From edf241cd9b8de964d2636e4af7b6d0e5642d8d19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris PeBenito Date: Mar 13 2006 21:36:49 +0000 Subject: add evolution, bug 1384 --- diff --git a/refpolicy/Changelog b/refpolicy/Changelog index d97bbc5..ad2ede6 100644 --- a/refpolicy/Changelog +++ b/refpolicy/Changelog @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ apt (Erich Schubert) clamav (Erich Schubert) dpkg (Erich Schubert) + evolution mozilla mplayer rhgb diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables b/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables index 6af4c0a..35c21eb 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables +++ b/refpolicy/policy/global_tunables @@ -378,6 +378,13 @@ gen_tunable(cron_can_relabel,false) ## ##

+## Disable transitions to evolution domains. +##

+## +gen_tunable(disable_evolution_trans,false) + +## +##

## Disable transitions to user mozilla domains ##

## diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.fc b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3ded67 --- /dev/null +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.fc @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ + +# +# /tmp +# +/tmp/\.exchange-USER(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ROLE_evolution_exchange_tmp_t,s0) + +# +# /usr +# +/usr/bin/evolution.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/evolution/.*evolution-alarm-notify.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_alarm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/evolution/.*evolution-exchange-storage.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_exchange_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/evolution-data-server.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_server_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/evolution-webcal.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evolution_webcal_exec_t,s0) + +ifdef(`strict_policy',` +HOME_DIR/\.evolution(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ROLE_evolution_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.camel_certs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ROLE_evolution_home_t,s0) +') diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c3c559 --- /dev/null +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.if @@ -0,0 +1,822 @@ +## Evolution email client + +####################################### +## +## The per user domain template for the evolution module. +## +## +##

+## This template creates a derived domains which are used +## for evolution email client and other related evolution applications such as webcal and alarm +## type is also created to protect the user evolution keys. +##

+##

+## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and +## generally does not need to be invoked directly +## by policy writers. +##

+## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +## +## +## The role associated with the user domain. +## +## +# +template(`evolution_per_userdomain_template',` + + ######################################## + # + # Declarations + # + + type $1_evolution_t; + domain_type($1_evolution_t) + domain_entry_file($1_evolution_t,evolution_exec_t) + role $3 types $1_evolution_t; + + type $1_evolution_tmpfs_t; + files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_tmpfs_t) + + type $1_evolution_home_t alias $1_evolution_rw_t; + files_poly_member($1_evolution_home_t) + userdom_user_home_content($1,$1_evolution_home_t) + + type $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t; + files_type($1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t) + + type $1_evolution_alarm_t; + domain_type($1_evolution_alarm_t) + role $3 types $1_evolution_alarm_t; + + type $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t; + files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t) + + type $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t; + files_type($1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t) + + type $1_evolution_exchange_t; + domain_type($1_evolution_exchange_t) + role $3 types $1_evolution_exchange_t; + + type $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t; + files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t) + + type $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t; + files_tmp_file($1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t) + + type $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t; + files_type($1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t) + + type $1_evolution_server_t; + domain_type($1_evolution_server_t) + role $3 types $1_evolution_server_t; + + type $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t; + files_type($1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t) + + type $1_evolution_webcal_t; + domain_type($1_evolution_webcal_t) + role $3 types $1_evolution_webcal_t; + + type $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t; + files_tmpfs_file($1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t) + + type $1_orbit_tmp_t; + files_type($1_orbit_tmp_t) + + ######################################## + # + # Evolution local policy + # + + allow $1_evolution_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_nice }; + allow $1_evolution_t self:process { signal getsched setsched }; + allow $1_evolution_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:file read; + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + can_exec($1_evolution_t,evolution_alarm_exec_t) + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; + files_tmp_filetrans($1_evolution_t,$1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t,{ dir file }) + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_t:file read; + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + can_exec($1_evolution_t,evolution_server_exec_t) + + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolution_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms; + fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_t,$1_evolution_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + + allow $1_evolution_t $2:dir search; + allow $1_evolution_t $2:fd use; + allow $1_evolution_t $2:file read; + allow $1_evolution_t $2:lnk_file read; + allow $1_evolution_t $2:process sigchld; + allow $1_evolution_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_t $2:dir search; + allow $1_evolution_t $2:file read; + + domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_exec_t, $1_evolution_t) + + allow $2 $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $2 $1_evolution_t:process noatsecure; + allow $2 $1_evolution_t:process signal_perms; + + # Access .evolution + allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:{ dir file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto }; + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + + # Allow the user domain to signal/ps. + allow $2 $1_evolution_t:dir { search getattr read }; + allow $2 $1_evolution_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr }; + allow $2 $1_evolution_t:process getattr; + # We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access + # /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels + # (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if + # running in a privileged domain. + dontaudit $2 $1_evolution_t:process ptrace; + + #FIXME check to see if really needed + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_evolution_t) + kernel_read_system_state($1_evolution_t) + # Allow netstat + kernel_read_network_state($1_evolution_t) + kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_evolution_t) + + corecmd_exec_shell($1_evolution_t) + # Run various programs + corecmd_exec_bin($1_evolution_t) + corecmd_exec_sbin($1_evolution_t) + + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_pop_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_smtp_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_innd_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1_evolution_t) + ###corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ipp($1_evolution_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_pop_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_smtp_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_innd_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1_evolution_t) + ###corenet_udp_sendrecv_ipp($1_evolution_t) + corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_t) + corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_pop_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_innd_port($1_evolution_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port($1_evolution_t) + ###corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port($1_evolution_t) + # not sure about this bind + corenet_udp_bind_generic_port($1_evolution_t) + + dev_read_urand($1_evolution_t) + + files_read_etc_files($1_evolution_t) + files_read_usr_files($1_evolution_t) + files_read_usr_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + files_read_var_files($1_evolution_t) + + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + + libs_use_ld_so($1_evolution_t) + libs_use_shared_libs($1_evolution_t) + + logging_send_syslog_msg($1_evolution_t) + + miscfiles_read_localization($1_evolution_t) + + sysnet_read_config($1_evolution_t) + sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_evolution_t) + + udev_read_state($1_evolution_t) + + userdom_rw_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented + # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization) + # until properly implemented + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + + mta_read_config($1_evolution_t) + + xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_t,$1_evolution_tmpfs_t) + + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + files_list_home($1_evolution_t) + fs_read_nfs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + + ',` + files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_read_nfs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_list_nfs($1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + files_list_home($1_evolution_t) + fs_read_cifs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_read_cifs_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + ',` + files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_read_cifs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_list_cifs($1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`mail_read_content',` + userdom_list_user_tmp($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t) + + ifdef(`mls_policy',`',` + fs_search_removable($1_evolution_t) + fs_read_removable_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_read_removable_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + ') + ',` + files_dontaudit_list_tmp($1_evolution_t) + files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_list_removable($1_evolution_t) + fs_donaudit_read_removable_files($1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_list_user_tmp($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && read_default_t',` + files_list_default($1_evolution_t) + files_read_default_files($1_evolution_t) + files_read_default_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + ',` + files_dontaudit_read_default_files($1_evolution_t) + files_dontaudit_list_default($1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && read_untrusted_content',` + files_list_tmp($1_evolution_t) + files_list_home($1_evolution_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + + userdom_list_user_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_untrusted_content_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_list_user_tmp_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_tmp_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_read_user_tmp_untrusted_content_symlinks($1,$1_evolution_t) + ',` + files_dontaudit_list_tmp($1_evolution_t) + files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_list_user_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_list_user_tmp_untrusted_content($1,$1_evolution_t) + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`write_untrusted_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + files_search_home($1_evolution_t) + + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + ',` + fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_manage_nfs_dirs($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`write_untrusted_content && use_samba_home_dirs',` + files_search_home($1_evolution_t) + + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_evolution_t) + ',` + fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_manage_cifs_dirs($1_evolution_t) + fs_dontaudit_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`write_untrusted_content',` + files_search_home($1_evolution_t) + + userdom_manage_user_untrusted_content_files($1,$1_evolution_t,{ dir file }) + ',` + files_dontaudit_list_home($1_evolution_t) + files_dontaudit_list_tmp($1_evolution_t) + + userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + #userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_tmp($1,$1_evolution_t) + #userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_tmp_files($1,$1_evolution_t) + #userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_home_subdirs($1,$1_evolution_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`automount',` + automount_read_state($1_evolution_t) + ') + + # Allow printing the mail + optional_policy(`cups',` + cups_read_rw_config($1_evolution_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`dbus',` + dbus_system_bus_client_template($1_evolution,$1_evolution_t) + dbus_send_system_bus($1_evolution_t) + dbus_user_bus_client_template($1,$1_evolution,$1_evolution_t) + dbus_send_user_bus($1,$1_evolution_t) + ') + + # Encrypt mail + optional_policy(`gpg',` + gpg_domtrans_user_gpg($1,$1_evolution_t) + gpg_signal_user_gpg($1,$1_evolution_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`lpd',` + lpd_domtrans_user_lpr($1,$1_evolution_t) + ') + + # Allow POP/IMAP/SMTP/NNTP/LDAP/IPP(printing) + optional_policy(`nis',` + nis_use_ypbind($1_evolution_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`nscd',` + nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_exchange_t) + ') + + ### Junk mail filtering (start spamd) + optional_policy(`spamassassin',` + spamassassin_exec_spamd($1_evolution_t) + spamassassin_domtrans_user_client($1,$1_evolution_t) + spamassassin_domtrans_user_local_client($1,$1_evolution_t) + # Allow evolution to signal the daemon + # FIXME: Now evolution can read spamd temp files + spamassassin_read_spamd_tmp_files($1_evolution_t) + spamassassin_signal_spamd($1_evolution_t) + spamassassin_dontaudit_getattr_spamd_tmp_sockets($1_evolution_t) + ') + + ifdef(`TODO',` + + #dbus connect to + allow $1_evolution_t $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + + # Gnome common stuff + gnome_application($1_evolution, $1) + + #TODO gnome stuff + # Store passwords in .gnome2_private + # Type for storing secret data + # (different from home, not directly accessible from ROLE_t) + type $1_evolutioin_secret_t; + userdom_user_home_content($1,$1_evolutioin_secret_t) + + # Put secret files in .gnome2_private + allow $1_evolution_t $1_gnome_secret_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_t $1_evolutioin_secret_t:file create_file_perms; + type_transition $1_evolution_t $1_gnome_secret_t:file $1_evolutioin_secret_t; + + allow $2 $1_evolution_secret_t:file unlink; + + ifdef(`TODO',` + gnome_file_dialog($1_evolution, $1) + ') + # Start links in web browser + ifdef(`mozilla', ` + corecmd_exec_shell($1_evolution_t) + domain_auto_trans($1_evolution_t, mozilla_exec_t, $1_mozilla_t) + ') + + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Evolution alarm local policy + # + + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t self:fifo_file { read write }; + + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms; + fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_alarm_t,$1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + # Access evolution home + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_server_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_alarm_exec_t, $1_evolution_alarm_t) + allow $1_evolution_alarm_t $2:fd use; + + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_alarm_t) + + miscfiles_read_localization($1_evolution_alarm_t) + + # Access evolution home + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_alarm_t) + # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented + # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization) + # until properly implemented + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_alarm_t) + + xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_alarm_t,$1_evolution_alarm_tmpfs_t) + + # Access evolution home + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_alarm_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_alarm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`nscd',` + nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_alarm_t) + ') + + ifdef(`TODO',` + # Gnome common stuff + gnome_application($1_evolution_alarm,$1) + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Evolution exchange connector local policy + # + + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + # Access evolution home + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir create_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_home_t:file create_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_server_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_server_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + # /tmp/.exchange-$USER + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t:file create_file_perms; + files_tmp_filetrans($1_evolution_exchange_t, $1_evolution_exchange_tmp_t, { file dir }) + + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms; + fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_exchange_t,$1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; + #FIXME, who should own this. I dont think this module should + allow $1_evolution_exchange_t $1_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + # Clock applet talks to exchange (FIXME: Needs policy) + allow $2 $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $2 $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + # Transition from user domain + domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_exchange_exec_t, $1_evolution_exchange_t) + + kernel_read_network_state($1_evolution_exchange_t) + kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_evolution_exchange_t) + + # Allow netstat + corecmd_exec_bin($1_evolution_exchange_t) + + # Access evolution home + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_exchange_t) + + # Access evolution home + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_exchange_t) + # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented + # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization) + # until properly implemented + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_exchange_t) + + xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_exchange_t,$1_evolution_exchange_tmpfs_t) + + # Access evolution home + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_exchange_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_exchange_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`nscd',` + nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_exchange_t) + ') + + ifdef(`TODO',` + # Gnome common stuff + gnome_application($1_evolution_exchange, $1) + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Evolution data server local policy + # + + allow $1_evolution_server_t self:fifo_file { read write }; + allow $1_evolution_server_t self:unix_stream_socket { accept connectto }; + # Talk to ldap (address book), + # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr) + allow $1_evolution_server_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; + + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_exchange_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_exchange_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + # Access evolution home + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_home_t:dir create_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_home_t:file create_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_home_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_alarm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_evolution_server_t $1_evolution_alarm_orbit_tmp_t:sock_file write; + + allow $1_evolution_server_t $2:fd use; + + kernel_read_system_state($1_evolution_server_t) + + corecmd_exec_shell($1_evolution_server_t) + + # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_http_port($1_evolution_server_t) + # Talk to ldap (address book) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_server_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port($1_evolution_server_t) + + files_read_etc_files($1_evolution_server_t) + # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr) + files_read_usr_files($1_evolution_server_t) + + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_evolution_server_t) + + libs_use_ld_so($1_evolution_server_t) + libs_use_shared_libs($1_evolution_server_t) + + # Look in /etc/pki + miscfiles_read_certs($1_evolution_server_t) + + # Talk to ldap (address book) + # Obtain weather data via http (read server name from xml file in /usr) + sysnet_read_config($1_evolution_server_t) + sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_evolution_server_t) + + # Access evolution home + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_server_t) + # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented + # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization) + # until properly implemented + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_server_t) + + # Transition from user type + tunable_policy(`!disable_evolution_trans',` + domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_server_exec_t, $1_evolution_server_t) + ') + + # Access evolution home + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_nfs_files($1_evolution_server_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_cifs_files($1_evolution_server_t) + ') + + optional_policy(`nscd',` + nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_server_t) + ') + + ifdef(`TODO',` + # Gnome common stuff + gnome_application($1_evolution_server, $1) + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Evolution webcal local policy + # + + allow $1_evolution_webcal_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; + + # X/evolution common stuff + allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; + allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_evolution_webcal_t $1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms; + fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_evolution_webcal_t,$1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + + # Transition from user type + domain_auto_trans($2, evolution_webcal_exec_t, $1_evolution_webcal_t) + + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port($1_evolution_webcal_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_http_port($1_evolution_webcal_t) + + # Networking capability - connect to website and handle ics link + sysnet_read_config($1_evolution_webcal_t) + sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_evolution_webcal_t) + + # Search home directory (?) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_evolution_webcal_t) + # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented + # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization) + # until properly implemented + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files($1,$1_evolution_webcal_t) + + xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_evolution_webcal_t,$1_evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t) + + optional_policy(`nscd',` + nscd_socket_use($1_evolution_webcal_t) + ') + + ifdef(`TODO',` + # Gnome common stuff + gnome_application($1_evolution_webcal, $1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in users evolution home folders. +## +## +##

