libmisc/cleanup_group.c 2008-12-23 17:45:18.000000000 -0500
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/cleanup_group.c 2014-10-14 09:00:33.594753105 -0400
+@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void cleanup_report_mod_group (void *cle
+ gr_dbname (),
+ info->action));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info->audit_msg,
+ info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ void cleanup_report_mod_gshadow (void *c
+ sgr_dbname (),
+ info->action));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info->audit_msg,
+ info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ void cleanup_report_add_group_group (voi
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/group",
++ "adding-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ void cleanup_report_add_group_gshadow (v
+
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "adding-shadow-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ void cleanup_report_del_group_group (voi
+ "failed to remove group %s from %s",
+ name, gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/group",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
++ "removing-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ void cleanup_report_del_group_gshadow (v
+ "failed to remove group %s from %s",
+ name, sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "removing-shadow-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_group (unused void *
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking group file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-group",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_gshadow (unused void
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking gshadow file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-gshadow",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/libmisc/cleanup_user.c shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/cleanup_user.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/libmisc/cleanup_user.c 2008-12-23 17:45:18.000000000 -0500
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/cleanup_user.c 2014-10-14 09:01:51.878745031 -0400
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ void cleanup_report_mod_passwd (void *cl
+ pw_dbname (),
+ info->action));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
+ info->audit_msg,
+ info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ void cleanup_report_add_user_passwd (voi
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, pw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to /etc/passwd",
++ "adding-user",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ void cleanup_report_add_user_shadow (voi
+
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, spw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to /etc/shadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "adding-shadow-user",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_passwd (unused void
+ Prog, pw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking passwd file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-passwd",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_shadow (unused void
+ Prog, spw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking shadow file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-shadow",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/chage.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chage.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/chage.c 2011-11-19 17:54:47.000000000 -0500
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chage.c 2014-10-14 08:39:23.787884075 -0400
+@@ -126,9 +126,10 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void fail_exit (int
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (E_SUCCESS != code) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change age",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 0);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-age",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+@@ -873,11 +874,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Permission denied.\n"), Prog);
+ fail_exit (E_NOPERM);
+ }
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "display aging info",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+-#endif
++ /* Displaying fields is not of interest to audit */
+ list_fields ();
+ fail_exit (E_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -896,41 +893,43 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change all aging information",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-all-aging-information",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ #endif
+ } else {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (Mflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change max age",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-max-age",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ if (mflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change min age",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-min-age",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (dflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change last change date",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-last-change-date",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (Wflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change passwd warning",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-passwd-warning",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (Iflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change inactive days",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-inactive-days",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (Eflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change passwd expiration",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-passwd-expiration",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/gpasswd.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/gpasswd.c 2014-09-13 15:45:54.989829559 -0400
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c 2014-10-14 08:43:07.393861012 -0400
+@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ (void) fputs (_(" -d, --delete USER remove USER from GROUP\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -h, --help display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -Q, --root CHROOT_DIR directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
+- (void) fputs (_(" -r, --remove-password remove the GROUP's password\n"), usageout);
++ (void) fputs (_(" -r, --delete-password remove the GROUP's password\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -R, --restrict restrict access to GROUP to its members\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -M, --members USER,... set the list of members of GROUP\n"), usageout);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -397,21 +397,14 @@ static void open_files (void)
+
+ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const char *suffix)
+ {
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- char buf[1024];
+-#endif
+ if (aflg) {
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
+ "%s failed to add user %s to group %s%s",
+ myname, user, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to add user %s to group %s%s",
+- myname, user, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (dflg) {
+@@ -419,13 +412,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to remove user %s from group %s%s",
+ myname, user, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to remove user %s from group %s%s",
+- myname, user, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (rflg) {
+@@ -433,13 +422,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to remove password of group %s%s",
+ myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to remove password of group %s%s",
+- myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "delete-group-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Rflg) {
+@@ -447,13 +432,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to restrict access to group %s%s",
+ myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to restrict access to group %s%s",
+- myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "restrict-group",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Aflg || Mflg) {
+@@ -463,13 +444,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to set the administrators of group %s to %s%s",
+ myname, group, admins, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to set the administrators of group %s to %s%s",
+- myname, group, admins, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "set-admins-of-group",
++ admins, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -479,13 +456,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to set the members of group %s to %s%s",
+ myname, group, members, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to set the members of group %s to %s%s",
+- myname, group, members, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-users-to-group",
++ members, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -494,13 +467,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to change password of group %s%s",
+ myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to change password of group %s%s",
+- myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "change-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -531,21 +500,14 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure_gshadow
+
+ static void log_gpasswd_success (const char *suffix)
+ {
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- char buf[1024];
+-#endif
+ if (aflg) {
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "user %s added by %s to group %s%s",
+ user, myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "user %s added by %s to group %s%s",
+- user, myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (dflg) {
+@@ -553,13 +515,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "user %s removed by %s from group %s%s",
+ user, myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "user %s removed by %s from group %s%s",
+- user, myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (rflg) {
+@@ -567,13 +525,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "password of group %s removed by %s%s",
+ group, myname, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "password of group %s removed by %s%s",
+- group, myname, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "delete-group-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Rflg) {
+@@ -581,13 +535,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "access to group %s restricted by %s%s",
+ group, myname, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "access to group %s restricted by %s%s",
+- group, myname, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "restrict-group",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Aflg || Mflg) {
+@@ -597,13 +547,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "administrators of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+ group, myname, admins, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "administrators of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+- group, myname, admins, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "set-admins-of-group",
++ admins, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -613,13 +559,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "members of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+ group, myname, members, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "members of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+- group, myname, members, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-users-to-group",
++ members, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -628,13 +570,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "password of group %s changed by %s%s",
+ group, myname, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "password of group %s changed by %s%s",
+- group, myname, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "change-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/groupadd.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/groupadd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/groupadd.c 2011-11-18 16:23:30.000000000 -0500
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/groupadd.c 2014-10-14 08:39:23.800884073 -0400
+@@ -127,6 +127,15 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int sta
+ exit (status);
+ }
+
++static void fail_exit(int status)
++{
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger(AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog, "add-group", group_name,
++ AUDIT_NO_ID, SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++ exit (status);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * new_grent - initialize the values in a group file entry
+ *
+@@ -210,7 +219,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname (), grp.gr_name);
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ /*
+@@ -220,7 +229,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname (), sgrp.sg_name);
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+ }
+@@ -244,7 +253,7 @@ static void check_new_name (void)
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: '%s' is not a valid group name\n"),
+ Prog, group_name);
+
+- exit (E_BAD_ARG);
++ fail_exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -260,11 +269,11 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/group",
++ "add-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -282,11 +291,11 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-shadow-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -300,12 +309,6 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+
+ /* Report success at the system level */
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "",
+- group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+-#endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "new group: name=%s, GID=%u",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id));
+ del_cleanup (cleanup_report_add_group);
+@@ -323,7 +326,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_group, NULL);
+
+@@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_gshadow, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -349,7 +352,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ if (gr_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", gr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -359,7 +362,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+@@ -489,7 +492,7 @@ static void check_flags (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: group '%s' already exists\n"),
+ Prog, group_name);
+- exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
++ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+
+ if (gflg && (getgrgid (group_id) != NULL)) {
+@@ -508,7 +511,7 @@ static void check_flags (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: GID '%lu' already exists\n"),
+ Prog, (unsigned long int) group_id);
+- exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
++ fail_exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+@@ -536,7 +539,7 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ retval = pam_start ("groupadd", pampw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+@@ -556,7 +559,7 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ if (NULL != pamh) {
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ }
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+@@ -588,7 +591,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot setup cleanup service.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -610,7 +613,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ if (!gflg) {
+ if (find_new_gid (rflg, &group_id, NULL) < 0) {
+- exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
++ fail_exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/groupdel.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/groupdel.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/groupdel.c 2011-11-18 16:23:30.000000000 -0500
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/groupdel.c 2014-10-14 08:39:23.801884073 -0400
+@@ -100,6 +100,15 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int sta
+ exit (status);
+ }
+
++static void fail_exit(int status)
++{
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger(AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog, "delete-group", group_name,
++ AUDIT_NO_ID, SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++ exit (status);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * grp_update - update group file entries
+ *
+@@ -126,7 +135,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
+ Prog, group_name, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -138,7 +147,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
+ Prog, group_name, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+@@ -157,12 +166,12 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/group",
++ "delete-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -182,12 +191,12 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-shadow-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -201,13 +210,6 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+
+- /* Report success at the system level */
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "",
+- group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+-#endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "group '%s' removed\n", group_name));
+ del_cleanup (cleanup_report_del_group);
+ }
+@@ -224,7 +226,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_group, NULL);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -233,7 +235,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_gshadow, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -251,7 +253,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", gr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ if (is_shadow_grp) {
+@@ -260,7 +262,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+@@ -301,7 +303,7 @@ static void group_busy (gid_t gid)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove the primary group of user '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, pwd->pw_name);
+- exit (E_GROUP_BUSY);
++ fail_exit (E_GROUP_BUSY);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -379,7 +381,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot setup cleanup service.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ process_flags (argc, argv);
+@@ -393,7 +395,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ retval = pam_start ("groupdel", pampw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+@@ -414,7 +416,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ if (NULL != pamh) {
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ }
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+@@ -434,7 +436,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: group '%s' does not exist\n"),
+ Prog, group_name);
+- exit (E_NOTFOUND);
++ fail_exit (E_NOTFOUND);
+ }
+
+ group_id = grp->gr_gid;
+@@ -458,7 +460,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: %s is the NIS master\n"),
+ Prog, nis_master);
+ }
+- exit (E_NOTFOUND);
++ fail_exit (E_NOTFOUND);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/groupmod.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/groupmod.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/groupmod.c 2011-11-18 16:23:30.000000000 -0500
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/groupmod.c 2014-10-14 08:49:28.517821702 -0400
+@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info_group.audit_msg,
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info_gshadow.audit_msg,
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info_passwd.audit_msg,
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+@@ -499,8 +499,8 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- "modifying group",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "modify-group",
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -512,6 +512,8 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ */
+ static void prepare_failure_reports (void)
+ {
++ char *nv_pair, nv[64];
++
+ info_group.name = group_name;
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ info_gshadow.name = group_name;
+@@ -524,76 +526,106 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (voi
+ #endif
+ info_passwd.audit_msg = xmalloc (512);
+
+- (void) snprintf (info_group.audit_msg, 511,
+- "changing %s; ", gr_dbname ());
++ info_group.action = xmalloc (512);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+- (void) snprintf (info_gshadow.audit_msg, 511,
+- "changing %s; ", sgr_dbname ());
++ info_gshadow.action = xmalloc (512);
+ #endif
+- (void) snprintf (info_passwd.audit_msg, 511,
+- "changing %s; ", pw_dbname ());
++ info_passwd.action = xmalloc (512);
+
+- info_group.action = info_group.audit_msg
+- + strlen (info_group.audit_msg);
++ (void) snprintf (info_group.audit_msg, 511,
++ "changing-group");
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+- info_gshadow.action = info_gshadow.audit_msg
+- + strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg);
++ (void) snprintf (info_gshadow.audit_msg, 511,
++ "changing-shadow-group");
+ #endif
+- info_passwd.action = info_passwd.audit_msg
+- + strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg);
++ (void) snprintf (info_passwd.audit_msg, 511,
++ "changing-group-passwd");
+
++ nv_pair = audit_encode_nv_string(" grp", group_name,
++ strlen(group_name));
++ if(nv_pair) {
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ strncat(info_gshadow.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++#endif
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ free(nv_pair);
++ }
++ snprintf(nv, sizeof(nv), " gid=%lu", (unsigned long)group_id);
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv, 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv, 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
++
+ (void) snprintf (info_group.action,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511,
+ "group %s/%lu",
+ group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ (void) snprintf (info_gshadow.action,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511,
+ "group %s", group_name);
+ #endif
+ (void) snprintf (info_passwd.action,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511,
+ "group %s/%lu",
+ group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
+
+ if (nflg) {
++ nv_pair = audit_encode_nv_string(" new_group", group_newname,
++ strlen(group_newname));
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
+ strncat (info_group.action, ", new name: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+ strncat (info_group.action, group_newname,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ strncat(info_gshadow.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_gshadow.audit_msg));
+ strncat (info_gshadow.action, ", new name: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.action));
+ strncat (info_gshadow.action, group_newname,
+- 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.action));
+ #endif
+
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
+ strncat (info_passwd.action, ", new name: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action));
+ strncat (info_passwd.action, group_newname,
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action));
++ free(nv_pair);
+ }
+ if (pflg) {
++ /* Note: audit doesn't want this value recorded */
+ strncat (info_group.action, ", new password",
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ strncat (info_gshadow.action, ", new password",
+- 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.action));
+ #endif
+ }
+ if (gflg) {
++ snprintf(nv, sizeof(nv), " new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long)group_newid);
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv,
++ 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv,
++ 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
++
+ strncat (info_group.action, ", new gid: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+ (void) snprintf (info_group.action+strlen (info_group.action),
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action),
+ "%lu", (unsigned long int) group_newid);
+
+ strncat (info_passwd.action, ", new gid: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action));
+ (void) snprintf (info_passwd.action+strlen (info_passwd.action),
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg),
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action),
+ "%lu", (unsigned long int) group_newid);
+ }
+ info_group.audit_msg[511] = '\0';
+@@ -601,6 +633,11 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (voi
+ info_gshadow.audit_msg[511] = '\0';
+ #endif
+ info_passwd.audit_msg[511] = '\0';
++ info_group.action[511] = '\0';
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ info_gshadow.action[511] = '\0';
++#endif
++ info_passwd.action[511] = '\0';
+
+ // FIXME: add a system cleanup
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_report_mod_group, &info_group);
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/newgrp.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/newgrp.c 2014-09-13 15:45:55.010829557 -0400
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c 2014-10-14 08:39:23.802884073 -0400
+@@ -197,11 +197,12 @@ static void check_perms (const struct gr
+ strcmp (cpasswd, grp->gr_passwd) != 0) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "authentication new-gid=%lu",
++ "authentication new_gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) grp->gr_gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_AUTH, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "Invalid password for group '%s' from '%s'",
+@@ -212,11 +213,12 @@ static void check_perms (const struct gr
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "authentication new-gid=%lu",
++ "authentication new_gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) grp->gr_gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_AUTH, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 1);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+
+@@ -227,19 +229,6 @@ failure:
+ * harm. -- JWP
+ */
+ closelog ();
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- if (groupname) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", groupname);
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+- audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+- } else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+- "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+- }
+-#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+@@ -308,15 +297,27 @@ static void syslog_sg (const char *name,
+ is_newgrp ? "newgrp" : "sg", strerror (errno));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (group) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", group);
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1];
++ int len = strnlen(group, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(group, len)) {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=%s",
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group,
++ group, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=\"%s\"",
++ group);
++ }
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -442,7 +443,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) getuid ()));
+@@ -558,15 +559,26 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ perror ("getgroups");
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (group) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", group);
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1];
++ int len = strnlen(group, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(group, len)) {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=%s",
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group,
++ group, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=\"%s\"", group);
++ }
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -707,10 +719,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ perror ("setgid");
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
++ "changing new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+@@ -719,10 +731,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ perror ("setuid");
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
++ "changing new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+@@ -736,10 +748,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ execl (SHELL, "sh", "-c", command, (char *) 0);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
++ "changing new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ perror (SHELL);
+ exit ((errno == ENOENT) ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
+@@ -803,11 +815,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf), "changing new-gid=%lu",
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf), "changing new_gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 1);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ /*
+ * Exec the login shell and go away. We are trying to get back to
+@@ -831,15 +843,24 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ closelog ();
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (NULL != group) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", group);
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1];
++ int len = strnlen(group, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(group, len)) {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=%s",
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group,
++ group, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=\"%s\"", group);
++ }
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/useradd.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/useradd.c 2014-09-13 15:45:54.957829561 -0400
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c 2014-10-14 08:52:53.066800605 -0400
+@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ static void create_mail (void);
+ */
+ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ {
++ int type;
++
+ if (home_added) {
+ if (rmdir (user_home) != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -218,12 +220,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, spw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking shadow file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -231,12 +227,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking passwd file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -244,12 +234,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking group file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -258,20 +242,19 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking gshadow file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
++ if (code == E_PW_UPDATE || code >= E_GRP_UPDATE)
++ type = AUDIT_USER_MGMT;
++ else
++ type = AUDIT_ADD_USER;
++
++ audit_logger (type, Prog,
++ "add-user",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -578,7 +561,7 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USYS_CONFIG, Prog,
+- "changing useradd defaults",
++ "changing-useradd-defaults",
+ NULL, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -848,12 +831,6 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: Out of memory. Cannot update %s.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", gr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE); /* XXX */
+ }
+
+@@ -867,18 +844,12 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname (), ngrp->gr_name);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", gr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, ngrp->gr_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -923,12 +894,6 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: Out of memory. Cannot update %s.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", sgr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE); /* XXX */
+ }
+
+@@ -942,18 +907,13 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname (), nsgrp->sg_name);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", sgr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
++
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-to-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, nsgrp->sg_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -1296,7 +1256,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
++ "add-user",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1385,7 +1345,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking shadow file",
++ "unlocking-shadow-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1398,7 +1358,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking passwd file",
++ "unlocking-passwd-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1410,7 +1370,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking group file",
++ "unlocking-group-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1424,7 +1384,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking gshadow file",
++ "unlocking-gshadow-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1584,7 +1544,7 @@ static void grp_add (void)
+ Prog, gr_dbname (), grp.gr_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group",
++ "add-group",
+ grp.gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1600,7 +1560,7 @@ static void grp_add (void)
+ Prog, sgr_dbname (), sgrp.sg_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group",
++ "add-group",
+ grp.gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1610,7 +1570,7 @@ static void grp_add (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "new group: name=%s, GID=%u", user_name, user_gid));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group",
++ "add-group",
+ grp.gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -1725,17 +1685,11 @@ static void usr_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, spw_dbname (), spent.sp_namp);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding shadow password",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
++ "add-user",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -1771,12 +1725,6 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot create directory %s\n"),
+ Prog, user_home);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding home directory",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+ chown (user_home, user_id, user_gid);
+@@ -1784,8 +1732,8 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ 0777 & ~getdef_num ("UMASK", GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK));
+ home_added = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-home-dir",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -1951,12 +1899,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ */
+ if (getpwnam (user_name) != NULL) { /* local, no need for xgetpwnam */
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: user '%s' already exists\n"), Prog, user_name);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+
+@@ -1972,12 +1914,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: group %s exists - if you want to add this user to that group, use -g.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2007,12 +1943,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: UID %lu is not unique\n"),
+ Prog, (unsigned long) user_id);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_UID_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2057,9 +1987,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding SELinux user mapping",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, 0);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_ASSIGN, Prog,
++ "add-selinux-user-mapping",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ rv = E_SE_UPDATE;
+ }
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/userdel.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/userdel.c 2014-09-13 15:45:55.001829558 -0400
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c 2014-10-14 08:44:52.714850149 -0400
+@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ static void update_groups (void)
+ * Update the DBM group file with the new entry as well.
