a3a04f
From 364275d1ae8c55242497e7c8804fb28aa3b73465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
a3a04f
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
a3a04f
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 10:13:14 -0700
a3a04f
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
a3a04f
 writing server memory to file.
a3a04f
a3a04f
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13020
a3a04f
a3a04f
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
a3a04f
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
a3a04f
---
a3a04f
 source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
a3a04f
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
a3a04f
a3a04f
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
a3a04f
index 317143f..7b07078 100644
a3a04f
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
a3a04f
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
a3a04f
@@ -4474,6 +4474,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 	}
a3a04f
 
a3a04f
 	/* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
a3a04f
+	/*
a3a04f
+	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
a3a04f
+	 */
a3a04f
 	if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
a3a04f
 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
a3a04f
 		error_to_writebrawerr(req);
a3a04f
@@ -4574,6 +4577,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 			exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
a3a04f
 		}
a3a04f
 
a3a04f
+		/*
a3a04f
+		 * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
a3a04f
+		 * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
a3a04f
+		 * bytes available - we just read from the client.
a3a04f
+		 */
a3a04f
 		nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
a3a04f
 		if (nwritten == -1) {
a3a04f
 			TALLOC_FREE(buf);
a3a04f
@@ -4647,6 +4655,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
a3a04f
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
a3a04f
 	size_t numtowrite;
a3a04f
+	size_t remaining;
a3a04f
 	off_t startpos;
a3a04f
 	const char *data;
a3a04f
 	NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
a3a04f
@@ -4679,6 +4688,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
a3a04f
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
a3a04f
 
a3a04f
+	/*
a3a04f
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
a3a04f
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
a3a04f
+	 */
a3a04f
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
a3a04f
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
a3a04f
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
a3a04f
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
a3a04f
+		return;
a3a04f
+	}
a3a04f
+
a3a04f
 	if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
a3a04f
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
a3a04f
 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
a3a04f
@@ -4756,6 +4776,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 {
a3a04f
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
a3a04f
 	size_t numtowrite;
a3a04f
+	size_t remaining;
a3a04f
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
a3a04f
 	off_t startpos;
a3a04f
 	const char *data;
a3a04f
@@ -4796,6 +4817,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
a3a04f
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
a3a04f
 
a3a04f
+	/*
a3a04f
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
a3a04f
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
a3a04f
+	 */
a3a04f
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
a3a04f
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
a3a04f
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
a3a04f
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
a3a04f
+		return;
a3a04f
+	}
a3a04f
+
a3a04f
 	if (!fsp->print_file) {
a3a04f
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
a3a04f
 			(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
a3a04f
@@ -5018,6 +5050,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 			goto out;
a3a04f
 		}
a3a04f
 	} else {
a3a04f
+		/*
a3a04f
+		 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
a3a04f
+		 */
a3a04f
 		if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
a3a04f
 				smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
a3a04f
 			reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
a3a04f
@@ -5444,6 +5479,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 {
a3a04f
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
a3a04f
 	size_t numtowrite;
a3a04f
+	size_t remaining;
a3a04f
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
a3a04f
 	NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
a3a04f
 	off_t startpos;
a3a04f
@@ -5477,6 +5513,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 	mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
a3a04f
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
a3a04f
 
a3a04f
+	/*
a3a04f
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
a3a04f
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
a3a04f
+	 */
a3a04f
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
a3a04f
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
a3a04f
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
a3a04f
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
a3a04f
+		return;
a3a04f
+	}
a3a04f
+
a3a04f
 	if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
a3a04f
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
a3a04f
 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
a3a04f
@@ -6069,6 +6116,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
a3a04f
 
a3a04f
 	numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
a3a04f
 
a3a04f
+	/*
a3a04f
+	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
a3a04f
+	 */
a3a04f
 	if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
a3a04f
 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
a3a04f
 		END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);
a3a04f
-- 
a3a04f
1.9.1
a3a04f