diff --git a/refpolicy/Changelog b/refpolicy/Changelog index fbe4f5c..61fef3c 100644 --- a/refpolicy/Changelog +++ b/refpolicy/Changelog @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ - Added modules: portage + userhelper usernetctl * Tue Jan 17 2006 Chris PeBenito - 20060117 diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.fc b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cd9dc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.fc @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +# +# /etc +# +/etc/security/console.apps(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:userhelper_conf_t,s0) + +# +# /usr +# +/usr/sbin/userhelper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:userhelper_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..440bf9e --- /dev/null +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.if @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +## SELinux utility to run a shell with a new role + +####################################### +## +## The per user domain template for the userhelper module. +## +## +##

+## This template creates a derived domains which are used +## for userhelper. +##

+##

+## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and +## generally does not need to be invoked directly +## by policy writers. +##

+## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +## The role associated with the user domain. +## +# +template(`userhelper_per_userdomain_template',` + gen_require(` + type userhelper_exec_t, userhelper_conf_t; + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Declarations + # + type $1_userhelper_t; + domain_type($1_userhelper_t) + domain_entry_file($1_userhelper_t,userhelper_exec_t) + domain_role_change_exempt($1_userhelper_t) + domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1_userhelper_t) + domain_wide_inherit_fd($1_userhelper_t) + domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1_userhelper_t) + role system_r types $1_userhelper_t; + + ######################################## + # + # Local policy + # + allow $1_userhelper_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service dac_override chown sys_tty_config }; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:fd use; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:shm create_shm_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:sem create_sem_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:msg { send receive }; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_userhelper_t self:sock_file r_file_perms; + + #Transition to the derived domain. + domain_auto_trans($2,userhelper_exec_t,$1_userhelper_t) + allow $2 $1_userhelper_t:fd use; + allow $1_userhelper_t $2:fd use; + allow $1_userhelper_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t $2:process sigchld; + + allow $1_userhelper_t self:process setexec; + + allow $1_userhelper_t userhelper_conf_t:file rw_file_perms; + allow $1_userhelper_t userhelper_conf_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + + can_exec($1_userhelper_t, userhelper_exec_t) + + dontaudit $2 $1_userhelper_t:process signal; + + kernel_read_all_sysctl($1_userhelper_t) + kernel_getattr_debugfs($1_userhelper_t) + kernel_read_system_state($1_userhelper_t) + + # Execute shells + corecmd_exec_shell($1_userhelper_t) + # By default, revert to the calling domain when a program is executed + corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_userhelper_t,$2) + corecmd_sbin_domtrans($1_userhelper_t,$2) + + # Inherit descriptors from the current session. + domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_userhelper_t) + # for when the user types "exec userhelper" at the command line + domain_sigchld_wide_inherit_fd($1_userhelper_t) + + dev_read_urand($1_userhelper_t) + # Read /dev directories and any symbolic links. + dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1_userhelper_t) + + files_list_var_lib($1_userhelper_t) + # Write to utmp. + files_filetrans_pid($1_userhelper_t,initrc_var_run_t) + # Read the /etc/security/default_type file + files_read_etc_files($1_userhelper_t) + # Read /var. + files_read_var_files($1_userhelper_t) + files_read_var_symlink($1_userhelper_t) + # for some PAM modules and for cwd + files_search_home($1_userhelper_t) + + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_userhelper_t) + fs_read_nfs_files($1_userhelper_t) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks($1_userhelper_t) + + # Allow $1_userhelper to obtain contexts to relabel TTYs + selinux_get_fs_mount($1_userhelper_t) + selinux_validate_context($1_userhelper_t) + selinux_compute_access_vector($1_userhelper_t) + selinux_compute_create_context($1_userhelper_t) + selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_userhelper_t) + selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_userhelper_t) + + # Read the devpts root directory. + term_list_ptys($1_userhelper_t) + # Relabel terminals. + term_relabel_all_user_ttys($1_userhelper_t) + term_relabel_all_user_ptys($1_userhelper_t) + # Access terminals. + term_use_all_user_ttys($1_userhelper_t) + term_use_all_user_ptys($1_userhelper_t) + + auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_userhelper_t) + auth_manage_pam_pid($1_userhelper_t) + auth_manage_var_auth($1_userhelper_t) + auth_search_pam_console_data($1_userhelper_t) + + # Inherit descriptors from the current session. + init_use_fd($1_userhelper_t) + # Write to utmp. + init_manage_utmp($1_userhelper_t) + + libs_use_ld_so($1_userhelper_t) + libs_use_shared_libs($1_userhelper_t) + + miscfiles_read_localization($1_userhelper_t) + + seutil_read_config($1_userhelper_t) + seutil_read_default_contexts($1_userhelper_t) + + userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd($1_userhelper_t) + # Allow $1_userhelper_t to transition to user domains. + userdom_bin_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_userhelper_t) + userdom_sbin_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_userhelper_t) + userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_userhelper_t) + + ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + optional_policy(`rpm',` + # Allow transitioning to rpm_t, for up2date + rpm_domtrans($1_userhelper_t) + ') + ') + + tunable_policy(`! secure_mode',` + #if we are not in secure mode then we can transition to sysadm_t + userdom_bin_spec_domtrans_sysadm($1_userhelper_t) + userdom_sbin_spec_domtrans_sysadm($1_userhelper_t) + userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_sysadm($1_userhelper_t) + ') + + + optional_policy(`logging',` + logging_send_syslog_msg($1_userhelper_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`nis',` + nis_use_ypbind($1_userhelper_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`nscd',` + nscd_use_socket($1_userhelper_t) + ') + + ifdef(`TODO',` + allow $1_userhelper_t xdm_t:fd use; + allow $1_userhelper_t xdm_var_run_t:dir search; + allow $1_userhelper_t xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl }; + + optional_policy(`gnome-pty-helper.te',` + allow $1_userhelper_t gphdomain:fd use; + ') + optional_policy(`xauth', ` + domain_auto_trans($1_userhelper_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t) + allow $1_userhelper_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read }; + ') + optional_policy(`mozilla', ` + domain_auto_trans($1_mozilla_t, userhelper_exec_t, $1_userhelper_t) + ') + # for when the network connection is killed + dontaudit unpriv_userdomain $1_userhelper_t:process signal; + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to search userhelp configuration +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +# +interface(`userhelper_dontaudit_search_config',` + gen_require(` + type userhelper_conf_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 userhelper_conf_t:dir search; +') diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22cae2e --- /dev/null +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.te @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + +policy_module(userhelper,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type userhelper_conf_t; +files_type(userhelper_conf_t) + +type userhelper_exec_t; +files_type(userhelper_conf_t) diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if index f6f09fe..8e9100a 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if @@ -242,7 +242,9 @@ interface(`corecmd_mmap_bin_files',` ######################################## ## ## Execute a file in a bin directory -## in the specified domain. +## in the specified domain but do not +## do it automatically. This is an explicit +## transition, requiring the caller to use setexeccon(). ## ## ##

