diff --git a/SOURCES/samba-4.10-redhat.patch b/SOURCES/samba-4.10-redhat.patch index a248091..e7a075d 100644 --- a/SOURCES/samba-4.10-redhat.patch +++ b/SOURCES/samba-4.10-redhat.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ From 9aa816f5017bd38cbb9af2af5a7c385647e4f76d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Bokovoy Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 19:25:53 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 01/88] s3-rpcserver: fix security level check for +Subject: [PATCH 01/97] s3-rpcserver: fix security level check for DsRGetForestTrustInformation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 @@ -80,13 +80,13 @@ index d799ba4feef..87613b99fde 100644 } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From e71fddb9ad5275a222d96bdcee06571a9a8c73c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 16:50:45 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 02/88] Add a test to check dNSHostName with netbios aliases +Subject: [PATCH 02/97] Add a test to check dNSHostName with netbios aliases BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14396 @@ -132,13 +132,13 @@ index 95c0cf76f90..6073ea972f9 100755 # Test createcomputer option of 'net ads join' # -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From e80e373485818eb7faebf5c9aae10d82fbc4e2e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 15:52:46 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 03/88] Fix accidental overwrite of dnsHostName by the last +Subject: [PATCH 03/97] Fix accidental overwrite of dnsHostName by the last netbios alias BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14396 @@ -186,13 +186,13 @@ index 9d4f656ffec..a31011b0ff8 100644 status = ADS_ERROR_LDAP(LDAP_NO_MEMORY); goto done; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 7ca5f9b2956ec41777837a7e14800a4345505ed6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 19:04:51 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 04/88] Refactor ads_keytab_add_entry() to make it iterable +Subject: [PATCH 04/97] Refactor ads_keytab_add_entry() to make it iterable so we can more easily add msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName entries. @@ -453,13 +453,13 @@ index 97d5535041c..0f450a09df5 100644 out: SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 087d6dd4c4f25860643ab5920a1b2c0c70e5551b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 17:55:12 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 05/88] Add a test for msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName entries in +Subject: [PATCH 05/97] Add a test for msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName entries in keytab BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14396 @@ -501,13 +501,13 @@ index 6073ea972f9..a40b477a173 100755 testit "leave" $VALGRIND $net_tool ads leave -U$DC_USERNAME%$DC_PASSWORD || failed=`expr $failed + 1` -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 1ae32dddad89cdb75ae2c8fb3e7378ce6f5ad6af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 15:36:28 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 06/88] Add msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName entries to the keytab +Subject: [PATCH 06/97] Add msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName entries to the keytab BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14396 @@ -648,13 +648,13 @@ index db2b72ab1b5..02a628ee0e6 100644 { LDAPMessage *res = NULL; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 939b9265a533393189ef3c513e77b2cb009a51d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 15:54:12 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 07/88] Add net-ads-join dnshostname=fqdn option +Subject: [PATCH 07/97] Add net-ads-join dnshostname=fqdn option BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14396 @@ -794,13 +794,13 @@ index a40b477a173..85257f445d8 100755 exit $failed -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 25a6679a5260dafde7a7d2aed9bfe43eaf083b1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:04:57 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 08/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: add +Subject: [PATCH 08/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: add netlogon_creds_random_challenge() It's good to have just a single isolated function that will generate @@ -851,13 +851,13 @@ index 82febe74440..82797d453ed 100644 void netlogon_creds_des_decrypt_LMKey(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct netr_LMSessionKey *key); void netlogon_creds_des_encrypt(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct samr_Password *pass); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 1e8ad7efe35d8b79fef387ff709d6a499565c39a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:07:30 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 09/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:torture/rpc: make use of +Subject: [PATCH 09/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:torture/rpc: make use of netlogon_creds_random_challenge() This will avoid getting flakey tests once our server starts to @@ -1007,13 +1007,13 @@ index 026d86d50e4..e11014922f8 100644 torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r), "ServerReqChallenge"); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 74ee204ad4647d0d7a2097124652cbcd43406c7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:08:38 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 10/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: make use of +Subject: [PATCH 10/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: make use of netlogon_creds_random_challenge() in netlogon_creds_cli.c This will avoid getting rejected by the server if we generate @@ -1041,13 +1041,13 @@ index 817d2cd041a..0f6ca11ff96 100644 subreq = dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_send(state, state->ev, state->binding_handle, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 10196846d019d0e2ccef51f32ddd39fc17ca60aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:10:53 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 11/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server:netlogon: make +Subject: [PATCH 11/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server:netlogon: make use of netlogon_creds_random_challenge() This is not strictly needed, but makes things more clear. @@ -1074,13 +1074,13 @@ index 87613b99fde..86b2f343e82 100644 *r->out.return_credentials = pipe_state->server_challenge; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 215aca6d11b900ee3cf11568d27bce77e0567653 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:10:53 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 12/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server:netlogon: make +Subject: [PATCH 12/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server:netlogon: make use of netlogon_creds_random_challenge() This is not strictly needed, but makes things more clear. @@ -1107,13 +1107,13 @@ index 023adfd99e9..de260d8051d 100644 *r->out.return_credentials = pipe_state->server_challenge; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 4551bf623426e8c543b287807d447feb69bb0f09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:15:26 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 13/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: add +Subject: [PATCH 13/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: add netlogon_creds_is_random_challenge() to avoid weak values This is the check Windows is using, so we won't generate challenges, @@ -1177,13 +1177,13 @@ index 82797d453ed..ad768682b9f 100644 void netlogon_creds_des_encrypt_LMKey(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct netr_LMSessionKey *key); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From f7e09421ace8fe60c0110770d909800d21ae6c8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:17:29 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 14/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: reject weak +Subject: [PATCH 14/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: reject weak client challenges in netlogon_creds_server_init() This implements the note from MS-NRPC 3.1.4.1 Session-Key Negotiation: @@ -1262,13 +1262,13 @@ index d319d9b879e..394505d166d 100644 ) -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 6bc86fb69bf50c89a334fd2dcbce6999a2360fb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 19:20:25 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 15/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: +Subject: [PATCH 15/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: protect netr_ServerPasswordSet2 against unencrypted passwords BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497 @@ -1357,13 +1357,13 @@ index de260d8051d..acbf077c6c7 100644 ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, NULL, &res, attrs, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 1f8dec1cbb37f3406d999425590f8a923586ccac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:53:50 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 16/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: +Subject: [PATCH 16/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: protect netr_ServerPasswordSet2 against unencrypted passwords BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497 @@ -1502,13 +1502,13 @@ index 86b2f343e82..fd9127b386f 100644 p->session_info, p->msg_ctx, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 2ad269be74481789ded62a3dcb538709c6d6e291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:18:45 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 17/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: +Subject: [PATCH 17/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: refactor dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check() We should debug more details about the failing request. @@ -1585,13 +1585,13 @@ index acbf077c6c7..b4326a4ecaa 100644 /* -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 57941290adb9a2fd4be9aa4a70f879a684b38dfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:56:53 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 18/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: +Subject: [PATCH 18/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: support "server require