#

# Macros for all user login domains.

#

# role_tty_type_change(starting_role, ending_role)

#

# change from role $1_r to $2_r and relabel tty appropriately

#

undefine(`role_tty_type_change')

define(`role_tty_type_change', `

allow $1_r $2_r;

type_change $2_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file $2_devpts_t;

type_change $2_t $1_tty_device_t:chr_file $2_tty_device_t;

# avoid annoying messages on terminal hangup

dontaudit $1_t { $2_devpts_t $2_tty_device_t }:chr_file ioctl;

')

#

# reach_sysadm(user)

#

# Reach sysadm_t via programs like userhelper/sudo/su

#

undefine(`reach_sysadm')

define(`reach_sysadm', `

ifdef(`userhelper.te', `userhelper_domain($1)')

ifdef(`sudo.te', `sudo_domain($1)')

ifdef(`su.te', `

su_domain($1)

# When an ordinary user domain runs su, su may try to

# update the /root/.Xauthority file, and the user shell may

# try to update the shell history. This is not allowed, but 

# we dont need to audit it.

dontaudit $1_su_t { sysadm_home_dir_t staff_home_dir_t }:dir search;

dontaudit $1_su_t { sysadm_home_t staff_home_t }:dir rw_dir_perms;

dontaudit $1_su_t { sysadm_home_t staff_home_t }:file create_file_perms;

') dnl ifdef su.te

ifdef(`xauth.te', `

file_type_auto_trans($1_xauth_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, sysadm_xauth_home_t,file)

ifdef(`userhelper.te', `

file_type_auto_trans($1_userhelper_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, sysadm_xauth_home_t,file)

') dnl userhelper.te 

') dnl xauth.te 

') dnl reach_sysadm

#

# priv_user(user)

#

# Privileged user domain

#

undefine(`priv_user')

define(`priv_user', `

# Reach sysadm_t

reach_sysadm($1)

# Read file_contexts for rpm and get security decisions. 

r_dir_file($1_t, file_context_t)

can_getsecurity($1_t)

# Signal and see information about unprivileged user domains.

allow $1_t unpriv_userdomain:process signal_perms;

can_ps($1_t, unpriv_userdomain)

allow $1_t { ttyfile ptyfile tty_device_t }:chr_file getattr;

# Read /root files if boolean is enabled.

if (staff_read_sysadm_file) {

allow $1_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };

allow $1_t sysadm_home_t:file { getattr read };

}

') dnl priv_user

#

# user_domain(domain_prefix)

#

# Define derived types and rules for an ordinary user domain.

#

# The type declaration and role authorization for the domain must be

# provided separately.  Likewise, domain transitions into this domain

# must be specified separately.  

#

# user_domain() is also called by the admin_domain() macro

undefine(`user_domain')

define(`user_domain', `

# Use capabilities

# Type for home directory.

type $1_home_dir_t, file_type, sysadmfile, home_dir_type, home_type, user_home_dir_type, polydir;

type $1_home_t, file_type, sysadmfile, home_type, user_home_type, $1_file_type, polymember;

# Transition manually for { lnk sock fifo }. The rest is in content macros.

tmp_domain_notrans($1, `, user_tmpfile, $1_file_type')

file_type_auto_trans($1_t, tmp_t, $1_tmp_t, { lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:{ dir file } { relabelto relabelfrom };

ifdef(`support_polyinstantiation', `

type_member $1_t tmp_t:dir $1_tmp_t;

type_member $1_t $1_home_dir_t:dir $1_home_t;

')

base_user_domain($1)

ifdef(`mls_policy', `', `

access_removable_media($1_t)

')

# do not allow privhome access to sysadm_home_dir_t

file_type_auto_trans(privhome, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t)

allow $1_t boot_t:dir { getattr search };

dontaudit $1_t boot_t:lnk_file read;

dontaudit $1_t boot_t:file read;

allow $1_t system_map_t:file { getattr read };

# Instantiate derived domains for a number of programs.

# These derived domains encode both information about the calling

# user domain and the program, and allow us to maintain separation

# between different instances of the program being run by different

# user domains.

ifelse($1, sysadm, `',`

ifdef(`apache.te', `apache_user_domain($1)')

ifdef(`i18n_input.te', `i18n_input_domain($1)')

')

ifdef(`slocate.te', `locate_domain($1)')

ifdef(`lockdev.te', `lockdev_domain($1)')

can_kerberos($1_t)

# allow port_t name binding for UDP because it is not very usable otherwise

allow $1_t port_t:udp_socket name_bind;

#

# Need the following rule to allow users to run vpnc

#

ifdef(`xserver.te', `

allow $1_t xserver_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;

')

# Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from

# the same domain and outside users)  disabling this forces FTP passive mode

# and may change other protocols

if (user_tcp_server) {

allow $1_t port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;

