#

# Macros for all user login domains.

#

#

# base_user_domain(domain_prefix)

#

# Define derived types and rules for an ordinary user domain.

#

# The type declaration and role authorization for the domain must be

# provided separately.  Likewise, domain transitions into this domain

# must be specified separately.  

#

# base_user_domain() is also called by the admin_domain() macro

undefine(`base_user_domain')

define(`base_user_domain', `

# Type for network-obtained content

type $1_untrusted_content_t, file_type, $1_file_type, sysadmfile, customizable, polymember;

type $1_untrusted_content_tmp_t, file_type, $1_file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile, customizable, polymember;

# Allow user to relabel untrusted content

allow $1_t { $1_untrusted_content_t $1_untrusted_content_tmp_t }:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto relabelfrom };

allow $1_t { $1_untrusted_content_t $1_untrusted_content_tmp_t }:file { getattr unlink relabelto relabelfrom rename };

# Read content

read_content($1_t, $1)

# Write trusted content. This includes proper transition

# for /home, and /tmp, so no other transition is necessary (or allowed)

write_trusted($1_t, $1)

# Maybe the home directory is networked

network_home($1_t)

# Transition for { lnk, fifo, sock }. The rest is covered by write_trusted.

# Relabel files in the home directory 

file_type_auto_trans($1_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t, { fifo_file sock_file lnk_file }); 

allow $1_t $1_home_t:{ notdevfile_class_set dir } { relabelfrom relabelto };

can_setfscreate($1_t)

ifdef(`ftpd.te' , `

if (ftpd_is_daemon) {

file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t)

}

')

allow $1_t self:capability { setgid chown fowner };

dontaudit $1_t self:capability { sys_nice fsetid };

# $1_r is authorized for $1_t for the initial login domain.

role $1_r types $1_t;

allow system_r $1_r;

r_dir_file($1_t, usercanread)

# Grant permissions within the domain.

general_domain_access($1_t)

if (allow_execmem) {

# Allow making anonymous memory executable, e.g. 

# for runtime-code generation or executable stack.

allow $1_t self:process execmem;

}

if (allow_execmem && allow_execstack) {

# Allow making the stack executable via mprotect.

allow $1_t self:process execstack;

}

# Allow text relocations on system shared libraries, e.g. libGL.

allow $1_t texrel_shlib_t:file execmod;

#

# kdeinit wants this access

#

allow $1_t device_t:dir { getattr search };

# Find CDROM devices

r_dir_file($1_t, sysctl_dev_t)

# for eject

allow $1_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file getattr;

allow $1_t fs_type:dir getattr;

allow $1_t event_device_t:chr_file { getattr read ioctl };

# open office is looking for the following

allow $1_t dri_device_t:chr_file getattr;

dontaudit $1_t dri_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;

# Supress ls denials:

# getattr() - ls -l

# search_dir() - symlink path resolution

# read_dir() - deep ls: ls parent/...

dontaudit_getattr($1_t)

dontaudit_search_dir($1_t)

dontaudit_read_dir($1_t)

# allow ptrace

can_ptrace($1_t, $1_t)

# Allow user to run restorecon and relabel files

can_getsecurity($1_t)

r_dir_file($1_t, default_context_t)

r_dir_file($1_t, file_context_t)

allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file read;

# GNOME checks for usb and other devices

rw_dir_file($1_t,usbfs_t)

can_exec($1_t, noexattrfile)

# Bind to a Unix domain socket in /tmp.

allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind;

# Use the type when relabeling terminal devices.

type_change $1_t tty_device_t:chr_file $1_tty_device_t;

# Debian login is from shadow utils and does not allow resetting the perms.

# have to fix this!

type_change $1_t ttyfile:chr_file $1_tty_device_t;

# for running TeX programs

r_dir_file($1_t, tetex_data_t)

can_exec($1_t, tetex_data_t)