+ */
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user from group",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "deleting-user-from-group",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, ngrp->gr_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "delete '%s' from group '%s'\n",
+@@ -263,9 +263,9 @@ static void update_groups (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user from shadow group",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "deleting-user-from-shadow-group",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, nsgrp->sg_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "delete '%s' from shadow group '%s'\n",
+@@ -342,9 +342,9 @@ static void remove_usergroup (void)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "deleting group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
++ "delete-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, user_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -360,9 +360,9 @@ static void remove_usergroup (void)
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "deleting shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, user_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user",
++ "delete-user",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -498,24 +498,12 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, pw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ pw_locked = true;
+ if (pw_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (is_shadow_pwd) {
+@@ -523,12 +511,6 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, spw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking shadow password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ spw_locked = true;
+@@ -536,12 +518,6 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, spw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening shadow password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -549,23 +525,11 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ gr_locked = true;
+ if (gr_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -574,24 +538,12 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking shadow group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sgr_locked= true;
+ if (sgr_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening shadow group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -622,7 +574,7 @@ static void update_user (void)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user entries",
++ "delete-user",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -716,7 +668,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "Cannot remove %s: %s", mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -732,7 +684,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "Cannot remove %s: %s", mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -742,8 +694,8 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else
+ {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -760,7 +712,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -775,7 +727,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "Cannot remove %s: %s", mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -785,8 +737,8 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else
+ {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -980,7 +932,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user not found",
++ "deleting-user-not-found",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -1024,7 +976,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ if (!fflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user logged in",
++ "deleting-user-logged-in",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -1101,8 +1053,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else
+ {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "deleting-home-directory",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -1111,7 +1063,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (0 != errors) {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting home directory",
++ "deleting-home-directory",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+@@ -1124,8 +1076,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to SELinux user mapping removal failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "removing SELinux user mapping",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_REMOVE, Prog,
++ "delete-selinux-user-mapping",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+diff -urp shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/usermod.c shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/usermod.c 2014-09-13 15:45:55.013829557 -0400
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c 2014-10-14 08:50:05.817817855 -0400
+@@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "updating passwd",
+- user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 0);
++ "updating-password",
++ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "lock user '%s' password", user_newname));
+ strcpy (buf, "!");
+@@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "updating password",
+- user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 0);
++ "updating-password",
++ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "unlock user '%s' password", user_newname));
+ s = pw_pass;
+@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ } else if (pflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing password",
++ "updating-password",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "change user '%s' password", user_newname));
+@@ -413,8 +413,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing name",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-name",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -434,8 +434,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+
+ if (uflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing uid",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-uid",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -445,8 +445,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ }
+ if (gflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing primary group",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-primary-group",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -456,8 +456,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ }
+ if (cflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing comment",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-comment",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ pwent->pw_gecos = user_newcomment;
+@@ -465,8 +465,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+
+ if (dflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-home-dir",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ }
+ if (sflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing user shell",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-shell",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
+
+ if (fflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing inactive days",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-inactive-days",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -524,8 +524,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
+ date_to_str (old_exp, sizeof(old_exp),
+ user_expire * DAY);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing expiration date",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-expiration-date",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -592,9 +592,9 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void fail_exit (int
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "modifying account",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 0);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "modify-account",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ exit (code);
+ }
+@@ -648,9 +648,12 @@ static void update_group (void)
+ user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing group member",
+- user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (
++ AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "update-member-in-group",
++ user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ ngrp->gr_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "change '%s' to '%s' in group '%s'",
+@@ -664,9 +667,11 @@ static void update_group (void)
+ ngrp->gr_mem = del_list (ngrp->gr_mem, user_name);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "removing group member",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ ngrp->gr_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "delete '%s' from group '%s'",
+@@ -679,9 +684,11 @@ static void update_group (void)
+ ngrp->gr_mem = add_list (ngrp->gr_mem, user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ ngrp->gr_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "add '%s' to group '%s'",
+ user_newname, ngrp->gr_name));
+@@ -756,9 +763,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ nsgrp->sg_adm = add_list (nsgrp->sg_adm, user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing admin name in shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "update-admin-name-in-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, nsgrp->sg_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "change admin '%s' to '%s' in shadow group '%s'",
+@@ -778,9 +786,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing member in shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "update-member-in-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ nsgrp->sg_name, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "change '%s' to '%s' in shadow group '%s'",
+@@ -794,9 +803,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ nsgrp->sg_mem = del_list (nsgrp->sg_mem, user_name);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "removing user from shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ nsgrp->sg_name, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "delete '%s' from shadow group '%s'",
+@@ -809,9 +819,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ nsgrp->sg_mem = add_list (nsgrp->sg_mem, user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-shadow-group",
++ user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ nsgrp->sg_name, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "add '%s' to shadow group '%s'",
+ user_newname, nsgrp->sg_name));
+@@ -1515,8 +1526,8 @@ static void move_home (void)
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (uflg || gflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing home directory owner",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-home-dir-owner",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -1534,8 +1545,8 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "moving home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "moving-home-dir",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid,
+ 1);
+ #endif
+@@ -1554,9 +1565,9 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ Prog, user_home);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT,
+ Prog,
+- "moving home directory",
++ "moving-home-dir",
+ user_newname,
+ (unsigned int) user_newid,
+ 1);
+@@ -1760,8 +1771,8 @@ static void move_mailbox (void)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing mail file owner",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-mail-file-owner",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -1779,8 +1790,8 @@ static void move_mailbox (void)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing mail file name",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-mail-file-name",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -1910,8 +1921,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "modifying User mapping ",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_ASSIGN, Prog,
++ "changing-selinux-user-mapping ",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -1923,8 +1934,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to SELinux user mapping removal failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "removing SELinux user mapping",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_REMOVE, Prog,
++ "delete-selinux-user-mapping",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -1962,8 +1973,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ */
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (uflg || gflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing home directory owner",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-home-dir-owner",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-backup-mode.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-backup-mode.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7366b86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-backup-mode.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.backup-mode shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.backup-mode 2012-05-18 21:44:54.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c 2012-09-19 20:27:16.089444234 +0200
+@@ -301,15 +301,12 @@ static int create_backup (const char *ba
+ struct utimbuf ub;
+ FILE *bkfp;
+ int c;
+- mode_t mask;
+
+ if (fstat (fileno (fp), &sb) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- mask = umask (077);
+- bkfp = fopen (backup, "w");
+- (void) umask (mask);
++ bkfp = fopen_set_perms (backup, "w", &sb);
+ if (NULL == bkfp) {
+ return -1;
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-chgrp-guard.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-chgrp-guard.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..220884c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-chgrp-guard.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml.chgrp-guard shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml.chgrp-guard 2016-05-04 13:44:17.267917583 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml 2016-05-04 13:44:17.284917968 +0200
+@@ -198,6 +198,12 @@
+ The group ownership of files outside of the user's home directory
+ must be fixed manually.
+ </para>
++ <para>
++ The change of the group ownership of files inside of the user's
++ home directory is also not done if the home dir owner uid is
++ different from the current or new user id. This is safety measure
++ for special home directories such as <filename>/</filename>.
++ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+@@ -364,6 +370,12 @@
+ must be fixed manually.
+ </para>
+ <para>
++ The change of the user ownership of files inside of the user's
++ home directory is also not done if the home dir owner uid is
++ different from the current or new user id. This is safety measure
++ for special home directories such as <filename>/</filename>.
++ </para>
++ <para>
+ No checks will be performed with regard to the
+ <option>UID_MIN</option>, <option>UID_MAX</option>,
+ <option>SYS_UID_MIN</option>, or <option>SYS_UID_MAX</option>
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.chgrp-guard shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.chgrp-guard 2016-05-04 13:44:17.280917877 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c 2016-05-04 13:44:17.285917991 +0200
+@@ -1971,7 +1971,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+
+ if (!mflg && (uflg || gflg)) {
+- if (access (dflg ? user_newhome : user_home, F_OK) == 0) {
++ struct stat sb;
++
++ if (stat (dflg ? user_newhome : user_home, &sb) == 0 &&
++ ((uflg && sb.st_uid == user_newid) || sb.st_uid == user_id)) {
+ /*
+ * Change the UID on all of the files owned by
+ * `user_id' to `user_newid' in the user's home
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-crypt-null.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-crypt-null.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fba72e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-crypt-null.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c.crypt-null 2010-08-22 15:05:02.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.438355782 +0200
+@@ -49,11 +49,10 @@
+ if (!cp) {
+ /*
+ * Single Unix Spec: crypt() may return a null pointer,
+- * and set errno to indicate an error. The caller doesn't
+- * expect us to return NULL, so...
++ * and set errno to indicate an error. In this case return
++ * the NULL so the caller can handle appropriately.
+ */
+- perror ("crypt");
+- exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ return cp;
+ }
+
+ /* The GNU crypt does not return NULL if the algorithm is not
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c.crypt-null 2010-08-22 21:14:41.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.440355847 +0200
+@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ bool valid (const char *password, const
+ */
+
+ if ( (NULL != ent->pw_name)
++ && (NULL != encrypted)
+ && (strcmp (encrypted, ent->pw_passwd) == 0)) {
+ return true;
+ } else {
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c.crypt-null 2009-07-13 00:24:48.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.438355782 +0200
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ int pw_auth (const char *cipher,
+ char prompt[1024];
+ char *clear = NULL;
+ const char *cp;
++ const char *encrypted;
+ int retval;
+
+ #ifdef SKEY
+@@ -177,7 +178,11 @@ int pw_auth (const char *cipher,
+ * the results there as well.
+ */
+
+- retval = strcmp (pw_encrypt (input, cipher), cipher);
++ encrypted = pw_encrypt (input, cipher);
++ if (encrypted!=NULL)
++ retval = strcmp (encrypted, cipher);
++ else
++ retval = -1;
+
+ #ifdef SKEY
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c.crypt-null 2011-12-09 22:31:40.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.440355847 +0200
+@@ -469,6 +469,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #endif
+ cp = pw_encrypt (newpwd,
+ crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, arg));
++ if (cp == NULL) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c.crypt-null 2011-12-09 22:31:40.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.440355847 +0200
+@@ -492,6 +492,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #endif
+ cp = pw_encrypt (newpwd,
+ crypt_make_salt(crypt_method, arg));
++ if (cp == NULL) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c.crypt-null 2011-11-19 23:55:04.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.441355866 +0200
+@@ -939,6 +939,10 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group
+ }
+
+ cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL));
++ if (cp==NULL) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
+ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ if (is_shadowgrp) {
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c.crypt-null 2011-07-30 03:50:01.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.442355881 +0200
+@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ static void check_perms (const struct gr
+ cpasswd = pw_encrypt (cp, grp->gr_passwd);
+ strzero (cp);
+
+- if (grp->gr_passwd[0] == '\0' ||
++ if (cpasswd == NULL ||
++ grp->gr_passwd[0] == '\0' ||
+ strcmp (cpasswd, grp->gr_passwd) != 0) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c.crypt-null 2011-12-09 22:31:40.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.442355881 +0200
+@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int add_user (const char *name, u
+ static void update_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password)
+ {
+ void *crypt_arg = NULL;
++ char *cp;
+ if (crypt_method != NULL) {
+ #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
+ if (sflg) {
+@@ -398,9 +399,13 @@ static void update_passwd (struct passwd
+ if ((crypt_method != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(crypt_method, "NONE"))) {
+ pwd->pw_passwd = (char *)password;
+ } else {
+- pwd->pw_passwd = pw_encrypt (password,
+- crypt_make_salt (crypt_method,
+- crypt_arg));
++ cp=pw_encrypt (password, crypt_make_salt (crypt_method,
++ crypt_arg));
++ if (cp == NULL) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ pwd->pw_passwd = cp;
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* !USE_PAM */
+@@ -412,6 +417,7 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ {
+ const struct spwd *sp;
+ struct spwd spent;
++ char *cp;
+
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ void *crypt_arg = NULL;
+@@ -448,7 +454,12 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ } else {
+ const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method,
+ crypt_arg);
+- spent.sp_pwdp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
++ cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
++ if (cp == NULL) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ spent.sp_pwdp = cp;
+ }
+ spent.sp_lstchg = (long) time ((time_t *) 0) / SCALE;
+ if (0 == spent.sp_lstchg) {
+@@ -492,7 +503,12 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ spent.sp_pwdp = (char *)password;
+ } else {
+ const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, crypt_arg);
+- spent.sp_pwdp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
++ cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
++ if (cp == NULL) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ spent.sp_pwdp = cp;
+ }
+ #else
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c.crypt-null 2012-02-13 21:32:01.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c 2013-07-25 12:27:30.443355896 +0200
+@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa
+ }
+
+ cipher = pw_encrypt (clear, crypt_passwd);
+- if (strcmp (cipher, crypt_passwd) != 0) {
++ if ((cipher == NULL) || (strcmp (cipher, crypt_passwd) != 0)) {
+ strzero (clear);
+ strzero (cipher);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "incorrect password for %s",
+@@ -349,6 +349,10 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa
+ * Encrypt the password, then wipe the cleartext password.
+ */
+ cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL));
++ if (cp == NULL) {
++ perror ("crypt");
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
+ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-date-parsing.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-date-parsing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38ec091
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-date-parsing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.c.date-parsing shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.c.date-parsing 2008-06-14 00:07:51.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.c 2014-08-29 13:41:22.553267506 +0200
+@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ static int yyHaveDay;
+ static int yyHaveRel;
+ static int yyHaveTime;
+ static int yyHaveZone;
++static int yyHaveYear;
+ static int yyTimezone;
+ static int yyDay;
+ static int yyHour;
+@@ -1730,6 +1731,7 @@ yyreduce:
+ yyDay = (yyvsp[(3) - (5)].Number);
+ yyYear = (yyvsp[(5) - (5)].Number);
+ }
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ break;
+
+@@ -1740,6 +1742,7 @@ yyreduce:
+ yyYear = (yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Number);
+ yyMonth = -(yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Number);
+ yyDay = -(yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Number);
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ break;
+
+@@ -1750,6 +1753,7 @@ yyreduce:
+ yyDay = (yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Number);
+ yyMonth = (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Number);
+ yyYear = -(yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Number);
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ break;
+
+@@ -1767,6 +1771,7 @@ yyreduce:
+ yyMonth = (yyvsp[(1) - (4)].Number);
+ yyDay = (yyvsp[(2) - (4)].Number);
+ yyYear = (yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Number);
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ break;
+
+@@ -1784,6 +1789,7 @@ yyreduce:
+ yyMonth = (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Number);
+ yyDay = (yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Number);
+ yyYear = (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Number);
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ break;
+
+@@ -1928,7 +1934,8 @@ yyreduce:
+ case 49:
+ #line 397 "getdate.y"
+ {
+- if ((yyHaveTime != 0) && (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
++ if ((yyHaveTime != 0 || (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Number) >= 100) && !yyHaveYear
++ && (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
+ yyYear = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Number);
+ else
+ {
+@@ -2556,7 +2563,7 @@ yylex (void)
+ return LookupWord (buff);
+ }
+ if (c != '(')
+- return *yyInput++;
++ return (unsigned char)*yyInput++;
+ Count = 0;
+ do
+ {
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.y.date-parsing shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.y
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.y.date-parsing 2008-05-26 10:57:51.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/getdate.y 2014-08-29 13:40:37.502229879 +0200
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ static int yyHaveDay;
+ static int yyHaveRel;
+ static int yyHaveTime;
+ static int yyHaveZone;
++static int yyHaveYear;
+ static int yyTimezone;
+ static int yyDay;
+ static int yyHour;
+@@ -293,18 +294,21 @@ date : tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ yyDay = $3;
+ yyYear = $5;
+ }
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tUNUMBER tSNUMBER tSNUMBER {
+ /* ISO 8601 format. yyyy-mm-dd. */
+ yyYear = $1;
+ yyMonth = -$2;
+ yyDay = -$3;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tUNUMBER tMONTH tSNUMBER {
+ /* e.g. 17-JUN-1992. */
+ yyDay = $1;
+ yyMonth = $2;
+ yyYear = -$3;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tMONTH tUNUMBER {
+ yyMonth = $1;
+@@ -314,6 +318,7 @@ date : tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ yyMonth = $1;
+ yyDay = $2;
+ yyYear = $4;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tUNUMBER tMONTH {
+ yyMonth = $2;
+@@ -323,6 +328,7 @@ date : tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ yyMonth = $2;
+ yyDay = $1;
+ yyYear = $3;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ ;
+
+@@ -395,7 +401,8 @@ relunit : tUNUMBER tYEAR_UNIT {
+
+ number : tUNUMBER
+ {
+- if ((yyHaveTime != 0) && (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
++ if ((yyHaveTime != 0 || $1 >= 100) && !yyHaveYear
++ && (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
+ yyYear = $1;
+ else
+ {
+@@ -802,7 +809,7 @@ yylex (void)
+ return LookupWord (buff);
+ }
+ if (c != '(')
+- return *yyInput++;
++ return (unsigned char)*yyInput++;
+ Count = 0;
+ do
+ {
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45c677a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.default-range shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.default-range 2012-01-08 17:35:44.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c 2013-06-14 15:14:51.970237594 +0200
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++#if 0
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -150,6 +151,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+@@ -200,6 +202,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_h
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++#if 0
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_h
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
+ if (ret != 0) {
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-errmsg.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-errmsg.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f3a1d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-errmsg.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg 2013-02-20 15:41:44.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c 2013-06-14 14:22:59.529661095 +0200
+@@ -1760,6 +1760,9 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ if (access (user_home, F_OK) != 0) {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (set_selinux_file_context (user_home, NULL) != 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot set SELinux context for home directory %s\n"),
++ Prog, user_home);
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -1789,6 +1792,9 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ /* Reset SELinux to create files with default contexts */
+ if (reset_selinux_file_context () != 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot reset SELinux file creation context\n"),
++ Prog);
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+ #endif
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-goodname.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-goodname.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82b7839
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-goodname.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname 2009-07-13 00:24:45.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c 2018-04-24 16:32:40.970529916 +0200
+@@ -49,25 +49,44 @@
+ static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
+ {
+ /*
+- * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
+- */
+- if (('\0' == *name) ||
+- !((('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name))) {
++ * User/group names must match gnu e-regex:
++ * [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,30}[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?
