diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in
index 344e1e6..61e8572 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in
@@ -971,3 +971,29 @@ interface(`corenet_use_tun_tap_device',`
 	dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1)
 	allow $1 tun_tap_device_t:chr_file { read write };
 ')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Unconfined access to network objects.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	The domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`corenet_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute node_type, netif_type, port_type;
+		class tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg node_bind name_bind };
+		class udp_socket { send_msg recv_msg node_bind name_bind };
+		class rawip_socket node_bind;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 node_type:node *;
+	allow $1 netif_type:netif *;
+	allow $1 port_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { send_msg recv_msg };
+
+	# Bind to any network address.
+	# cjp: rawip_socket doesnt make any sense
+	allow $1 port_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } name_bind;
+	allow $1 node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } node_bind;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
index 1b6de8e..07544d7 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
@@ -2042,3 +2042,25 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_setattr_video_dev',`
 
 	dontaudit $1 v4l_device_t:chr_file setattr;
 ')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Unconfined access to devices.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	Domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dev_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute device_node, memory_raw_write, memory_raw_read;
+		type mtrr_device_t;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 device_node:devfile_class_set *;
+	allow $1 mtrr_device_t:file *;
+
+	allow $1 self:capability sys_rawio;
+	typeattribute $1 memory_raw_write, memory_raw_read;
+')
+
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
index b8618ad..f70cff2 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if
@@ -1675,3 +1675,23 @@ interface(`fs_getattr_all_files',`
 	allow $1 filesystem_type:sock_file getattr;
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Unconfined access to filesystems
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	Domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`fs_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute filesystem_type;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 filesystem_type:filesystem *;
+
+	# Create/access other files.  fs_type is to pick up various
+	# pseudo filesystem types that are applied to both the filesystem
+	# and its files.
+	allow $1 filesystem_type:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file blk_file } *;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
index 2c58d7a..9b0abcf 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
@@ -1015,3 +1015,27 @@ interface(`kernel_relabel_unlabeled',`
 	allow $1 unlabeled_t:dir_file_class_set { getattr relabelfrom };
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Unconfined access to the kernel.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	Domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`kernel_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type kernel_t, unlabeled_t;
+		attribute can_load_kernmodule, can_receive_kernel_messages;
+	')
+
+#	allow $1 proc_fs:{ dir file } *;
+
+	allow $1 sysctl_t:{ dir file } *;
+	allow $1 kernel_t:system *;
+	allow $1 unlabeled_t:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file blk_file } *;
+
+	typeattribute $1 can_load_kernmodule, can_receive_kernel_messages;
+
+	kernel_rw_all_sysctl($1)
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
index 80398fe..bf5fa47 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ policy_module(kernel,1.0)
 #
 
 # assertion related attributes
-attribute can_load_policy;
-attribute can_setenforce;
-attribute can_setsecparam;
 attribute can_load_kernmodule;
 attribute can_receive_kernel_messages;
 
@@ -17,7 +14,7 @@ attribute can_receive_kernel_messages;
 # kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads.
 # It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class.
 # 
-type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule, can_load_policy;
+type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule;
 role system_r types kernel_t;
 domain_type(kernel_t)
 sid kernel context_template(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,s0 - s9:c0.c127)
@@ -173,6 +170,8 @@ corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
 corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
 corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
 
+selinux_load_policy(kernel_t)
+
 term_use_console(kernel_t)
 
 # Mount root file system.  Used when loading a policy
@@ -200,9 +199,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(kernel_t)
 seutil_read_config(kernel_t)
 seutil_read_binary_pol(kernel_t)
 
-neverallow ~can_load_policy security_t:security load_policy;
-neverallow ~can_setenforce security_t:security setenforce;
-neverallow ~can_setsecparam security_t:security setsecparam;
 neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_module;
 
 ########################################
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
index a8baa0c..6f79c6e 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if
@@ -250,3 +250,24 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_user_contexts',`
 	allow $1 security_t:security compute_user;
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <desc>
+##	Unconfined access to the SELinux security server.
+## </desc>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	Domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`selinux_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute can_load_policy, can_setenforce, can_setsecparam;
+		type security_t;
+		class security { load_policy setenforce setbool };
+	')
+
+	# Access the security API.
+	allow $1 security_t:security *;
+	auditallow $1 security_t:security { load_policy setenforce setbool };
+
+	typeattribute $1 can_load_policy, can_setenforce, can_setsecparam;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te
index 25c104a..6953df6 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ policy_module(selinux,1.0)
 # Declarations
 #
 
