## <summary>X Windows Server</summary>

template(`xserver_common_domain_template',`

	##############################

	#

	# Declarations

	#

	gen_require(`

		type xkb_var_lib_t, xserver_log_t;

	')

	type $1_xserver_t;

	domain_type($1_xserver_t)

	type $1_xserver_tmp_t;

	files_tmp_file($1_xserver_tmp_t)

	type $1_xserver_tmpfs_t;

	files_tmpfs_file($1_xserver_tmpfs_t)

	##############################

	#

	# $1_xserver_t local policy

	#

	# setuid/setgid for the wrapper program to change UID

	# sys_rawio is for iopl access - should not be needed for frame-buffer

	# sys_admin, locking shared mem?  chowning IPC message queues or semaphores?

	# admin of APM bios?

	# sys_nice is so that the X server can set a negative nice value

	# execheap needed until the X module loader is fixed.

	allow $1_xserver_t self:capability { dac_override fsetid setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod net_bind_service };

	dontaudit $1_xserver_t self:capability chown;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:process { execmem execheap setsched };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:sock_file r_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:shm create_shm_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:sem create_sem_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:msg { send receive };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;

	files_filetrans_tmp($1_xserver_t, $1_xserver_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:dir manage_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;

	fs_filetrans_tmpfs($1_xserver_t,$1_xserver_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	files_search_var_lib($1_xserver_t)

	# Create files in /var/log with the xserver_log_t type.

	allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	logging_filetrans_log($1_xserver_t,xserver_log_t,file)

	kernel_read_system_state($1_xserver_t)

	kernel_read_device_sysctl($1_xserver_t)

	kernel_read_modprobe_sysctl($1_xserver_t)

	# Xorg wants to check if kernel is tainted

	kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_xserver_t)

	# Run helper programs in $1_xserver_t.

	corecmd_search_sbin($1_xserver_t)

	corecmd_exec_bin($1_xserver_t)

	corecmd_exec_shell($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_bind_xserver_port($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_xserver_t)

	dev_read_sysfs($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_mouse($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_mtrr($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_apm_bios($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_agp_dev($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_framebuffer($1_xserver_t)

	dev_manage_dri_dev($1_xserver_t)

	dev_create_dir($1_xserver_t)

	dev_setattr_dev_dir($1_xserver_t)

	# raw memory access is needed if not using the frame buffer

	dev_read_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)

	dev_write_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)

	# for other device nodes such as the NVidia binary-only driver

	dev_rw_xserver_misc_dev($1_xserver_t)

	# read events - the synaptics touchpad driver reads raw events

	dev_rw_input_dev($1_xserver_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_xserver_t)

	files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_xserver_t)

	# brought on by rhgb

	files_search_mnt($1_xserver_t)

	# for nscd

	files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_xserver_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xserver_t)

	fs_search_nfs($1_xserver_t)

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xserver_t)

	term_setattr_unallocated_ttys($1_xserver_t)

	term_use_unallocated_tty($1_xserver_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_xserver_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_xserver_t)

	logging_send_syslog_msg($1_xserver_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization($1_xserver_t)

	miscfiles_read_fonts($1_xserver_t)

	modutils_domtrans_insmod($1_xserver_t)

	seutil_dontaudit_search_config($1_xserver_t)

	sysnet_read_config($1_xserver_t)

	optional_policy(`authlogin',`

		auth_search_pam_console_data($1_xserver_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`nis',`

		nis_use_ypbind($1_xserver_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`nscd',`

		nscd_use_socket($1_xserver_t)

	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	ifdef(`distro_redhat',`

		ifdef(`rpm.te', `

			allow $1_xserver_t rpm_t:shm { unix_read unix_write read write associate getattr };

			allow $1_xserver_t rpm_tmpfs_t:file { read write };

			rpm_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

		')

	')

	file_type_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xdm_xserver_tmp_t, $1_xserver_tmp_t, sock_file)

	# Connect to xfs.

	ifdef(`xfs.te', `

		can_unix_connect($1_xserver_t, xfs_t)

		allow $1_xserver_t xfs_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

		allow $1_xserver_t xfs_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;

	')

	') dnl end TODO

')

#######################################

## <summary>

##	The per user domain template for the xserver module.

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	Define a derived domain for the X server when executed

##	by a user domain (e.g. via startx).  See the xdm module

##	if using an X Display Manager.

##	

##	

##	This is invoked automatically for each user and

##	generally does not need to be invoked directly

##	by policy writers.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="prefix">

##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

## </param>

## <param name="user_domain">

##	The type of the user domain.

## </param>

## <param name="user_role">

##	The role associated with the user domain.

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_per_userdomain_template',`

	##############################

	#

	# Declarations

	#

	gen_require(`

		type xauth_exec_t;

		type xserver_exec_t;

		type iceauth_exec_t;

