## <summary>X Windows Server</summary>

#######################################

## <summary>

##	Template to create types and rules common to

##	all X server domains.

## </summary>

## <param name="prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_common_domain_template',`

	##############################

	#

	# Declarations

	#

	type $1_xserver_t;

	domain_type($1_xserver_t)

	type $1_xserver_tmp_t;

	files_tmp_file($1_xserver_tmp_t)

	type $1_xserver_tmpfs_t;

	files_tmpfs_file($1_xserver_tmpfs_t)

	##############################

	#

	# $1_xserver_t local policy

	#

	# setuid/setgid for the wrapper program to change UID

	# sys_rawio is for iopl access - should not be needed for frame-buffer

	# sys_admin, locking shared mem?  chowning IPC message queues or semaphores?

	# admin of APM bios?

	# sys_nice is so that the X server can set a negative nice value

	# execheap needed until the X module loader is fixed.

	# NVIDIA Needs execstack

	allow $1_xserver_t self:capability { dac_override fsetid setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod net_bind_service };

	dontaudit $1_xserver_t self:capability chown;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:process { execmem execheap execstack setsched };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:sock_file r_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:shm create_shm_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:sem create_sem_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:msg { send receive };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };

	allow $1_xserver_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;

	files_tmp_filetrans($1_xserver_t, $1_xserver_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })

	allow $1_xserver_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

	type_transition $1_xserver_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file $1_xserver_tmp_t;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:dir manage_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;

	fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_xserver_t,$1_xserver_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	files_search_var_lib($1_xserver_t)

	# Create files in /var/log with the xserver_log_t type.

	allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	logging_log_filetrans($1_xserver_t,xserver_log_t,file)

	kernel_read_system_state($1_xserver_t)

	kernel_read_device_sysctls($1_xserver_t)

	kernel_read_modprobe_sysctls($1_xserver_t)

	# Xorg wants to check if kernel is tainted

	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_xserver_t)

	kernel_write_proc_files($1_xserver_t)

	# Run helper programs in $1_xserver_t.

	corecmd_search_sbin($1_xserver_t)

	corecmd_exec_bin($1_xserver_t)

	corecmd_exec_shell($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_bind_xserver_port($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_xserver_t)

	dev_read_sysfs($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_mouse($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_mtrr($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_apm_bios($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_agp($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rw_framebuffer($1_xserver_t)

	dev_manage_dri_dev($1_xserver_t)

	dev_create_generic_dirs($1_xserver_t)

	dev_setattr_generic_dirs($1_xserver_t)

	# raw memory access is needed if not using the frame buffer

	dev_read_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)

	dev_write_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)

	# for other device nodes such as the NVidia binary-only driver

	dev_rw_xserver_misc($1_xserver_t)

	# read events - the synaptics touchpad driver reads raw events

	dev_rw_input_dev($1_xserver_t)

	dev_rwx_zero($1_xserver_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_xserver_t)

	files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_xserver_t)

	files_read_usr_files($1_xserver_t)

	# brought on by rhgb

	files_search_mnt($1_xserver_t)

	# for nscd

	files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_xserver_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xserver_t)

	fs_search_nfs($1_xserver_t)

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xserver_t)

	init_getpgid($1_xserver_t)

	term_setattr_unallocated_ttys($1_xserver_t)

	term_use_unallocated_ttys($1_xserver_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_xserver_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_xserver_t)

	logging_send_syslog_msg($1_xserver_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization($1_xserver_t)

	miscfiles_read_fonts($1_xserver_t)

	modutils_domtrans_insmod($1_xserver_t)

	seutil_dontaudit_search_config($1_xserver_t)

	sysnet_read_config($1_xserver_t)

	optional_policy(`authlogin',`

		auth_search_pam_console_data($1_xserver_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`nis',`

		nis_use_ypbind($1_xserver_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`nscd',`

		nscd_socket_use($1_xserver_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`xfs',`

		xfs_stream_connect($1_xserver_t)

	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	ifdef(`distro_redhat',`

		ifdef(`rpm.te', `

			allow $1_xserver_t rpm_t:shm { unix_read unix_write read write associate getattr };

			allow $1_xserver_t rpm_tmpfs_t:file { read write };

			rpm_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

		')

	')

	') dnl end TODO

')

#######################################

## <summary>

##	The per user domain template for the xserver module.

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	Define a derived domain for the X server when executed