schannel:WORKSTATION$ = no" This allows to add expections for individual workstations, when using "server schannel = yes". @@ -1632,13 +1632,13 @@ index b4326a4ecaa..e7bafb31e83 100644 *creds_out = creds; return NT_STATUS_OK; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 779b37e825fe406892ff77be18c098d314cd387d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 13:37:26 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 19/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: log +Subject: [PATCH 19/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: log warnings about unsecure configurations MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 @@ -1759,13 +1759,13 @@ index e7bafb31e83..7668a9eb923 100644 return NT_STATUS_OK; } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 60b83fbda31c53c592a02f0ed43356a912021021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 14:57:22 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 20/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: +Subject: [PATCH 20/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: refactor dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 @@ -1860,13 +1860,13 @@ index fd9127b386f..8541571b459 100644 -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From c0a188b2696edb8f3ae9f7f56a820b11358bad98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 14:23:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 21/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: +Subject: [PATCH 21/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: support "server require schannel:WORKSTATION$ = no" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 @@ -1911,13 +1911,13 @@ index 8541571b459..f9b10103bd5 100644 *creds_out = creds; return NT_STATUS_OK; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From c9550b81b55316cf5d667502885fc248a5999fb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 14:42:52 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 22/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: log +Subject: [PATCH 22/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: log warnings about unsecure configurations MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 @@ -2039,13 +2039,13 @@ index f9b10103bd5..7f6704adbda 100644 return NT_STATUS_OK; } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 63f03e2e29e81f890a5d88c726cced6d3e7bbf5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 17:27:54 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 23/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): docs-xml: document 'server +Subject: [PATCH 23/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): docs-xml: document 'server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT' BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497 @@ -2141,13 +2141,13 @@ index 489492d79b1..b682d086f76 100644 + -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 8a40da45b7f4e7a9110daf010383c4fce30bd9b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gary Lockyer Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 12:39:54 +1200 -Subject: [PATCH 24/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4 torture rpc: Test empty +Subject: [PATCH 24/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4 torture rpc: Test empty machine acct pwd Ensure that an empty machine account password can't be set by @@ -2240,13 +2240,13 @@ index e11014922f8..0ba45f0c1da 100644 /* now try a random password */ password = generate_random_password(tctx, 8, 255); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 341a448cb69557410fa79dbb8a3d4adbab79d5b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gary Lockyer Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 15:57:34 +1200 -Subject: [PATCH 25/88] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4 torture rpc: repeated +Subject: [PATCH 25/97] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4 torture rpc: repeated bytes in client challenge Ensure that client challenges with the first 5 bytes identical are @@ -2615,13 +2615,13 @@ index 0ba45f0c1da..97c16688bc9 100644 } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 268303632f79d7395b452172c06b25ad68fe35fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 15:09:33 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 26/88] s4: torture: Add smb2.notify.handle-permissions test. +Subject: [PATCH 26/97] s4: torture: Add smb2.notify.handle-permissions test. Add knownfail entry. @@ -2744,13 +2744,13 @@ index ebb4f8a4f8e..b017491c8fb 100644 suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-NOTIFY tests"); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 448d4e99f8883a07589264cfca474c3dff8b5942 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 18:25:23 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 27/88] s3: smbd: Ensure change notifies can't get set unless +Subject: [PATCH 27/97] s3: smbd: Ensure change notifies can't get set unless the directory handle is open for SEC_DIR_LIST. Remove knownfail entry. @@ -2795,13 +2795,13 @@ index 44c0b09432e..d23c03bce41 100644 DEBUG(1, ("change_notify_create: fsp->notify != NULL, " "fname = %s\n", fsp->fsp_name->base_name)); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 041c86926999594f13b884522b1d9fcc65f92a52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Volker Lendecke Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 21:49:25 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 28/88] CVE-2020-14323 winbind: Fix invalid lookupsids DoS +Subject: [PATCH 28/97] CVE-2020-14323 winbind: Fix invalid lookupsids DoS A lookupsids request without extra_data will lead to "state->domain==NULL", which makes winbindd_lookupsids_recv trying to dereference it. @@ -2829,13 +2829,13 @@ index d28b5fa9f01..a289fd86f0f 100644 } if (request->extra_data.data[request->extra_len-1] != '\0') { -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From e6e77a3a503f9223ecbc2d32a1d24e20f834659f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Volker Lendecke Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 21:48:57 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 29/88] CVE-2020-14323 torture4: Add a simple test for invalid +Subject: [PATCH 29/97] CVE-2020-14323 torture4: Add a simple test for invalid lookup_sids winbind call We can't add this test before the fix, add it to knownfail and have the fix @@ -2897,13 +2897,13 @@ index 9745b621ca9..71f248c0d61 100644 suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "WINBIND - struct based protocol tests"); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 2b4763940d1826a2b4e5eaa1e2df338004cd9af0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Laurent Menase Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 12:31:53 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 30/88] winbind: Fix a memleak +Subject: [PATCH 30/97] winbind: Fix a memleak Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14388 Signed-off-by: Laurent Menase @@ -2931,13 +2931,13 @@ index 556b4523866..325ba1abd82 100644 } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From accc423a4eb9170ab0dbe4b2ba90ce83790e7a16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 13:39:58 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 31/88] s3:tests: Add test for 'valid users = DOMAIN\%U' +Subject: [PATCH 31/97] s3:tests: Add test for 'valid users = DOMAIN\%U' BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14467 @@ -2989,13 +2989,13 @@ index 1a46f11c85d..c813a8f9def 100755 + exit $failed -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 1c594e3734e3ffd2dfc615897ac95792878f2df4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 14:12:48 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 32/88] s3:smbd: Fix %U substitutions if it contains a domain +Subject: [PATCH 32/97] s3:smbd: Fix %U substitutions if it contains a domain name 'valid users = DOMAIN\%U' worked with Samba 3.6 and broke in a newer @@ -3050,13 +3050,13 @@ index 3cbf7f318a2..0705e197975 100644 if (sharename != NULL) { name = talloc_string_sub(mem_ctx, name, "%S", sharename); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From d93ddae23e1b378f771134e93d1b15e61e2278af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 11:48:26 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 33/88] docs: Fix documentation for require_membership_of of +Subject: [PATCH 33/97] docs: Fix documentation for require_membership_of of pam_winbind BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14358 @@ -3088,13 +3088,13 @@ index a9a227f1647..a61fb2d58e5 100644 -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From c9aea952eb3f8d83701abd6db4d48c8d93a8517a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 12:14:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 34/88] docs: Fix documentation for require_membership_of of +Subject: [PATCH 34/97] docs: Fix documentation for require_membership_of of pam_winbind.conf BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14358 @@ -3127,13 +3127,13 @@ index fcac1ee7036..d81a0bd6eba 100644 This option only operates during password authentication, and will not restrict access if a password is not required for any reason (such as SSH key-based login). -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From b04be6ffd3a1c9eda1f1dc78d60ad7b3a9b7471d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 21:05:07 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 35/88] Fix a typo in recent net man page changes +Subject: [PATCH 35/97] Fix a typo in recent net man page changes BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14406 @@ -3158,13 +3158,13 @@ index 69e18df8b6c..9b1d4458acc 100644 -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From a5a7dac759c2570861732c68efefb62371a29565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 22:01:49 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 36/88] selftest: add tests for binary +Subject: [PATCH 36/97] selftest: add tests for binary msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName Like the short names added implicitly by Windows DC. @@ -3236,13 +3236,13 @@ index 85257f445d8..eef4a31a6a7 100755 rm -f $dedicated_keytab_file -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 2769976aaa13474d2b5ee7b58ee17d5824dfa5a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 16:51:27 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 37/88] Properly handle msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName returned +Subject: [PATCH 37/97] Properly handle msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName returned from Windows DC Windows DC adds short names for each specified msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName @@ -3330,13 +3330,13 @@ index 02a628ee0e6..2684bba63ec 100644 DEBUG(1, ("Host account for %s does not have msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName.\n", machine_name)); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 9727953d482a3849d4ac1f40486bc567f6b77067 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2020 17:17:33 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 38/88] Fix usage of ldap_get_values_len for +Subject: [PATCH 38/97] Fix usage of ldap_get_values_len for msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14406 @@ -3372,13 +3372,13 @@ index 2684bba63ec..d1ce9cee2f0 100644 return NULL; } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From ec4cfe786d8c3cb67bb0e9224ae1822902c672d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Isaac Boukris Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2020 15:17:04 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 39/88] HACK:s3:winbind: Rely on the domain child for online +Subject: [PATCH 39/97] HACK:s3:winbind: Rely on the domain child for online check --- @@ -3435,13 +3435,13 @@ index 6e3277e5529..35b76a367aa 100644 /* Handle online/offline messages. */ -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 958bed1a1e5c9f334a1859bef14f4fe1657c3e49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 16:00:52 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 40/88] s3:smbd: Use fsp al the talloc memory context +Subject: [PATCH 40/97] s3:smbd: Use fsp al the talloc memory context Somehow the lck pointer gets freed before we call TALLOC_FREE(). @@ -3466,13 +3466,13 @@ index de557f53a20..9a24e331ab1 100644 &mtimespec); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 2591ae5d6a1dbd71391801b7bdf20bd37c8e8375 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 12:58:31 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 41/88] Revert "s3:smbd: Use fsp al the talloc memory context" +Subject: [PATCH 41/97] Revert "s3:smbd: Use fsp al the talloc memory context" This reverts commit 958bed1a1e5c9f334a1859bef14f4fe1657c3e49. --- @@ -3493,13 +3493,13 @@ index 9a24e331ab1..de557f53a20 100644 &mtimespec); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 2438619ec7ef18816f6b92c87a094851223d2bb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Khem Raj Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2020 22:42:09 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 42/88] nsswitch/nsstest.c: Avoid nss function conflicts with +Subject: [PATCH 42/97] nsswitch/nsstest.c: Avoid nss function conflicts with glibc nss.h glibc 2.32 will define these varibles [1] which results in conflicts @@ -3596,13 +3596,13 @@ index 6d92806cffc..46f96795f39 100644 static void nss_test_errors(void) -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From d5410b038bb3b1d31783c0d825dc933497f6eeaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 10:30:08 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 43/88] lib:util: Add basic memcache unit test +Subject: [PATCH 43/97] lib:util: Add basic memcache unit test BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14625 @@ -3772,13 +3772,13 @@ index e7639c4da27..e3f7d9acb4a 100644 [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/libcli/auth/test_ntlm_check")]) plantestsuite("samba.unittests.test_registry_regfio", "none", -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 7f6661b3c60319073d7fd58906b9a3728f421fed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 10:37:12 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 44/88] lib:util: Add cache oversize test for memcache +Subject: [PATCH 44/97] lib:util: Add cache oversize test for memcache BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14625 @@ -3856,13 +3856,13 @@ index 00000000000..0a74ace3003 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +^samba.unittests.memcache.torture_memcache_add_oversize -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 53c7f00510556aea15b640254934e514c1d88c25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 18:10:38 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 45/88] lib:util: Avoid free'ing our own pointer +Subject: [PATCH 45/97] lib:util: Avoid free'ing our own pointer MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit @@ -3932,13 +3932,13 @@ index 0a74ace3003..00000000000 @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -^samba.unittests.memcache.torture_memcache_add_oversize -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 138662453fb421609b4fa30487a53a50c085895f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Allison Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 15:48:08 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 46/88] s3: spoolss: Make parameters in call to user_ok_token() +Subject: [PATCH 46/97] s3: spoolss: Make parameters in call to user_ok_token() match all other uses. We already have p->session_info->unix_info->unix_name, we don't @@ -3972,13 +3972,13 @@ index f32b465afb6..c0f1803c2fa 100644 !W_ERROR_IS_OK(print_access_check(p->session_info, p->msg_ctx, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 9550eb620ff23fb9f9414c9de596789aae64aef1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Schneider Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 13:42:06 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 47/88] s3:smbd: Fix possible null pointer dereference in +Subject: [PATCH 47/97] s3:smbd: Fix possible null pointer dereference in token_contains_name() BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14572 @@ -4008,13 +4008,13 @@ index 0705e197975..64276c79fbe 100644 /* Check if username starts with domain name */ if (domain_len > 0) { -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 49a19805c6837df04dce449841d011fc67e0a7df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Volker Lendecke Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:50:12 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 48/88] passdb: Simplify sids_to_unixids() +Subject: [PATCH 48/97] passdb: Simplify sids_to_unixids() Best reviewed with "git show -b", there's a "continue" statement that changes subsequent indentation. @@ -4238,13 +4238,13 @@ index 1bb15ccb8b4..186ba17fda6 100644 } break; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 8b39b14dcaf104a2f3172917ef926a3fec5db891 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 09:12:59 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 49/88] CVE-2016-2124: s4:libcli/sesssetup: don't fallback to +Subject: [PATCH 49/97] CVE-2016-2124: s4:libcli/sesssetup: don't fallback to non spnego authentication if we require kerberos We should not send NTLM[v2] data on the wire if the user asked for kerberos @@ -4300,13 +4300,13 @@ index 6ee4929e8d7..a0a1f4baa56 100644 } else { struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 41cc796909aeade44c4f1e88923936ba4444278e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 10:40:28 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 50/88] CVE-2016-2124: s3:libsmb: don't fallback to non spnego +Subject: [PATCH 50/97] CVE-2016-2124: s3:libsmb: don't fallback to non spnego authentication if we require kerberos We should not send NTLM[v2] nor plaintext data on the wire if the user @@ -4338,13 +4338,13 @@ index 9bba2665663..9a69d4b7217 100644 /* * SessionSetupAndX was introduced by LANMAN 1.0. So we skip -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 3c1688714ea93cdb7c3088b8a5e5da3025e43b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ralph Boehme Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 08:06:45 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 51/88] s3/auth: use set_current_user_info() in +Subject: [PATCH 51/97] s3/auth: use set_current_user_info() in auth3_generate_session_info_pac() This delays reloading config slightly, but I don't see how could affect @@ -4394,13 +4394,13 @@ index 167d4e00367..0e9c423efef 100644 ntuser, ntdomain, rhost)); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From cf43f0a90b3025077479d37ad905fe730695e739 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Cabrero Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 11:51:08 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 52/88] selftest: Fix ktest usermap file +Subject: [PATCH 52/97] selftest: Fix ktest usermap file The user was not mapped: @@ -4429,13 +4429,13 @@ index 9e4da0e6a08..2eb5003112e 100755 close(USERMAP); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 703f43ea7817fa0ab423134a4c40bf9c37f90274 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 16:42:00 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 53/88] selftest/Samba3: replace (winbindd => "yes", skip_wait +Subject: [PATCH 53/97] selftest/Samba3: replace (winbindd => "yes", skip_wait => 1) with (winbindd => "offline") This is much more flexible and concentrates the logic in a single place. @@ -4489,13 +4489,13 @@ index 2eb5003112e..bbbefea44b7 100755 do { if ($ret != 0) { -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From eadbcf608a98c8ff90b2d5d91b61fc8100d2cc71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Fri, 22 Oct 2021 16:20:36 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 54/88] CVE-2020-25719 CVE-2020-25717: selftest: remove +Subject: [PATCH 54/97] CVE-2020-25719 CVE-2020-25717: selftest: remove "gensec:require_pac" settings BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801 @@ -4534,13 +4534,13 @@ index a7a6c4c9587..0f644661176 100755 log level = $ctx->{server_loglevel} lanman auth = Yes -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 628493ea5f0cda3851ab13a41b8018daa228132b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 17:29:34 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 55/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:winbindd: make sure we default to +Subject: [PATCH 55/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:winbindd: make sure we default to r->out.authoritative = true We need to make sure that temporary failures don't trigger a fallback @@ -4708,13 +4708,13 @@ index 3245c70bb8e..315eb366a52 100644 