	')

	xserver_common_domain_template($1)

	role $3 types $1_xserver_t;

	type $1_iceauth_t;

	domain_type($1_iceauth_t)

	role $3 types $1_iceauth_t;

	type $1_iceauth_home_t alias $1_iceauth_rw_t;

	files_poly_member($1_iceauth_home_t)

	userdom_home_file($1,$1_iceauth_home_t)

	type $1_xauth_t;

	domain_type($1_xauth_t)

	role $3 types $1_xauth_t;

	type $1_xauth_home_t alias $1_xauth_rw_t;

	files_poly_member($1_xauth_home_t)

	userdom_home_file($1,$1_xauth_home_t)

	type $1_xauth_tmp_t;

	files_tmp_file($1_xauth_tmp_t)

	##############################

	#

	# $1_xserver_t Local policy

	#

	domain_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:process sigchld;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };

	domain_auto_trans($2, xserver_exec_t, $1_xserver_t)

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:process { signal sigchld };

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;

	# Communicate via System V shared memory.

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;

	getty_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

	locallogin_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

	userdom_search_user_home($1,$1_xserver_t)

	userdom_use_user_tty($1,$1_xserver_t)

	userdom_setattr_user_tty($1,$1_xserver_t)

	userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files($1,$1_xserver_t)

	optional_policy(`userhelper',`

		userhelper_search_config($1_xserver_t)

	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	# Read fonts

	read_fonts($1_xserver_t, $1)

	allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $1_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	ifdef(`xdm.te', `

		allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file unlink;

		allow $1_xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:dir search;

	')

	') dnl end TODO

	##############################

	#

	# $1_xauth_t Local policy

	#

	allow $1_xauth_t self:process signal;

	allow $1_xauth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,$1_xauth_t,$1_xauth_home_t,file)

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;

	files_filetrans_tmp($1_xauth_t, $1_xauth_tmp_t, { file dir })

	domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process signal;

	# allow ps to show xauth

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:dir { search getattr read };

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process getattr;

	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access

	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels

	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if

	# running in a privileged domain.

	dontaudit $2 $1_xauth_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

	domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_xauth_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_xauth_t)

	files_search_pids($1_xauth_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xauth_t)

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xauth_t)

	# cjp: why?

	term_use_ptmx($1_xauth_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_xauth_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_xauth_t)

	sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_xauth_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_xauth_t)

	userdom_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_xauth_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_xauth_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_xauth_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`nis',`

		nis_use_ypbind($1_xauth_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`ssh',`

		ssh_sigchld($1_xauth_t)

		ssh_read_pipe($1_xauth_t)

		ssh_dontaudit_rw_tcp_socket($1_xauth_t)

	')

	##############################

	#

	# $1_iceauth_t Local policy

	#

	domain_auto_trans($2, iceauth_exec_t, $1_iceauth_t)

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:process sigchld;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,$1_iceauth_t,$1_iceauth_home_t,file)

	# allow ps to show iceauth

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:dir { search getattr read };

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:process getattr;

	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access

	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels

	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if

	# running in a privileged domain.

	dontaudit $2 $1_iceauth_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_iceauth_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_iceauth_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_iceauth_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_iceauth_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_iceauth_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_iceauth_t)

	')

')

#######################################

## <summary>

##	Define a derived domain for the X server when executed

##	by an X Display Manager.

## </summary>

## <param name="prefix">

##	The prefix of the display manager domain.

## </param>

## <param name="xdm_domain">

##	The type of the display manager domain.

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_displaymgr_domain_template',`

	##############################

	#

	# Declarations

	#

	xserver_common_domain_template($1)

	init_system_domain($1_xserver_t,xserver_exec_t)

	##############################

	#

	# Local policy

	#

	domain_auto_trans($2, xserver_exec_t, $1_xserver_t)

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:process { signal sigchld };

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh signal sigkill };

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:file unlink;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;

	# Run xkbcomp.

	can_exec($1_xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t)

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file read;

	files_search_var_lib($1_xserver_t)

	init_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

	userdom_dontaudit_search_all_users_home($1_xserver_t)

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	# Read all global and per user fonts

	read_fonts($1_xserver_t, sysadm)

	read_fonts($1_xserver_t, staff)

	read_fonts($1_xserver_t, user)

	dontaudit $1_xserver_t sysadm_t:shm { unix_read unix_write };

	allow $1_xserver_t xdm_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;

	') dnl end TODO

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Transition to a user Xauthority domain.

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	Transition to a user Xauthority domain.

##	

##	

##	This is a templated interface, and should only

##	be called from a per-userdomain template.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="userdomain_prefix">

##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

## </param>

## <param name="domain">

##	Domain allowed access.

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_domtrans_user_xauth',`

	gen_require(`

		type $1_xauth_t, xauth_exec_t;

	')

	domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Do not audit attempts to read all user

##	.ICEauthority files.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	Domain do not audit.

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_dontaudit_read_all_users_iceauth',`

	gen_require(`

		attribute iceauth_home_type;

	')

	dontaudit $1 iceauth_home_type:file r_file_perms;

')