+## This is a templated interface, and should only +## be called from a per-userdomain template. +##

+## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The object class of the object being created. If +## no class is specified, dir will be used. +## +## +# +template(`evolution_home_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type $1_evolution_home_t; + ') + + allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + type_transition $2 $1_evolution_home_t:$4 $3; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to user evolution unix stream socket. +## +## +##

+## Connect to user evolution unix stream socket. +##

+##

+## This is a templated interface, and should only +## be called from a per-userdomain template. +##

+## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +template(`evolution_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type $1_evolution_t; + ') + + allow $2 $1_evolution_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $2 $1_evolution_home_t:dir search; +') diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b6950d --- /dev/null +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + +policy_module(evolution,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type evolution_exec_t; +files_type(evolution_exec_t) + +type evolution_alarm_exec_t; +files_type(evolution_alarm_exec_t) + +type evolution_exchange_exec_t; +files_type(evolution_exchange_exec_t) + +type evolution_server_exec_t; +files_type(evolution_server_exec_t) + +type evolution_webcal_exec_t; +files_type(evolution_webcal_exec_t) diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if index db8f672..0d9786b 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if @@ -391,3 +391,32 @@ template(`gpg_domtrans_user_gpg',` allow $1_gpg_t $2:process sigchld; ') +######################################## +## +## Send generic signals to user gpg processes. +## +## +##

