diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12150.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12150.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7eb1ef8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12150.patch @@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ +From 9fb528332f48de59d70d48686e3af4df70206635 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 17:06:21 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:popt_common: don't turn a guessed + username into a specified one + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + source3/include/auth_info.h | 1 + + source3/lib/popt_common.c | 6 +----- + source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/include/auth_info.h b/source3/include/auth_info.h +index c6f71ad..8212c27 100644 +--- a/source3/include/auth_info.h ++++ b/source3/include/auth_info.h +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info *auth_info, + const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info); + void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info, + const char *username); ++void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info); + const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info); + void set_cmdline_auth_info_domain(struct user_auth_info *auth_info, + const char *domain); +diff --git a/source3/lib/popt_common.c b/source3/lib/popt_common.c +index 9928c70..36b5e92 100644 +--- a/source3/lib/popt_common.c ++++ b/source3/lib/popt_common.c +@@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ void popt_common_credentials_set_delay_post(void) + void popt_common_credentials_post(void) + { + struct user_auth_info *auth_info = cmdline_auth_info; +- const char *username = NULL; + + if (get_cmdline_auth_info_use_machine_account(auth_info) && + !set_cmdline_auth_info_machine_account_creds(auth_info)) +@@ -259,10 +258,7 @@ void popt_common_credentials_post(void) + * correctly parsed yet. If we have a username we need to set it again + * to run the string parser for the username correctly. + */ +- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info); +- if (username != NULL && username[0] != '\0') { +- set_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info, username); +- } ++ reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info); + } + + static void popt_common_credentials_callback(poptContext con, +diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c +index ad51a4f..80142e2 100644 +--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c ++++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ + struct user_auth_info { + struct cli_credentials *creds; + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx; ++ bool got_username; + bool got_pass; + int signing_state; + bool smb_encrypt; +@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info *auth_info, + if (!ok) { + exit(EIO); + } ++ auth_info->got_username = true; + } + + const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info) +@@ -123,11 +125,38 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info, + exit(ENOMEM); + } + ++ auth_info->got_username = true; + if (strchr_m(username, '%') != NULL) { + auth_info->got_pass = true; + } + } + ++void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info) ++{ ++ const char *username = NULL; ++ const char *new_val = NULL; ++ ++ if (!auth_info->got_username) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ username = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds); ++ if (username == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } ++ if (username[0] == '\0') { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ cli_credentials_parse_string(auth_info->creds, ++ username, ++ CRED_SPECIFIED); ++ new_val = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds); ++ if (new_val == NULL) { ++ exit(ENOMEM); ++ } ++} ++ + const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info) + { + const char *domain = NULL; +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 97a7ddff5d327bf5bcc27c8a88b000b3a187a827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 17:16:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: + get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED + +This is an addition to the fixes for CVE-2015-5296. + +It applies to smb2mount -e, smbcacls -e and smbcquotas -e. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c +index 80142e2..90ee67c 100644 +--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c ++++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c +@@ -265,6 +265,9 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state_raw(struct user_auth_info *auth_info, + + int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info) + { ++ if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) { ++ return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED; ++ } + return auth_info->signing_state; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + + +From b760a464ee3d94edeff6eb10a0b08359d6e98099 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2016 09:26:32 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of + SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal' + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c +index 59c0998..350c6d4 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c +@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, PyObject *args, + + req = cli_full_connection_creds_send( + NULL, self->ev, "myname", host, NULL, 0, share, "?????", +- cli_creds, 0, 0); ++ cli_creds, 0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT); + if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) { + return -1; + } +-- +1.9.1 + + +From f42ffde214c3be1d6ba3afd8fe88a3e04470c4bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 05:49:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/7] CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED + in gpo_connect_server() + +It's important that we use a signed connection to get the GPOs! + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c +index 836bc23..3740d4e 100644 +--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c ++++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c +@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads, + ads->auth.password, + CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS | + CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS, +- Undefined); ++ SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { + DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: " + "failed to connect: %s\n", +-- +1.9.1 + + +From d8c6aceb94ab72991eb538ab5dc388686a177052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:24:14 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 5/7] CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials: + cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for + NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + auth/credentials/credentials.