fstrcpy(resp->data.auth.nt_status_string, nt_errstr(result)); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From fc3b3940208c2f03ea3aeb4b6f7e609fa9f90648 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 17:29:34 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 56/88] CVE-2020-25717: s4:auth/ntlm: make sure +Subject: [PATCH 56/97] CVE-2020-25717: s4:auth/ntlm: make sure auth_check_password() defaults to r->out.authoritative = true We need to make sure that temporary failures don't trigger a fallback @@ -4744,13 +4744,13 @@ index 3a3fa7eaa59..f754bd5cd44 100644 ev, auth_ctx, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From ecd3a8af56dcd1aad43999a253175aa04b298eef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 57/88] CVE-2020-25717: s4:torture: start with authoritative = +Subject: [PATCH 57/97] CVE-2020-25717: s4:torture: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit @@ -4800,13 +4800,13 @@ index c237c82bbe7..72d0bf28fdd 100644 DATA_BLOB names_blob, chal, lm_resp, nt_resp; int i; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 3feb493c3dd5383712a41729ed6f770695acb8b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 58/88] CVE-2020-25717: s4:smb_server: start with authoritative +Subject: [PATCH 58/97] CVE-2020-25717: s4:smb_server: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit @@ -4842,13 +4842,13 @@ index 13f13934412..5e817eecd4b 100644 NTSTATUS status; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From e1a1787d1d3b64adc743eab4f626068b438d0e5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 59/88] CVE-2020-25717: s4:auth_simple: start with +Subject: [PATCH 59/97] CVE-2020-25717: s4:auth_simple: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit @@ -4875,13 +4875,13 @@ index fcd9050979d..da8f094a838 100644 NTSTATUS nt_status; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From e09409714301455ba7bbed1d80a9c90c05257aaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 60/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: start with authoritative +Subject: [PATCH 60/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit @@ -4967,13 +4967,13 @@ index 41591a8de33..fc0fc19bacb 100644 uchar lm_key[16]; static const uchar zeros[8] = { 0, }; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 26570ee2e981cc5d44eeeed020a051a4771470fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 61/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:torture: start with authoritative = +Subject: [PATCH 61/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:torture: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit @@ -5004,13 +5004,13 @@ index 64bc45e6a7c..48190e78bf8 100644 SMBOWFencrypt(pdb_get_nt_passwd(pdb_entry), challenge_8, local_nt_response); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 36af26aac042ce48ae912d0ab7ce398280d81c93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 62/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:rpcclient: start with authoritative +Subject: [PATCH 62/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:rpcclient: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit @@ -5037,13 +5037,13 @@ index 631740562c6..30fa1ed7816 100644 uint16_t validation_level; union netr_Validation *validation = NULL; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 8eec50d65a10baa4e282c4a833c3cb202cd33255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 63/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: start with authoritative = 1 +Subject: [PATCH 63/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit that we don't miss important places. @@ -5087,13 +5087,13 @@ index a71c75631d7..bf7ccb4348c 100644 nt_status = make_auth4_context_s4(auth_context, mem_ctx, &auth4_context); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 46bc67c24c83940ef56cfa5dbbdb8544c290f200 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 17:42:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 64/88] CVE-2020-25717: auth/ntlmssp: start with authoritative +Subject: [PATCH 64/97] CVE-2020-25717: auth/ntlmssp: start with authoritative = 1 This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit @@ -5120,13 +5120,13 @@ index 140e89daeb1..eebada670be 100644 status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password_recv(subreq, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 986642f066c3fdf187a8799898196a23cb9d532c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Cabrero Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 10:43:40 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 65/88] CVE-2020-25717: loadparm: Add new parameter "min domain +Subject: [PATCH 65/97] CVE-2020-25717: loadparm: Add new parameter "min domain uid" BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801 @@ -5219,13 +5219,13 @@ index 0db44e92d19..57d1d909099 100644 apply_lp_set_cmdline(); } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 16fa6601a3517c723e90dfb8b1a086df2616e668 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 19:57:18 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 66/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let +Subject: [PATCH 66/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() forward the low level errors Mapping everything to ACCESS_DENIED makes it hard to debug problems, @@ -5253,13 +5253,13 @@ index 4ef2270cb34..26a38f92b30 100644 } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 10a4bdbe4a16fec1bd9b212736a9d26500e0981e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Cabrero Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 10:45:11 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 67/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Check minimum domain uid +Subject: [PATCH 67/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Check minimum domain uid BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801 BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556 @@ -5300,13 +5300,13 @@ index 8ff20c33759..8801d3f0f0b 100644 result = make_server_info(tmp_ctx); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 58bea3837cfbeba5cd5c56060a42117fffedbda4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 17:40:30 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 68/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: we should not try to +Subject: [PATCH 68/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: we should not try to autocreate the guest account We should avoid autocreation of users as much as possible. @@ -5333,13 +5333,13 @@ index 8998f9c8f8a..074e8c7eb71 100644 /* extra sanity check that the guest account is valid */ -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From e78afbcff415d78cb29b65204fefeb0355d6651e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 18:08:20 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 69/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: no longer let check_account() +Subject: [PATCH 69/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: no longer let check_account() autocreate local users So far we autocreated local user accounts based on just the @@ -5372,13 +5372,13 @@ index 8801d3f0f0b..6ee500493e6 100644 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find authenticated user %s via " "getpwnam(), denying access.\n", dom_user)); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From a3ffab81c235aae479262cca73cf4361f76f7f9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ralph Boehme Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 12:33:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 70/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: remove fallbacks in +Subject: [PATCH 70/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: remove fallbacks in smb_getpwnam() So far we tried getpwnam("DOMAIN\account") first and @@ -5516,13 +5516,13 @@ index 6ee500493e6..161e05c2106 100644 /* Create local user if requested but only if winbindd -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 9a1bb168388205f5a2bfa459a5da63c5046eaa7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 18:03:55 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 71/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: don't let create_local_token +Subject: [PATCH 71/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: don't let create_local_token depend on !winbind_ping() We always require a running winbindd on a domain member, so @@ -5561,13 +5561,13 @@ index 161e05c2106..c0e5cfd7fa8 100644 status = create_token_from_username(session_info, server_info->unix_name, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From bbe5c6693ba6954dab5bfef9f8c3778164cd879e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Bokovoy Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 18:50:45 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 72/88] CVE-2020-25717: Add FreeIPA domain controller role +Subject: [PATCH 72/97] CVE-2020-25717: Add FreeIPA domain controller role As we want to reduce use of 'classic domain controller' role but FreeIPA relies on it internally, add a separate role to mark FreeIPA domain @@ -5974,13 +5974,13 @@ index 51fed4da62b..1f09b721408 100644 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER: -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 3a8b4d3b410508dfb0538376046a5b38c53f9568 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 18:11:57 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 73/88] CVE-2020-25717: auth/gensec: always require a PAC in +Subject: [PATCH 73/97] CVE-2020-25717: auth/gensec: always require a PAC in domain mode (DC or member) AD domains always provide a PAC unless UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED is set @@ -6044,13 +6044,13 @@ index e185acc0c20..694661b53b5 100644 DBG_NOTICE("Unable to find PAC for %s, resorting to local " "user lookup\n", principal_string); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 15cca0f7ee6f4b8d96b6b650b2d009b030a2bc5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2021 23:17:19 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 74/88] CVE-2020-25717: s4:auth: remove unused +Subject: [PATCH 74/97] CVE-2020-25717: s4:auth: remove unused auth_generate_session_info_principal() We'll require a PAC at the main gensec layer already. @@ -6188,13 +6188,13 @@ index fb88cb87f66..a8c7d8b4b85 100644 _PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From