@@ -259,7 +261,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_mmap_bin_files',` ##

##

## This interface was added to handle -## the ssh-agent policy. +## the userhelper policy. ##

## ## @@ -269,17 +271,54 @@ interface(`corecmd_mmap_bin_files',` ## The type of the new process. ## # -interface(`corecmd_bin_domtrans',` +interface(`corecmd_bin_spec_domtrans',` gen_require(` type bin_t; - class dir search; - class lnk_file { getattr read }; ') allow $1 bin_t:dir search; allow $1 bin_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; - domain_auto_trans($1,bin_t,$2) + domain_trans($1,bin_t,$2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a file in a bin directory +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

+## Execute a file in a bin directory +## in the specified domain. This allows +## the specified domain to execute any file +## on these filesystems in the specified +## domain. This is not suggested. +##

+##

+## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

+##

+## This interface was added to handle +## the ssh-agent policy. +##

+## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +# +interface(`corecmd_bin_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type bin_t; + ') + + corecmd_bin_spec_domtrans($1,$2) + type_transition $1 bin_t:process $2; ') ######################################## @@ -541,6 +580,49 @@ interface(`corecmd_sbin_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute a file in a sbin directory +## in the specified domain but do not +## do it automatically. This is an explicit +## transition, requiring the caller to use setexeccon(). +## +## +##

+## Execute a file in a sbin directory +## in the specified domain. This allows +## the specified domain to execute any file +## on these filesystems in the specified +## domain. This is not suggested. +##

