#

# Macros for all admin domains.

#

#

# admin_domain(domain_prefix)

#

# Define derived types and rules for an administrator domain.

#

# The type declaration and role authorization for the domain must be

# provided separately.  Likewise, domain transitions into this domain

# must be specified separately.  If the every_domain() rules are desired,

# then these rules must also be specified separately.

#

undefine(`admin_domain')

define(`admin_domain',`

# Type for home directory.

attribute $1_file_type;

type $1_home_dir_t, file_type, sysadmfile, home_dir_type, home_type;

type $1_home_t, file_type, sysadmfile, home_type, $1_file_type;

# Type and access for pty devices.

can_create_pty($1, `, admin_tty_type')

# Transition manually for { lnk sock fifo }. The rest is in content macros.

tmp_domain_notrans($1, `, $1_file_type')

file_type_auto_trans($1_t, tmp_t, $1_tmp_t, { lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:{ dir file } { relabelto relabelfrom };

# Type for tty devices.

type $1_tty_device_t, sysadmfile, ttyfile, dev_fs, admin_tty_type;

# Inherit rules for ordinary users.

base_user_domain($1)

access_removable_media($1_t)

allow $1_t self:capability setuid;

ifdef(`su.te', `su_domain($1)')

ifdef(`userhelper.te', `userhelper_domain($1)')

ifdef(`sudo.te', `sudo_domain($1)')

# Let admin stat the shadow file.

allow $1_t shadow_t:file getattr;

ifdef(`crond.te', `

allow $1_crond_t var_log_t:file r_file_perms;

')

# Allow system log read

allow $1_t kernel_t:system syslog_read;

# Allow autrace

# allow sysadm_t self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_readpriv;

# Use capabilities other than sys_module.

allow $1_t self:capability ~sys_module;

# Use system operations.

allow $1_t kernel_t:system *;

# Set password information for other users.

allow $1_t self:passwd { passwd chfn chsh };

# Skip authentication when pam_rootok is specified.

allow $1_t self:passwd rootok;

# Manipulate other user crontab.

allow $1_t self:passwd crontab;

can_getsecurity(sysadm_crontab_t)

# Change system parameters.

can_sysctl($1_t)

# Create and use all files that have the sysadmfile attribute.

allow $1_t sysadmfile:{ file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms;

allow $1_t sysadmfile:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

allow $1_t sysadmfile:dir create_dir_perms;

# for lsof

allow $1_t mtrr_device_t:file getattr;

allow $1_t fs_type:dir getattr;

# Access removable devices.

allow $1_t removable_device_t:devfile_class_set rw_file_perms;

# Communicate with the init process.

allow $1_t initctl_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

# Examine all processes.

can_ps($1_t, domain)

# allow renice

allow $1_t domain:process setsched;

# Send signals to all processes.

allow $1_t { domain unlabeled_t }:process signal_perms;

# Access all user terminals.

allow $1_t tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t ttyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t ptyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t serial_device:chr_file setattr;

# allow setting up tunnels

allow $1_t tun_tap_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;

# run ls -l /dev

allow $1_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow $1_t { device_t device_type }:{ chr_file blk_file } getattr;

allow $1_t ptyfile:chr_file getattr;

# Run programs from staff home directories.

# Not ideal, but typical if users want to login as both sysadm_t or staff_t.

can_exec($1_t, staff_home_t)

# Run programs from /usr/src.

can_exec($1_t, src_t)

# Relabel all files.

# Actually this will not allow relabeling ALL files unless you change

# sysadmfile to file_type (and change the assertion in assert.te that

# only auth_write can relabel shadow_t)

allow $1_t sysadmfile:dir { getattr read search relabelfrom relabelto };

allow $1_t sysadmfile:notdevfile_class_set { getattr relabelfrom relabelto };

ifdef(`startx.te', `

ifdef(`xserver.te', `

# Create files in /tmp/.X11-unix with our X servers derived

# tmp type rather than user_xserver_tmp_t.

file_type_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xserver_tmpfile, $1_xserver_tmp_t, sock_file)

')dnl end xserver.te

')dnl end startx.te

ifdef(`xdm.te', `

ifdef(`xauth.te', `

if (xdm_sysadm_login) {

allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;

allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search;

}

can_pipe_xdm($1_t)

')dnl end ifdef xauth.te

')dnl end ifdef xdm.te

#

# A user who is authorized for sysadm_t may nonetheless have

# a home directory labeled with user_home_t if the user is expected

# to login in either user_t or sysadm_t.  Hence, the derived domains

# for programs need to be able to access user_home_t.  

# 

# Allow our gph domain to write to .xsession-errors.

ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `

allow $1_gph_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms;

allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms;

')

# Allow our crontab domain to unlink a user cron spool file.

ifdef(`crontab.te',

`allow $1_crontab_t user_cron_spool_t:file unlink;')

# for the administrator to run TCP servers directly

can_tcp_connect($1_t, $1_t)

allow $1_t port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;

# Connect data port to ftpd.

ifdef(`ftpd.te', `can_tcp_connect(ftpd_t, $1_t)')

# Connect second port to rshd.

ifdef(`rshd.te', `can_tcp_connect(rshd_t, $1_t)')

#

# Allow sysadm to execute quota commands against filesystems and files.

#

allow $1_t fs_type:filesystem quotamod;

# Grant read and write access to /dev/console.

allow $1_t console_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;

# Allow MAKEDEV to work

allow $1_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

allow $1_t device_type:{ blk_file chr_file } { create unlink rename };

allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file { create read };

# for lsof

allow $1_t domain:socket_class_set getattr;

allow $1_t eventpollfs_t:file getattr;

')

define(`security_manager_domain', `

typeattribute $1 secadmin;

# Allow administrator domains to set the enforcing flag.

can_setenforce($1)

# Allow administrator domains to set policy booleans.

can_setbool($1)

# Get security policy decisions.

can_getsecurity($1)

# Allow administrator domains to set security parameters

can_setsecparam($1)

# Run admin programs that require different permissions in their own domain.

# These rules were moved into the appropriate program domain file.

# added by mayerf@tresys.com

# The following rules are temporary until such time that a complete

# policy management infrastructure is in place so that an administrator

# cannot directly manipulate policy files with arbitrary programs.

#

allow $1 secadmfile:file { relabelto relabelfrom create_file_perms };

allow $1 secadmfile:lnk_file { relabelto relabelfrom create_lnk_perms };

allow $1 secadmfile:dir { relabelto relabelfrom create_dir_perms };

# Set an exec context, e.g. for runcon.

can_setexec($1)

# Set a context other than the default one for newly created files.

can_setfscreate($1)

allow $1 self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_readpriv;

')