## <summary>Secure shell client and server policy.</summary>

#######################################

## <summary>

##	The per user domain template for the ssh module.

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	This template creates a derived domains which are used

##	for ssh client sessions and user ssh agents.  A derived

##	type is also created to protect the user ssh keys.

##	

##	

##	This template is invoked automatically for each user, and

##	generally does not need to be invoked directly

##	by policy writers.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="userdomain_prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="user_domain">

##	<summary>

##	The type of the user domain.

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="user_role">

##	<summary>

##	The role associated with the user domain.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`ssh_per_userdomain_template',`

	gen_require(`

		attribute ssh_server;

		type ssh_exec_t, ssh_agent_exec_t;

		type sshd_key_t, ssh_keysign_exec_t;

		type sshd_tmp_t, sshd_t;

	')

	##############################

	#

	# Declarations

	#

	type $1_home_ssh_t;

	userdom_user_home_content($1,$1_home_ssh_t)

	role $3 types $1_ssh_t;

	type $1_ssh_t;

	domain_type($1_ssh_t)

	domain_entry_file($1_ssh_t,ssh_exec_t)

	type $1_ssh_agent_t;

	domain_type($1_ssh_agent_t)

	domain_entry_file($1_ssh_agent_t,ssh_agent_exec_t)

	role $3 types $1_ssh_agent_t;

	type $1_ssh_keysign_t;

	domain_type($1_ssh_keysign_t)

	domain_entry_file($1_ssh_keysign_t,ssh_keysign_exec_t)

	role $3 types $1_ssh_keysign_t;

	type $1_ssh_tmpfs_t;

	files_tmpfs_file($1_ssh_tmpfs_t)

	##############################

	#

	# $1_ssh_t local policy

	#

	allow $1_ssh_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override dac_read_search };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:fd use;

	allow $1_ssh_t self:fifo_file { read getattr lock ioctl write append };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:unix_stream_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown listen accept };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;

	allow $1_ssh_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	allow $1_ssh_t self:shm { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write lock unix_read unix_write };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:sem { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write unix_read unix_write };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:msgq { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write enqueue unix_read unix_write };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:msg { send receive };

	allow $1_ssh_t self:tcp_socket { create connect ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind getopt setopt shutdown };

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_ssh_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_ssh_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_ssh_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_ssh_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_ssh_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;

	fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_ssh_t,$1_ssh_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

	# Transition from the user domain to the derived domain.

	domain_auto_trans($2, ssh_exec_t, $1_ssh_t)

	allow $2 $1_ssh_t:fd use;

	allow $1_ssh_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_ssh_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $2:process sigchld;

	# Read the ssh key file.

	allow $1_ssh_t sshd_key_t:file r_file_perms;

	# Access the ssh temporary files.

	allow $1_ssh_t sshd_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t sshd_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;

	files_tmp_filetrans($1_ssh_t, sshd_tmp_t, { file dir })

	# for rsync

	allow $1_ssh_t $2:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	# user can manage the keys and config

	allow $2 $1_home_ssh_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

	allow $2 $1_home_ssh_t:file create_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_home_ssh_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	allow $2 $1_home_ssh_t:sock_file create_file_perms;

	# inheriting stream sockets is needed for "ssh host command" as no pty

	# is allocated

	# cjp: should probably fix target to be an attribute for ssh servers

	# or "regular" (not special like sshd_extern_t) servers

	allow $2 sshd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;

	# ssh client can manage the keys and config

	userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_ssh_t)

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_home_ssh_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_home_ssh_t:file create_file_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_home_ssh_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

	# ssh servers can read the user keys and config

	allow ssh_server $1_home_ssh_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow ssh_server $1_home_ssh_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;

	allow ssh_server $1_home_ssh_t:file r_file_perms;

	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_ssh_t)

	corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port($1_ssh_t)

	dev_read_urand($1_ssh_t)

	fs_getattr_all_fs($1_ssh_t)

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_ssh_t)

	# run helper programs - needed eg for x11-ssh-askpass

	corecmd_exec_shell($1_ssh_t)

	corecmd_exec_bin($1_ssh_t)

	corecmd_list_sbin($1_ssh_t)

	corecmd_read_sbin_symlinks($1_ssh_t)

	# cjp: these are probably not needed:

	corecmd_read_sbin_files($1_ssh_t)

	corecmd_read_sbin_pipes($1_ssh_t)

	corecmd_read_sbin_sockets($1_ssh_t)

	domain_use_interactive_fds($1_ssh_t)

	files_list_home($1_ssh_t)

	files_read_usr_files($1_ssh_t)

	files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_ssh_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_ssh_t)

	files_read_var_files($1_ssh_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_ssh_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_ssh_t)

	logging_send_syslog_msg($1_ssh_t)

	logging_read_generic_logs($1_ssh_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization($1_ssh_t)

	seutil_read_config($1_ssh_t)

	sysnet_read_config($1_ssh_t)

	sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_ssh_t)

	userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds($1_ssh_t)