++ *
++ * as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
++ * sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
++ *
++ * Also do not allow fully numeric names or just "." or "..".
++ */
++ int numeric;
++
++ if ('\0' == *name ||
++ ('.' == *name && (('.' == name[1] && '\0' == name[2]) ||
++ '\0' == name[1])) ||
++ !((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
++ (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
++ (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
++ *name == '_' ||
++ *name == '.')) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
++ numeric = isdigit(*name);
++
+ while ('\0' != *++name) {
+- if (!(( ('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name) ) ||
+- ( ('0' <= *name) && ('9' >= *name) ) ||
+- ('_' == *name) ||
+- ('-' == *name) ||
+- ( ('$' == *name) && ('\0' == *(name + 1)) )
++ if (!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
++ (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
++ (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
++ *name == '_' ||
++ *name == '.' ||
++ *name == '-' ||
++ (*name == '$' && name[1] == '\0')
+ )) {
+ return false;
+ }
++ numeric &= isdigit(*name);
+ }
+
+- return true;
++ return !numeric;
+ }
+
+ bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name)
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname 2012-05-25 13:45:27.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml 2012-09-19 18:43:53.492160653 +0200
+@@ -259,12 +259,6 @@
+ <refsect1 id='caveats'>
+ <title>CAVEATS</title>
+ <para>
+- Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+- followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+- They can end with a dollar sign.
+- In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
+- </para>
+- <para>
+ Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname 2012-05-25 13:45:29.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml 2012-09-19 18:43:53.493160675 +0200
+@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+- Do no create the user's home directory, even if the system
++ Do not create the user's home directory, even if the system
+ wide setting from <filename>/etc/login.defs</filename>
+ (<option>CREATE_HOME</option>) is set to
+ <replaceable>yes</replaceable>.
+@@ -654,12 +654,6 @@
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+- Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+- followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+- They can end with a dollar sign.
+- In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
+- </para>
+- <para>
+ Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-id-alloc.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-id-alloc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c55739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-id-alloc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1213 @@
+Previously, this allocation was optimized for an outdated
+deployment style (that of /etc/group alongside nss_db). The issue
+here is that this results in extremely poor performance when using
+SSSD, Winbind or nss_ldap.
+
+There were actually two serious bugs here that have been addressed:
+
+1) Running getgrent() loops won't work in most SSSD or Winbind
+environments, as full group enumeration is disabled by default.
+This could easily result in auto-allocating a group that was
+already in use. (This might result in a security issue as well, if
+the shared GID is a privileged group).
+
+2) For system groups, the loop was always iterating through the
+complete SYS_GID_MIN->SYS_GID_MAX range. On SSSD and Winbind, this
+means hundreds of round-trips to LDAP (unless the GIDs were
+specifically configured to be ignored by the SSSD or winbindd).
+To a user with a slow connection to their LDAP server, this would
+appear as if groupadd -r was hung. (Though it would eventually
+complete).
+
+This patch changes the algorithm to be more favorable for LDAP
+environments, at the expense of some performance when using nss_db.
+Given that the DB is a local service, this should have a negligible
+effect from a user's perspective.
+
+With the new algorithm, we simply first iterate through all entries
+in the local database with gr_next(), recording the IDs that are in
+use. We then start from the highest presumed-available entry and
+call getgrgid() to see if it is available. We continue this until
+we come to the first unused GID. We then select that and return it.
+
+If we make it through all the remaining IDs without finding a free
+one, we start over from the beginning of the range and try to find
+room in one of the gaps in the range.
+
+The patch was originally written by Stephen Gallagher and applied
+identically also to the user allocation by Tomáš Mráz.
+
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.id-alloc shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.id-alloc 2014-09-10 10:25:41.165524986 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_gid.c 2014-09-10 10:25:41.195525677 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,118 @@
+ #include "getdef.h"
+
+ /*
++ * get_ranges - Get the minimum and maximum ID ranges for the search
++ *
++ * This function will return the minimum and maximum ranges for IDs
++ *
++ * 0: The function completed successfully
++ * EINVAL: The provided ranges are impossible (such as maximum < minimum)
++ *
++ * preferred_min: The special-case minimum value for a specifically-
++ * requested ID, which may be lower than the standard min_id
++ */
++static int get_ranges(bool sys_group, gid_t *min_id, gid_t *max_id,
++ gid_t *preferred_min)
++{
++ gid_t gid_def_max = 0;
++
++ if (sys_group) {
++ /* System groups */
++
++ /* A requested ID is allowed to be below the autoselect range */
++ *preferred_min = (gid_t) 1;
++
++ /* Get the minimum ID range from login.defs or default to 101 */
++ *min_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
++
++ /*
++ * If SYS_GID_MAX is unspecified, we should assume it to be one
++ * less than the GID_MIN (which is reserved for non-system accounts)
++ */
++ gid_def_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("GID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
++ *max_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("SYS_GID_MAX",
++ (unsigned long) gid_def_max);
++
++ /* Check that the ranges make sense */
++ if (*max_id < *min_id) {
++ (void) fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_GID_MIN (%lu), "
++ "GID_MIN (%lu), SYS_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
++ Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
++ getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL),
++ (unsigned long) *max_id);
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* Non-system groups */
++
++ /* Get the values from login.defs or use reasonable defaults */
++ *min_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("GID_MIN", 1000UL);
++ *max_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("GID_MAX", 60000UL);
++
++ /*
++ * The preferred minimum should match the standard ID minimum
++ * for non-system groups.
++ */
++ *preferred_min = *min_id;
++
++ /* Check that the ranges make sense */
++ if (*max_id < *min_id) {
++ (void) fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Invalid configuration: GID_MIN (%lu), "
++ "GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
++ Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
++ (unsigned long) *max_id);
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * check_gid - See if the requested GID is available
++ *
++ * On success, return 0
++ * If the ID is in use, return EEXIST
++ * If the ID is outside the range, return ERANGE
++ * In other cases, return errno from getgrgid()
++ */
++static int check_gid(const gid_t gid,
++ const gid_t gid_min,
++ const gid_t gid_max,
++ bool *used_gids)
++{
++ /* First test that the preferred ID is in the range */
++ if (gid < gid_min || gid > gid_max) {
++ return ERANGE;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Check whether we already detected this GID
++ * using the gr_next() loop
++ */
++ if (used_gids != NULL && used_gids[gid]) {
++ return EEXIST;
++ }
++ /* Check if the GID exists according to NSS */
++ errno = 0;
++ if (getgrgid(gid) != NULL) {
++ return EEXIST;
++ } else {
++ /* getgrgid() was NULL, check whether this was
++ * due to an error, so we can report it.
++ */
++ /* ignore errors for now * if (errno != 0) {
++ return errno;
++ } */
++ }
++
++ /* If we've made it here, the GID must be available */
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/*
+ * find_new_gid - Find a new unused GID.
+ *
+ * If successful, find_new_gid provides an unused group ID in the
+@@ -48,166 +160,339 @@
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused GIDs are available.
+ */
+-int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
+- gid_t *gid,
+- /*@null@*/gid_t const *preferred_gid)
++int find_new_gid(bool sys_group,
++ gid_t *gid,
++ /*@null@*/gid_t const *preferred_gid)
+ {
+- const struct group *grp;
+- gid_t gid_min, gid_max, group_id;
+ bool *used_gids;
++ const struct group *grp;
++ gid_t gid_min, gid_max, preferred_min;
++ gid_t group_id, id;
++ gid_t lowest_found, highest_found;
++ int result;
++ int nospam = 0;
+
+- assert (gid != NULL);
++ assert(gid != NULL);
+
+- if (!sys_group) {
+- gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL);
+- gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MAX", 60000UL);
+- if (gid_max < gid_min) {
+- (void) fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Invalid configuration: GID_MIN (%lu), GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
+- Prog, (unsigned long) gid_min, (unsigned long) gid_max);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- } else {
+- gid_min = (gid_t) 1;
+- gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
+- gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MAX", (unsigned long) gid_max);
+- if (gid_max < gid_min) {
+- (void) fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_GID_MIN (%lu), GID_MIN (%lu), SYS_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
+- Prog, (unsigned long) gid_min, getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL), (unsigned long) gid_max);
++ /*
++ * First, figure out what ID range is appropriate for
++ * automatic assignment
++ */
++ result = get_ranges(sys_group, &gid_min, &gid_max, &preferred_min);
++ if (result == EINVAL) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ /* Check if the preferred GID is available */
++ if (preferred_gid) {
++ result = check_gid(*preferred_gid, preferred_min, gid_max, NULL);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /*
++ * Make sure the GID isn't queued for use already
++ */
++ if (gr_locate_gid (*preferred_gid) == NULL) {
++ *gid = *preferred_gid;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ /*
++ * gr_locate_gid() found the GID in an as-yet uncommitted
++ * entry. We'll proceed below and auto-set a GID.
++ */
++ } else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE) {
++ /*
++ * Continue on below. At this time, we won't
++ * treat these two cases differently.
++ */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred. We should report
++ * this and fail the group creation.
++ * This differs from the automatic creation
++ * behavior below, since if a specific GID was
++ * requested and generated an error, the user is
++ * more likely to want to stop and address the
++ * issue.
++ */
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Encountered error attempting to use "
++ "preferred GID: %s\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
++
++ /*
++ * Search the entire group file,
++ * looking for the next unused value.
++ *
++ * We first check the local database with gr_rewind/gr_next to find
++ * all local values that are in use.
++ *
++ * We then compare the next free value to all databases (local and
++ * remote) and iterate until we find a free one. If there are free
++ * values beyond the lowest (system groups) or highest (non-system
++ * groups), we will prefer those and avoid potentially reclaiming a
++ * deleted group (which can be a security issue, since it may grant
++ * access to files belonging to that former group).
++ *
++ * If there are no GIDs available at the end of the search, we will
++ * have no choice but to iterate through the range looking for gaps.
++ *
++ */
++
++ /* Create an array to hold all of the discovered GIDs */
+ used_gids = malloc (sizeof (bool) * (gid_max +1));
+ if (NULL == used_gids) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
+- Prog, strerror (errno));
++ _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
++ Prog, strerror (errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memset (used_gids, false, sizeof (bool) * (gid_max + 1));
+
+- if ( (NULL != preferred_gid)
+- && (*preferred_gid >= gid_min)
+- && (*preferred_gid <= gid_max)
+- /* Check if the user exists according to NSS */
+- && (getgrgid (*preferred_gid) == NULL)
+- /* Check also the local database in case of uncommitted
+- * changes */
+- && (gr_locate_gid (*preferred_gid) == NULL)) {
+- *gid = *preferred_gid;
+- free (used_gids);
+- return 0;
+- }
+-
+- /* if we did not find free preffered system gid, we start to look for
+- * one in the range assigned to dynamic system IDs */
+- if (sys_group)
+- gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
++ /* First look for the lowest and highest value in the local database */
++ (void) gr_rewind ();
++ highest_found = gid_min;
++ lowest_found = gid_max;
++ while ((grp = gr_next ()) != NULL) {
++ /*
++ * Does this entry have a lower GID than the lowest we've found
++ * so far?
++ */
++ if ((grp->gr_gid <= lowest_found) && (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min)) {
++ lowest_found = grp->gr_gid - 1;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Does this entry have a higher GID than the highest we've found
++ * so far?
++ */
++ if ((grp->gr_gid >= highest_found) && (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max)) {
++ highest_found = grp->gr_gid + 1;
++ }
++
++ /* create index of used GIDs */
++ if (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min
++ && grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
++
++ used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
++ }
++ }
+
+- /*
+- * Search the entire group file,
+- * looking for the largest unused value.
+- *
+- * We check the list of groups according to NSS (setgrent/getgrent),
+- * but we also check the local database (gr_rewind/gr_next) in case
+- * some groups were created but the changes were not committed yet.
+- */
+ if (sys_group) {
+- gid_t id;
+- /* setgrent / getgrent / endgrent can be very slow with
+- * LDAP configurations (and many accounts).
+- * Since there is a limited amount of IDs to be tested
+- * for system accounts, we just check the existence
+- * of IDs with getgrgid.
+- */
+- group_id = gid_max;
+- for (id = gid_max; id >= gid_min; id--) {
+- if (getgrgid (id) != NULL) {
+- group_id = id - 1;
+- used_gids[id] = true;
+- }
++ /*
++ * For system groups, we want to start from the
++ * top of the range and work downwards.
++ */
++
++ /*
++ * At the conclusion of the gr_next() search, we will either
++ * have a presumed-free GID or we will be at GID_MIN - 1.
++ */
++ if (lowest_found < gid_min) {
++ /*
++ * In this case, a GID is in use at GID_MIN.
++ *
++ * We will reset the search to GID_MAX and proceed down
++ * through all the GIDs (skipping those we detected with
++ * used_gids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
++ * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted GID,
++ * so administrators should be instructed to use this
++ * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign GIDs
++ * explicitly).
++ */
++ lowest_found = gid_max;
+ }
+
+- (void) gr_rewind ();
+- while ((grp = gr_next ()) != NULL) {
+- if ((grp->gr_gid <= group_id) && (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min)) {
+- group_id = grp->gr_gid - 1;
+- }
+- /* create index of used GIDs */
+- if (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
+- used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
++ /* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
++ for (id = lowest_found; id >= gid_min; id--) {
++ result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This GID is available. Return it. */
++ *gid = id;
++ free(used_gids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available GIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
+ }
+ }
+- } else {
+- group_id = gid_min;
+- setgrent ();
+- while ((grp = getgrent ()) != NULL) {
+- if ((grp->gr_gid >= group_id) && (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max)) {
+- group_id = grp->gr_gid + 1;
+- }
+- /* create index of used GIDs */
+- if (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
+- used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
++
++ /*
++ * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from GID_MAX,
++ * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
++ * scenario here is that we will run through (GID_MAX - GID_MIN - 1)
++ * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with lowest_found as
++ * GID_MAX - 1, all groups in the range in use and maintained by
++ * network services such as LDAP.)
++ */
++ if (lowest_found != gid_max) {
++ for (id = gid_max; id >= gid_min; id--) {
++ result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This GID is available. Return it. */
++ *gid = id;
++ free(used_gids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available GIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
++ }
+ }
+ }
+- endgrent ();
++ } else { /* !sys_group */
++ /*
++ * For non-system groups, we want to start from the
++ * bottom of the range and work upwards.
++ */
+
+- (void) gr_rewind ();
+- while ((grp = gr_next ()) != NULL) {
+- if ((grp->gr_gid >= group_id) && (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max)) {
+- group_id = grp->gr_gid + 1;
+- }
+- /* create index of used GIDs */
+- if (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
+- used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
+- }
++ /*
++ * At the conclusion of the gr_next() search, we will either
++ * have a presumed-free GID or we will be at GID_MAX + 1.
++ */
++ if (highest_found > gid_max) {
++ /*
++ * In this case, a GID is in use at GID_MAX.
++ *
++ * We will reset the search to GID_MIN and proceed up
++ * through all the GIDs (skipping those we detected with
++ * used_gids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
++ * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted GID,
++ * so administrators should be instructed to use this
++ * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign GIDs
++ * explicitly).
++ */
++ highest_found = gid_min;
+ }
+- }
+
+- /*
+- * If a group (resp. system group) with GID equal to GID_MAX (resp.
+- * GID_MIN) exists, the above algorithm will give us GID_MAX+1
+- * (resp. GID_MIN-1) even if not unique. Search for the first free
+- * GID starting with GID_MIN (resp. GID_MAX).
+- */
+- if (sys_group) {
+- if (group_id < gid_min) {
+- for (group_id = gid_max; group_id >= gid_min; group_id--) {
+- if (false == used_gids[group_id]) {
+- break;
++ /* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
++ for (id = highest_found; id <= gid_max; id++) {
++ result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This GID is available. Return it. */
++ *gid = id;
++ free(used_gids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available GIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
+ }
+- }
+- if (group_id < gid_min) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Can't get unique system GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
+- Prog);
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
+- "no more available GID on the system"));
+- free (used_gids);
+- return -1;
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
+ }
+ }
+- } else {
+- if (group_id > gid_max) {
+- for (group_id = gid_min; group_id <= gid_max; group_id++) {
+- if (false == used_gids[group_id]) {
+- break;
++
++ /*
++ * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from GID_MIN,
++ * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
++ * scenario here is that we will run through (GID_MAX - GID_MIN - 1)
++ * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with highest_found as
++ * GID_MIN + 1, all groups in the range in use and maintained by
++ * network services such as LDAP.)
