diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b-runc.patch b/SOURCES/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b-runc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7975703
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b-runc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+From bf6405284aa3870a39b402309003633a1c230ed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host
+ binary to container
+
+There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
+pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
+have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
+writeable).
+
+As a hotfix we require memfd_create(2), but we can always extend this to
+use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or tmpfs. The main downside to this
+approach is no page-cache sharing for the runc binary (which overlayfs
+would give us) but this is far less complicated.
+
+This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
+Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
+ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
+worry about it).
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
+Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>
+---
+ libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c        |  11 ++
+ 2 files changed, 232 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..d9f6093a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <limits.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/vfs.h>
++#include <sys/mman.h>
++#include <sys/sendfile.h>
++#include <sys/syscall.h>
++
++#include <linux/magic.h>
++#include <linux/memfd.h>
++
++/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
++#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
++#  define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
++#endif
++#ifndef SYS_memfd_create
++#  error "memfd_create(2) syscall not supported by this glibc version"
++#endif
++int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
++{
++	return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
++}
++
++/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
++#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
++#  define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
++#endif
++#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
++#  define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
++#  define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
++#endif
++#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
++#  define F_SEAL_SEAL   0x0001	/* prevent further seals from being set */
++#  define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002	/* prevent file from shrinking */
++#  define F_SEAL_GROW   0x0004	/* prevent file from growing */
++#  define F_SEAL_WRITE  0x0008	/* prevent writes */
++#endif
++
++
++#define OUR_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
++#define OUR_MEMFD_SEALS \
++	(F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
++
++static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
++{
++	void *old = ptr;
++	do {
++		ptr = realloc(old, size);
++	} while(!ptr);
++	return ptr;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
++ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather
++ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
++ */
++static int is_self_cloned(void)
++{
++	int fd, seals;
++
++	fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (fd < 0)
++		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++	seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
++	close(fd);
++	return seals == OUR_MEMFD_SEALS;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
++ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
++ */
++static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
++{
++	int fd;
++	char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
++
++	if (!length)
++		return NULL;
++
++	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (fd < 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	*length = 0;
++	for (;;) {
++		int n;
++
++		n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (n < 0)
++			goto error;
++		if (!n)
++			break;
++
++		copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
++		memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
++		*length += n;
++	}
++	close(fd);
++	return copy;
++
++error:
++	close(fd);
++	free(copy);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/*
++ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
++ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
++ * to the array of pointers.
++ */
++static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
++{
++	int num = 0;
++	char *cur = data;
++
++	if (!data || *output != NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	while (cur < data + data_length) {
++		num++;
++		*output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
++		(*output)[num - 1] = cur;
++		cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
++	}
++	(*output)[num] = NULL;
++	return num;
++}
++
++/*
++ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
++ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
++ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
++ */
++static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
++{
++	char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
++	size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
++
++	cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
++	if (!cmdline)
++		goto error;
++	environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
++	if (!environ)
++		goto error;
++
++	if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
++		goto error;
++	if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	return 0;
++
++error:
++	free(environ);
++	free(cmdline);
++	return -EINVAL;
++}
++
++#define SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
++static int clone_binary(void)
++{
++	int binfd, memfd, err;
++	ssize_t sent = 0;
++
++	memfd = memfd_create(OUR_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
++	if (memfd < 0)
++		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++	binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (binfd < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, SENDFILE_MAX);
++	close(binfd);
++	if (sent < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, OUR_MEMFD_SEALS);
++	if (err < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	return memfd;
++
++error:
++	close(memfd);
++	return -EIO;
++}
++
++int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
++{
++	int execfd;
++	char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
++
++	/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
++	int cloned = is_self_cloned();
++	if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
++		return cloned;
++
++	if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	execfd = clone_binary();
++	if (execfd < 0)
++		return -EIO;
++
++	fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
++	return -ENOEXEC;
++}
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+index cb224314..784fd9b0 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+@@ -528,6 +528,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
+ 	free(namespaces);
+ }
+ 
++/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
++int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
++
+ void nsexec(void)
+ {
+ 	int pipenum;
+@@ -543,6 +546,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
+ 	if (pipenum == -1)
+ 		return;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary
++	 * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
++	 * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
++	 */
++	if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
++		bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
++
+ 	/* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
+ 	nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/runc.spec b/SPECS/runc.spec
index 3053d28..bf3248f 100644
--- a/SPECS/runc.spec
+++ b/SPECS/runc.spec
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ scl enable go-toolset-1.10 -- go build -buildmode pie -compiler gc -tags="rpm_cr
 
 Name: %{repo}
 Version: 1.0.0
-Release: 57.dev.git%{shortcommit0}%{?dist}
+Release: 59.dev.git%{shortcommit0}%{?dist}
 Summary: CLI for running Open Containers
 License: ASL 2.0
 URL: http//%{provider_prefix}
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ Source1: 99-containers.conf
 Patch0: change-default-root.patch
 Patch1: 0001-Revert-Apply-cgroups-earlier.patch
 Patch2: 1807.patch
+Patch3: 0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b-runc.patch
 Requires: criu
 Requires(pre): container-selinux >= 2:2.2-2
 ExclusiveArch: aarch64 %{arm} ppc64le s390x x86_64
@@ -289,6 +290,13 @@ export GOPATH=%{buildroot}/%{gopath}:$(pwd)/Godeps/_workspace:%{gopath}
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Fri Feb 08 2019 Frantisek Kluknavsky <fkluknav@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-59.dev.git2abd837
+- Resolves: #1664908
+- CVE-2019-5736
+
+* Fri Feb 08 2019 Frantisek Kluknavsky <fkluknav@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-58.dev.git2abd837
+- Resolves: #1664908
+
 * Wed Nov 28 2018 Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-57.dev.git2abd837
 - Resolves: #1650512 - build with the right golang dependency