	# Write to the user domain tty.

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_ssh_t)

	tunable_policy(`read_default_t',`

		files_list_default($1_ssh_t)

		files_read_default_files($1_ssh_t)

		files_read_default_symlinks($1_ssh_t)

		files_read_default_sockets($1_ssh_t)

		files_read_default_pipes($1_ssh_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_ssh_t)

		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_ssh_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_ssh_t)

		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_ssh_t)

	')

	# for port forwarding

	tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',`

		corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port($1_ssh_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		kerberos_use($1_ssh_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		nis_use_ypbind($1_ssh_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		nscd_socket_use($1_ssh_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		xserver_user_client_template($1,$1_ssh_t,$1_ssh_tmpfs_t)

		xserver_domtrans_user_xauth($1,$1_ssh_t)

	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	# Read /var/run, /var/log.

	allow $1_ssh_t var_run_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t var_run_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	# Access the users .ssh directory.

	file_type_auto_trans({ sysadm_ssh_t $1_ssh_t }, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_ssh_t, dir)

	file_type_auto_trans($1_ssh_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_ssh_t, sock_file)

	allow sysadm_ssh_t $1_home_ssh_t:file create_file_perms;

	allow sysadm_ssh_t $1_home_ssh_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

	dontaudit $1_ssh_t $1_home_t:dir { getattr search };

	# for /bin/sh used to execute xauth

	dontaudit $1_ssh_t proc_t:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };

	# allow ps to show ssh

	can_ps($1_t, $1_ssh_t)

	#allow ssh to access keys stored on removable media

	# Should we have a boolean around this?

	files_search_mnt($1_ssh_t)

	r_dir_file($1_ssh_t, removable_t) 

	if (allow_ssh_keysign) {

	domain_auto_trans($1_ssh_t, ssh_keysign_exec_t, $1_ssh_keysign_t)

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t sshd_key_t:file { getattr read };

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t self:capability { setgid setuid };

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t urandom_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;

	uses_shlib($1_ssh_keysign_t)

	dontaudit $1_ssh_keysign_t selinux_config_t:dir search;

	dontaudit $1_ssh_keysign_t proc_t:dir search;

	dontaudit $1_ssh_keysign_t proc_t:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t usr_t:dir search;

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t etc_t:file { getattr read };

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t self:dir search;

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t self:file { getattr read };

	allow $1_ssh_keysign_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;

	}

	') dnl endif TODO

	##############################

	#

	# $1_ssh_agent_t local policy

	#

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:process setrlimit;

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:capability setgid;

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t { $1_ssh_agent_t $2 }:process signull;

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_ssh_agent_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	# for ssh-add

	allow $2 $1_ssh_agent_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	# Allow the user shell to signal the ssh program.

	allow $2 $1_ssh_agent_t:process signal;

	# for the transition back to normal privs upon exec

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $2:fd use;

	allow $2 $1_ssh_agent_t:fd use;

	allow $2 $1_ssh_agent_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_ssh_agent_t:process sigchld;

	# Allow the ssh program to communicate with ssh-agent.

	allow $1_ssh_t sshd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	domain_auto_trans($2, ssh_agent_exec_t, $1_ssh_agent_t)

	allow $2 $1_ssh_agent_t:fd use;

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $2:fd use;

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $2:process sigchld;

	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_ssh_agent_t)

	dev_read_urand($1_ssh_agent_t)

	dev_read_rand($1_ssh_agent_t)

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_ssh_agent_t)

	# transition back to normal privs upon exec

	corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t,$1_t)

	corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $1_t)

	domain_use_interactive_fds($1_ssh_agent_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_ssh_agent_t)

	files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_ssh_agent_t)

	files_search_home($1_ssh_agent_t)

	libs_read_lib_files($1_ssh_agent_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_ssh_agent_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_ssh_agent_t)

	logging_send_syslog_msg($1_ssh_agent_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization($1_ssh_agent_t)

	seutil_dontaudit_read_config($1_ssh_agent_t)

	# Write to the user domain tty.

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_ssh_agent_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_ssh_agent_t)

		# transition back to normal privs upon exec

		fs_nfs_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $1_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`

		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_ssh_agent_t)

		# transition back to normal privs upon exec

		fs_cifs_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $1_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		nis_use_ypbind($1_ssh_agent_t)

	')

#	optional_policy(`

#		# KDM:

#		xdm_sigchld($1_ssh_agent_t)

#	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

	ifdef(`xdm.te',`

	can_pipe_xdm($1_ssh_agent_t)

	')

	# allow ps to show ssh

	can_ps($1_t, $1_ssh_agent_t)

	dontaudit $1_ssh_agent_t proc_t:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };

	# Access the ssh temporary files. Should we have an own type here

	# to which only ssh, ssh-agent and ssh-add have access?

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $1_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	file_type_auto_trans($1_ssh_agent_t, tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)

	# transition back to normal privs upon exec

	domain_auto_trans($1_ssh_agent_t, $1_home_t, $1_t)

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $1_home_dir_t:dir search;