+attribute can_load_policy;
+attribute can_setenforce;
+attribute can_setsecparam;
+
 # 
 # security_t is the target type when checking
 # the permissions in the security class.  It is also
@@ -15,3 +19,7 @@ type security_t;
 fs_type(security_t)
 sid security context_template(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0)
 genfscon selinuxfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0)
+
+neverallow ~can_load_policy security_t:security load_policy;
+neverallow ~can_setenforce security_t:security setenforce;
+neverallow ~can_setsecparam security_t:security setsecparam;
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
index 996a029..659efa2 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ## <summary>Policy controlling access to storage devices</summary>
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to get the attributes of fixed disk
 ##	device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ interface(`storage_getattr_fixed_disk',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Do not audit attempts made by the caller to get
 ##	the attributes of fixed disk device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process to not audit.
 ## </param>
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_getattr_fixed_disk',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to set the attributes of fixed disk
 ##	device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_fixed_disk',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Do not audit attempts made by the caller to set
 ##	the attributes of fixed disk device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process to not audit.
 ## </param>
@@ -75,12 +75,12 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_fixed_disk',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from a fixed disk.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -98,12 +98,12 @@ interface(`storage_raw_read_fixed_disk',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to a fixed disk.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ interface(`storage_raw_write_fixed_disk',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Create block devices in /dev with the fixed disk type.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -197,12 +197,12 @@ interface(`storage_swapon_fixed_disk',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from a logical volume.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -220,12 +220,12 @@ interface(`storage_raw_read_lvm_volume',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from a logical volume.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ interface(`storage_raw_write_lvm_volume',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to get the attributes of
 ##	the generic SCSI interface device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -262,10 +262,10 @@ interface(`storage_getattr_scsi_generic',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to set the attributes of
 ##	the generic SCSI interface device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -281,13 +281,13 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_scsi_generic',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -305,13 +305,13 @@ interface(`storage_read_scsi_generic',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write, in a
 ##	generic fashion, from any SCSI device.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -329,10 +329,10 @@ interface(`storage_write_scsi_generic',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Get attributes of the device nodes
 ##	for the SCSI generic inerface.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -348,10 +348,10 @@ interface(`storage_getattr_scsi_generic',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Set attributes of the device nodes
 ##	for the SCSI generic inerface.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -367,10 +367,10 @@ interface(`storage_set_scsi_generic_attributes',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to get the attributes of removable
 ##	devices device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -386,10 +386,10 @@ interface(`storage_getattr_removable_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Do not audit attempts made by the caller to get
 ##	the attributes of removable devices device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process to not audit.
 ## </param>
@@ -404,10 +404,10 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_getattr_removable_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to set the attributes of removable
 ##	devices device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -423,10 +423,10 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_removable_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Do not audit attempts made by the caller to set
 ##	the attributes of removable devices device nodes.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process to not audit.
 ## </param>
@@ -441,13 +441,13 @@ interface(`storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read from
 ##	a removable device.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -463,13 +463,13 @@ interface(`storage_raw_read_removable_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly write to
 ##	a removable device.
 ##	This is extremly dangerous as it can bypass the
 ##	SELinux protections for filesystem objects, and
 ##	should only be used by trusted domains.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -485,10 +485,10 @@ interface(`storage_raw_write_removable_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read
 ##	a tape device.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -504,10 +504,10 @@ interface(`storage_read_tape_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to directly read
 ##	a tape device.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -523,10 +523,10 @@ interface(`storage_write_tape_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to get the attributes
 ##	of device nodes of tape devices.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -542,10 +542,10 @@ interface(`storage_getattr_tape_device',`
 ')
 
 ########################################
-## <desc>
+## <summary>
 ##	Allow the caller to set the attributes
 ##	of device nodes of tape devices.
-## </desc>
+## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
 ##	The type of the process performing this action.
 ## </param>
@@ -560,3 +560,23 @@ interface(`storage_setattr_tape_device',`
 	allow $1 tape_device_t:blk_file setattr;
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Unconfined access to storage devices.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	Domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`storage_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type fixed_disk_device_t, removable_device_t;
+		type lvm_vg_t, scsi_generic_device_t, tape_device_t;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 { fixed_disk_device_t removable_device_t }:blk_file *;
+	allow $1 { lvm_vg_t scsi_generic_device_t tape_device_t }:blk_file *;
+
+	typeattribute $1 fixed_disk_raw_read, fixed_disk_raw_write;
+	typeattribute $1 scsi_generic_read, scsi_generic_write;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/domain.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/domain.if
index 28da967..2c975b9 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/domain.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/domain.if
@@ -452,6 +452,45 @@ interface(`domain_read_all_entry_files',`
 	allow $1 entry_type:file r_file_perms;
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Unconfined access to domains.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	The type of the process performing this action.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`domain_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute domain, set_curr_context;
+		class fd use;
+		class fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+		class process { transition dyntransition execmem };
+		class dir r_dir_perms;
+		class file r_file_perms;
+		class lnk_file r_file_perms;
+	')
+
+	# Use/sendto/connectto sockets created by any domain.
+	allow $1 domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *;
+
+	# Use descriptors and pipes created by any domain.
+	allow $1 domain:fd use;
+	allow $1 domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+
+	# Act upon any other process.
+	allow $1 domain:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem };
+	typeattribute $1 set_curr_context;
+
+	# Create/access any System V IPC objects.
+	allow $1 domain:{ sem msgq shm } *;
+	allow $1 domain:msg { send receive };
+
+	# For /proc/pid
+	allow $1 domain:dir r_dir_perms;
+	allow $1 domain:file r_file_perms;
+	allow $1 domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+')
 
