## <summary>Policy for UML</summary>

#######################################

## <summary>

##	The per user domain template for the uml module.

## </summary>

## <desc>

##	

##	This template creates a derived domains which are used

##	for uml program.

##	

##	

##	This template is invoked automatically for each user, and

##	generally does not need to be invoked directly

##	by policy writers.

##	

## </desc>

## <param name="userdomain_prefix">

##	<summary>

##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user

##	is the prefix for user_t).

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="user_domain">

##	<summary>

##	The type of the user domain.

##	</summary>

## </param>

## <param name="user_role">

##	<summary>

##	The role associated with the user domain.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

template(`uml_per_userdomain_template',`

	########################################

	#

	# Declarations

	#

	type $1_uml_t;

	domain_type($1_uml_t)

	role $3 types $1_uml_t;

	type $1_uml_exec_t;

	domain_entry_file($1_uml_t,$1_uml_exec_t)

	type $1_uml_ro_t;

	files_type($1_uml_ro_t)

	type $1_uml_rw_t;

	files_type($1_uml_rw_t)

	type $1_uml_tmp_t;

	files_tmp_file($1_uml_tmp_t)

	type $1_uml_tmpfs_t;

	files_tmpfs_file($1_uml_tmpfs_t)

	type $1_uml_devpts_t;

	term_pty($1_uml_devpts_t)

	########################################

	#

	# Local policy

	#

	allow $1_uml_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t self:process { fork signal_perms ptrace };

	allow $1_uml_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;

	# Use the network.

	allow $1_uml_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t $2:process sigchld;

	allow $1_uml_t $2:fifo_file { ioctl read write getattr lock append };

	# allow the UML thing to happen

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr };

	term_create_pty($1_uml_t,$1_uml_devpts_t)

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;

	files_tmp_filetrans($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t, { file dir })

	can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t)

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };

	fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_uml_t,$1_uml_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

	can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmpfs_t)

	# access config files

	allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:file r_file_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:lnk_file { getattr read };

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir create_dir_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:file create_file_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:sock_file create_file_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;

	userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1,$1_uml_t,$1_uml_rw_t,{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

	allow $2 uml_ro_t:dir r_dir_perms;

	allow $2 uml_ro_t:file r_file_perms;

	allow $2 uml_ro_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

	allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:{ file sock_file fifo_file } { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms };

	allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:lnk_file { relabelfrom relabelto create_lnk_perms };

	allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t $1_uml_exec_t }:dir { relabelfrom relabelto create_dir_perms };

	allow $2 $1_uml_exec_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms };

	allow $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_uml_t:process signal_perms;

	# allow ps, ptrace, signal

	allow $2 $1_uml_t:dir { search getattr read };

	allow $2 $1_uml_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };

	allow $2 $1_uml_t:process getattr;

	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access

	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels

	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if

	# running in a privileged domain.

	dontaudit $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;

	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;

	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;

	# Transition from the user domain to this domain.

	domain_auto_trans($2, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t }, $1_uml_t)

	can_exec($1_uml_t, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t })

	# for mconsole

	allow { $2 $1_uml_t } $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;

	allow $1_uml_t $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto;

	kernel_read_system_state($1_uml_t)

	# for SKAS - need something better

	kernel_write_proc_files($1_uml_t)

	# for xterm

	corecmd_exec_bin($1_uml_t)

	corecmd_exec_sbin($1_uml_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)

	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t)

	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t)

	corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_uml_t)

	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t)

	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t)

	corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_uml_t)

	corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev($1_uml_t)

	domain_use_interactive_fds($1_uml_t)

	# for xterm

	files_read_etc_files($1_uml_t)

	files_dontaudit_read_etc_runtime_files($1_uml_t)

	# putting uml data under /var is usual...

	files_search_var($1_uml_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_uml_t)

	init_read_utmp($1_uml_t)

	init_dontaudit_write_utmp($1_uml_t)

	# for xterm

	libs_use_ld_so($1_uml_t)

	libs_use_shared_libs($1_uml_t)

	libs_exec_lib_files($1_uml_t)

	# Inherit and use descriptors from newrole.

	seutil_use_newrole_fds($1_uml_t)

	# Use the network.

	sysnet_read_config($1_uml_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_uml_t)

	optional_policy(`

		mount_send_nfs_client_request($1_uml_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		nis_use_ypbind($1_uml_t)

	')

	optional_policy(`

		ssh_tcp_connect($1_uml_t)

	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`

		# for X

		optional_policy(`

			ifelse($1, sysadm,`

			',`

				optional_policy(`

					allow $1_uml_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;

				')

				allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file write;

				allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

			')

		')

		optional_policy(`

			# for uml_net

			domain_auto_trans($1_uml_t, uml_net_exec_t, uml_net_t)

			allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };

			allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };

			dontaudit uml_net_t privfd:fd use;

			can_access_pty(uml_net_t, $1_uml)

			dontaudit uml_net_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir { getattr search };

		')

		#TODO

		optional_policy(`

			allow $1_uml_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };

		')

	')

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Set attributes on uml utility socket files.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`uml_setattr_util_sockets',`

	gen_require(`

		type uml_switch_var_run_t;

	')

	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:sock_file setattr;

')

########################################

## <summary>

##	Manage uml utility files.

## </summary>

## <param name="domain">

##	<summary>

##	Domain allowed access.

##	</summary>

## </param>

#

interface(`uml_manage_util_files',`

	gen_require(`

		type uml_switch_var_run_t;

	')

	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;

	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;

	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

')