ec14a33f17e638870c997b56d4b5ce9096cbb27a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 12:27:28 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 75/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: fix memory leaks in +Subject: [PATCH 75/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: fix memory leaks in ntlm_auth_generate_session_info_pac() BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801 @@ -6262,13 +6262,13 @@ index 3f70732a837..fefdd32bf11 100644 DEBUG(10, ("Domain is [%s] (using Winbind)\n", domain)); } -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 9e036a77eca721c4ea23c3f629d9e504d5780f79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 12:44:01 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 76/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: let +Subject: [PATCH 76/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: let ntlm_auth_generate_session_info_pac() base the name on the PAC LOGON_INFO only @@ -6404,13 +6404,13 @@ index fefdd32bf11..ff2fd30a9ae 100644 if (!unixuser) { status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 4c01fd62e30b8e1137e7de01ecb41c94550dac24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 19:42:20 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 77/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let +Subject: [PATCH 77/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() delegate everything to make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo() @@ -6725,13 +6725,13 @@ index 26a38f92b30..3099e8f9057 100644 status = NT_STATUS_OK; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 2d7cd152d95e091447731b3699be9654ca13cffc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 17:14:01 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 78/88] CVE-2020-25717: selftest: configure 'ktest' env with +Subject: [PATCH 78/97] CVE-2020-25717: selftest: configure 'ktest' env with winbindd and idmap_autorid The 'ktest' environment was/is designed to test kerberos in an active @@ -6776,13 +6776,13 @@ index bbbefea44b7..7034127ef0b 100755 } return $ret; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 6b4c3693d4ae3c54fd4c890b71829ac582436dee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 18:12:49 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 79/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let +Subject: [PATCH 79/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() reject a PAC in standalone mode We should be strict in standalone mode, that we only support MIT realms @@ -6861,13 +6861,13 @@ index 3099e8f9057..23f746c078e 100644 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(1, ("Failed to map kerberos pac to server info (%s)\n", -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 6f6a1fedb97d119a7f15831f7295b1774e806ba8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 17:59:59 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 80/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify +Subject: [PATCH 80/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify get_user_from_kerberos_info() by removing the unused logon_info argument This code is only every called in standalone mode on a MIT realm, @@ -7011,13 +7011,13 @@ index 074e8c7eb71..7b69ca6c222 100644 bool *mapped_to_guest, char **ntuser, -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 8fd8d952c4396484f822c51f71667baaf49402b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Metzmacher Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 18:03:04 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 81/88] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify +Subject: [PATCH 81/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify make_session_info_krb5() by removing unused arguments This is only ever be called in standalone mode with an MIT realm, @@ -7114,13 +7114,13 @@ index 7b69ca6c222..b8f37cbeee0 100644 { return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From bf0696ec4f3080ebd0b61cac5a05a9284ccabda8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joseph Sutton Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 15:39:19 +1200 -Subject: [PATCH 82/88] krb5pac.idl: Add ticket checksum PAC buffer type +Subject: [PATCH 82/97] krb5pac.idl: Add ticket checksum PAC buffer type Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett @@ -7154,13 +7154,13 @@ index f27e7243ee4..711b7f94b6c 100644 in such a way that they are backwards compatible with existing servers. This makes it safe to just use a [default] for -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 7a9f618fdbf32872594f47dd4bc83ce087af4bbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joseph Sutton Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 15:40:59 +1200 -Subject: [PATCH 83/88] security.idl: Add well-known SIDs for FAST +Subject: [PATCH 83/97] security.idl: Add well-known SIDs for FAST Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett @@ -7186,13 +7186,13 @@ index 5930f448955..e6065a35691 100644 * http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh509017(v=ws.10).aspx */ -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 7713b56a8a8b26e05aa9a517348e3f95da1144a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joseph Sutton Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 16:15:26 +1300 -Subject: [PATCH 84/88] krb5pac.idl: Add missing buffer type values +Subject: [PATCH 84/97] krb5pac.idl: Add missing buffer type values BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14642 @@ -7218,13 +7218,13 @@ index 711b7f94b6c..141894ec5f1 100644 } PAC_TYPE; -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From a85bf1d86d6e081c781cc93a8e7aaa049c3818d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joseph Sutton Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 20:33:38 +1300 -Subject: [PATCH 85/88] CVE-2020-25719 krb5pac.idl: Add PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO PAC +Subject: [PATCH 85/97] CVE-2020-25719 krb5pac.idl: Add PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO PAC buffer type BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14561 @@ -7275,13 +7275,13 @@ index 141894ec5f1..4bfec2de5e6 100644 in such a way that they are backwards compatible with existing servers. This makes it safe to just use a [default] for -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 57e4c415ecae66ee984a30eb66d5d248e0e8587d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joseph Sutton Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 20:33:49 +1300 -Subject: [PATCH 86/88] CVE-2020-25719 krb5pac.idl: Add PAC_REQUESTER_SID PAC +Subject: [PATCH 86/97] CVE-2020-25719 krb5pac.idl: Add PAC_REQUESTER_SID PAC buffer type BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14561 @@ -7326,13 +7326,13 @@ index 4bfec2de5e6..f750359a069 100644 in such a way that they are backwards compatible with existing servers. This makes it safe to just use a [default] for -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 7782a97868ead29b6e87fa98dcef8dbc2706b67d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Bartlett Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2021 11:20:19 +1300 -Subject: [PATCH 87/88] CVE-2020-25721 krb5pac: Add new buffers for +Subject: [PATCH 87/97] CVE-2020-25721 krb5pac: Add new buffers for samAccountName and objectSID These appear when PAC_UPN_DNS_FLAG_HAS_SAM_NAME_AND_SID is set. @@ -7413,13 +7413,13 @@ index a9ae2c4a789..57b28df9e52 100644 NDR_CHECK(ndr_push_subcontext_start(_ndr_info_pad, &_ndr_info, 0, _ndr_size)); NDR_CHECK(ndr_push_set_switch_value(_ndr_info, r->info, r->type)); -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 From 44e8dd1a9a3c02dee31497fe20411758fce1acf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Bokovoy Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 19:06:01 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 88/88] IPA DC: add missing checks +Subject: [PATCH 88/97] IPA DC: add missing checks When introducing FreeIPA support, two places were forgotten: @@ -7465,5 +7465,1084 @@ index 57bfc596005..3f77856457e 100644 sid = dom_sid_dup(p->mem_ctx, get_global_sam_sid()); if (!sid) { -- -2.33.1 +2.34.1 + + +From c64bcd68614871cdddc9fe37c860729f490b4da1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 15:27:58 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 89/97] CVE-2020-25717: idmap_nss: verify that the name of the + sid belongs to the configured domain + +We already check the sid belongs to the domain, but checking the name +too feels better and make it easier to understand. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme + +[abartlet@samba.org backorted from commit bfd093648b4af51d104096c0cb3535e8706671e5 + as header libcli/security/dom_sid.h was not present for struct dom_sid_buf] + +[abartlet@samba.org fix CVE marker] +--- + source3/winbindd/idmap_nss.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/winbindd/idmap_nss.c b/source3/winbindd/idmap_nss.c +index 3fe98cbc729..243b67ccafd 100644 +--- a/source3/winbindd/idmap_nss.c ++++ b/source3/winbindd/idmap_nss.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include "nsswitch/winbind_client.h" + #include "idmap.h" + #include "lib/winbind_util.h" ++#include "libcli/security/dom_sid.h" + + #undef DBGC_CLASS + #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_IDMAP +@@ -135,18 +136,21 @@ static NTSTATUS idmap_nss_sids_to_unixids(struct idmap_domain *dom, struct id_ma + for (i = 0; ids[i]; i++) { + struct group *gr; + enum lsa_SidType type; +- const char *p = NULL; ++ const char *_domain = NULL; ++ const char *_name = NULL; ++ char *domain = NULL; + char *name = NULL; + bool ret; + + /* by default calls to winbindd are disabled + the following call will not recurse so this is safe */ + (void)winbind_on(); +- ret = winbind_lookup_sid(talloc_tos(), ids[i]->sid, NULL, +- &p, &type); ++ ret = winbind_lookup_sid(talloc_tos(), ++ ids[i]->sid, ++ &_domain, ++ &_name, ++ &type); + (void)winbind_off(); +- name = discard_const_p(char, p); +- + if (!ret) { + /* TODO: how do we know if the name is really not mapped, + * or something just failed ? */ +@@ -154,6 +158,18 @@ static NTSTATUS idmap_nss_sids_to_unixids(struct idmap_domain *dom, struct id_ma + continue; + } + ++ domain = discard_const_p(char, _domain); ++ name = discard_const_p(char, _name); ++ ++ if (!strequal(domain, dom->name)) { ++ struct dom_sid_buf buf; ++ DBG_ERR("DOMAIN[%s] ignoring SID[%s] belongs to %s [%s\\%s]\n", ++ dom->name, dom_sid_str_buf(ids[i]->sid, &buf), ++ sid_type_lookup(type), domain, name); ++ ids[i]->status = ID_UNMAPPED; ++ continue; ++ } ++ + switch (type) { + case SID_NAME_USER: { + struct passwd *pw; +@@ -186,6 +202,7 @@ static NTSTATUS idmap_nss_sids_to_unixids(struct idmap_domain *dom, struct id_ma + ids[i]->status = ID_UNKNOWN; + break; + } ++ TALLOC_FREE(domain); + TALLOC_FREE(name); + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; +-- +2.34.1 + + +From c7d277ef2c902482eca00fc981bf340a088fbfe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Joseph Sutton +Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 20:53:30 +1300 +Subject: [PATCH 90/97] CVE-2020-25717: nsswitch/nsstest.c: Lower 'non existent + uid' to make room for new accounts + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901 + +Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher +Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme +(cherry picked from commit fdbee5e074ebd76d659613b8b7114d70f938c38a) +--- + nsswitch/nsstest.