+## This is a templated interface, and should only +## be called from a per-userdomain template. +##

+## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +template(`gpg_signal_user_gpg',` + gen_require(` + type $1_gpg_t; + ') + + allow $2 $1_gpg_t:process signal; +') diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te index e9271c6..22fb375 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -policy_module(gpg, 1.0.1) +policy_module(gpg, 1.0.2) ######################################## # diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if index 5c17e86..5f97e34 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.if @@ -46,6 +46,25 @@ interface(`automount_exec_config',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the domain to read state files in /proc. +## +## +## +## Domain to allow access. +## +## +# +interface(`automount_read_state',` + gen_require(` + type automount_t; + ') + + allow $1 automount_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1 automount_t:file r_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes ## of automount temporary directories. ## diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te index 9346dca..990cd01 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/automount.te @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -policy_module(automount,1.2.0) +policy_module(automount,1.2.1) ######################################## # diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if index cf3cf5b..060b714 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if @@ -161,6 +161,11 @@ template(`spamassassin_per_userdomain_template',` files_read_default_pipes($1_spamc_t) ') + optional_policy(`evolution',` + # Allow connection to spamd socket above + evolution_stream_connect($1,$1_spamc_t) + ') + optional_policy(`mount',` mount_send_nfs_client_request($1_spamc_t) ') @@ -310,6 +315,11 @@ template(`spamassassin_per_userdomain_template',` fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($1_spamassassin_t) ') + optional_policy(`evolution',` + # Write pid file and socket in ~/.evolution/cache/tmp + evolution_home_filetrans($1,spamd_t,spamd_tmp_t,{ file sock_file }) + ') + optional_policy(`nis',` # cjp: clearly some redundancy here @@ -351,6 +361,77 @@ interface(`spamassassin_exec',` ######################################## ## +## Singnal the spam assassin daemon +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_signal_spamd',` + gen_require(` + type spamd_t; + ') + + allow $1 spamd_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute the spamassassin daemon +## program in the caller directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_exec_spamd',` + gen_require(` + type spamd_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1,spamd_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute spamassassin client in the user spamassassin client domain. +## +## +##

+## This is a template and should only be called +## from per user domain tempaltes. +##

+## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain. eg user would be the prefix of user_t. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +template(`spamassassin_domtrans_user_client',` + gen_require(` + type $1_spamc_t, spamc_exec_t; + ') + + domain_auto_trans($2,spamc_exec_t,$1_spamc_t) + + allow $2 $1_spamc_t:fd use; + allow $1_spamc_t $2:fd use; + allow $1_spamc_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow $1_spamc_t $2:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute the spamassassin client ## program in the caller directory. ## @@ -367,3 +448,74 @@ interface(`spamassassin_exec_client',` can_exec($1,spamc_exec_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Execute spamassassin in the user spamassassin domain. +## +## +##

+## This is a template and should only be called +## from per user domain tempaltes. +##

+## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain. eg user would be the prefix of user_t. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +template(`spamassassin_domtrans_user_local_client',` + gen_require(` + type $1_spamassassin_t, spamassassin_exec_t; + ') + + domain_auto_trans($2,spamassassin_exec_t,$1_spamassassin_t) + + allow $2 $1_spamassassin_t:fd use; + allow $1_spamassassin_t $2:fd use; + allow $1_spamassassin_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow $1_spamassassin_t $2:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read temporary spamd file. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_read_spamd_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type spamd_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 spamd_tmp_t:file r_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to get attributes of temporary +## spamd sockets/ +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_dontaudit_getattr_spamd_tmp_sockets',` + gen_require(` + type spamd_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 spamd_tmp_t:sock_file getattr; +') diff --git a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te index 35f1513..31167a0 100644 --- a/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te +++ b/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -policy_module(spamassassin,1.3.1) +policy_module(spamassassin,1.3.2) ######################################## #