}

# port access is audited even if dac would not have allowed it, so dontaudit it here

dontaudit $1_t reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;

# Allow system log read

if (user_dmesg) {

allow $1_t kernel_t:system syslog_read;

} else {

# else do not log it

dontaudit $1_t kernel_t:system syslog_read;

}

# Allow read access to utmp.

allow $1_t initrc_var_run_t:file { getattr read lock };

# The library functions always try to open read-write first,

# then fall back to read-only if it fails. 

# Do not audit write denials to utmp to avoid the noise.

dontaudit $1_t initrc_var_run_t:file write;

# do not audit read on disk devices

dontaudit $1_t { removable_device_t fixed_disk_device_t }:blk_file read;

ifdef(`xdm.te', `

allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;

allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search;

#

# Changing this to dontaudit should cause the .xsession-errors file to be written to /tmp

# 

dontaudit xdm_t $1_home_t:file rw_file_perms;

')dnl end ifdef xdm.te

ifdef(`ftpd.te', `

if (ftp_home_dir) {

file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t)

}

')dnl end ifdef ftpd

')dnl end user_domain macro

###########################################################################

#

# Domains for ordinary users.

#

undefine(`limited_user_role')

define(`limited_user_role', `

# user_t/$1_t is an unprivileged users domain.

type $1_t, domain, userdomain, unpriv_userdomain, nscd_client_domain, privfd;

#Type for tty devices.

type $1_tty_device_t, sysadmfile, ttyfile, user_tty_type, dev_fs;

# Type and access for pty devices.

can_create_pty($1, `, userpty_type, user_tty_type')

# Access ttys.

allow $1_t privfd:fd use;

allow $1_t $1_tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };

# Grant read/search permissions to some of /proc.

r_dir_file($1_t, proc_t)

r_dir_file($1_t, proc_net_t)

base_file_read_access($1_t)

# Execute from the system shared libraries.

uses_shlib($1_t)

# Read /etc.

r_dir_file($1_t, etc_t)

allow $1_t etc_runtime_t:file r_file_perms;

allow $1_t etc_runtime_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

allow $1_t self:process { fork sigchld setpgid signal_perms };

# read localization information

read_locale($1_t)

read_sysctl($1_t)

can_exec($1_t, { bin_t sbin_t shell_exec_t ls_exec_t })

allow $1_t self:dir search;

allow $1_t self:file { getattr read };

allow secadm_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t self:lnk_file read;

allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;

allow $1_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };

dontaudit $1_t { var_spool_t var_log_t }:dir search;

# Read /dev directories and any symbolic links.

allow $1_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

allow $1_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };

')

undefine(`full_user_role')

define(`full_user_role', `

limited_user_role($1)

typeattribute  $1_t web_client_domain;

attribute $1_file_type;

ifdef(`useradd.te', `

# Useradd relabels /etc/skel files so needs these privs 

allow useradd_t $1_file_type:dir create_dir_perms;

allow useradd_t $1_file_type:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;

')

can_exec($1_t, usr_t)

# Read directories and files with the readable_t type.

# This type is a general type for "world"-readable files.

allow $1_t readable_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow $1_t readable_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;

# Stat lost+found.

allow $1_t lost_found_t:dir getattr;

# Read /var, /var/spool, /var/run.

r_dir_file($1_t, var_t)

# what about pipes and sockets under /var/spool?

r_dir_file($1_t, var_spool_t)

r_dir_file($1_t, var_run_t)

allow $1_t var_lib_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow $1_t var_lib_t:file { getattr read };

# for running depmod as part of the kernel packaging process

allow $1_t modules_conf_t:file { getattr read };

# Read man directories and files.

r_dir_file($1_t, man_t)

# Allow users to rw usb devices

if (user_rw_usb) {

rw_dir_create_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t)

} else {

r_dir_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t)

}

r_dir_file($1_t,sysfs_t)

# Do not audit write denials to /etc/ld.so.cache.

dontaudit $1_t ld_so_cache_t:file write;

# $1_t is also granted permissions specific to user domains.

user_domain($1)

dontaudit $1_t sysadm_home_t:file { read append };

ifdef(`syslogd.te', `

# Some programs that are left in $1_t will try to connect

# to syslogd, but we do not want to let them generate log messages.

# Do not audit.

dontaudit $1_t devlog_t:sock_file { read write };

dontaudit $1_t syslogd_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;

')

# Stop warnings about access to /dev/console

dontaudit $1_t init_t:fd use;

dontaudit $1_t initrc_t:fd use;

allow $1_t initrc_t:fifo_file write;

#

# Rules used to associate a homedir as a mountpoint

#

allow $1_home_t self:filesystem associate;

allow $1_file_type $1_home_t:filesystem associate;

')

undefine(`in_user_role')

define(`in_user_role', `

role user_r types $1;

role staff_r types $1;

')