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nsswitch/nsstest.c b/nsswitch/nsstest.c +index 46f96795f39..8ce7493d1b6 100644 +--- a/nsswitch/nsstest.c ++++ b/nsswitch/nsstest.c +@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static void nss_test_errors(void) + printf("ERROR Non existent user gave error %d\n", last_error); + } + +- pwd = getpwuid(0xFFF0); ++ pwd = getpwuid(0xFF00); + if (pwd || last_error != NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND) { + total_errors++; + printf("ERROR Non existent uid gave error %d\n", last_error); +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 0ff9bba35a043267a2781c294f5832378cd6da54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Bartlett +Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 16:10:31 +1300 +Subject: [PATCH 91/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Fallback to a SID/UID based + mapping if the named based lookup fails +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Before the CVE-2020-25717 fixes we had a fallback from +getpwnam('DOMAIN\user') to getpwnam('user') which was very dangerous and +unpredictable. + +Now we do the fallback based on sid_to_uid() followed by +getpwuid() on the returned uid. + +This obsoletes 'username map [script]' based workaround adviced +for CVE-2020-25717, when nss_winbindd is not used or +idmap_nss is actually used. + +In future we may decide to prefer or only do the SID/UID based +lookup, but for now we want to keep this unchanged as much as possible. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901 + +Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher + +[metze@samba.org moved the new logic into the fallback codepath only + in order to avoid behavior changes as much as possible] +Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme + +Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme +Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 15 19:01:56 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184 + +[abartlet@samba.org backported from commit 0a546be05295a7e4a552f9f4f0c74aeb2e9a0d6e + as usage.py is not present in Samba 4.10] +--- + source3/auth/auth_util.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_util.c b/source3/auth/auth_util.c +index c0e5cfd7fa8..b463059f259 100644 +--- a/source3/auth/auth_util.c ++++ b/source3/auth/auth_util.c +@@ -1837,7 +1837,9 @@ const struct auth_session_info *get_session_info_system(void) + ***************************************************************************/ + + static NTSTATUS check_account(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *domain, +- const char *username, char **found_username, ++ const char *username, ++ const struct dom_sid *sid, ++ char **found_username, + struct passwd **pwd, + bool *username_was_mapped) + { +@@ -1872,6 +1874,31 @@ static NTSTATUS check_account(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *domain, + } + + passwd = smb_getpwnam(mem_ctx, dom_user, &real_username, false); ++ if (!passwd && !*username_was_mapped) { ++ struct dom_sid_buf buf; ++ uid_t uid; ++ bool ok; ++ ++ DBG_DEBUG("Failed to find authenticated user %s via " ++ "getpwnam(), fallback to sid_to_uid(%s).\n", ++ dom_user, dom_sid_str_buf(sid, &buf)); ++ ++ ok = sid_to_uid(sid, &uid); ++ if (!ok) { ++ DBG_ERR("Failed to convert SID %s to a UID (dom_user[%s])\n", ++ dom_sid_str_buf(sid, &buf), dom_user); ++ return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; ++ } ++ passwd = getpwuid_alloc(mem_ctx, uid); ++ if (!passwd) { ++ DBG_ERR("Failed to find local account with UID %lld for SID %s (dom_user[%s])\n", ++ (long long)uid, ++ dom_sid_str_buf(sid, &buf), ++ dom_user); ++ return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; ++ } ++ real_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, passwd->pw_name); ++ } + if (!passwd) { + DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find authenticated user %s via " + "getpwnam(), denying access.\n", dom_user)); +@@ -2017,6 +2044,7 @@ NTSTATUS make_server_info_info3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + bool username_was_mapped; + struct passwd *pwd; + struct auth_serversupplied_info *result; ++ struct dom_sid sid; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_stackframe(); + + /* +@@ -2063,9 +2091,13 @@ NTSTATUS make_server_info_info3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + + /* this call will try to create the user if necessary */ + ++ sid_copy(&sid, info3->base.domain_sid); ++ sid_append_rid(&sid, info3->base.rid); ++ + nt_status = check_account(tmp_ctx, + nt_domain, + nt_username, ++ &sid, + &found_username, + &pwd, + &username_was_mapped); +-- +2.34.1 + + +From f035c041e42594bacfe7c3f4e5ea5d05399e1c5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2021 10:57:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 92/97] CVE-2020-25717: s3-auth: fix MIT Realm regression + +This looks like a regression introduced by the recent security fixes. This +commit should hopefully fixes it. + +As a quick solution it might be possible to use the username map script based on +the example in https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901#c0. We're not +sure this behaves identical, but it might work in the standalone server case. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14922 + +Reported-at: https://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/2021-November/238720.html + +Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +(cherry picked from commit 1e61de8306604a0d3858342df8a1d2412d8d418b) +--- + source3/auth/user_krb5.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/auth/user_krb5.c b/source3/auth/user_krb5.c +index b8f37cbeee0..169bf563368 100644 +--- a/source3/auth/user_krb5.c ++++ b/source3/auth/user_krb5.c +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ NTSTATUS get_user_from_kerberos_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + char *fuser = NULL; + char *unixuser = NULL; + struct passwd *pw = NULL; ++ bool may_retry = false; + + DEBUG(3, ("Kerberos ticket principal name is [%s]\n", princ_name)); + +@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ NTSTATUS get_user_from_kerberos_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + domain = realm; + } else { + domain = lp_workgroup(); ++ may_retry = true; + } + + fuser = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, +@@ -89,6 +91,13 @@ NTSTATUS get_user_from_kerberos_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + *mapped_to_guest = false; + + pw = smb_getpwnam(mem_ctx, fuser, &unixuser, true); ++ if (may_retry && pw == NULL && !*is_mapped) { ++ fuser = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, user); ++ if (!fuser) { ++ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; ++ } ++ pw = smb_getpwnam(mem_ctx, fuser, &unixuser, true); ++ } + if (pw) { + if (!unixuser) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 8b8d1b20b16381c305c23ce03a559b8c7de67f5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 16:48:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 93/97] CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: add defines for icon + lengths + +From https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1740.txt + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c b/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c +index afad70ce180..3a35620bfe4 100644 +--- a/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c ++++ b/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c +@@ -283,6 +283,8 @@ typedef enum {ADOUBLE_META, ADOUBLE_RSRC} adouble_type_t; + #define ADEDLEN_MACFILEI 4 + #define ADEDLEN_PRODOSFILEI 8 + #define ADEDLEN_MSDOSFILEI 2 ++#define ADEDLEN_ICONBW 128 ++#define ADEDLEN_ICONCOL 1024 + #define ADEDLEN_DID 4 + #define ADEDLEN_PRIVDEV 8 + #define ADEDLEN_PRIVINO 8 +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 3f2e9a6de36c086cff0bb3296f00c85a37a2653c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Sat, 20 Nov 2021 16:36:42 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 94/97] CVE-2021-44142: smbd: add Netatalk xattr used by + vfs_fruit to the list of private Samba xattrs + +This is an internal xattr that should not be user visible. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +[slow@samba.org: conflict due to changed includes in source3/smbd/trans2.c] +--- + source3/smbd/trans2.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/smbd/trans2.c b/source3/smbd/trans2.c +index f8d987bbe63..406087c0419 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/trans2.