policy_module(kernel,1.0)

# assertion related attributes

attribute can_load_policy;

attribute can_setenforce;

attribute can_setsecparam;

attribute can_load_kernmodule;

attribute can_receive_kernel_messages;

# constraint related attributes

attribute can_change_process_identity;

attribute can_change_process_role;

attribute can_change_object_identity;

#

# kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads.

# It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class.

# 

type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule, can_load_policy;

role system_r types kernel_t;

domain_make_domain(kernel_t)

sid kernel context_template(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,s0 - s9:c0.c127)

#

# unlabeled_t is the type of unlabeled objects.

# Objects that have no known labeling information or that

# have labels that are no longer valid are treated as having this type.

#

type unlabeled_t;

sid unlabeled context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

# These initial sids are no longer used, and can be removed:

sid any_socket		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid file_labels		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid icmp_socket		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid igmp_packet		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid init		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid kmod		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid netmsg		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid policy		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid scmp_packet		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid sysctl_modprobe 	context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid sysctl_fs		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid sysctl_kernel	context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid sysctl_net		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid sysctl_net_unix	context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid sysctl_vm		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid sysctl_dev		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

sid tcp_socket		context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)

# 

# security_t is the target type when checking

# the permissions in the security class.  It is also

# applied to selinuxfs inodes.

#

type security_t;

fs_make_fs(security_t)

sid security context_template(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0)

genfscon selinuxfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0)

#

# sysfs_t is the type for /sys

#

type sysfs_t;

files_make_mountpoint(sysfs_t)

fs_make_fs(sysfs_t)

genfscon sysfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:sysfs_t,s0)

#

# usbfs_t is the type for /proc/bus/usb

#

type usbfs_t alias usbdevfs_t;

files_make_mountpoint(usbfs_t)

fs_make_fs(usbfs_t)

genfscon usbfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:usbfs_t,s0)

genfscon usbdevfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:usbfs_t,s0)

#

# Procfs types

#

type proc_t;

files_make_mountpoint(proc_t)

fs_make_fs(proc_t)

genfscon proc / context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)

genfscon proc /sysvipc context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)

# kernel message interface

type proc_kmsg_t;

genfscon proc /kmsg context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_kmsg_t,s0)

neverallow ~can_receive_kernel_messages proc_kmsg_t:file ~getattr;

# /proc kcore: inaccessible

type proc_kcore_t;

neverallow * proc_kcore_t:file ~getattr;

genfscon proc /kcore context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_kcore_t,s0)

type proc_mdstat_t;

genfscon proc /mdstat context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_mdstat_t,s0)

type proc_net_t;

genfscon proc /net context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_net_t,s0)

#

# Sysctl types

#

# /proc/irq directory and files

type sysctl_irq_t;

genfscon proc /irq context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_irq_t,s0)

# /proc/net/rpc directory and files

type sysctl_rpc_t;

genfscon proc /net/rpc context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_rpc_t,s0)

# /proc/sys directory, base directory of sysctls

type sysctl_t;

files_make_mountpoint(sysctl_t)

sid sysctl context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)

genfscon proc /sys context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/fs directory and files

type sysctl_fs_t;

files_make_mountpoint(sysctl_fs_t)

genfscon proc /sys/fs context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/kernel directory and files

type sysctl_kernel_t;

genfscon proc /sys/kernel context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file

type sysctl_modprobe_t;

genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug file

type sysctl_hotplug_t;

genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_hotplug_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/net directory and files

type sysctl_net_t;

genfscon proc /sys/net context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/net/unix directory and files

type sysctl_net_unix_t;

genfscon proc /sys/net/unix context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_unix_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/vm directory and files

type sysctl_vm_t;

genfscon proc /sys/vm context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_t,s0)

# /proc/sys/dev directory and files

type sysctl_dev_t;

genfscon proc /sys/dev context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)

########################################

#

# kernel local policy

#

# Use capabilities. need to investigate which capabilities are actually used

allow kernel_t self:capability *;

# Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files

allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;

# old general_domain_access()

allow kernel_t self:shm create_shm_perms;

allow kernel_t self:sem create_sem_perms;

allow kernel_t self:msg { send receive };

allow kernel_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;

allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;

allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;

allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;

allow kernel_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

allow kernel_t self:fd use;

# old general_proc_read_access():

allow kernel_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_t:{ lnk_file file } r_file_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_net_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_net_t:file r_file_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_mdstat_t:file r_file_perms;

allow kernel_t proc_kcore_t:file getattr;

allow kernel_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr;

allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file r_file_perms;

allow kernel_t security_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow kernel_t security_t:file rw_file_perms;

allow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;

auditallow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;

corecommands_execute_shell(kernel_t)

corecommands_read_system_programs_directory(kernel_t)

files_read_root_dir(kernel_t)

files_list_home_directories(kernel_t)

files_read_general_application_resources(kernel_t)

init_sigchld(kernel_t)

libraries_use_dynamic_loader(kernel_t)

libraries_use_shared_libraries(kernel_t)

selinux_read_config(kernel_t)

selinux_read_binary_policy(kernel_t)

terminal_use_console(kernel_t)

domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t)

# Mount root file system.  Used when loading a policy

# from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem

fs_mount_all_fs(kernel_t)

# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe is set to /bin/true if not using modules.

corecommands_execute_general_programs(kernel_t)

logging_send_system_log_message(kernel_t)

# Kernel-generated traffic, e.g. ICMP replies.

corenetwork_sendrecv_raw_on_all_interfaces(kernel_t)

corenetwork_sendrecv_raw_on_all_nodes(kernel_t)

# Kernel-generated traffic, e.g. TCP resets.

corenetwork_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_interfaces(kernel_t)

corenetwork_sendrecv_tcp_on_all_nodes(kernel_t)

neverallow ~can_load_policy security_t:security load_policy;

neverallow ~can_setenforce security_t:security setenforce;

neverallow ~can_setsecparam security_t:security setsecparam;

# enabling dyntransition breaks process tranquility.  If you dont

# know what this means or dont understand the implications of a

# dynamic transition, you shouldnt be using it!!!

neverallow * *:process { setcurrent dyntransition };

neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule *:capability sys_module;

########################################

#

# Unlabeled process local policy

#

# If you load a new policy that removes active domains, processes can

# get stuck if you do not allow unlabeled processes to signal init.

# If you load an incompatible policy, you should probably reboot,

# since you may have compromised system security.

init_sigchld(unlabeled_t)