# Use the type when relabeling pty devices.

type_change $1_t server_pty:chr_file $1_devpts_t;

tmpfs_domain($1)

ifdef(`cardmgr.te', `

# to allow monitoring of pcmcia status

allow $1_t cardmgr_var_run_t:file { getattr read };

')

# Modify mail spool file.

allow $1_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow $1_t mail_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;

#

# Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan

#

ifdef(`apmd.te', `

allow $1_t apmd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

allow $1_t apmd_var_run_t:sock_file write;

')

#

# Allow the query of filesystem quotas

#

allow $1_t fs_type:filesystem quotaget;

# Run helper programs.

can_exec_any($1_t)

# Run programs developed by other users in the same domain.

can_exec($1_t, $1_home_t)

can_exec($1_t, $1_tmp_t)

# Run user programs that require different permissions in their own domain.

# These rules were moved into the individual program domains.

# Instantiate derived domains for a number of programs.

# These derived domains encode both information about the calling

# user domain and the program, and allow us to maintain separation

# between different instances of the program being run by different

# user domains.

ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `gph_domain($1, $1)')

ifdef(`chkpwd.te', `chkpwd_domain($1)')

ifdef(`fingerd.te', `fingerd_macro($1)')

ifdef(`mta.te', `mail_domain($1)')

ifdef(`exim.te', `exim_user_domain($1)')

ifdef(`crontab.te', `crontab_domain($1)')

ifdef(`screen.te', `screen_domain($1)')

ifdef(`tvtime.te', `tvtime_domain($1)')

ifdef(`mozilla.te', `mozilla_domain($1)')

ifdef(`thunderbird.te', `thunderbird_domain($1)')

ifdef(`samba.te', `samba_domain($1)')

ifdef(`gpg.te', `gpg_domain($1)')

ifdef(`xauth.te', `xauth_domain($1)')

ifdef(`iceauth.te', `iceauth_domain($1)')

ifdef(`startx.te', `xserver_domain($1)')

ifdef(`lpr.te', `lpr_domain($1)')

ifdef(`ssh.te', `ssh_domain($1)')

ifdef(`irc.te', `irc_domain($1)')

ifdef(`using_spamassassin', `spamassassin_domain($1)')

ifdef(`pyzor.te', `pyzor_domain($1)')

ifdef(`razor.te', `razor_domain($1)')

ifdef(`uml.te', `uml_domain($1)')

ifdef(`cdrecord.te', `cdrecord_domain($1)')

ifdef(`mplayer.te', `mplayer_domains($1)')

fontconfig_domain($1)

# GNOME

ifdef(`gnome.te', `

gnome_domain($1)

ifdef(`games.te', `games_domain($1)')

ifdef(`gift.te', `gift_domains($1)')

ifdef(`evolution.te', `evolution_domains($1)')

ifdef(`ethereal.te', `ethereal_domain($1)')

')

# ICE communication channel

ice_domain($1, $1)

# ORBit communication channel (independent of GNOME)

orbit_domain($1, $1)

# Instantiate a derived domain for user cron jobs.

ifdef(`crond.te', `crond_domain($1)')

ifdef(`vmware.te', `vmware_domain($1)')

if (user_direct_mouse) {

# Read the mouse.

allow $1_t mouse_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;

}

# Access other miscellaneous devices.

allow $1_t misc_device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

can_resmgrd_connect($1_t)

#

# evolution and gnome-session try to create a netlink socket

#

dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;

dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;

# Use the network.

can_network($1_t)

allow $1_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;

can_ypbind($1_t)

can_winbind($1_t)

ifdef(`pamconsole.te', `

allow $1_t pam_var_console_t:dir search;

')

allow $1_t var_lock_t:dir search;

# Grant permissions to access the system DBus

ifdef(`dbusd.te', `

dbusd_client(system, $1)

can_network_server_tcp($1_dbusd_t)

allow $1_dbusd_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;

allow $1_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };

dbusd_client($1, $1)

allow $1_t $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };

dbusd_domain($1)

ifdef(`hald.te', `

allow $1_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;

allow hald_t $1_t:dbus send_msg;