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/trans2.c +@@ -176,6 +176,16 @@ void aapl_force_zero_file_id(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn) + Refuse to allow clients to overwrite our private xattrs. + ****************************************************************************/ + ++/* ++ * Taken from vfs_fruit.c ++ */ ++#define NETATALK_META_XATTR "org.netatalk.Metadata" ++#if defined(HAVE_ATTROPEN) ++#define AFPINFO_EA_NETATALK NETATALK_META_XATTR ++#else ++#define AFPINFO_EA_NETATALK "user." NETATALK_META_XATTR ++#endif ++ + bool samba_private_attr_name(const char *unix_ea_name) + { + static const char * const prohibited_ea_names[] = { +@@ -183,6 +193,7 @@ bool samba_private_attr_name(const char *unix_ea_name) + SAMBA_XATTR_DOS_ATTRIB, + SAMBA_XATTR_MARKER, + XATTR_NTACL_NAME, ++ AFPINFO_EA_NETATALK, + NULL + }; + +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 00287584703e9e91e804e0f182bd844b7c436716 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2021 07:19:32 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 95/97] CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: harden ad_unpack_xattrs() + +This ensures ad_unpack_xattrs() is only called for an ad_type of ADOUBLE_RSRC, +which is used for parsing ._ AppleDouble sidecar files, and the buffer +ad->ad_data is AD_XATTR_MAX_HDR_SIZE bytes large which is a prerequisite for all +buffer out-of-bounds access checks in ad_unpack_xattrs(). + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c b/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c +index 3a35620bfe4..76139e51047 100644 +--- a/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c ++++ b/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c +@@ -728,14 +728,27 @@ static bool ad_pack(struct adouble *ad) + static bool ad_unpack_xattrs(struct adouble *ad) + { + struct ad_xattr_header *h = &ad->adx_header; ++ size_t bufsize = talloc_get_size(ad->ad_data); + const char *p = ad->ad_data; + uint32_t hoff; + uint32_t i; + ++ if (ad->ad_type != ADOUBLE_RSRC) { ++ return false; ++ } ++ + if (ad_getentrylen(ad, ADEID_FINDERI) <= ADEDLEN_FINDERI) { + return true; + } + ++ /* ++ * Ensure the buffer ad->ad_data was allocated by ad_alloc() for an ++ * ADOUBLE_RSRC type (._ AppleDouble file on-disk). ++ */ ++ if (bufsize != AD_XATTR_MAX_HDR_SIZE) { ++ return false; ++ } ++ + /* 2 bytes padding */ + hoff = ad_getentryoff(ad, ADEID_FINDERI) + ADEDLEN_FINDERI + 2; + +@@ -985,11 +998,12 @@ static bool ad_unpack(struct adouble *ad, const size_t nentries, + ad->ad_eid[eid].ade_len = len; + } + +- ok = ad_unpack_xattrs(ad); +- if (!ok) { +- return false; ++ if (ad->ad_type == ADOUBLE_RSRC) { ++ ok = ad_unpack_xattrs(ad); ++ if (!ok) { ++ return false; ++ } + } +- + return true; + } + +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 94141fa38e082e4ab50be6c2f79c8506e72bc274 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2021 15:04:03 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 96/97] CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: add basic cmocka tests + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +[slow@samba.org: conflict due to missing test in selftest/tests.py] +--- + selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble | 3 + + selftest/tests.py | 2 + + source3/lib/test_adouble.c | 393 +++++++++++++++++++ + source3/wscript_build | 5 + + 4 files changed, 403 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble + create mode 100644 source3/lib/test_adouble.c + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..8b0314f2fae +--- /dev/null ++++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++^samba.unittests.adouble.parse_abouble_finderinfo2\(none\) ++^samba.unittests.adouble.parse_abouble_finderinfo3\(none\) ++^samba.unittests.adouble.parse_abouble_date2\(none\) +diff --git a/selftest/tests.py b/selftest/tests.py +index e3f7d9acb4a..4bc4d301c4c 100644 +--- a/selftest/tests.py ++++ b/selftest/tests.py +@@ -260,3 +260,5 @@ plantestsuite("samba.unittests.ntlm_check", "none", + [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/libcli/auth/test_ntlm_check")]) + plantestsuite("samba.unittests.test_registry_regfio", "none", + [os.path.join(bindir(), "default/source3/test_registry_regfio")]) ++plantestsuite("samba.unittests.adouble", "none", ++ [os.path.join(bindir(), "test_adouble")]) +diff --git a/source3/lib/test_adouble.c b/source3/lib/test_adouble.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..667d2a7542e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/source3/lib/test_adouble.c +@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ ++/* ++ * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 2021 Ralph Boehme ++ * ++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify ++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ++ * GNU General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with this program. If not, see . ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++extern NTSTATUS vfs_fruit_init(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx); ++ ++#include "vfs_fruit.c" ++#include ++ ++ ++static int setup_talloc_context(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe(); ++ ++ *state = frame; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int teardown_talloc_context(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ ++ TALLOC_FREE(frame); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Basic and sane buffer. ++ */ ++static uint8_t ad_basic[] = { ++ 0x00, 0x05, 0x16, 0x07, /* Magic */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, /* Version */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, /* Count */ ++ /* adentry 1: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, /* eid: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x32, /* offset */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, /* length */ ++ /* adentry 2: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* eid: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, /* offset */ ++ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* length */ ++ /* FinderInfo data: 32 bytes */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * An empty FinderInfo entry. ++ */ ++static uint8_t ad_finderinfo1[] = { ++ 0x00, 0x05, 0x16, 0x07, /* Magic */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, /* Version */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, /* Count */ ++ /* adentry 1: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, /* eid: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, /* off: points at end of buffer */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* len: 0, so off+len don't exceed bufferlen */ ++ /* adentry 2: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* eid: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, /* offset */ ++ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* length */ ++ /* FinderInfo data: 32 bytes */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * A dangerous FinderInfo with correct length exceeding buffer by one byte. ++ */ ++static uint8_t ad_finderinfo2[] = { ++ 0x00, 0x05, 0x16, 0x07, /* Magic */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, /* Version */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, /* Count */ ++ /* adentry 1: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, /* eid: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x33, /* off: points at beginng of data + 1 */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, /* len: 32, so off+len exceeds bufferlen by 1 */ ++ /* adentry 2: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* eid: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, /* offset */ ++ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* length */ ++ /* FinderInfo data: 32 bytes */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++}; ++ ++static uint8_t ad_finderinfo3[] = { ++ 0x00, 0x05, 0x16, 0x07, /* Magic */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, /* Version */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, /* Count */ ++ /* adentry 1: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, /* eid: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x33, /* off: points at beginng of data + 1 */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1f, /* len: 31, so off+len don't exceed buf */ ++ /* adentry 2: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* eid: Resourcefork */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, /* offset */ ++ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, /* length */ ++ /* FinderInfo data: 32 bytes */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * A dangerous name entry. ++ */ ++static uint8_t ad_name[] = { ++ 0x00, 0x05, 0x16, 0x07, /* Magic */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, /* Version */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, /* Count */ ++ /* adentry 1: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, /* eid: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x32, /* offset */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, /* length */ ++ /* adentry 2: Name */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, /* eid: Name */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, /* off: points at end of buffer */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* len: 1, so off+len exceeds bufferlen */ ++ /* FinderInfo data: 32 bytes */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * A empty ADEID_FILEDATESI entry. ++ */ ++static uint8_t ad_date1[] = { ++ 0x00, 0x05, 0x16, 0x07, /* Magic */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, /* Version */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, /* Count */ ++ /* adentry 1: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, /* eid: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x32, /* offset */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, /* length */ ++ /* adentry 2: Dates */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, /* eid: dates */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, /* off: end of buffer */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* len: 0, empty entry, valid */ ++ /* FinderInfo data: 32 bytes */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * A dangerous ADEID_FILEDATESI entry, invalid length. ++ */ ++static uint8_t ad_date2[] = { ++ 0x00, 0x05, 0x16, 0x07, /* Magic */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, /* Version */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Filler */ ++ 0x00, 0x02, /* Count */ ++ /* adentry 1: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, /* eid: FinderInfo */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x32, /* offset */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, /* length */ ++ /* adentry 2: Dates */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, /* eid: dates */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x43, /* off: FinderInfo buf but one byte short */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, /* len: 15, so off+len don't exceed bufferlen */ ++ /* FinderInfo data: 32 bytes */ ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ++}; ++ ++static struct adouble *parse_adouble(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, ++ uint8_t *adbuf, ++ size_t adsize, ++ off_t filesize) ++{ ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ bool ok; ++ ++ ad = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct adouble); ++ ad->ad_data = talloc_zero_size(ad, adsize); ++ assert_non_null(ad); ++ ++ memcpy(ad->ad_data, adbuf, adsize); ++ ++ ok = ad_unpack(ad, 2, filesize); ++ if (!ok) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return ad; ++} ++ ++static void parse_abouble_basic(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ char *p = NULL; ++ ++ ad = parse_adouble(frame, ad_basic, sizeof(ad_basic), 0xffffff52); ++ assert_non_null(ad); ++ ++ p = ad_get_entry(ad, ADEID_FINDERI); ++ assert_non_null(p); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void parse_abouble_finderinfo1(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ char *p = NULL; ++ ++ ad = parse_adouble(frame, ++ ad_finderinfo1, ++ sizeof(ad_finderinfo1), ++ 0xffffff52); ++ assert_non_null(ad); ++ ++ p = ad_get_entry(ad, ADEID_FINDERI); ++ assert_null(p); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void parse_abouble_finderinfo2(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ ++ ad = parse_adouble(frame, ++ ad_finderinfo2, ++ sizeof(ad_finderinfo2), ++ 0xffffff52); ++ assert_null(ad); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void parse_abouble_finderinfo3(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ ++ ad = parse_adouble(frame, ++ ad_finderinfo3, ++ sizeof(ad_finderinfo3), ++ 0xffffff52); ++ assert_null(ad); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void parse_abouble_name(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ ++ ad = parse_adouble(frame, ad_name, sizeof(ad_name), 0x52); ++ assert_null(ad); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void parse_abouble_date1(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ char *p = NULL; ++ ++ ad = parse_adouble(frame, ad_date1, sizeof(ad_date1), 0x52); ++ assert_non_null(ad); ++ ++ p = ad_get_entry(ad, ADEID_FILEDATESI); ++ assert_null(p); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++static void parse_abouble_date2(void **state) ++{ ++ TALLOC_CTX *frame = *state; ++ struct adouble *ad = NULL; ++ ++ ad = parse_adouble(frame, ad_date2, sizeof(ad_date2), 0x52); ++ assert_null(ad); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++int main(int argc, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ const struct CMUnitTest tests[] = { ++ cmocka_unit_test(parse_abouble_basic), ++ cmocka_unit_test(parse_abouble_finderinfo1), ++ cmocka_unit_test(parse_abouble_finderinfo2), ++ cmocka_unit_test(parse_abouble_finderinfo3), ++ cmocka_unit_test(parse_abouble_name), ++ cmocka_unit_test(parse_abouble_date1), ++ cmocka_unit_test(parse_abouble_date2), ++ }; ++ ++ if (argc == 2) { ++ cmocka_set_test_filter(argv[1]); ++ } ++ cmocka_set_message_output(CM_OUTPUT_SUBUNIT); ++ ++ rc = cmocka_run_group_tests(tests, ++ setup_talloc_context, ++ teardown_talloc_context); ++ ++ return rc; ++} +diff --git a/source3/wscript_build b/source3/wscript_build +index 26e251f442a..5230ae32934 100644 +--- a/source3/wscript_build ++++ b/source3/wscript_build +@@ -1080,6 +1080,11 @@ bld.SAMBA3_SUBSYSTEM('SPOOLSSD', + + ########################## BINARIES ################################# + ++bld.SAMBA3_BINARY('test_adouble', ++ source='lib/test_adouble.c', ++ deps='smbd_base STRING_REPLACE cmocka OFFLOAD_TOKEN', ++ install=False) ++ + bld.SAMBA3_BINARY('smbd/smbd', + source='smbd/server.c smbd/smbd_cleanupd.c', + deps=''' +-- +2.34.1 + + +From 5c1c2ea3dbe554f621014bb2b3133c0859dce2da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ralph Boehme +Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 17:03:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 97/97] CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: harden parsing code + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914 + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme +--- + selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble | 3 - + source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble + +diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble +deleted file mode 100644 +index 8b0314f2fae..00000000000 +--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba.unittests.adouble ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ +-^samba.unittests.adouble.parse_abouble_finderinfo2\(none\) +-^samba.unittests.adouble.parse_abouble_finderinfo3\(none\) +-^samba.unittests.adouble.parse_abouble_date2\(none\) +diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c b/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c +index 76139e51047..17e97d15bdb 100644 +--- a/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c ++++ b/source3/modules/vfs_fruit.c +@@ -540,6 +540,94 @@ static AfpInfo *afpinfo_new(TALLOC_CTX *ctx); + static ssize_t afpinfo_pack(const AfpInfo *ai, char *buf); + static AfpInfo *afpinfo_unpack(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const void *data); + ++/* ++ * All entries besides FinderInfo and resource fork must fit into the ++ * buffer. FinderInfo is special as it may be larger then the default 32 bytes ++ * if it contains marshalled xattrs, which we will fixup that in ++ * ad_convert(). The first 32 bytes however must also be part of the buffer. ++ * ++ * The resource fork is never accessed directly by the ad_data buf. ++ */ ++static bool ad_entry_check_size(uint32_t eid, ++ size_t bufsize, ++ uint32_t off, ++ uint32_t got_len) ++{ ++ struct { ++ off_t expected_len; ++ bool fixed_size; ++ bool minimum_size; ++ } ad_checks[] = { ++ [ADEID_DFORK] = {-1, false, false}, /* not applicable */ ++ [ADEID_RFORK] = {-1, false, false}, /* no limit */ ++ [ADEID_NAME] = {ADEDLEN_NAME, false, false}, ++ [ADEID_COMMENT] = {ADEDLEN_COMMENT, false, false}, ++ [ADEID_ICONBW] = {ADEDLEN_ICONBW, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_ICONCOL] = {ADEDLEN_ICONCOL, false, false}, ++ [ADEID_FILEI] = {ADEDLEN_FILEI, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_FILEDATESI] = {ADEDLEN_FILEDATESI, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_FINDERI] = {ADEDLEN_FINDERI, false, true}, ++ [ADEID_MACFILEI] = {ADEDLEN_MACFILEI, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_PRODOSFILEI] = {ADEDLEN_PRODOSFILEI, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_MSDOSFILEI] = {ADEDLEN_MSDOSFILEI, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_SHORTNAME] = {ADEDLEN_SHORTNAME, false, false}, ++ [ADEID_AFPFILEI] = {ADEDLEN_AFPFILEI, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_DID] = {ADEDLEN_DID, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_PRIVDEV] = {ADEDLEN_PRIVDEV, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_PRIVINO] = {ADEDLEN_PRIVINO, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_PRIVSYN] = {ADEDLEN_PRIVSYN, true, false}, ++ [ADEID_PRIVID] = {ADEDLEN_PRIVID, true, false}, ++ }; ++ ++ if (eid >= ADEID_MAX) { ++ return false; ++ } ++ if (got_len == 0) { ++ /* Entry present, but empty, allow */ ++ return true; ++ } ++ if (ad_checks[eid].expected_len == 0) { ++ /* ++ * Shouldn't happen: implicitly initialized to zero because ++ * explicit initializer missing. ++ */ ++ return false; ++ } ++ if (ad_checks[eid].expected_len == -1) { ++ /* Unused or no limit */ ++ return true; ++ } ++ if (ad_checks[eid].fixed_size) { ++ if (ad_checks[eid].expected_len != got_len) { ++ /* Wrong size fo fixed size entry. */ ++ return false; ++ } ++ } else { ++ if (ad_checks[eid].minimum_size) { ++ if (got_len < ad_checks[eid].expected_len) { ++ /* ++ * Too small for variable sized entry with ++ * minimum size. ++ */ ++ return false; ++ } ++ } else { ++ if (got_len > ad_checks[eid].expected_len) { ++ /* Too big for variable sized entry. */ ++ return false; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ if (off + got_len < off) { ++ /* wrap around */ ++ return false; ++ } ++ if (off + got_len > bufsize) { ++ /* overflow */ ++ return false; ++ } ++ return true; ++} + + /** + * Return a pointer to an AppleDouble entry +@@ -548,8 +636,15 @@ static AfpInfo *afpinfo_unpack(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const void *data); + **/ + static char *ad_get_entry(const struct adouble *ad, int eid) + { ++ size_t bufsize = talloc_get_size(ad->ad_data); + off_t off = ad_getentryoff(ad, eid); + size_t len = ad_getentrylen(ad, eid); ++ bool valid; ++ ++ valid = ad_entry_check_size(eid, bufsize, off, len); ++ if (!valid) { ++ return NULL; ++ } + + if (off == 0 || len == 0) { + return NULL; +@@ -935,20 +1030,11 @@ static bool ad_unpack(struct adouble *ad, const size_t nentries, + return false; + } + +- /* +- * All entries besides FinderInfo and resource fork +- * must fit into the buffer. FinderInfo is special as +- * it may be larger then the default 32 bytes (if it +- * contains marshalled xattrs), but we will fixup that +- * in ad_convert(). And the resource fork is never +- * accessed directly by the ad_data buf (also see +- * comment above) anyway. +- */ +- if ((eid != ADEID_RFORK) && +- (eid != ADEID_FINDERI) && +- ((off + len) > bufsize)) { +- DEBUG(1, ("bogus eid %d: off: %" PRIu32 ", len: %" PRIu32 "\n", +- eid, off, len)); ++ ok = ad_entry_check_size(eid, bufsize, off, len); ++ if (!ok) { ++ DBG_ERR("bogus eid [%"PRIu32"] bufsize [%zu] " ++ "off [%"PRIu32"] len [%"PRIu32"]\n", ++ eid, bufsize, off, len); + return false; + } + +-- +2.34.1 diff --git a/SPECS/samba.spec b/SPECS/samba.spec index 7062f94..6c1b77e 100644 --- a/SPECS/samba.spec +++ b/SPECS/samba.spec @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ # ctdb is enabled by default, you can disable it with: --without clustering %bcond_without clustering -%define main_release 17 +%define main_release 18 %define samba_version 4.10.16 %define talloc_version 2.1.16 @@ -3305,6 +3305,11 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot} %endif # with_clustering_support %changelog +* Tue Jan 25 2022 Andreas Schneider - 4.10.16-18 +- resolves: #2034800 - Fix usermap script regression caused by CVE-2020-25717 +- resolves: #2036595 - Fix MIT realm regression caused by CVE-2020-25717 +- resolves: #2046148 - Fix CVE-2021-44142 + * Mon Nov 15 2021 Andreas Schneider - 4.10.16-17 - related: #2019673 - Add missing checks for IPA DC server role