++ */
++ if (highest_found != gid_min) {
++ for (id = gid_min; id <= gid_max; id++) {
++ result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This GID is available. Return it. */
++ *gid = id;
++ free(used_gids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available GIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
+ }
+ }
+- if (group_id > gid_max) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Can't get unique GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
+- Prog);
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available GID on the system"));
+- free (used_gids);
+- return -1;
+- }
+ }
+ }
+
+- free (used_gids);
+- *gid = group_id;
+- return 0;
++ /* The code reached here and found no available IDs in the range */
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
++ Prog);
++ SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, "no more available GIDs on the system"));
++ free(used_gids);
++ return -1;
+ }
+
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.id-alloc shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.id-alloc 2011-07-29 17:39:16.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/find_new_uid.c 2014-10-17 16:52:30.481217270 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,118 @@
+ #include "getdef.h"
+
+ /*
++ * get_ranges - Get the minimum and maximum ID ranges for the search
++ *
++ * This function will return the minimum and maximum ranges for IDs
++ *
++ * 0: The function completed successfully
++ * EINVAL: The provided ranges are impossible (such as maximum < minimum)
++ *
++ * preferred_min: The special-case minimum value for a specifically-
++ * requested ID, which may be lower than the standard min_id
++ */
++static int get_ranges(bool sys_user, uid_t *min_id, uid_t *max_id,
++ uid_t *preferred_min)
++{
++ uid_t uid_def_max = 0;
++
++ if (sys_user) {
++ /* System users */
++
++ /* A requested ID is allowed to be below the autoselect range */
++ *preferred_min = (uid_t) 1;
++
++ /* Get the minimum ID range from login.defs or default to 101 */
++ *min_id = (uid_t) getdef_ulong("SYS_UID_MIN", 101UL);
++
++ /*
++ * If SYS_UID_MAX is unspecified, we should assume it to be one
++ * less than the UID_MIN (which is reserved for non-system accounts)
++ */
++ uid_def_max = (uid_t) getdef_ulong("UID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
++ *max_id = (uid_t) getdef_ulong("SYS_UID_MAX",
++ (unsigned long) uid_def_max);
++
++ /* Check that the ranges make sense */
++ if (*max_id < *min_id) {
++ (void) fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_UID_MIN (%lu), "
++ "UID_MIN (%lu), SYS_UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
++ Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
++ getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL),
++ (unsigned long) *max_id);
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* Non-system users */
++
++ /* Get the values from login.defs or use reasonable defaults */
++ *min_id = (uid_t) getdef_ulong("UID_MIN", 1000UL);
++ *max_id = (uid_t) getdef_ulong("UID_MAX", 60000UL);
++
++ /*
++ * The preferred minimum should match the standard ID minimum
++ * for non-system users.
++ */
++ *preferred_min = *min_id;
++
++ /* Check that the ranges make sense */
++ if (*max_id < *min_id) {
++ (void) fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Invalid configuration: UID_MIN (%lu), "
++ "UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
++ Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
++ (unsigned long) *max_id);
++ return EINVAL;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * check_uid - See if the requested UID is available
++ *
++ * On success, return 0
++ * If the ID is in use, return EEXIST
++ * If the ID is outside the range, return ERANGE
++ * In other cases, return errno from getpwuid()
++ */
++static int check_uid(const uid_t uid,
++ const uid_t uid_min,
++ const uid_t uid_max,
++ bool *used_uids)
++{
++ /* First test that the preferred ID is in the range */
++ if (uid < uid_min || uid > uid_max) {
++ return ERANGE;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Check whether we already detected this UID
++ * using the pw_next() loop
++ */
++ if (used_uids != NULL && used_uids[uid]) {
++ return EEXIST;
++ }
++ /* Check if the UID exists according to NSS */
++ errno = 0;
++ if (getpwuid(uid) != NULL) {
++ return EEXIST;
++ } else {
++ /* getpwuid() was NULL, check whether this was
++ * due to an error, so we can report it.
++ */
++ /* ignore errors for now * if (errno != 0) {
++ return errno;
++ } */
++ }
++
++ /* If we've made it here, the UID must be available */
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/*
+ * find_new_uid - Find a new unused UID.
+ *
+ * If successful, find_new_uid provides an unused user ID in the
+@@ -48,162 +160,339 @@
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused UIDs are available.
+ */
+-int find_new_uid (bool sys_user,
+- uid_t *uid,
+- /*@null@*/uid_t const *preferred_uid)
++int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
++ uid_t *uid,
++ /*@null@*/uid_t const *preferred_uid)
+ {
+- const struct passwd *pwd;
+- uid_t uid_min, uid_max, user_id;
+ bool *used_uids;
++ const struct passwd *pwd;
++ uid_t uid_min, uid_max, preferred_min;
++ uid_t user_id, id;
++ uid_t lowest_found, highest_found;
++ int result;
++ int nospam = 0;
+
+ assert (uid != NULL);
+
+- if (!sys_user) {
+- uid_min = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL);
+- uid_max = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MAX", 60000UL);
+- if (uid_max < uid_min) {
+- (void) fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Invalid configuration: UID_MIN (%lu), UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
+- Prog, (unsigned long) uid_min, (unsigned long) uid_max);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- } else {
+- uid_min = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_UID_MIN", 101UL);
+- uid_max = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
+- uid_max = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_UID_MAX", (unsigned long) uid_max);
+- if (uid_max < uid_min) {
+- (void) fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_UID_MIN (%lu), UID_MIN (%lu), SYS_UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
+- Prog, (unsigned long) uid_min, getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL), (unsigned long) uid_max);
++ /*
++ * First, figure out what ID range is appropriate for
++ * automatic assignment
++ */
++ result = get_ranges(sys_user, &uid_min, &uid_max, &preferred_min);
++ if (result == EINVAL) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ /* Check if the preferred UID is available */
++ if (preferred_uid) {
++ result = check_uid(*preferred_uid, preferred_min, uid_max, NULL);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /*
++ * Make sure the UID isn't queued for use already
++ */
++ if (pw_locate_uid (*preferred_uid) == NULL) {
++ *uid = *preferred_uid;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ /*
++ * pw_locate_uid() found the UID in an as-yet uncommitted
++ * entry. We'll proceed below and auto-set an UID.
++ */
++ } else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE) {
++ /*
++ * Continue on below. At this time, we won't
++ * treat these two cases differently.
++ */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred. We should report
++ * this and fail the user creation.
++ * This differs from the automatic creation
++ * behavior below, since if a specific UID was
++ * requested and generated an error, the user is
++ * more likely to want to stop and address the
++ * issue.
++ */
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Encountered error attempting to use "
++ "preferred UID: %s\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
++
++ /*
++ * Search the entire passwd file,
++ * looking for the next unused value.
++ *
++ * We first check the local database with pw_rewind/pw_next to find
++ * all local values that are in use.
++ *
++ * We then compare the next free value to all databases (local and
++ * remote) and iterate until we find a free one. If there are free
++ * values beyond the lowest (system users) or highest (non-system
++ * users), we will prefer those and avoid potentially reclaiming a
++ * deleted user (which can be a security issue, since it may grant
++ * access to files belonging to that former user).
++ *
++ * If there are no UIDs available at the end of the search, we will
++ * have no choice but to iterate through the range looking for gaps.
++ *
++ */
++
++ /* Create an array to hold all of the discovered UIDs */
+ used_uids = malloc (sizeof (bool) * (uid_max +1));
+ if (NULL == used_uids) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
+- Prog, strerror (errno));
++ _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
++ Prog, strerror (errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memset (used_uids, false, sizeof (bool) * (uid_max + 1));
+
+- if ( (NULL != preferred_uid)
+- && (*preferred_uid >= uid_min)
+- && (*preferred_uid <= uid_max)
+- /* Check if the user exists according to NSS */
+- && (getpwuid (*preferred_uid) == NULL)
+- /* Check also the local database in case of uncommitted
+- * changes */
+- && (pw_locate_uid (*preferred_uid) == NULL)) {
+- *uid = *preferred_uid;
+- free (used_uids);
+- return 0;
+- }
++ /* First look for the lowest and highest value in the local database */
++ (void) pw_rewind ();
++ highest_found = uid_min;
++ lowest_found = uid_max;
++ while ((pwd = pw_next ()) != NULL) {
++ /*
++ * Does this entry have a lower UID than the lowest we've found
++ * so far?
++ */
++ if ((pwd->pw_uid <= lowest_found) && (pwd->pw_uid >= uid_min)) {
++ lowest_found = pwd->pw_uid - 1;
++ }
+
++ /*
++ * Does this entry have a higher UID than the highest we've found
++ * so far?
++ */
++ if ((pwd->pw_uid >= highest_found) && (pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max)) {
++ highest_found = pwd->pw_uid + 1;
++ }
++
++ /* create index of used UIDs */
++ if (pwd->pw_uid >= uid_min
++ && pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max) {
++
++ used_uids[pwd->pw_uid] = true;
++ }
++ }
+
+- /*
+- * Search the entire password file,
+- * looking for the largest unused value.
+- *
+- * We check the list of users according to NSS (setpwent/getpwent),
+- * but we also check the local database (pw_rewind/pw_next) in case
+- * some users were created but the changes were not committed yet.
+- */
+ if (sys_user) {
+- uid_t id;
+- /* setpwent / getpwent / endpwent can be very slow with
+- * LDAP configurations (and many accounts).
+- * Since there is a limited amount of IDs to be tested
+- * for system accounts, we just check the existence
+- * of IDs with getpwuid.
+- */
+- user_id = uid_max;
+- for (id = uid_max; id >= uid_min; id--) {
+- if (getpwuid (id) != NULL) {
+- user_id = id - 1;
+- used_uids[id] = true;
+- }
++ /*
++ * For system users, we want to start from the
++ * top of the range and work downwards.
++ */
++
++ /*
++ * At the conclusion of the pw_next() search, we will either
++ * have a presumed-free UID or we will be at UID_MIN - 1.
++ */
++ if (lowest_found < uid_min) {
++ /*
++ * In this case, an UID is in use at UID_MIN.
++ *
++ * We will reset the search to UID_MAX and proceed down
++ * through all the UIDs (skipping those we detected with
++ * used_uids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
++ * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted UID,
++ * so administrators should be instructed to use this
++ * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign UIDs
++ * explicitly).
++ */
++ lowest_found = uid_max;
+ }
+
+- (void) pw_rewind ();
+- while ((pwd = pw_next ()) != NULL) {
+- if ((pwd->pw_uid <= user_id) && (pwd->pw_uid >= uid_min)) {
+- user_id = pwd->pw_uid - 1;
+- }
+- /* create index of used UIDs */
+- if (pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max) {
+- used_uids[pwd->pw_uid] = true;
++ /* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
++ for (id = lowest_found; id >= uid_min; id--) {
++ result = check_uid(id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This UID is available. Return it. */
++ *uid = id;
++ free(used_uids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique system UID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available UIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
+ }
+ }
+- } else {
+- user_id = uid_min;
+- setpwent ();
+- while ((pwd = getpwent ()) != NULL) {
+- if ((pwd->pw_uid >= user_id) && (pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max)) {
+- user_id = pwd->pw_uid + 1;
+- }
+- /* create index of used UIDs */
+- if (pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max) {
+- used_uids[pwd->pw_uid] = true;
++
++ /*
++ * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from UID_MAX,
++ * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
++ * scenario here is that we will run through (UID_MAX - UID_MIN - 1)
++ * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with lowest_found as
++ * UID_MAX - 1, all users in the range in use and maintained by
++ * network services such as LDAP.)
++ */
++ if (lowest_found != uid_max) {
++ for (id = uid_max; id >= uid_min; id--) {
++ result = check_uid(id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This UID is available. Return it. */
++ *uid = id;
++ free(used_uids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique system UID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available UIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
++ }
+ }
+ }
+- endpwent ();
++ } else { /* !sys_user */
++ /*
++ * For non-system users, we want to start from the
++ * bottom of the range and work upwards.
++ */
+
+- (void) pw_rewind ();
+- while ((pwd = pw_next ()) != NULL) {
+- if ((pwd->pw_uid >= user_id) && (pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max)) {
+- user_id = pwd->pw_uid + 1;
+- }
+- /* create index of used UIDs */
+- if (pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max) {
+- used_uids[pwd->pw_uid] = true;
+- }
++ /*
++ * At the conclusion of the pw_next() search, we will either
++ * have a presumed-free UID or we will be at UID_MAX + 1.
++ */
++ if (highest_found > uid_max) {
++ /*
++ * In this case, a UID is in use at UID_MAX.
++ *
++ * We will reset the search to UID_MIN and proceed up
++ * through all the UIDs (skipping those we detected with
++ * used_uids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
++ * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted UID,
++ * so administrators should be instructed to use this
++ * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign UIDs
++ * explicitly).
++ */
++ highest_found = uid_min;
+ }
+- }
+
+- /*
+- * If a user (resp. system user) with UID equal to UID_MAX (resp.
+- * UID_MIN) exists, the above algorithm will give us UID_MAX+1
+- * (resp. UID_MIN-1) even if not unique. Search for the first free
+- * UID starting with UID_MIN (resp. UID_MAX).
+- */
+- if (sys_user) {
+- if (user_id < uid_min) {
+- for (user_id = uid_max; user_id >= uid_min; user_id--) {
+- if (false == used_uids[user_id]) {
+- break;
++ /* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
++ for (id = highest_found; id <= uid_max; id++) {
++ result = check_uid(id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This UID is available. Return it. */
++ *uid = id;
++ free(used_uids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique UID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available UIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
+ }
+- }
+- if (user_id < uid_min ) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Can't get unique system UID (no more available UIDs)\n"),
+- Prog);
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
+- "no more available UID on the system"));
+- free (used_uids);
+- return -1;
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
+ }
+ }
+- } else {
+- if (user_id > uid_max) {
+- for (user_id = uid_min; user_id <= uid_max; user_id++) {
+- if (false == used_uids[user_id]) {
+- break;
++
++ /*
++ * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from UID_MIN,
++ * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
++ * scenario here is that we will run through (UID_MAX - UID_MIN - 1)
++ * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with highest_found as
++ * UID_MIN + 1, all users in the range in use and maintained by
++ * network services such as LDAP.)
++ */
++ if (highest_found != uid_min) {
++ for (id = uid_min; id <= uid_max; id++) {
++ result = check_uid(id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
++ if (result == 0) {
++ /* This UID is available. Return it. */
++ *uid = id;
++ free(used_uids);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (result == EEXIST) {
++ /* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * An unexpected error occurred.
++ *
++ * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
++ * the logs
++ *
++ */
++ if (!nospam) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique UID (%s). "
++ "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
++ Prog, strerror(result));
++ SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
++ "Error checking available UIDs: %s",
++ strerror(result)));
++ nospam = 1;
++ }
++ /*
++ * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
++ * will work properly.
++ */
+ }
+ }
+- if (user_id > uid_max) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: Can't get unique UID (no more available UIDs)\n"),
+- Prog);
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available UID on the system"));
+- free (used_uids);
+- return -1;
+- }
+ }
+ }
+
+- free (used_uids);
+- *uid = user_id;
+- return 0;
++ /* The code reached here and found no available IDs in the range */
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ _("%s: Can't get unique UID (no more available UIDs)\n"),
++ Prog);
++ SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, "no more available UIDs on the system"));
++ free(used_uids);
++ return -1;
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b05e5bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml.info-parent-dir shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml.info-parent-dir 2012-05-25 13:45:28.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml 2012-09-19 18:46:35.651613365 +0200
+@@ -216,7 +216,15 @@
+ <para>
+ If this field does not specify an existing directory, the
+ specified directory is created, with ownership set to the
+- user being created or updated and its primary group.
++ user being created or updated and its primary group. Note
++ that newusers does not create parent directories of the new
++ user's home directory. The newusers command will fail to
++ create the home directory if the parent directories do not
++ exist, and will send a message to stderr informing the user
++ of the failure. The newusers command will not halt or return
++ a failure to the calling shell if it fails to create the home
++ directory, it will continue to process the batch of new users
++ specified.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If the home directory of an existing user is changed,
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-ingroup.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-ingroup.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1844fbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-ingroup.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c.ingroup shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c.ingroup 2018-04-24 16:55:24.546677529 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c 2018-04-24 16:58:17.113445562 +0200
+@@ -83,15 +83,29 @@ static void usage (void)
+ }
+ }
+
++static bool ingroup(const char *name, struct group *gr)
++{
++ char **look;
++ bool notfound = true;
++
++ look = gr->gr_mem;
++ while (*look && notfound)
++ notfound = strcmp (*look++, name);
++
++ return !notfound;
++}
++
+ /*
+- * find_matching_group - search all groups of a given group id for
++ * find_matching_group - search all groups of a gr's group id for
+ * membership of a given username
++ * but check gr itself first
+ */
+-static /*@null@*/struct group *find_matching_group (const char *name, gid_t gid)
++static /*@null@*/struct group *find_matching_group (const char *name, struct group *gr)
+ {
+- struct group *gr;
+- char **look;
+- bool notfound = true;
++ gid_t gid = gr->gr_gid;
++
++ if (ingroup(name, gr))
++ return gr;
+
+ setgrent ();
+ while ((gr = getgrent ()) != NULL) {
+@@ -103,14 +117,8 @@ static /*@null@*/struct group *find_matc
+ * A group with matching GID was found.