') dnl end ifdef hald.te

') dnl end ifdef dbus.te

# allow port_t name binding for UDP because it is not very usable otherwise

allow $1_t port_t:udp_socket name_bind;

# Gnome pannel binds to the following

ifdef(`cups.te', `

allow $1_t { cupsd_etc_t cupsd_rw_etc_t }:file { read getattr };

')

# for perl

dontaudit $1_t net_conf_t:file ioctl;

# Communicate within the domain.

can_udp_send($1_t, self)

# Connect to inetd.

ifdef(`inetd.te', `

can_tcp_connect($1_t, inetd_t)

can_udp_send($1_t, inetd_t)

can_udp_send(inetd_t, $1_t)

')

# Connect to portmap.

ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_tcp_connect($1_t, portmap_t)')

# Inherit and use sockets from inetd

ifdef(`inetd.te', `

allow $1_t inetd_t:fd use;

allow $1_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;')

# Very permissive allowing every domain to see every type.

allow $1_t kernel_t:system ipc_info;

# When the user domain runs ps, there will be a number of access

# denials when ps tries to search /proc.  Do not audit these denials.

dontaudit $1_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;

dontaudit $1_t domain:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;

dontaudit $1_t domain:process { getattr getsession };

#

# Cups daemon running as user tries to write /etc/printcap

#

dontaudit $1_t usr_t:file setattr;

# Use X

x_client_domain($1, $1)

ifdef(`xserver.te', `

allow $1_t xserver_misc_device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;

')

ifdef(`xdm.te', `

# Connect to the X server run by the X Display Manager.

can_unix_connect($1_t, xdm_t)

# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file

r_dir_file($1_t, xdm_var_run_t)

allow $1_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };

allow xdm_t $1_home_dir_t:dir getattr;

ifdef(`xauth.te', `

file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_xauth_home_t, file)

')

')dnl end ifdef xdm.te

# Access the sound device.

allow $1_t sound_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };

# Access the power device.

allow $1_t power_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };

allow $1_t var_log_t:dir { getattr search };

dontaudit $1_t logfile:file getattr;

# Check to see if cdrom is mounted

allow $1_t mnt_t:dir { getattr search };

# Get attributes of file systems.

allow $1_t fs_type:filesystem getattr;

# Read and write /dev/tty and /dev/null.

allow $1_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t null_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;

allow $1_t zero_device_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };

allow $1_t { random_device_t urandom_device_t }:chr_file ra_file_perms;

#

# Added to allow reading of cdrom

#

allow $1_t rpc_pipefs_t:dir getattr;

allow $1_t nfsd_fs_t:dir getattr;

allow $1_t binfmt_misc_fs_t:dir getattr;

# /initrd is left mounted, various programs try to look at it

dontaudit $1_t ramfs_t:dir getattr;

#

# Emacs wants this access

#

allow $1_t wtmp_t:file r_file_perms;

dontaudit $1_t wtmp_t:file write;

# Read the devpts root directory.

allow $1_t devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;

r_dir_file($1_t, src_t)

# Allow user to read default_t files

# This is different from reading default_t content, 

# because it also includes sockets, fifos, and links

if (read_default_t) {

allow $1_t default_t:dir r_dir_perms;

allow $1_t default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;

}

# Read fonts

read_fonts($1_t, $1)

read_sysctl($1_t);

#

# Caused by su - init scripts

#

dontaudit $1_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { ioctl read write };

#

# Running ifconfig as a user generates the following

#

dontaudit $1_t self:socket create;

dontaudit $1_t sysctl_net_t:dir search;

ifdef(`rpcd.te', `

create_dir_file($1_t, nfsd_rw_t)

')

')dnl end base_user_domain macro