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c +index 06648c7..5e3b5e8 100644 +--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c ++++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */ + #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" + #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h" ++#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h" + #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" + #include "tevent.h" + #include "param/param.h" +@@ -300,6 +301,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cre + + _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred) + { ++ uint32_t gensec_features = 0; ++ + if (cred->bind_dn) { + return true; + } +@@ -327,6 +330,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c + return true; + } + ++ gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred); ++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) { ++ return true; ++ } ++ ++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) { ++ return true; ++ } ++ ++ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) { ++ return true; ++ } ++ + return false; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 28f4a8dbd2b82bb8fb9f6224e1641d935766e62a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:35:49 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 6/7] CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add + smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory() + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c | 5 +++++ + libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c +index b21d796..239e5eb 100644 +--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c ++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c +@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn) + return false; + } + ++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn) ++{ ++ return conn->mandatory_signing; ++} ++ + void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options) + { + set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options); +diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h +index e48fc35..2594f07 100644 +--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h ++++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h +@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); + + enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); + bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); ++bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); + + void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options); + const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); +-- +1.9.1 + + +From 28506663282a1457708c38c58437e9eb9c0002bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2016 06:07:56 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 7/7] CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if + authentication was not requested + +With forced encryption or required signing we should also don't fallback. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12997 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 16 ++++------------ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +index 75012b2..fdcd665 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include "trans2.h" + #include "libsmb/nmblib.h" + #include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h" ++#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" + + /******************************************************************** + Important point. +@@ -145,9 +146,6 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + char *servicename; + char *sharename; + char *newserver, *newshare; +- const char *username; +- const char *password; +- const char *domain; + NTSTATUS status; + int flags = 0; + int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info); +@@ -225,21 +223,15 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + smb2cli_conn_set_max_credits(c->conn, DEFAULT_SMB2_MAX_CREDITS); + } + +- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info); +- password = get_cmdline_auth_info_password(auth_info); +- domain = get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(auth_info); +- if ((domain == NULL) || (domain[0] == '\0')) { +- domain = lp_workgroup(); +- } +- + creds = get_cmdline_auth_info_creds(auth_info); + + status = cli_session_setup_creds(c, creds); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + /* If a password was not supplied then + * try again with a null username. */ +- if (password[0] || !username[0] || +- get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) || ++ if (force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) || ++ cli_credentials_authentication_requested(creds) || ++ cli_credentials_is_anonymous(creds) || + !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup_anon(c))) + { + d_printf("session setup failed: %s\n", +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12151.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12151.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfd6f80 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12151.patch @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +From be03c9118e812f93d50c71294fbf9f12bcf2a7f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:13:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add + cli_state_is_encryption_on() helper function + +This allows to check if the current cli_state uses encryption +(either via unix extentions or via SMB3). + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + source3/libsmb/clientgen.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + source3/libsmb/proto.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c +index bc5c1b1ce3c..3e8523e5ce8 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c +@@ -339,6 +339,19 @@ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli) + return cli->smb1.pid; + } + ++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli) ++{ ++ if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) { ++ return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn); ++ } ++ ++ if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) { ++ return false; ++ } ++ ++ return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon); ++} ++ + bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli) + { + uint16_t tid = cli_state_get_tid(cli); +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h +index 764f3fc1b12..67fa43e4e4a 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h ++++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h +@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli); + uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli); + uint32_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t pid); + uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli); ++bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli); + bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli); + uint16_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli); + uint16_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint16_t tid); +-- +2.13.5 + + +From 16d3c8288ae78a686715c242293691c00ec6d7a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher +Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2016 10:36:49 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of + cli_state_is_encryption_on() + +This will keep enforced encryption across dfs referrals. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12996 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 4 ++-- + source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +index c477d7c6a46..99818a681e3 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + "IPC$", + dfs_auth_info, + false, +- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn), ++ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli), + smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn), + 0, + 0x20, +@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + dfs_refs[count].share, + dfs_auth_info, + false, +- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn), ++ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli), + smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn), + 0, + 0x20, +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c +index ed6ca2b1b9f..b55cf1e2d15 100644 +--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c ++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c +@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context, + + for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) { + num_servers++; +- if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) { ++ if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) { + return (void *)false; + } + } +-- +2.13.5 + diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12163.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12163.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e9f99e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2017-12163.patch @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +From 364275d1ae8c55242497e7c8804fb28aa3b73465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jeremy Allison +Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 10:13:14 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from + writing server memory to file. + +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13020 + +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher +--- + source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c +index 317143f..7b07078 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c +@@ -4474,6 +4474,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req) + } + + /* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */ ++ /* ++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ + if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + error_to_writebrawerr(req); +@@ -4574,6 +4577,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req) + exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed"); + } + ++ /* ++ * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163 ++ * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite ++ * bytes available - we just read from the client. ++ */ + nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite); + if (nwritten == -1) { + TALLOC_FREE(buf); +@@ -4647,6 +4655,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req) + connection_struct *conn = req->conn; + ssize_t nwritten = -1; + size_t numtowrite; ++ size_t remaining; + off_t startpos; + const char *data; + NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; +@@ -4679,6 +4688,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req) + startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0); + data = (const char *)req->buf + 3; + ++ /* ++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than ++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ ++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); ++ if (numtowrite > remaining) { ++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); ++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) { + init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, + (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, +@@ -4756,6 +4776,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req) + { + connection_struct *conn = req->conn; + size_t numtowrite; ++ size_t remaining; + ssize_t nwritten = -1; + off_t startpos; + const char *data; +@@ -4796,6 +4817,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req) + startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0); + data = (const char *)req->buf + 3; + ++ /* ++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than ++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ ++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); ++ if (numtowrite > remaining) { ++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); ++ END_PROFILE(SMBwrite); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (!fsp->print_file) { + init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, + (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, +@@ -5018,6 +5050,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req) + goto out; + } + } else { ++ /* ++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ + if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite || + smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); +@@ -5444,6 +5479,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req) + { + connection_struct *conn = req->conn; + size_t numtowrite; ++ size_t remaining; + ssize_t nwritten = -1; + NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK; + off_t startpos; +@@ -5477,6 +5513,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req) + mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4)); + data = (const char *)req->buf + 1; + ++ /* ++ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than ++ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ ++ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); ++ if (numtowrite > remaining) { ++ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); ++ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose); ++ return; ++ } ++ + if (fsp->print_file == NULL) { + init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, + (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, +@@ -6069,6 +6116,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req) + + numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1); + ++ /* ++ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. ++ */ + if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr); +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/SPECS/samba.spec b/SPECS/samba.spec index e167c3a..8ad30d5 100644 --- a/SPECS/samba.spec +++ b/SPECS/samba.spec @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ # ctdb is enabled by default, you can disable it with: --without clustering %bcond_without clustering -%define main_release 10 +%define main_release 11 %define samba_version 4.6.2 %define talloc_version 2.1.9 @@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ Patch15: samba-v4-6-fix_winbind_normalize_names.patch Patch16: samba-v4-6-fix_net_ads_changetrustpw.patch Patch17: samba-v4.6-fix_smbpasswd_user_pwd_change.patch Patch18: samba-v4.6-graceful_fsctl_validate_negotiate_info.patch +Patch19: CVE-2017-12150.patch +Patch20: CVE-2017-12151.patch +Patch21: CVE-2017-12163.patch Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/groupadd Requires(post): systemd @@ -2649,6 +2652,9 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot} %endif # with_clustering_support %changelog +* Thu Sep 14 2017 Andreas Schneider - 4.6.2-11 +- resolves: #1491213 - CVE-2017-12150 CVE-2017-12151 CVE-2017-12163 + * Wed Aug 23 2017 Andreas Schneider - 4.6.2-10 - resolves: #1484423 - Require at least krb5 version 1.15.1 - resolves: #1484713 - Fix password changes for users via smbpasswd