+ * Test for membership of 'name'.
+ */
+- look = gr->gr_mem;
+- while ((NULL != *look) && notfound) {
+- notfound = (strcmp (*look, name) != 0);
+- look++;
+- }
+- if (!notfound) {
++ if (ingroup(name, gr))
+ break;
+- }
+ }
+ endgrent ();
+ return gr;
+@@ -373,6 +381,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ bool initflag = false;
+ int i;
++ bool is_member = false;
+ bool cflag = false;
+ int err = 0;
+ gid_t gid;
+@@ -611,22 +620,36 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ goto failure;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS
++ /* when using pam_group, she will not be listed in the groups
++ * database. However getgroups() will return the group. So
++ * if she is listed there already it is ok to grant membership.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
++ if (grp->gr_gid == grouplist[i]) {
++ is_member = true;
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++#endif /* HAVE_SETGROUPS */
+ /*
+ * For splitted groups (due to limitations of NIS), check all
+ * groups of the same GID like the requested group for
+ * membership of the current user.
+ */
+- grp = find_matching_group (name, grp->gr_gid);
+- if (NULL == grp) {
+- /*
+- * No matching group found. As we already know that
+- * the group exists, this happens only in the case
+- * of a requested group where the user is not member.
+- *
+- * Re-read the group entry for further processing.
+- */
+- grp = xgetgrnam (group);
+- assert (NULL != grp);
++ if (!is_member) {
++ grp = find_matching_group (name, grp);
++ if (NULL == grp) {
++ /*
++ * No matching group found. As we already know that
++ * the group exists, this happens only in the case
++ * of a requested group where the user is not member.
++ *
++ * Re-read the group entry for further processing.
++ */
++ grp = xgetgrnam (group);
++ assert (NULL != grp);
++ }
+ }
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ sgrp = getsgnam (group);
+@@ -639,7 +662,9 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ /*
+ * Check if the user is allowed to access this group.
+ */
+- check_perms (grp, pwd, group);
++ if (!is_member) {
++ check_perms (grp, pwd, group);
++ }
+
+ /*
+ * all successful validations pass through this point. The group id
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-ja-translation.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-ja-translation.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..407cc3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-ja-translation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From f2ce4cc54edc7dfeb6b12f3e8fff98255a9f477d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Taizo Ito <taizo.ito@hde.co.jp>
+Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 13:51:27 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] typo in japanese man page of useradd
+
+---
+ po/ja.po | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/po/ja.po b/po/ja.po
+index a68a698..0c21c29 100644
+--- a/po/ja.po
++++ b/po/ja.po
+@@ -2047,7 +2047,7 @@ msgid " -s, --shell SHELL login shell of the new account\n"
+ msgstr " -s, --shell SHELL 新アカウントのログインシェル\n"
+
+ msgid " -u, --uid UID user ID of the new account\n"
+-msgstr " -u, --iud UID 新アカウントのユーザ ID\n"
++msgstr " -u, --uid UID 新アカウントのユーザ ID\n"
+
+ msgid ""
+ " -U, --user-group create a group with the same name as the "
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-lastlog-unexpire.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-lastlog-unexpire.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a7ae2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-lastlog-unexpire.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/lastlog.8.xml.unexpire shadow-4.1.5.1/man/lastlog.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/lastlog.8.xml.unexpire 2012-05-25 13:45:28.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/lastlog.8.xml 2016-04-28 15:09:11.026084219 +0200
+@@ -105,6 +105,17 @@
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
++ <option>-C</option>, <option>--clear</option>
++ </term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++ Clear lastlog record of an user. This option can be used only together
++ with <option>-u</option> (<option>--user</option>)).
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++ <varlistentry>
++ <term>
+ <option>-h</option>, <option>--help</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+@@ -124,6 +135,17 @@
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
++ <varlistentry>
++ <term>
++ <option>-S</option>, <option>--set</option>
++ </term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++ Set lastlog record of an user to the current time. This option can be
++ used only together with <option>-u</option> (<option>--user</option>)).
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>-t</option>, <option>--time</option>
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c.unexpire shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c.unexpire 2011-11-06 21:54:18.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c 2016-04-28 15:49:30.253371990 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,13 @@
+ #endif
+
+ /*
++ * Needed for systems with older audit library.
++ */
++#ifndef AUDIT_ACCT_UNLOCK
++#define AUDIT_ACCT_UNLOCK 1136
++#endif
++
++/*
+ * Global variables
+ */
+ const char *Prog; /* Program name */
+@@ -71,6 +78,8 @@ static struct stat statbuf; /* fstat buf
+ static bool uflg = false; /* print only an user of range of users */
+ static bool tflg = false; /* print is restricted to most recent days */
+ static bool bflg = false; /* print excludes most recent days */
++static bool Cflg = false; /* clear record for user */
++static bool Sflg = false; /* set record for user */
+
+ #define NOW (time ((time_t *) 0))
+
+@@ -83,8 +92,10 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int sta
+ "Options:\n"),
+ Prog);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -b, --before DAYS print only lastlog records older than DAYS\n"), usageout);
++ (void) fputs (_(" -C, --clear clear lastlog record of an user (usable only with -u)\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -h, --help display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -R, --root CHROOT_DIR directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
++ (void) fputs (_(" -S, --set set lastlog record to current time (usable only with -u)\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -t, --time DAYS print only lastlog records more recent than DAYS\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -u, --user LOGIN print lastlog record of the specified LOGIN\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs ("\n", usageout);
+@@ -194,6 +205,80 @@ static void print (void)
+ }
+ }
+
++static void update_one (/*@null@*/const struct passwd *pw)
++{
++ off_t offset;
++ struct lastlog ll;
++ int err;
++
++ if (NULL == pw) {
++ return;
++ }
++
++ offset = (off_t) pw->pw_uid * sizeof (ll);
++ /* fseeko errors are not really relevant for us. */
++ err = fseeko (lastlogfile, offset, SEEK_SET);
++ assert (0 == err);
++
++ memzero (&ll, sizeof (ll));
++
++ if (Sflg) {
++ ll.ll_time = NOW;
++#ifdef HAVE_LL_HOST
++ strcpy (ll.ll_host, "localhost");
++#endif
++ strcpy (ll.ll_line, "lastlog");
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ACCT_UNLOCK, Prog,
++ "clearing-lastlog",
++ pw->pw_name, (unsigned int) pw->pw_uid, SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++ }
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ else {
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ACCT_UNLOCK, Prog,
++ "refreshing-lastlog",
++ pw->pw_name, (unsigned int) pw->pw_uid, SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
++ }
++#endif
++
++ if (fwrite (&ll, sizeof(ll), 1, lastlogfile) != 1) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: Failed to update the entry for UID %lu\n"),
++ Prog, (unsigned long int)pw->pw_uid);
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++}
++
++static void update (void)
++{
++ const struct passwd *pwent;
++
++ if (!uflg) /* safety measure */
++ return;
++
++ if (has_umin && has_umax && (umin == umax)) {
++ update_one (getpwuid ((uid_t)umin));
++ } else {
++ setpwent ();
++ while ( (pwent = getpwent ()) != NULL ) {
++ if ((has_umin && (pwent->pw_uid < (uid_t)umin))
++ || (has_umax && (pwent->pw_uid > (uid_t)umax))) {
++ continue;
++ }
++ update_one (pwent);
++ }
++ endpwent ();
++ }
++
++ if (fflush (lastlogfile) != 0 || fsync (fileno (lastlogfile)) != 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: Failed to update the lastlog file\n"),
++ Prog);
++ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++}
++
+ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ /*
+@@ -208,18 +293,24 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_help_open ();
++#endif
++
+ {
+ int c;
+ static struct option const longopts[] = {
+ {"before", required_argument, NULL, 'b'},
++ {"clear", no_argument, NULL, 'C'},
+ {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
+ {"root", required_argument, NULL, 'R'},
++ {"set", no_argument, NULL, 'S'},
+ {"time", required_argument, NULL, 't'},
+ {"user", required_argument, NULL, 'u'},
+ {NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'}
+ };
+
+- while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "b:hR:t:u:", longopts,
++ while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "b:ChR:St:u:", longopts,
+ NULL)) != -1) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case 'b':
+@@ -235,11 +326,21 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ bflg = true;
+ break;
+ }
++ case 'C':
++ {
++ Cflg = true;
++ break;
++ }
+ case 'h':
+ usage (EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ /*@notreached@*/break;
+ case 'R': /* no-op, handled in process_root_flag () */
+ break;
++ case 'S':
++ {
++ Sflg = true;
++ break;
++ }
+ case 't':
+ {
+ unsigned long days;
+@@ -294,9 +395,21 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ Prog, argv[optind]);
+ usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
++ if (Cflg && Sflg) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: Option -C cannot be used together with option -S\n"),
++ Prog);
++ usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ if ((Cflg || Sflg) && !uflg) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: Options -C and -S require option -u to specify the user\n"),
++ Prog);
++ usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
+ }
+
+- lastlogfile = fopen (LASTLOG_FILE, "r");
++ lastlogfile = fopen (LASTLOG_FILE, (Cflg || Sflg)?"r+":"r");
+ if (NULL == lastlogfile) {
+ perror (LASTLOG_FILE);
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -310,7 +423,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+- print ();
++ if (Cflg || Sflg)
++ update ();
++ else
++ print ();
+
+ (void) fclose (lastlogfile);
+
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am.unexpire shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am.unexpire 2011-11-18 22:23:30.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am 2016-04-28 15:09:11.027084241 +0200
+@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ groupmod_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID)
+ grpck_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ grpconv_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ grpunconv_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
++lastlog_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT)
+ login_SOURCES = \
+ login.c \
+ login_nopam.c
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in.unexpire shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in.unexpire 2012-05-25 13:56:51.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in 2016-04-28 15:09:11.027084241 +0200
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ id_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1)
+ $(top_builddir)/lib/libshadow.la
+ lastlog_SOURCES = lastlog.c
+ lastlog_OBJECTS = lastlog.$(OBJEXT)
+-lastlog_LDADD = $(LDADD)
++lastlog_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT)
+ lastlog_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) \
+ $(top_builddir)/libmisc/libmisc.a \
+ $(top_builddir)/lib/libshadow.la
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d5cbc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg 2013-02-20 15:41:44.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c 2013-03-19 18:40:04.908292810 +0100
+@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', data deleted", user_name));
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', exit code: %d", user_name, code));
+ exit (code);
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-long-entry.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-long-entry.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaf9689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-long-entry.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/defines.h.long-entry shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/defines.h
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/defines.h.long-entry 2011-09-18 22:44:10.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/defines.h 2018-04-24 16:34:31.261417493 +0200
+@@ -382,4 +382,7 @@ extern char *strerror ();
+ # endif
+ #endif
+
++/* Maximum length of passwd entry */
++#define PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH 32768
++
+ #endif /* _DEFINES_H_ */
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwio.c.long-entry shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwio.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwio.c.long-entry 2011-02-16 21:32:24.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwio.c 2018-04-24 16:34:31.263417454 +0200
+@@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ static int passwd_put (const void *ent,
+ || (pw->pw_gid == (gid_t)-1)
+ || (valid_field (pw->pw_gecos, ":\n") == -1)
+ || (valid_field (pw->pw_dir, ":\n") == -1)
+- || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)) {
++ || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)
++ || (strlen (pw->pw_name) + strlen (pw->pw_passwd) +
++ strlen (pw->pw_gecos) + strlen (pw->pw_dir) +
++ strlen (pw->pw_shell) + 100 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetpwent.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry 2009-04-06 06:28:53.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetpwent.c 2018-04-24 16:34:31.263417454 +0200
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
+ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *buf)
+ {
+ static struct passwd pwent;
+- static char pwdbuf[1024];
++ static char pwdbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
+ register int i;
+ register char *cp;
+ char *fields[NFIELDS];
+@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *bu
+ * the password structure remain valid.
+ */
+
+- if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf)
++ if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf) {
++ fprintf (stderr, "Too long passwd entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
+ return 0; /* fail if too long */
++ }
+ strcpy (pwdbuf, buf);
+
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetspent.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry 2009-04-12 04:46:43.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/sgetspent.c 2018-04-24 16:34:31.264417435 +0200
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
+ */
+ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *string)
+ {
+- static char spwbuf[1024];
++ static char spwbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
+ static struct spwd spwd;
+ char *fields[FIELDS];
+ char *cp;
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *stri
+ */
+
+ if (strlen (string) >= sizeof spwbuf) {
++ fprintf (stderr, "Too long shadow entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
+ return 0; /* fail if too long */
+ }
+ strcpy (spwbuf, string);
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/shadowio.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry 2011-02-16 21:32:24.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/shadowio.c 2018-04-24 16:34:31.265417416 +0200
+@@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ static int shadow_put (const void *ent,
+
+ if ( (NULL == sp)
+ || (valid_field (sp->sp_namp, ":\n") == -1)
+- || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)) {
++ || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)
++ || (strlen (sp->sp_namp) + strlen (sp->sp_pwdp) +
++ 1000 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-manfix.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-manfix.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18dc342
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-manfix.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/chage.1.xml.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/chage.1.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/chage.1.xml.manfix 2012-05-25 13:45:27.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/chage.1.xml 2018-04-24 16:43:48.545743715 +0200
+@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@
+ Set the number of days since January 1st, 1970 when the password
+ was last changed. The date may also be expressed in the format
+ YYYY-MM-DD (or the format more commonly used in your area).
++ If the <replaceable>LAST_DAY</replaceable> is set to
++ <emphasis>0</emphasis> the user is forced to change his password
++ on the next log on.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+@@ -123,6 +126,13 @@
+ <replaceable>EXPIRE_DATE</replaceable> will remove an account
+ expiration date.
+ </para>
++ <para>
++ For example the following command can be used
++ to set an account to expire in 180 days:
++ </para>
++ <programlisting>
++ chage -E $(date -d +180days +%Y-%m-%d)
++ </programlisting>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupmems.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix 2012-05-25 13:45:28.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupmems.8.xml 2015-12-18 12:27:08.466909647 +0100
+@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@
+ $ chown root.groups groupmems
+ $ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+ </programlisting>
++
++ <para>
++ In the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 the <command>groupmems</command>
++ command is not setuid and regular users cannot use it to manipulate
++ the membership of their own group. This might change in future
++ major releases of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
++ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='configuration'>
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix 2012-05-25 13:45:27.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5 2015-12-18 12:34:08.080715842 +0100
+@@ -147,10 +147,6 @@ 以下の参照表は、
+ shadow パスワード機能のどのプログラムが
+ どのパラメータを使用するかを示したものである。
+ .na
+-.IP chfn 12
+-CHFN_AUTH CHFN_RESTRICT
+-.IP chsh 12
+-CHFN_AUTH
+ .IP groupadd 12
+ GID_MAX GID_MIN
+ .IP newusers 12
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix 2012-05-25 13:45:28.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml 2014-08-29 13:31:38.364812323 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,17 @@
+ long numeric parameters is machine-dependent.
+ </para>
+
++ <para>
++ Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
++ behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
++ tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
++ passwd command) should be configured elsewhere. The only values that
++ affect PAM modules are <emphasis>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> and <emphasis>SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS</emphasis>
++ for pam_unix module, <emphasis>FAIL_DELAY</emphasis> for pam_faildelay module,
++ and <emphasis>UMASK</emphasis> for pam_umask module. Refer to
++ pam(8) for more information.
++ </para>
++
+ <para>The following configuration items are provided:</para>
+
+ <variablelist remap='IP'>
+@@ -248,26 +258,6 @@
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+- <term>chfn</term>
+- <listitem>
+- <para>
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">CHFN_AUTH</phrase>
+- CHFN_RESTRICT
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+- </para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+- <varlistentry>
+- <term>chgpasswd</term>
+- <listitem>
+- <para>
+- ENCRYPT_METHOD MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
+- <phrase condition="sha_crypt">SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
+- SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS</phrase>
+- </para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+- <varlistentry>
+ <term>chpasswd</term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+@@ -278,14 +268,6 @@
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+- <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+- <term>chsh</term>
+- <listitem>
+- <para>
+- CHSH_AUTH LOGIN_STRING
+- </para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+ <!-- expiry: no variables (CONSOLE_GROUPS linked, but not used) -->
+ <!-- faillog: no variables -->
+ <varlistentry>
+@@ -346,34 +328,6 @@
+ </varlistentry>
+ <!-- id: no variables -->
+ <!-- lastlog: no variables -->
+- <varlistentry>
+- <term>login</term>
+- <listitem>
+- <para>
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+- CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+- ENV_TZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+- ERASECHAR FAIL_DELAY
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">FAILLOG_ENAB</phrase>
+- FAKE_SHELL
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">FTMP_FILE</phrase>
+- HUSHLOGIN_FILE
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">ISSUE_FILE</phrase>
+- KILLCHAR
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">LASTLOG_ENAB</phrase>
+- LOGIN_RETRIES
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+- LOGIN_TIMEOUT LOG_OK_LOGINS LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE
+- MOTD_FILE NOLOGINS_FILE PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+- QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+- TTYGROUP TTYPERM TTYTYPE_FILE
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">ULIMIT UMASK</phrase>
+- USERGROUPS_ENAB
+- </para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+ <!-- logoutd: no variables -->
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>newgrp / sg</term>
+@@ -399,17 +353,6 @@
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <!-- nologin: no variables -->
+- <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+- <term>passwd</term>
+- <listitem>
+- <para>
+- ENCRYPT_METHOD MD5_CRYPT_ENAB OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
+- PASS_ALWAYS_WARN PASS_CHANGE_TRIES PASS_MAX_LEN PASS_MIN_LEN
+- <phrase condition="sha_crypt">SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
+- SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS</phrase>
+- </para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>pwck</term>
+ <listitem>
+@@ -436,32 +379,6 @@
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+- <varlistentry>
+- <term>su</term>
+- <listitem>
+- <para>
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+- CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+- ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ LOGIN_STRING MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+- MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+- SULOG_FILE SU_NAME
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">SU_WHEEL_ONLY</phrase>
+- SYSLOG_SU_ENAB
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">USERGROUPS_ENAB</phrase>
+- </para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+- <varlistentry>
+- <term>sulogin</term>
+- <listitem>
+- <para>
+- ENV_HZ
+- <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ</phrase>
+- </para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>useradd</term>
+ <listitem>
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix 2015-12-17 14:05:47.930742412 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml 2015-12-17 14:05:47.945742754 +0100
+@@ -134,8 +134,8 @@
+ <replaceable>HOME_DIR</replaceable> is not specified.