+##

+## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

+##

+## This interface was added to handle +## the userhelper policy. +##

+## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +# +interface(`corecmd_sbin_spec_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type sbin_t; + ') + + allow $1 sbin_t:dir search; + allow $1 sbin_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; + + domain_trans($1,sbin_t,$2) +') + +######################################## +## ## Check if a shell is executable (DAC-wise). ## ## @@ -564,8 +646,6 @@ interface(`corecmd_check_exec_shell',` interface(`corecmd_exec_shell',` gen_require(` type bin_t, shell_exec_t; - class dir r_dir_perms; - class lnk_file r_file_perms; ') allow $1 bin_t:dir r_dir_perms; @@ -580,8 +660,6 @@ interface(`corecmd_exec_shell',` interface(`corecmd_exec_ls',` gen_require(` type bin_t, ls_exec_t; - class dir r_dir_perms; - class lnk_file r_file_perms; ') allow $1 bin_t:dir r_dir_perms; @@ -617,8 +695,6 @@ interface(`corecmd_exec_ls',` interface(`corecmd_shell_spec_domtrans',` gen_require(` type bin_t, shell_exec_t; - class dir r_dir_perms; - class lnk_file r_file_perms; ') allow $1 bin_t:dir r_dir_perms; diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if index d02815b..db68ba8 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if @@ -1074,6 +1074,23 @@ interface(`domain_mmap_all_entry_files',` ######################################## ## +## Execute an entry_type in the specified domain. +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +# +# cjp: added for userhelper +interface(`domain_entry_spec_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + attribute entry_type; + ') + + domain_trans($1,entry_type,$2) +') + +######################################## +## ## Unconfined access to domains. ## ## diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.te index b27ecd5..91f46de 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.te +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.te @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -policy_module(xdm,1.1.0) +policy_module(xdm,1.1.1) ######################################## # @@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ optional_policy(`locallogin',` locallogin_signull(xdm_t) ') +optional_policy(`userhelper',` + userhelper_dontaudit_search_config(xdm_t) +') + ifdef(`TODO',` # cjp: TODO: integrate strict policy: daemon_domain(xdm, `, privuser, privrole, auth_chkpwd, privowner, privmem, nscd_client_domain') diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if index fca8333..21032db 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if @@ -586,6 +586,26 @@ interface(`auth_exec_pam',` can_exec($1,pam_exec_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Manage var auth files. Used by various other applications +## and pam applets etc. +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +# +interface(`auth_manage_var_auth',` + gen_require(` + type var_auth_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + allow $1 var_auth_t:dir create_dir_perms; + allow $1 var_auth_t:file rw_file_perms; + allow $1 var_auth_t:lnk_file rw_file_perms; +') + ####################################### # # auth_read_pam_pid(domain) @@ -638,6 +658,24 @@ interface(`auth_delete_pam_pid',` allow $1 pam_var_run_t:file { getattr unlink }; ') +######################################## +## +## Manage pam PID files. +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +# +interface(`auth_manage_pam_pid',` + gen_require(` + type pam_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 pam_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms; + allow $1 pam_var_run_t:file create_file_perms; +') + ####################################### # # auth_domtrans_pam_console(domain) diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if index ebd5801..fe34c0b 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/init.if @@ -873,3 +873,19 @@ interface(`init_dontaudit_rw_script_pid',` dontaudit $1 initrc_var_run_t:file { getattr read write append }; ') +######################################## +## +## Manage init files like utmp. +## +## +## Domain access allowed. +## +# +interface(`init_manage_utmp',` + gen_require(` + type initrc_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 initrc_var_run_t:file create_file_perms; +') diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if index e8fc6ce..3109ce5 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if @@ -2390,6 +2390,75 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_unpriv_user_shared_mem',` ######################################## ## +## Execute bin_t in the unprivileged user domains. This +## is an explicit transition, requiring the +## caller to use setexeccon(). +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +# +interface(`userdom_bin_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + corecmd_bin_spec_domtrans($1,unpriv_userdomain) + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:fd use; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fd use; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute generic sbin programs in all unprivileged user +## domains. This is an explicit transition, requiring the +## caller to use setexeccon(). +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +# +interface(`userdom_sbin_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + corecmd_sbin_spec_domtrans($1,unpriv_userdomain) + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:fd use; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fd use; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute all entrypoint files in unprivileged user +## domains. This is an explicit transition, requiring the +## caller to use setexeccon(). +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +# +interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + domain_entry_spec_domtrans($1,unpriv_userdomain) + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:fd use; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fd use; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute a shell in the sysadm domain. ## ## @@ -2416,6 +2485,71 @@ interface(`userdom_shell_domtrans_sysadm',` ######################################## ## +## Execute a generic bin program in the sysadm domain. +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +# +interface(`userdom_bin_spec_domtrans_sysadm',` + gen_require(` + type sysadm_t; + ') + + corecmd_bin_spec_domtrans($1,sysadm_t) + + allow $1 sysadm_t:fd use; + allow sysadm_t $1:fd use; + allow sysadm_t $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow sysadm_t $1:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a generic sbin program in the sysadm domain. +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +# +interface(`userdom_sbin_spec_domtrans_sysadm',` + gen_require(` + type sysadm_t; + ') + + corecmd_sbin_spec_domtrans($1,sysadm_t) + + allow $1 sysadm_t:fd use; + allow sysadm_t $1:fd use; + allow sysadm_t $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow sysadm_t $1:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute all entrypoint files in the sysadm domain. This +## is an explicit transition, requiring the +## caller to use setexeccon(). +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +# +interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_sysadm',` + gen_require(` + type sysadm_t; + ') + + domain_entry_spec_domtrans($1,sysadm_t) + + allow $1 sysadm_t:fd use; + allow sysadm_t $1:fd use; + allow sysadm_t $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow sysadm_t $1:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## ## Search the staff users home directory. ## ##