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file write;

	#

	# Allow command to ssh-agent > ~/.ssh_agent

	#

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $1_home_t:file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_ssh_agent_t $1_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;

	# Allow the ssh program to communicate with ssh-agent.

	allow $1_ssh_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file write;

	allow $1_ssh_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	') dnl endif TODO

	##############################

	#

	# $1_ssh_keysign_t local policy

	#

	optional_policy(`

		nscd_socket_use($1_ssh_keysign_t)

	')

')

#######################################

## <summary>

##	The template to define a ssh server.

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	This template creates a domains to be used for

##	creating a ssh server.  This is typically done

##	to have multiple ssh servers of different sensitivities,

##	such as for an internal network-facing ssh server, and

##	a external network-facing ssh server.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="userdomain_prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the server domain (e.g., sshd

##	is the prefix for sshd_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`ssh_server_template', `

	type $1_t, ssh_server;

	domain_type($1_t)

	role system_r types $1_t;

	type $1_devpts_t;

	term_login_pty($1_devpts_t)

	type $1_var_run_t;

	files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)

	allow $1_t self:capability { kill sys_chroot sys_resource chown dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid sys_tty_config };

	allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_t self:process { signal setsched setrlimit setexec };

	allow $1_t self:tcp_socket { listen accept create connect ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind getopt setopt shutdown };

	allow $1_t self:udp_socket { connect create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind getopt setopt shutdown };

	allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr getattr relabelfrom };

	term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)

	allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;

	files_pid_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_run_t,file)

	can_exec($1_t, sshd_exec_t)

	# Access key files

	allow $1_t sshd_key_t:file { getattr read };

	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t)

	corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_t)

	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_t)

	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_t)

	corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_t)

	dev_read_urand($1_t)

	fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs($1_t)

	selinux_get_fs_mount($1_t)

	selinux_validate_context($1_t)

	selinux_compute_access_vector($1_t)

	selinux_compute_create_context($1_t)

	selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_t)

	selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_t)

	auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_t)

	auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_t)

	auth_rw_login_records($1_t)

	auth_rw_lastlog($1_t)

	auth_append_faillog($1_t)

	corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1_t)

	corecmd_getattr_bin_files($1_t)

	# for sshd subsystems, such as sftp-server.

	corecmd_getattr_bin_files($1_t)

	domain_interactive_fd($1_t)

	domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1_t)

	domain_role_change_exemption($1_t)

	domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_t)

	files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_t)

	init_rw_utmp($1_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)

	logging_search_logs($1_t)

	logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)

	mls_file_read_up($1_t)

	mls_file_write_down($1_t)

	mls_file_upgrade($1_t)

	mls_file_downgrade($1_t)

	mls_process_set_level($1_t)

	seutil_read_default_contexts($1_t)

	sysnet_read_config($1_t)

	userdom_dontaudit_relabelfrom_unpriv_users_ptys($1_t)

	userdom_search_all_users_home_content($1_t)

	# Allow checking users mail at login

	mta_getattr_spool($1_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`

		fs_read_nfs_files($1_t)

	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`

		fs_read_cifs_files($1_t)

	')

	# cjp: commenting out until typeattribute works in conditional

	# and require block in optional else is resolved

	#optional_policy(`

	#	tunable_policy(`run_ssh_inetd',`

	#		allow $1_t self:process signal;

	#		files_list_pids($1_t)

	#	',`

	#		corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port($1_t)

	#		init_use_fds($1_t)

	#		init_use_script_ptys($1_t)

	#	')

	#',`

		# These rules should match the else block

		# of the run_ssh_inetd tunable directly above

		corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port($1_t)

		init_use_fds($1_t)

		init_use_script_ptys($1_t)

	#')

	optional_policy(`

		kerberos_use($1_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		mount_send_nfs_client_request($1_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		nscd_socket_use($1_t)

	')

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Send a SIGCHLD signal to the ssh server.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`ssh_sigchld',`

	gen_require(`

		type sshd_t;

	')

	allow $1 sshd_t:process sigchld;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Read a ssh server unnamed pipe.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`ssh_read_pipes',`

	gen_require(`

		type sshd_t;

	')

	allow $1 sshd_t:fifo_file { getattr read };

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Do not audit attempts to read and write

##	ssh server TCP sockets.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain to not audit.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`ssh_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets',`

	gen_require(`

		type sshd_t;

	')

	dontaudit $1 sshd_t:tcp_socket { read write };

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Connect to SSH daemons over TCP sockets.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`ssh_tcp_connect',`

	gen_require(`

		type sshd_t;

	')

	allow $1 sshd_t:tcp_socket { connectto recvfrom };

	allow sshd_t $1:tcp_socket { acceptfrom recvfrom };

	kernel_tcp_recvfrom($1)

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Read ssh server keys

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`ssh_dontaudit_read_server_keys',`

	gen_require(`

		type sshd_key_t;

	')

	dontaudit $1 sshd_key_t:file { getattr read };

')