##	by a user domain (e.g. via startx).  See the xdm module

##	if using an X Display Manager.

##	

##	

##	This is invoked automatically for each user and

##	generally does not need to be invoked directly

##	by policy writers.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="user_domain">

##	<summary>

##	The type of the user domain.

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="user_role">

##	<summary>

##	The role associated with the user domain.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_per_userdomain_template',`

	##############################

	#

	# Declarations

	#

	xserver_common_domain_template($1)

	role $3 types $1_xserver_t;

	type $1_iceauth_t;

	domain_type($1_iceauth_t)

	role $3 types $1_iceauth_t;

	type $1_iceauth_home_t alias $1_iceauth_rw_t;

	files_poly_member($1_iceauth_home_t)

	userdom_user_home_content($1,$1_iceauth_home_t)

	type $1_xauth_t;

	domain_type($1_xauth_t)

	role $3 types $1_xauth_t;

	type $1_xauth_home_t alias $1_xauth_rw_t;

	files_poly_member($1_xauth_home_t)

	userdom_user_home_content($1,$1_xauth_home_t)

	type $1_xauth_tmp_t;

	files_tmp_file($1_xauth_tmp_t)

	##############################

	#

	# $1_xserver_t Local policy

	#

	domain_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:process sigchld;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };

	domain_auto_trans($2, xserver_exec_t, $1_xserver_t)

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:process { signal sigchld };

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;

	# Communicate via System V shared memory.

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;

	getty_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

	locallogin_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

	userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_xserver_t)

	userdom_use_user_ttys($1,$1_xserver_t)

	userdom_setattr_user_ttys($1,$1_xserver_t)

	userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files($1,$1_xserver_t)

	optional_policy(`userhelper',`

		userhelper_search_config($1_xserver_t)

	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	# Read fonts

	read_fonts($1_xserver_t, $1)

	allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $1_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	ifdef(`xdm.te', `

		allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file unlink;

		allow $1_xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:dir search;

	')

	') dnl end TODO

	##############################

	#

	# $1_xauth_t Local policy

	#

	allow $1_xauth_t self:process signal;

	allow $1_xauth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1,$1_xauth_t,$1_xauth_home_t,file)

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;

	files_tmp_filetrans($1_xauth_t, $1_xauth_tmp_t, { file dir })

	domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process signal;

	# allow ps to show xauth

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:dir { search getattr read };

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process getattr;

	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access

	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels

	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if

	# running in a privileged domain.

	dontaudit $2 $1_xauth_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

	allow xdm_t $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1,xdm_t,$1_xauth_home_t,file)

	domain_use_interactive_fds($1_xauth_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_xauth_t)

	files_search_pids($1_xauth_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xauth_t)

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xauth_t)

	# cjp: why?

	term_use_ptmx($1_xauth_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_xauth_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_xauth_t)

	sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_xauth_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_xauth_t)

	userdom_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_xauth_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_xauth_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_xauth_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`nis',`

		nis_use_ypbind($1_xauth_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`ssh',`

		ssh_sigchld($1_xauth_t)

		ssh_read_pipes($1_xauth_t)

		ssh_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets($1_xauth_t)

	')

	##############################

	#

	# $1_iceauth_t Local policy

	#

	domain_auto_trans($2, iceauth_exec_t, $1_iceauth_t)

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:process sigchld;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1,$1_iceauth_t,$1_iceauth_home_t,file)

	# allow ps to show iceauth

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:dir { search getattr read };

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:process getattr;

	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access

	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels

	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if

	# running in a privileged domain.

	dontaudit $2 $1_iceauth_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_iceauth_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_iceauth_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_iceauth_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_iceauth_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_iceauth_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_iceauth_t)

	')

')

#######################################

## <summary>

##	Template for creating sessions on a

##	prefix X server, with read-only

##	access to the X server shared

##	memory segments.

## </summary>

## <param name="prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="tmpfs_type">

##	<summary>

##	The type of the domain SYSV tmpfs files.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_ro_session_template',`

	gen_require(`

		type $1_xserver_t, $1_xserver_tmp_t, $1_xserver_tmpfs_t;

	')

	# Xserver read/write client shm

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $3:file rw_file_perms;

	# Connect to xserver

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:process signal;

	# Read /tmp/.X0-lock

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read };

	# Client read xserver shm

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:fd use;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file r_file_perms;

')

#######################################

## <summary>

##	Template for creating sessions on a

##	prefix X server, with read and write

##	access to the X server shared

##	memory segments.

## </summary>

## <param name="prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="tmpfs_type">

##	<summary>

##	The type of the domain SYSV tmpfs files.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_rw_session_template',`

	gen_require(`

		type $1_xserver_t, $1_xserver_tmpfs_t;