 #
 # These next macros are not interfaces, but actually are 
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/files.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/files.if
index 10dc4da..51ba3d8 100644
--- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/files.if
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/files.if
@@ -1342,3 +1342,30 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_spools',`
 	allow $1 var_spool_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
 	allow $1 var_spool_t:file create_file_perms;
 ')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Unconfined access to files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	Domain allowed access.
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`files_unconfined',`
+	gen_require(`
+		attribute file_type;
+		class unix_stream_socket name_bind;
+		class unix_dgram_socket name_bind;
+	')
+
+	# Create/access any file in a labeled filesystem;
+	allow $1 file_type:{ file chr_file } ~execmod;
+	allow $1 file_type:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file blk_file } *;
+
+	# Mount/unmount any filesystem with the context= option. 
+	allow $1 file_type:filesystem *;
+
+	# Bind to any network address.
+	# cjp: need to check this, I dont think this has any effect.
+	allow $1 file_type:{ unix_stream_socket unix_dgram_socket } name_bind;
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.fc b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.fc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3a6c12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.fc
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# Add programs here which should not be confined by SELinux
+# e.g.:
+# /usr/local/bin/appsrv	--	system_u:object_r:unconfined_exec_t
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c74aadb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+## <summary>The unconfined domain.</summary>
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	A template to make the specified domain unconfined.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	Domain to make unconfined.
+## </param>
+#
+template(`unconfined_access_template',`
+
+	# Use any Linux capability.
+	allow $1 self:capability *;
+
+	# Transition to myself, to make get_ordered_context_list happy.
+	allow $1 self:process transition;
+
+	# Write access is for setting attributes under /proc/self/attr.
+	allow $1 self:file rw_file_perms;
+
+	# Userland object managers
+	allow $1 self:nscd *;
+	allow $1 self:dbus *;
+	allow $1 self:passwd *;
+
+	kernel_unconfined($1)
+	dev_unconfined($1)
+	fs_unconfined($1)
+	selinux_unconfined($1)
+
+	domain_unconfined($1)
+	files_unconfined($1)
+
+	tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',`
+		# Allow loading DSOs that require executable stack.
+		allow $1 self:process execmem;
+	')
+
+	# to satisfy assertions:
+	optional_policy(`authlogin.te',`
+		auth_manage_shadow($1)
+		auth_relabelto_shadow($1)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`bootloader.te',`
+		bootloader_manage_kernel_modules($1)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`selinuxutil.te',`
+		seutil_create_binary_pol($1)
+		seutil_relabelto_binary_pol($1)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`storage.te',`
+		storage_unconfined($1)
+	')
+
+	ifdef(`TODO',`
+	if (allow_execmod) {
+		# Allow text relocations on system shared libraries, e.g. libGL.
+		allow $1 texrel_shlib_t:file execmod;
+	}
+
+	ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
+		# Communicate via dbusd.
+		allow $1 system_dbusd_t:dbus *;
+	')
+
+	ifdef(`nscd.te', `
+		# Get info via nscd.
+		allow $1 nscd_t:nscd *;
+	')
+	') dnl end TODO
+')
diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98106af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+
+policy_module(unconfined,1.0)
+
+########################################
+#
+# Declarations
+#
+
+type unconfined_t;
+type unconfined_exec_t;
+init_system_domain(unconfined_t,unconfined_exec_t)
+role system_r types unconfined_t;
+
+########################################
+#
+# Local policy
+#
+
+unconfined_access_template(unconfined_t)
+logging_send_syslog_msg(unconfined_t)
+
+#role sysadm_r types unconfined_t;
+#domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, unconfined_exec_t, unconfined_t)