+ <replaceable>BASE_DIR</replaceable> is
+ concatenated with the account name to define the home directory.
+- If the <option>-m</option> option is not used,
+- <replaceable>BASE_DIR</replaceable> must exist.
++ The <replaceable>BASE_DIR</replaceable> must exist otherwise
++ the home directory cannot be created.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ If this option is not specified, <command>useradd</command>
+@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+- <option>-d</option>, <option>--home</option>
++ <option>-d</option>, <option>--home-dir</option>
+ <replaceable>HOME_DIR</replaceable>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+@@ -171,8 +171,7 @@
+ login directory. The default is to append the
+ <replaceable>LOGIN</replaceable> name to
+ <replaceable>BASE_DIR</replaceable> and use that as the login
+- directory name. The directory <replaceable>HOME_DIR</replaceable>
+- does not have to exist but will not be created if it is missing.
++ directory name.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+@@ -358,11 +357,16 @@
+ <option>CREATE_HOME</option> is not enabled, no home
+ directories are created.
+ </para>
++ <para>
++ The directory where the user's home directory is created must
++ exist and have proper SELinux context and permissions. Otherwise
++ the user's home directory cannot be created or accessed.
++ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+- <option>-M</option>
++ <option>-M</option>, <option>--no-create-home</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml.manfix 2012-05-25 13:45:29.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/usermod.8.xml 2014-08-29 13:33:40.814632618 +0200
+@@ -132,7 +132,8 @@
+ If the <option>-m</option>
+ option is given, the contents of the current home directory will
+ be moved to the new home directory, which is created if it does
+- not already exist.
++ not already exist. If the current home directory does not exist
++ the new home directory will not be created.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+@@ -261,7 +262,8 @@
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Move the content of the user's home directory to the new
+- location.
++ location. If the current home directory does not exist
++ the new home directory will not be created.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option is only valid in combination with the
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-merge-group.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-merge-group.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5cea10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-merge-group.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c.merge-group shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c.merge-group 2011-02-16 21:32:24.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c 2013-01-29 13:56:43.049275513 +0100
+@@ -330,12 +330,12 @@ static /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *
+
+ /* Concatenate the 2 lines */
+ new_line_len = strlen (gr1->line) + strlen (gr2->line) +1;
+- new_line = (char *)malloc ((new_line_len + 1) * sizeof(char*));
++ new_line = (char *)malloc (new_line_len + 1);
+ if (NULL == new_line) {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+- snprintf(new_line, new_line_len, "%s\n%s", gr1->line, gr2->line);
++ snprintf(new_line, new_line_len + 1, "%s\n%s", gr1->line, gr2->line);
+ new_line[new_line_len] = '\0';
+
+ /* Concatenate the 2 list of members */
+@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *
+ members++;
+ }
+ }
+- new_members = (char **)malloc ( (members+1) * sizeof(char*) );
++ new_members = (char **)calloc (members+1, sizeof(char*));
+ if (NULL == new_members) {
+ free (new_line);
+ errno = ENOMEM;
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-move-home.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-move-home.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c87e232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-move-home.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.move-home shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.move-home 2014-08-29 13:31:38.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c 2014-08-29 14:14:13.860671177 +0200
+@@ -1571,6 +1571,11 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ Prog, user_home, user_newhome);
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
++ } else {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: The previous home directory (%s) does "
++ "not exist or is inaccessible. Move cannot be completed.\n"),
++ Prog, user_home);
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-null-tm.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-null-tm.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e531d14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-null-tm.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/faillog.c.null-tm shadow-4.1.5.1/src/faillog.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/faillog.c.null-tm 2011-11-19 23:54:47.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/faillog.c 2016-06-14 11:54:58.582314219 +0200
+@@ -163,10 +163,14 @@ static void print_one (/*@null@*/const s
+ }
+
+ tm = localtime (&fl.fail_time);
++ if (tm == NULL) {
++ cp = "(unknown)";
++ } else {
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+- strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%D %H:%M:%S %z", tm);
+- cp = ptime;
++ strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%D %H:%M:%S %z", tm);
++ cp = ptime;
+ #endif
++ }
+ printf ("%-9s %5d %5d ",
+ pw->pw_name, fl.fail_cnt, fl.fail_max);
+ /* FIXME: cp is not defined ifndef HAVE_STRFTIME */
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chage.c.null-tm shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chage.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chage.c.null-tm 2016-05-04 13:44:55.639787900 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chage.c 2016-06-14 11:54:58.583314243 +0200
+@@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ static void date_to_str (char *buf, size
+ struct tm *tp;
+
+ tp = gmtime (&date);
++ if (tp == NULL) {
++ (void) snprintf (buf, maxsize, "(unknown)");
++ return;
++ }
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ (void) strftime (buf, maxsize, "%Y-%m-%d", tp);
+ #else
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c.null-tm shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c.null-tm 2016-05-04 13:44:55.647788082 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/lastlog.c 2016-06-14 11:54:58.584314267 +0200
+@@ -165,13 +165,17 @@ static void print_one (/*@null@*/const s
+
+ ll_time = ll.ll_time;
+ tm = localtime (&ll_time);
++ if (tm == NULL) {
++ cp = "(unknown)";
++ } else {
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+- strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
+- cp = ptime;
++ strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
++ cp = ptime;
+ #else
+- cp = asctime (tm);
+- cp[24] = '\0';
++ cp = asctime (tm);
++ cp[24] = '\0';
+ #endif
++ }
+
+ if (ll.ll_time == (time_t) 0) {
+ cp = _("**Never logged in**\0");
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c.null-tm shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c.null-tm 2016-05-04 13:44:55.634787787 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c 2016-06-14 11:54:58.584314267 +0200
+@@ -438,6 +438,9 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *date_to
+ struct tm *tm;
+
+ tm = gmtime (&t);
++ if (tm == NULL) {
++ return "(unknown)";
++ }
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ (void) strftime (buf, sizeof buf, "%m/%d/%Y", tm);
+ #else /* !HAVE_STRFTIME */
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.null-tm shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.null-tm 2016-05-04 13:44:55.648788104 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c 2016-06-14 11:54:58.585314291 +0200
+@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ static void date_to_str (/*@unique@*//*@
+ } else {
+ time_t t = (time_t) date;
+ tp = gmtime (&t);
++ if (tp == NULL) {
++ strncpy (buf, "unknown", maxsize);
++ return;
++ }
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ strftime (buf, maxsize, "%Y-%m-%d", tp);
+ #else
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-orig-context.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-orig-context.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1ddb13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-orig-context.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.orig-context 2012-09-19 20:27:16.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c 2013-02-20 15:20:55.064962324 +0100
+@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s-", db->filename);
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
+ errors++;
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
+ errors++;
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c.orig-context 2012-02-13 20:16:32.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c 2013-02-20 15:19:01.495623232 +0100
+@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, co
+ */
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ free (oldlink);
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src
+ int err = 0;
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, c
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h.orig-context 2012-01-08 17:04:29.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h 2013-02-20 15:24:17.251126575 +0100
+@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ extern /*@observer@*/const char *crypt_m
+
+ /* selinux.c */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name);
++extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name);
+ extern int reset_selinux_file_context (void);
+ #endif
+
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c.orig-context 2012-01-08 17:35:44.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c 2013-02-20 15:16:40.383716877 +0100
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static bool selinux_enabled;
+ * Callers may have to Reset SELinux to create files with default
+ * contexts with reset_selinux_file_context
+ */
+-int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name)
++int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name)
+ {
+ /*@null@*/security_context_t scontext = NULL;
+
+@@ -62,19 +62,23 @@ int set_selinux_file_context (const char
+ if (selinux_enabled) {
+ /* Get the default security context for this file */
+ if (matchpathcon (dst_name, 0, &scontext) < 0) {
+- if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
+- return 1;
+- }
++ /* We could not get the default, copy the original */
++ if (orig_name == NULL)
++ goto error;
++ if (getfilecon (orig_name, &scontext) < 0)
++ goto error;
+ }
+ /* Set the security context for the next created file */
+- if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0) {
+- if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
+- return 1;
+- }
+- }
++ if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0)
++ goto error;
+ freecon (scontext);
+ }
+ return 0;
++ error:
++ if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
++ return 1;
++ }
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.orig-context 2012-09-19 20:23:33.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c 2013-02-20 15:19:31.221235459 +0100
+@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ {
+ if (access (user_home, F_OK) != 0) {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (user_home) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (user_home, NULL) != 0) {
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+ #endif
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux-perms.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux-perms.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c70296
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux-perms.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms 2016-05-04 13:44:55.633787764 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c 2016-05-30 12:01:30.421587253 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/avc.h>
++#endif
++#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#endif
+ #ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+@@ -76,6 +83,9 @@ static bool sgr_locked = false;
+ #endif
+ static bool gr_locked = false;
+
++/* The name of the caller */
++static char *myname = NULL;
++
+ /* local function prototypes */
+ static void fail_exit (int code);
+ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status);
+@@ -300,6 +310,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ #endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++static int
++log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++ int audit_fd;
++ va_list ap;
++
++ va_start(ap, fmt);
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++
++ if (audit_fd >= 0) {
++ char *buf;
++
++ if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
++ goto ret;
++ audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL, 0);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ free(buf);
++ goto ret;
++ }
++
++#endif
++ vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
++ret:
++ va_end(ap);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++selinux_check_root (void)
++{
++ int status = -1;
++ security_context_t user_context;
++ union selinux_callback old_callback;
++
++ if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
++ return;
++
++ old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
++ /* setup callbacks */
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
++ if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
++ status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
++
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ freecon(user_context);
++ if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
++ exit(1);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * open_files - lock and open the group databases
+ */
+@@ -393,6 +460,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ const struct group *gr;
+ struct group newgr;
++ struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+ int errors = 0;
+ int line = 0;
+
+@@ -408,8 +476,33 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ OPENLOG ("chgpasswd");
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_help_open ();
++#endif
++
++ /*
++ * Determine the name of the user that invoked this command. This
++ * is really hit or miss because there are so many ways that command
++ * can be executed and so many ways to trip up the routines that
++ * report the user name.
++ */
++ pw = get_my_pwent ();
++ if (NULL == pw) {
++ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
++ Prog);
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
++ "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
++ (unsigned long) getuid ()));
++ exit (E_NOPERM);
++ }
++ myname = xstrdup (pw->pw_name);
++
+ check_perms ();
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ selinux_check_root ();
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif
+@@ -533,6 +626,15 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ newgr.gr_passwd = cp;
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ {
++
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "change-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, gr->gr_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
++ }
++#endif
+ /*
+ * The updated group file entry is then put back and will
+ * be written to the group file later, after all the
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms 2016-05-04 13:44:55.633787764 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c 2016-05-30 12:01:42.877859957 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/avc.h>
++#endif
++#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+@@ -297,6 +304,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++static int
++log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++ int audit_fd;
++ va_list ap;
++
++ va_start(ap, fmt);
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++
++ if (audit_fd >= 0) {
++ char *buf;
++
++ if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
++ goto ret;
++ audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL, 0);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ free(buf);
++ goto ret;
++ }
++
++#endif
++ vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
++ret:
++ va_end(ap);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++selinux_check_root (void)
++{
++ int status = -1;
++ security_context_t user_context;
++ union selinux_callback old_callback;
++
++ if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
++ return;
++
++ old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
++ /* setup callbacks */
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
++ if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
++ status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
++
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ freecon(user_context);
++ if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
++ exit(1);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * open_files - lock and open the password databases
+ */
+@@ -405,8 +469,16 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ OPENLOG ("chpasswd");
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_help_open ();
++#endif
++
+ check_perms ();
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ selinux_check_root ();
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!use_pam)
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+@@ -563,6 +635,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ newpw.pw_passwd = cp;
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "updating-password",
++ pw->pw_name, (unsigned int) pw->pw_uid, 1);
++#endif
+ /*
+ * The updated password file entry is then put back and will
+ * be written to the password file later, after all the
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am.selinux-perms shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am.selinux-perms 2016-05-04 13:44:55.647788082 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am 2016-05-27 16:04:49.446582632 +0200
+@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ endif
+
+ chage_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ chfn_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
+-chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
++chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ chsh_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
+-chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
++chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ gpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in.selinux-perms shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in.selinux-perms 2016-05-04 13:44:55.647788082 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.in 2016-05-27 16:04:49.447582654 +0200
+@@ -437,9 +437,9 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = -DLOCALEDIR=\"$(datadir)/l
+ @USE_PAM_TRUE@LIBCRYPT_NOPAM =
+ chage_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ chfn_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
+-chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
++chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ chsh_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
+-chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
++chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ gpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ac32d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.selinux shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.selinux 2012-01-08 17:35:44.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c 2014-09-10 10:11:55.417506128 +0200
+@@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name,
+
+ ret = 0;
+
++ /* drop obsolete matchpathcon cache */
++ matchpathcon_fini();
++
+ done:
+ semanage_seuser_key_free (key);
+ semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
+@@ -369,6 +372,10 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
++
++ /* drop obsolete matchpathcon cache */
++ matchpathcon_fini();
++
+ done:
+ semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
+ return ret;
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.selinux shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.selinux 2014-09-10 10:10:18.791280619 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c 2014-09-10 10:10:18.798280781 +0200
+@@ -1850,6 +1850,7 @@ static void create_mail (void)
+ */
+ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ {
++ int rv = E_SUCCESS;
+ #ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+@@ -2037,10 +2038,33 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ usr_update ();
+
++ close_files ();
++
++ nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
++ nscd_flush_cache ("group");
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ if (Zflg && *user_selinux) {
++ if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
++ if (set_seuser (user_name, user_selinux) != 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
++ Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
++ "adding SELinux user mapping",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, 0);
++#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
++ rv = E_SE_UPDATE;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (mflg) {
+ create_home ();
+ if (home_added) {
+- copy_tree (def_template, user_home, false, false,
++ copy_tree (def_template, user_home, false, true,
+ (uid_t)-1, user_id, (gid_t)-1, user_gid);
+ } else {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -2056,27 +2080,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ create_mail ();
+ }
+
+- close_files ();
+-
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (Zflg) {
+- if (set_seuser (user_name, user_selinux) != 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
+- Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding SELinux user mapping",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, 0);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+- fail_exit (E_SE_UPDATE);
+- }
+- }
+-#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+-
+- nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
+- nscd_flush_cache ("group");
+-
+- return E_SUCCESS;
++ return rv;
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b79baee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c.userdel shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c.userdel 2012-05-25 13:51:55.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c 2014-02-12 11:40:30.707686132 +0100
+@@ -130,8 +130,9 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ "\n"
+ "Options:\n"),
+ Prog);
+- (void) fputs (_(" -f, --force force removal of files,\n"
+- " even if not owned by user\n"),
++ (void) fputs (_(" -f, --force force some actions that would fail otherwise\n"
++ " e.g. removal of user still logged in\n"
++ " or files, even if not owned by the user\n"),
+ usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -h, --help display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -r, --remove remove home directory and mail spool\n"), usageout);
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-usermod-passwd.patch b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-usermod-passwd.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8096cfd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-usermod-passwd.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.passwd shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.passwd 2015-12-17 14:05:47.959743073 +0100
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c 2015-12-18 12:42:28.290405529 +0100
+@@ -360,14 +360,17 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ strcat (buf, pw_pass);
+ pw_pass = buf;
+ } else if (Uflg && pw_pass[0] == '!') {
+- char *s;
++ char *s = pw_pass;
+
+- if (pw_pass[1] == '\0') {
++ while ('!' == *s)
++ ++s;
++
++ if (*s == '\0') {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: unlocking the user's password would result in a passwordless account.\n"
+ "You should set a password with usermod -p to unlock this user's password.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- return pw_pass;
++ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+@@ -376,12 +379,15 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "unlock user '%s' password", user_newname));
+- s = pw_pass;
+- while ('\0' != *s) {
+- *s = *(s + 1);
+- s++;
+- }
++ memmove (pw_pass, s, strlen (s) + 1);
+ } else if (pflg) {
++ if (strchr (user_pass, ':') != NULL) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: The password field cannot contain a colon character.\n"),
++ Prog);
++ return NULL;
++
++ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+ "updating-password",
+@@ -430,6 +436,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ if ( (!is_shadow_pwd)
+ || (strcmp (pwent->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) != 0)) {
+ pwent->pw_passwd = new_pw_passwd (pwent->pw_passwd);
++ if (pwent->pw_passwd == NULL)
++ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ if (uflg) {
+@@ -544,6 +552,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
+ * + aging has been requested
+ */
+ spent->sp_pwdp = new_pw_passwd (spent->sp_pwdp);
++ if (spent->sp_pwdp == NULL)
++ fail_exit(E_PW_UPDATE);
+
+ if (pflg) {
+ spent->sp_lstchg = (long) time ((time_t *) 0) / SCALE;
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2.sig b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0f1167
Binary files /dev/null and b/SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2.sig differ
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-utils.login.defs b/SOURCES/shadow-utils.login.defs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f27f88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-utils.login.defs
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#
+# Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
+# behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
+# tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
+# passwd command) should therefore be configured elsewhere. Refer to
+# /etc/pam.d/system-auth for more information.