	')

	xserver_ro_session_template($1,$2,$3)

	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;

')

#######################################

## <summary>

##	Template for creating full client sessions

##	on a user X server.

## </summary>

## <param name="prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="tmpfs_type">

##	<summary>

##	The type of the domain SYSV tmpfs files.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_user_client_template',`

	gen_require(`

		type xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t;

		type $1_xauth_home_t, $1_xserver_t, $1_xserver_tmpfs_t;

	')

	allow $2 self:shm create_shm_perms;

	allow $2 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;

	allow $2 self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };

	# Read .Xauthority file

	allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };

	# for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system

	allow $2 xdm_t:fd use;

	allow $2 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl };

	allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:dir search;

	allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };

	dontaudit $2 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write };

	# Allow connections to X server.

	files_search_tmp($2)

	miscfiles_read_fonts($2)

	userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$2)

	# for .xsession-errors

	userdom_dontaudit_write_user_home_content_files($1,$2)

	xserver_ro_session_template(xdm,$2,$3)

	xserver_rw_session_template($1,$2,$3)

	# Client write xserver shm

	tunable_policy(`allow_write_xshm',`

		allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;

		allow $2 $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;

	')

	# for X over a ssh tunnel

	optional_policy(`ssh',`

		kernel_tcp_recvfrom($2)

		ssh_tcp_connect($2)

	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	# cjp: need to implement the user-specific fonts part

	read_fonts($2, $1)

	')

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Transition to a user Xauthority domain.

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	Transition to a user Xauthority domain.

##	

##	

##	This is a templated interface, and should only

##	be called from a per-userdomain template.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="userdomain_prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`xserver_domtrans_user_xauth',`

	gen_require(`

		type $1_xauth_t, xauth_exec_t;

	')

	domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Connect to XDM over a unix domain

##	stream socket.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_stream_connect_xdm',`

	gen_require(`

		type xdm_t;

	')

	allow $1 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Read xdm-writable configuration files.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_read_xdm_rw_config',`

	gen_require(`

		type xdm_rw_etc_t;

	')

	files_search_etc($1)

	allow $1 xdm_rw_etc_t:dir { getattr read };

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Set the attributes of XDM temporary directories.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_setattr_xdm_tmp_dirs',`

	gen_require(`

		type xdm_tmp_t;

	')

	allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Create a named socket in a XDM

##	temporary directory.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets',`

	gen_require(`

		type xdm_tmp_t;

	')

	files_search_tmp($1)

	allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir ra_dir_perms;

	allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Read XDM pid files.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_read_xdm_pid',`

	gen_require(`

		type xdm_var_run_t;

	')

	files_search_pids($1)

	allow $1 xdm_var_run_t:file r_file_perms;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Execute the X server in the XDM X server domain.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_domtrans_xdm_xserver',`

	gen_require(`

		type xdm_xserver_t, xserver_exec_t;

	')

	domain_auto_trans($1,xserver_exec_t,xdm_xserver_t)

	allow $1 xdm_xserver_t:fd use;

	allow xdm_xserver_t $1:fd use;

	allow xdm_xserver_t $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow xdm_xserver_t $1:process sigchld;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Make an X session script an entrypoint for the specified domain.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	The domain for which the shell is an entrypoint.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_xsession_entry_type',`

	gen_require(`

		type xsession_exec_t;

	')

	domain_entry_file($1,xsession_exec_t)

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Execute an X session in the target domain.  This

##	is an explicit transition, requiring the

##	caller to use setexeccon().

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	Execute an Xsession in the target domain.  This

##	is an explicit transition, requiring the

##	caller to use setexeccon().

##	

##	

##	No interprocess communication (signals, pipes,

##	etc.) is provided by this interface since

##	the domains are not owned by this module.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="target_domain">

##	<summary>

##	The type of the shell process.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_xsession_spec_domtrans',`

	gen_require(`

		type xsession_exec_t;

	')

	domain_trans($1,xsession_exec_t,$2)

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Do not audit attempts to write the X server

##	log files.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain to not audit

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_dontaudit_write_log',`

	gen_require(`

		type xserver_log_t;

	')

	dontaudit $1 xserver_log_t:file { append write };

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Do not audit attempts to write the X server

##	log files.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain to not audit

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`xserver_delete_log',`

	gen_require(`

		type xserver_log_t;

	')

	logging_search_logs($1)

	allow $1 xserver_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

	allow $1 xserver_log_t:file unlink;

')