+#
+
+# *REQUIRED*
+# Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
+# home directory. If you _do_ define both, MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
+# QMAIL_DIR is for Qmail
+#
+#QMAIL_DIR Maildir
+MAIL_DIR /var/spool/mail
+#MAIL_FILE .mail
+
+# Password aging controls:
+#
+# PASS_MAX_DAYS Maximum number of days a password may be used.
+# PASS_MIN_DAYS Minimum number of days allowed between password changes.
+# PASS_MIN_LEN Minimum acceptable password length.
+# PASS_WARN_AGE Number of days warning given before a password expires.
+#
+PASS_MAX_DAYS 99999
+PASS_MIN_DAYS 0
+PASS_MIN_LEN 5
+PASS_WARN_AGE 7
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
+#
+UID_MIN 1000
+UID_MAX 60000
+# System accounts
+SYS_UID_MIN 201
+SYS_UID_MAX 999
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
+#
+GID_MIN 1000
+GID_MAX 60000
+# System accounts
+SYS_GID_MIN 201
+SYS_GID_MAX 999
+
+#
+# If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
+# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by
+# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument).
+#
+#USERDEL_CMD /usr/sbin/userdel_local
+
+#
+# If useradd should create home directories for users by default
+# On RH systems, we do. This option is overridden with the -m flag on
+# useradd command line.
+#
+CREATE_HOME yes
+
+# The permission mask is initialized to this value. If not specified,
+# the permission mask will be initialized to 022.
+UMASK 077
+
+# This enables userdel to remove user groups if no members exist.
+#
+USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
+
+# Use SHA512 to encrypt password.
+ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/shadow-utils.useradd b/SOURCES/shadow-utils.useradd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e81146
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/shadow-utils.useradd
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# useradd defaults file
+GROUP=100
+HOME=/home
+INACTIVE=-1
+EXPIRE=
+SHELL=/bin/bash
+SKEL=/etc/skel
+CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes
+
diff --git a/SPECS/shadow-utils.spec b/SPECS/shadow-utils.spec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d040f50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SPECS/shadow-utils.spec
@@ -0,0 +1,1082 @@
+Summary: Utilities for managing accounts and shadow password files
+Name: shadow-utils
+Version: 4.1.5.1
+Release: 25%{?dist}
+Epoch: 2
+URL: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
+Source0: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/releases/shadow-%{version}.tar.bz2
+Source3: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/releases/shadow-%{version}.tar.bz2.sig
+Source1: shadow-utils.login.defs
+Source2: shadow-utils.useradd
+Patch0: shadow-4.1.5-redhat.patch
+Patch1: shadow-4.1.5.1-goodname.patch
+Patch2: shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
+Patch3: shadow-4.1.5-uflg.patch
+Patch6: shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux.patch
+Patch7: shadow-4.1.5-2ndskip.patch
+Patch8: shadow-4.1.5.1-backup-mode.patch
+Patch9: shadow-4.1.5.1-merge-group.patch
+Patch10: shadow-4.1.5.1-orig-context.patch
+Patch11: shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
+Patch12: shadow-4.1.5.1-errmsg.patch
+Patch13: shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-owner.patch
+Patch14: shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
+Patch15: shadow-4.1.5.1-manfix.patch
+Patch16: shadow-4.1.5.1-crypt-null.patch
+Patch17: shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
+Patch18: shadow-4.1.5.1-date-parsing.patch
+Patch19: shadow-4.1.5.1-ingroup.patch
+Patch20: shadow-4.1.5.1-move-home.patch
+Patch21: shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-update.patch
+Patch22: shadow-4.1.5.1-ja-translation.patch
+Patch23: shadow-4.1.5.1-usermod-passwd.patch
+Patch24: shadow-4.1.5.1-id-alloc.patch
+Patch25: shadow-4.1.5.1-lastlog-unexpire.patch
+Patch26: shadow-4.1.5.1-chgrp-guard.patch
+Patch27: shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux-perms.patch
+Patch28: shadow-4.1.5.1-null-tm.patch
+Patch29: shadow-4.1.5.1-long-entry.patch
+
+License: BSD and GPLv2+
+Group: System Environment/Base
+BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.25.2-1
+BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 1.6.5
+BuildRequires: libsemanage-devel
+BuildRequires: libacl-devel libattr-devel
+BuildRequires: gnome-doc-utils docbook-style-xsl gettext
+#BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, libtool, gettext-devel
+Requires: libselinux >= 1.25.2-1
+Requires: audit-libs >= 1.6.5
+Requires: setup
+Requires(pre): coreutils
+Requires(post): coreutils
+Buildroot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
+
+%description
+The shadow-utils package includes the necessary programs for
+converting UNIX password files to the shadow password format, plus
+programs for managing user and group accounts. The pwconv command
+converts passwords to the shadow password format. The pwunconv command
+unconverts shadow passwords and generates a passwd file (a standard
+UNIX password file). The pwck command checks the integrity of password
+and shadow files. The lastlog command prints out the last login times
+for all users. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used for
+managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod commands
+are used for managing group accounts.
+
+%prep
+%setup -q -n shadow-%{version}
+%patch0 -p1 -b .redhat
+%patch1 -p1 -b .goodname
+%patch2 -p1 -b .info-parent-dir
+%patch3 -p1 -b .uflg
+%patch6 -p1 -b .selinux
+%patch7 -p1 -b .2ndskip
+%patch8 -p1 -b .backup-mode
+%patch9 -p1 -b .merge-group
+%patch10 -p1 -b .orig-context
+%patch11 -p1 -b .logmsg
+%patch12 -p1 -b .errmsg
+%patch13 -p1 -b .audit-owner
+%patch14 -p1 -b .default-range
+%patch15 -p1 -b .manfix
+%patch16 -p1 -b .crypt-null
+%patch17 -p1 -b .userdel
+%patch18 -p1 -b .date-parsing
+%patch19 -p1 -b .ingroup
+%patch20 -p1 -b .move-home
+%patch21 -p1 -b .audit-update
+%patch22 -p1 -b .ja-translation
+%patch23 -p1 -b .usermod-passwd
+%patch24 -p1 -b .id-alloc
+%patch25 -p1 -b .unexpire
+%patch26 -p1 -b .chgrp-guard
+%patch27 -p1 -b .selinux-perms
+%patch28 -p1 -b .null-tm
+%patch29 -p1 -b .long-entry
+
+iconv -f ISO88591 -t utf-8 doc/HOWTO > doc/HOWTO.utf8
+cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
+
+#rm po/*.gmo
+#rm po/stamp-po
+#aclocal
+#libtoolize --force
+#automake -a
+#autoconf
+
+%build
+
+%ifarch sparc64
+#sparc64 need big PIE
+export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fPIE"
+export LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now"
+%else
+export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fpie"
+export LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now"
+%endif
+
+export LC_ALL=C
+%configure \
+ --enable-shadowgrp \
+ --enable-man \
+ --with-audit \
+ --with-sha-crypt \
+ --with-selinux \
+ --without-libcrack \
+ --without-libpam \
+ --disable-shared \
+ --with-group-name-max-length=32
+# update the japanese translation
+(cd po; make ja.gmo)
+make
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
+install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default
+install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE1} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
+install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
+
+
+ln -s useradd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/adduser
+#ln -s %{_mandir}/man8/useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
+ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
+for subdir in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/{??,??_??,??_??.*}/man* ; do
+ test -d $subdir && test -e $subdir/useradd.8 && echo ".so man8/useradd.8" > $subdir/adduser.8
+done
+
+# Remove binaries we don't use.
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chfn
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chsh
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/expiry
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/groups
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/login
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/passwd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/su
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/faillog
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.access
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/limits
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/logoutd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/nologin
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/chgpasswd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/limits.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/limits.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/login.access.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/login.access.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/porttime.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/porttime.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/chgpasswd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/chgpasswd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
+
+find $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir} -depth -type d -empty -delete
+%find_lang shadow
+for dir in $(ls -1d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/{??,??_??}) ; do
+ dir=$(echo $dir | sed -e "s|^$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||")
+ lang=$(basename $dir)
+# echo "%%lang($lang) $dir" >> shadow.lang
+# echo "%%lang($lang) $dir/man*" >> shadow.lang
+ echo "%%lang($lang) $dir/man*/*" >> shadow.lang
+done
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%files -f shadow.lang
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc NEWS doc/HOWTO README
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
+%{_bindir}/sg
+%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/chage
+%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gpasswd
+%{_bindir}/lastlog
+%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/newgrp
+%{_sbindir}/adduser
+%attr(0750,root,root) %{_sbindir}/user*
+%attr(0750,root,root) %{_sbindir}/group*
+%{_sbindir}/grpck
+%{_sbindir}/pwck
+%{_sbindir}/*conv
+%{_sbindir}/chpasswd
+%{_sbindir}/newusers
+%{_sbindir}/vipw
+%{_sbindir}/vigr
+%{_mandir}/man1/chage.1*
+%{_mandir}/man1/gpasswd.1*
+%{_mandir}/man1/sg.1*
+%{_mandir}/man1/newgrp.1*
+%{_mandir}/man3/shadow.3*
+%{_mandir}/man5/shadow.5*
+%{_mandir}/man5/login.defs.5*
+%{_mandir}/man5/gshadow.5*
+%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/group*.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/user*.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/pwck.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/grpck.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/chpasswd.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/newusers.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/*conv.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/lastlog.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/vipw.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/vigr.8*
+
+%changelog
+* Tue Apr 24 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-25
+- prevent creating users ".." or "." or with all numeric usernames (#1373645)
+- raise limit for passwd and shadow entry length but also prevent
+ writing longer entries (#1422497)
+- consider also supplementary group membership in newgrp (#1425078)
+
+* Tue Jun 28 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-24
+- useradd: fix typo in japanese translation (#1202629)
+
+* Tue Jun 14 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-23
+- guard for localtime() and gmtime() failure (#1341167)
+
+* Mon May 30 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-22
+- chpasswd: add selinux_check_access() call (#1336902)
+
+* Wed May 4 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-20
+- usermod: guard against unsafe change of ownership of
+ special home directories (#1225560)
+
+* Thu Apr 28 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-19
+- documentation fixes (#1292820)
+- usermod: make password unlocking compatible with passwd (#1185425)
+- usermod: disallow ':' in raw password setting (#1292815)
+- improve the gid and uid allocation mechanism (#1279321)
+- lastlog: add options to unexpire unused accounts (#1285547)
+
+* Tue Nov 25 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-18
+- properly audit modification of gshadow
+
+* Fri Oct 17 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-16
+- update auditing to cover more events and fix some incorrect audit
+ records - patch by Steve Grubb (#1151580)
+
+* Wed Sep 10 2014 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-15
+- discard obsolete matchpathcon cache after semanage_commit()
+
+* Fri Aug 29 2014 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-14
+- label the newly created home dir correctly (#1077809)
+- mention that chage -d 0 forces password change (#1135010)
+- improve date parsing and error detecting in chage
+- avoid full group database scanning in newgrp in most common case
+- report error if usermod asked for moving homedir and it does not exist
+
+* Wed Feb 12 2014 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-13
+- clean up login.defs manpage
+- properly document userdel -f behavior
+
+* Fri Jan 24 2014 Daniel Mach <dmach@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-11
+- Mass rebuild 2014-01-24
+
+* Fri Dec 27 2013 Daniel Mach <dmach@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-10
+- Mass rebuild 2013-12-27
+
+* Fri Oct 18 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-9
+- document that the directory where user's home is created must exist
+
+* Thu Jul 25 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-8
+- slightly more meaningful error messages if crypt() returns NULL (#988184)
+- explicit suid permissions
+
+* Fri Jul 19 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-7
+- fix useradd man page bugs
+
+* Fri Jun 14 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-6
+- report error to stdout when SELinux context for home directory
+ cannot be determined (#973647)
+- audit the changing home directory owner (#885797)
+- do not set the default SELinux MLS range (#852676)
+
+* Tue Mar 19 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-5
+- improve the failure syslog message in useradd (#830617)
+
+* Wed Feb 20 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-4
+- keep the original context if matchpathcon() fails (#912399)
+
+* Tue Jan 29 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-3
+- fix bugs in merge_group_entries()
+
+* Fri Jan 11 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-2
+- /etc/default is owned by glibc-common now (#894194)
+
+* Wed Sep 19 2012 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-1
+- new upstream version
+- use the original file permissions when creating backup (#853102)
+
+* Wed Jul 25 2012 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5-5
+- make /etc/default/useradd world-readable (#835137)
+
+* Sat Jul 21 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.1.5-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_18_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jun 18 2012 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5-3
+- pwconv/grpconv skipped 2nd of consecutive failures (#832995)
+
+* Thu Mar 22 2012 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5-2
+- fix selinux context handling
+- reset selinux context on files copied from skel
+
+* Mon Mar 19 2012 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Tue Feb 07 2012 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-14
+- compile with PIE and RELRO flags (#784349)
+
+* Sat Jan 14 2012 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.1.4.3-13
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_17_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Dec 20 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-12
+- fix leaks in .IDs patch (#734340)
+
+* Wed Nov 16 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-11
+- free memory associated with SELinux security contexts
+
+* Wed Nov 09 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-10
+- replace semanage call by library call
+- useradd man page (#739147)
+
+* Tue Aug 02 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-9
+- man page adjustment (userdel -Z)
+
+* Tue Aug 02 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-8
+- fixing semanage issue (#701355)
+
+* Fri Jul 22 2011 Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-7
+- Make sure /etc/login.defs is not changed on upgrades from Fedora 1[345].
+
+* Wed Jun 29 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-6
+- man page fixes (#696213 #674878)
+
+* Tue Jun 28 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-5
+- userdel option to remove Linux login <-> SELinux login mapping (#639900)
+- useradd special exit value if SELinux user mapping is invalid (#639975)
+- usermod special exit value if SELinux user mapping is invalid (#639976)
+
+* Mon Jun 27 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-4
+- refer to PAM in /etc/login.defs (#629277)
+
+* Mon Jun 06 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-3
+- fix shadow-4.1.4.2-underflow.patch
+
+* Tue May 31 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-2
+- fix integer underflow in laslog (#706321)
+
+* Fri May 20 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.3-1
+- upgrade
+- change UID/GID_MIN to #1000
+- fix find_new_uid/gid for big UID/GID_MAX
+
+* Wed Feb 09 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-11
+- useradd man page (-m option)
+- create home directory on fs with noacl
+- remove faillog app (pam_tally.so is no longer shipped)
+ Resolves: #523265, #622320
+
+* Tue Feb 01 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-10
+- do not use gshadow functions from glibc, there is a bug
+ in glibc sgetsgent(#674361)
+ Resolves: #674234
+
+* Wed Jan 05 2011 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-9
+- fix gshadow functions from shadow utils
+- make shadow utils use gshadow functions from glibc
+ Resolves: #665780
+
+* Tue Jul 20 2010 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-8
+- fix pwck/grpck hang
+ Resolves: #586322
+
+* Mon Jun 14 2010 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-7
+- fix integer underflow in faillog (#603683)
+- use preferred GID for reserved static IDs
+
+* Thu Apr 29 2010 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-6
+- preserve ACL's on files in /etc/skel
+ Resolves: #513055
+
+* Wed Apr 28 2010 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-5
+- newusers man page more informative
+- userdel should not need to run semanage
+ Resolves: #586330 #586408
+
+* Thu Apr 01 2010 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-4
+- fix man directories ownership (#569418)
+
+* Fri Mar 26 2010 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-3
+- max group name length set to 32 characters
+
+* Wed Nov 18 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-2
+- apply patches{1,2,3}
+- enable SHA512 in /etc/login.defs
+
+* Mon Sep 07 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.2-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Fri Aug 21 2009 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.4.1-7
+- rebuilt with new audit
+
+* Wed Aug 05 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.4.1-6
+- increase threshold for uid/gid reservations to 200 (#515667)
+
+* Sun Jul 26 2009 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.1.4.1-5
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_12_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jul 16 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.4.1-4
+- fix a list of owned directories (#510366)
+
+* Thu Jul 16 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.4.1-3
+- reduce the reuse of system IDs
+
+* Wed Jul 15 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.4.1-2
+- speed up sys users look up on LDAP boxes (#511813)
+
+* Tue Jun 16 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.4.1-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Fri May 15 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.4-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Wed Apr 22 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.3.1-2
+- lastlog fix
+
+* Fri Apr 17 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.3.1-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Tue Apr 14 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.3-2
+- get "-n" option back
+- fix selinux issues
+
+* Tue Apr 14 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.3-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Tue Mar 24 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-12
+- don not allow UID/GID = 4294967295 (#484040)
+
+* Mon Jan 19 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-11
+- fix license tag (#226416)
+- get rid of tabs in spec file (#226416)
+- convert HOWTO to UTF8 (#226416)
+
+* Mon Jan 05 2009 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-10
+- Add policycoreutils as Requires, because of restorecon (#478494)
+
+* Sun Dec 21 2008 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.2-9
+- Add setup as a Requires. Perhaps this should be a files requires. (#477529)
+
+* Wed Sep 24 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-8
+- groupmems: check username for valid character (#455603)
+- groupmems: don't segfault on nonexistent group (#456088)
+
+* Thu Sep 11 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-7
+- fix usermod SELinux user mappings change (#458766)
+
+* Tue Sep 02 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-6
+- audit improvements, thnx. to sgrubb@redhat.com
+
+* Tue Sep 02 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-5
+- fix groupmems issues (#459825)
+
+* Mon Jul 28 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-4
+- fix configure options (#456748)
+
+* Thu Jul 24 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-3
+- recreate selinux patch
+
+* Tue Jul 22 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-2
+- provide getspnam by man-pages
+
+* Mon May 26 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.2-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Tue May 20 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.1-2
+- fix salt size problem (#447136)
+
+* Mon Apr 07 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.1-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Fri Mar 07 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.0-5
+- improve newgrp audit patch
+
+* Mon Mar 03 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.0-4
+- fix selinux labeling (#433757)
+
+* Tue Feb 19 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.0-3
+- fix groupmems segmentation fault (#430813)
+
+* Wed Feb 13 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.0-2
+- fix newgrp audit event
+
+* Wed Dec 12 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.1.0-1
+- new upgrade release from new upstream
+- provide vipw and vigr
+
+* Thu Nov 29 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-20
+- do not create mail spool entries for system accounts (#402351)
+
+* Thu Oct 18 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-19
+- fix timestamps when moving home dirs to another file system (#278571)
+
+* Mon Oct 08 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-18
+- mark localized man pages with %%lang
+
+* Wed Aug 22 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-17
+- rebuild
+
+* Tue Jun 26 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-16
+- fix "CAVEATS" section of groupadd man page (#245590)
+
+* Wed Jun 06 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-15
+- fix infinitive loop if there are duplicate entries
+ in /etc/group (#240915)
+
+* Wed Jun 06 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-14
+- do not run find_new_uid() twice and use getpwuid() to check
+ UID uniqueness (#236871)
+
+* Tue Apr 10 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-13
+- fix useradd dump core when build without WITH_SELINUX (#235641)
+
+* Mon Mar 26 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-12
+- create user's mailbox file by default (#231311)
+
+* Fri Mar 16 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-11
+- assign system dynamic UID/GID from the top of available UID/GID (#190523)
+
+* Wed Feb 28 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-10
+- spec file fixes to meet fedora standarts.
+- fix useless call of restorecon(). (#222159)
+
+* Sun Jan 14 2007 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-9
+- fix append option in usermod (#222540).
+
+* Thu Dec 21 2006 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-8
+- Fix execution and creation of Home Directories under SELinux
+- Resolves: rhbz#217441
+
+* Thu Dec 14 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-7
+- fix rpmlint issues
+
+* Wed Dec 06 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-6
+- use MD5 encryption by default (#218629).
+
+* Thu Nov 30 2006 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-5
+- Fix SELinux context on home directories created with useradd (#217441)
+
+* Tue Nov 14 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-4
+- fix chpasswd and chgpasswd stack overflow (#213052)
+
+* Sat Nov 04 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-3
+- fix "-g" and "-G" option.
+
+* Fri Nov 03 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-2
+- improve audit logging (#211659)
+- improve "-l" option. Do not reset faillog if it's used (#213450).
+
+* Wed Nov 01 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.18.1-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Wed Oct 25 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.17-7
+- add dist-tag
+
+* Wed Oct 04 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.17-6
+- fix regression. Permissions on user* group* binaries
+ should be 0750, because of CAPP/LSPP certification
+- fix groupdel man page
+
+* Fri Aug 11 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.17-5
+- fix bug introduced with UIG_GID.patch (#201991)
+
+* Sat Aug 05 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.17-4
+- fix userdel, it didn't delete user's group (#201379)
+
+* Fri Aug 04 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.17-3
+- fix UID/GID overflow in user* group* (#198920)
+
+* Fri Aug 04 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.17-2
+- do not inherit file desc. in execve(nscd)
+
+* Mon Jul 17 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.17-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 2:4.0.16-3.1
+- rebuild
+
+* Tue Jun 13 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.16-3
+- call "nscd -i" to flush nscd cache (#191464)
+
+* Sat Jun 10 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.16-2
+- "useradd -r" must create a system group (#194728)
+
+* Tue Jun 06 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.16-1
+- upgrade
+- do not replace login.defs file (#190014)
+
+* Sat Apr 08 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.15-3
+- fix typo in shadow-4.0.15-login.defs (#188263)
+
+* Tue Apr 04 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.15-2
+- properly notify nscd to flush its cache(#186803)
+
+* Mon Apr 03 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.15-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Fri Mar 10 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.14-4
+- fix lrename() function to handle relative symlinks too
+
+* Tue Mar 07 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.14-3
+- set default umask to 077 in login.defs
+
+* Mon Mar 06 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.14-2
+- use lrename() function, which follow a destination symbolic link(#181977)
+
+* Fri Feb 10 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 2:4.0.14-1.2
+- bump again for double-long bug on ppc(64)
+
+* Tue Feb 07 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 2:4.0.14-1.1
+- rebuilt for new gcc4.1 snapshot and glibc changes
+
+* Fri Jan 06 2006 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.14-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Fri Dec 09 2005 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue Nov 29 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.13-4
+- fix incorrect audit record in userdel (#174392)
+
+* Wed Nov 16 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.13-3
+- fix useradd segfaults (#173241)
+
+* Sat Nov 5 2005 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 2:4.0.13-2
+- Update audit communication to standard format messages
+
+* Fri Oct 21 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.13-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Fri Sep 23 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.12-4
+- add useradd -l option back, it was removed by mistake
+
+* Tue Sep 20 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.12-3
+- provide login.defs man page
+- adjust audit patch
+
+* Tue Aug 30 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.12-2
+- audit support
+
+* Sat Aug 27 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.12-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Sat Aug 13 2005 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 2:4.0.11.1-5
+- Change to use new selinux api for selinux_check_passwd_access
+
+* Tue Aug 09 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.11.1-4
+- change the password last changed field in the shadow file
+ when "usermod -p" is used (#164943)
+
+* Mon Aug 08 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.11.1-3
+- provide getspnam.3 man page(#162476)
+- fix useradd man page(#97131)
+
+* Mon Aug 08 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.11.1-2
+- do not copy files from skel directory if home directory
+ already exist (#89591,#80242)
+
+* Fri Aug 05 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.11.1-1
+- upgrade
+
+* Mon May 23 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.7-9
+- remove vigr binary
+
+* Mon May 23 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.7-8
+- fix nscd socket path
+
+* Fri Apr 29 2005 Jeremy Katz <katzj@redhat.com> - 2:4.0.7-7
+- don't assume selinux is enabled if is_selinux_enabled() returns -1
+
+* Mon Apr 18 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.7-6
+- fix chage -l option (#109499, #137498)
+
+* Mon Apr 04 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.7-5
+- fix memory leak, and CPU spinning when grp_update() and
+ duplicate group entries in /etc/group (#151484)
+
+* Tue Mar 29 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.7-4
+- use newgrp binary
+- newgrp don't ask for password if user's default GID = group ID,
+ ask for password if there is some in /etc/gshadow
+ and in /etc/group is 'x' (#149997)
+
+* Mon Mar 14 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>
+- gcc4 fix (#150994) 2:4.0.7-3
+
+* Mon Mar 07 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>
+- man pages cs,es,ko,ru,zh_CN,zh_TW to UTF-8
+
+* Wed Mar 02 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>
+- upgrade 2:4.0.7-1
+
+* Fri Feb 25 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-59
+- static limit on group count to dynamic (#125510, #148994, #147742)
+
+* Mon Feb 21 2005 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-58
+- add "-l" option #146214
+
+* Mon Feb 14 2005 Adrian Havill <havill@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed Feb 9 2005 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-39
+- Change useradd to use matchpathcon
+
+* Thu Oct 21 2004 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-37
+- Add matchpathcon to create the files correctly when they do not exist.
+
+* Mon Oct 18 2004 Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> - 2:4.0.3-36
+- Change symlink ownership when copying from /etc/skel (#66819, patch by
+ Michael Weiser)
+
+* Fri Oct 15 2004 Adrian Havill <havill@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-35
+- make the limit for the group name the same as the username (determined
+ by the header files, rather than a constant) (#56850)
+
+* Wed Oct 13 2004 Adrian Havill <havill@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-33
+- allow for mixed case and dots in usernames (#135401)
+- all man pages to UTF-8, not just Japanese (#133883)
+- add Polish blurb for useradd -n man page option (#82177)
+
+* Tue Oct 12 2004 Adrian Havill <havill@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-31
+- check for non-standard legacy place for ncsd HUP (/var/run/nscd.pid) and
+ then the std FHS place (/var/run/nscd.pid) (#125421)
+
+* Fri Oct 1 2004 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-30
+- Add checkPasswdAccess for chage in SELinux
+
+* Sun Sep 26 2004 Adrian Havill <riel@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-29
+- always unlock all files on any exit (#126709)
+
+* Tue Aug 24 2004 Warren Togami <wtogami@redhat.com> 2:4.0.3-26
+- #126596 fix Req and BuildReqs
+
+* Sun Aug 1 2004 Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> 4.0.3-25
+- Fix build deps etc, move to current auto* (Steve Grubb)
+
+* Sat Jul 10 2004 Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> 4.0.3-24
+- Fix nscd path. This fixes various stale data caching bugs (#125421)
+
+* Thu Jun 17 2004 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 4.0.3-23
+- Add get_enforce checks
+- Clean up patch for potential upstream submission
+- Add removemalloc patch to get it to build on 3.4
+
+* Tue Jun 15 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue Mar 30 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-21
+- rebuild
+
+* Tue Mar 30 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-20
+- make /etc/default world-readable, needed for #118338
+
+* Fri Feb 13 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed Jan 21 2004 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 4.0.3-18
+- Fix selinux relabel of /etc/passwd file
+
+* Wed Jan 7 2004 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-17
+- fix use of uninitialized memory in useradd (#89145)
+
+* Tue Dec 16 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-16
+- back to UTF-8 again
+- remove getspnam(3) man page, now conflicts with man-pages 1.64
+
+* Thu Nov 13 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-15
+- don't convert man pages to UTF-8 for RHEL 3, conditionalized using macro
+- fixup dangling man page references
+
+* Mon Nov 10 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-14
+- lastlog: don't pass a possibly-smaller field to localtime (#109648)
+- configure: call AC_SYS_LARGEFILE to get large file support
+
+* Fri Nov 7 2003 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 4.0.3-13.sel
+- turn on SELinux support
+
+* Wed Oct 22 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-12
+- convert ja man pages to UTF-8 (#106051)
+- override MKINSTALLDIRS at install-time (#107476)
+
+* Mon Sep 8 2003 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+- turn off SELinux support
+
+* Thu Sep 4 2003 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 4.0.3-11.sel
+- build with SELinux support
+
+* Mon Jul 28 2003 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 4.0.3-10
+- Add SELinux support
+
+* Wed Jun 04 2003 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed Jun 4 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-8
+- rebuild
+
+* Tue Jun 3 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-7
+- run autoconf to generate updated configure at compile-time
+
+* Wed Feb 12 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-6
+- adjust mailspool patch to complain if no group named "mail" exists, even
+ though that should never happen
+
+* Tue Feb 11 2003 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-5
+- fix perms on mailspools created by useradd to be owned by the "mail"
+ group (#59810)
+
+* Wed Jan 22 2003 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Mon Dec 9 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-3
+- install the shadow.3 man page
+
+* Mon Nov 25 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-2
+- disable use of cracklib at build-time
+- fixup reserved-account changes for useradd
+
+* Thu Nov 21 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 4.0.3-1
+- update to 4.0.3, bumping epoch
+
+* Mon Nov 18 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-14
+- remove man pages which conflict with the man-pages package(s)
+
+* Fri Nov 15 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-13
+- prevent libshadow from being built more than once, to keep automake happy
+- change how md5 and md5crypt are enabled, to keep autoconf happy
+- remove unpackaged files after %%install
+
+* Thu Aug 29 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-12
+- force .mo files to be regenerated with current gettext to flush out possible
+ problems
+- fixup non-portable encodings in translations
+- make sv translation header non-fuzzy so that it will be included (#71281)
+
+* Fri Aug 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-11
+- don't apply aging parameters when creating system accounts (#67408)
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2002 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- automated rebuild
+
+* Sun May 26 2002 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- automated rebuild
+
+* Fri May 17 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-8
+- rebuild in new environment
+
+* Wed Mar 27 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-7
+- rebuild with proper defines to get support for large lastlog files (#61983)
+
+* Fri Feb 22 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-6
+- rebuild
+
+* Fri Jan 25 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-5
+- fix autoheader breakage and random other things autotools complain about
+
+* Mon Aug 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 20000902-4
+- use -O0 instead of -O on ia64
+- build in source directory
+- don't leave lock files on the filesystem when useradd creates a group for
+ the user (#50269)
+- fix the -o option to check for duplicate UIDs instead of login names (#52187)
+
+* Thu Jul 26 2001 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com> 20000902-3
+- build with -O on ia64
+
+* Fri Jun 08 2001 Than Ngo <than@redhat.com> 20000902-2
+- fixup broken specfile
+
+* Tue May 22 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 20000902-1
+- Create an empty mailspool when creating a user so non-setuid/non-setgid
+ MDAs (postfix+procmail) can deliver mail (#41811)
+- 20000902
+- adapt patches
+
+* Fri Mar 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- don't overwrite user dot files in useradd (#19982)
+- truncate new files when moving overwriting files with the contents of other
+ files while moving directories (keeps files from looking weird later on)
+- configure using %%{_prefix} as the prefix
+
+* Fri Feb 23 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg@redhat.com>
+- langify
+
+* Wed Aug 30 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- Fix up chage behavior (Bug #15883)
+
+* Wed Aug 30 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- 20000826
+- Fix up useradd man page (Bug #17036)
+
+* Tue Aug 8 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- check for vipw lock before adding or deleting users (Bug #6489)
+
+* Mon Aug 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- take LOG_CONS out of the openlog() call so that we don't litter the
+ screen during text-mode upgrades
+
+* Tue Jul 18 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- Remove a fixed-size buffer that caused problems when adding a huge number
+ of users to a group (>8192 bytes) (Bugs #3809, #11930)
+
+* Tue Jul 18 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- remove dependency on util-linux because it causes prereq loops
+
+* Tue Jul 18 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- change symlinked man pages to includers
+- require /usr/bin/newgrp (util-linux) so that /usr/bin/sg isn't left dangling
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2000 Prospector <bugzilla@redhat.com>
+- automatic rebuild
+
+* Sun Jun 18 2000 Matt Wilson <msw@redhat.com>
+- use mandir for FHS
+- added patches in src/ and po/ to honor DESTDIR
+- use make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+* Wed Feb 16 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- Fix up usermod's symlink behavior (Bug #5458)
+
+* Fri Feb 11 2000 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- get rid of mkpasswd
+
+* Mon Feb 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- fix usermod patch to check for shadow before doing any shadow-specific stuff
+ and merge it into the pwlock patch
+
+* Sat Feb 5 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- fix man symlinks
+
+* Wed Feb 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <gafton@redhat.com>
+- make -p only change shadow password (bug #8923)
+
+* Mon Jan 31 2000 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- rebuild to fix dependeencies
+- man pages are compressed
+
+* Wed Jan 19 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- Fix a security bug (adduser could overwrite previously existing
+ groups, Bug #8609)
+
+* Sun Jan 9 2000 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com>
+- unset LINGUAS before building
+- Fix typo in newusers manpage (Bug #8258)
+- libtoolize
+
+* Wed Sep 22 1999 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- fix segfault for userdel when the primary group for the user is not
+ defined
+
+* Tue Sep 21 1999 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- Serial: 1 because now we are using 19990827 (why the heck can't they have
+ a normal version just like everybody else?!)
+- ported all patches to the new code base
+
+* Thu Apr 15 1999 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com>
+- SIGHUP nscd from usermod, too
+
+* Fri Apr 09 1999 Michael K. Johnson <johnsonm@redhat.com>
+- added usermod password locking from Chris Adams <cadams@ro.com>
+
+* Thu Apr 08 1999 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com>
+- have things that modify users/groups SIGHUP nscd on exit
+
+* Wed Mar 31 1999 Michael K. Johnson <johnsonm@redhat.com>
+- have userdel remove user private groups when it is safe to do so
+- allow -f to force user removal even when user appears busy in utmp
+
+* Tue Mar 23 1999 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com>
+- edit out unused CHFN fields from login.defs.
+
+* Sun Mar 21 1999 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- auto rebuild in the new build environment (release 7)
+
+* Wed Jan 13 1999 Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com>
+- configure fix for arm
+
+* Wed Dec 30 1998 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- build against glibc 2.1
+
+* Fri Aug 21 1998 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com>
+- Note that /usr/sbin/mkpasswd conflicts with /usr/bin/mkpasswd;
+ one of these (I think /usr/sbin/mkpasswd but other opinions are valid)
+ should probably be renamed. In any case, mkpasswd.8 from this package
+ needs to be installed. (problem #823)
+
+* Fri May 08 1998 Prospector System <bugs@redhat.com>
+- translations modified for de, fr, tr
+
+* Tue Apr 21 1998 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- updated to 980403
+- redid the patches
+
+* Tue Dec 30 1997 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- updated the spec file
+- updated the patch so that new accounts created on shadowed system won't
+ confuse pam_pwdb anymore ('!!' default password instead on '!')
+- fixed a bug that made useradd -G segfault
+- the check for the ut_user is now patched into configure
+
+* Thu Nov 13 1997 Erik Troan <ewt@redhat.com>
+- added patch for XOPEN oddities in glibc headers
+- check for ut_user before checking for ut_name -- this works around some
+ confusion on glibc 2.1 due to the utmpx header not defining the ut_name
+ compatibility stuff. I used a gross sed hack here because I couldn't make
+ automake work properly on the sparc (this could be a glibc 2.0.99 problem
+ though). The utuser patch works fine, but I don't apply it.
+- sleep after running autoconf
+
+* Thu Nov 06 1997 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- added forgot lastlog command to the spec file
+
+* Mon Oct 27 1997 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- obsoletes adduser
+
+* Thu Oct 23 1997 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- modified groupadd; updated the patch
+
+* Fri Sep 12 1997 Cristian Gafton <gafton@redhat.com>
+- updated to 970616
+- changed useradd to meet RH specs
+- fixed some bugs
+
+* Tue Jun 17 1997 Erik Troan <ewt@redhat.com>
+- built against glibc