diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-rootfs-add-mount-destination-validation.patch b/SOURCES/0001-rootfs-add-mount-destination-validation.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7734a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0001-rootfs-add-mount-destination-validation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+From 2dd156b190c02476191fc2522f9b0e0a1a098608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 16:11:35 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] rootfs: add mount destination validation
+
+This is a manual backport of fix for CVE-2021-30465 to runc-1.0.0-rc10
+(aka -rc90), upstream commit 84c14b43fa703db7 by Aleksa Sarai.
+
+Original description follows.
+
+----
+
+Because the target of a mount is inside a container (which may be a
+volume that is shared with another container), there exists a race
+condition where the target of the mount may change to a path containing
+a symlink after we have sanitised the path -- resulting in us
+inadvertently mounting the path outside of the container.
+
+This is not immediately useful because we are in a mount namespace with
+MS_SLAVE mount propagation applied to "/", so we cannot mount on top of
+host paths in the host namespace. However, if any subsequent mountpoints
+in the configuration use a subdirectory of that host path as a source,
+those subsequent mounts will use an attacker-controlled source path
+(resolved within the host rootfs) -- allowing the bind-mounting of "/"
+into the container.
+
+While arguably configuration issues like this are not entirely within
+runc's threat model, within the context of Kubernetes (and possibly
+other container managers that provide semi-arbitrary container creation
+privileges to untrusted users) this is a legitimate issue. Since we
+cannot block mounting from the host into the container, we need to block
+the first stage of this attack (mounting onto a path outside the
+container).
+
+The long-term plan to solve this would be to migrate to libpathrs, but
+as a stop-gap we implement libpathrs-like path verification through
+readlink(/proc/self/fd/$n) and then do mount operations through the
+procfd once it's been verified to be inside the container. The target
+could move after we've checked it, but if it is inside the container
+then we can assume that it is safe for the same reason that libpathrs
+operations would be safe.
+
+A slight wrinkle is the "copyup" functionality we provide for tmpfs,
+which is the only case where we want to do a mount on the host
+filesystem. To facilitate this, I split out the copy-up functionality
+entirely so that the logic isn't interspersed with the regular tmpfs
+logic. In addition, all dependencies on m.Destination being overwritten
+have been removed since that pattern was just begging to be a source of
+more mount-target bugs (we do still have to modify m.Destination for
+tmpfs-copyup but we only do it temporarily).
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-30465
+Reported-by: Etienne Champetier <champetier.etienne@gmail.com>
+Co-authored-by: Noah Meyerhans <nmeyerha@amazon.com>
+Reviewed-by: Samuel Karp <skarp@amazon.com>
+Reviewed-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
+---
+ libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go | 225 ++++++++++++++++---------------
+ libcontainer/utils/utils.go | 54 ++++++++
+ libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go | 35 +++++
+ 3 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
+index 106c4c2b..fe9afe48 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
++++ b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
+@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ import (
+ "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs"
+ "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/mount"
+ "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
+- libcontainerUtils "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
++ "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
+ "github.com/opencontainers/selinux/go-selinux/label"
++ "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+ "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+ )
+@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ const defaultMountFlags = unix.MS_NOEXEC | unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NODEV
+ // needsSetupDev returns true if /dev needs to be set up.
+ func needsSetupDev(config *configs.Config) bool {
+ for _, m := range config.Mounts {
+- if m.Device == "bind" && libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
++ if m.Device == "bind" && utils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe io.ReadWriter, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
+ func finalizeRootfs(config *configs.Config) (err error) {
+ // remount dev as ro if specified
+ for _, m := range config.Mounts {
+- if libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
++ if utils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
+ if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY == unix.MS_RDONLY {
+ if err := remountReadonly(m); err != nil {
+ return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err, "remounting %q as readonly", m.Destination)
+@@ -200,8 +201,6 @@ func prepareBindMount(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string) error {
+ if err := checkProcMount(rootfs, dest, m.Source); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+- // update the mount with the correct dest after symlinks are resolved.
+- m.Destination = dest
+ if err := createIfNotExists(dest, stat.IsDir()); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+@@ -238,18 +237,21 @@ func mountCgroupV1(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(subsystemPath, 0755); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+- flags := defaultMountFlags
+- if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY != 0 {
+- flags = flags | unix.MS_RDONLY
+- }
+- cgroupmount := &configs.Mount{
+- Source: "cgroup",
+- Device: "cgroup",
+- Destination: subsystemPath,
+- Flags: flags,
+- Data: filepath.Base(subsystemPath),
+- }
+- if err := mountNewCgroup(cgroupmount); err != nil {
++ if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, b.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
++ flags := defaultMountFlags
++ if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY != 0 {
++ flags = flags | unix.MS_RDONLY
++ }
++ var (
++ source = "cgroup"
++ data = filepath.Base(subsystemPath)
++ )
++ if data == "systemd" {
++ data = cgroups.CgroupNamePrefix + data
++ source = "systemd"
++ }
++ return unix.Mount(source, procfd, "cgroup", uintptr(flags), data)
++ }); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ } else {
+@@ -279,22 +281,67 @@ func mountCgroupV2(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(cgroupPath, 0755); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+- if err := unix.Mount(m.Source, cgroupPath, "cgroup2", uintptr(m.Flags), m.Data); err != nil {
+- // when we are in UserNS but CgroupNS is not unshared, we cannot mount cgroup2 (#2158)
+- if err == unix.EPERM || err == unix.EBUSY {
+- return unix.Mount("/sys/fs/cgroup", cgroupPath, "", uintptr(m.Flags)|unix.MS_BIND, "")
++ return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
++ if err := unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, "cgroup2", uintptr(m.Flags), m.Data); err != nil {
++ // when we are in UserNS but CgroupNS is not unshared, we cannot mount cgroup2 (#2158)
++ if err == unix.EPERM || err == unix.EBUSY {
++ return unix.Mount("/sys/fs/cgroup", procfd, "", uintptr(m.Flags)|unix.MS_BIND, "")
++ }
++ return err
+ }
++ return nil
++ })
++}
++
++func doTmpfsCopyUp(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string) (Err error) {
++ // Set up a scratch dir for the tmpfs on the host.
++ tmpdir, err := prepareTmp("/tmp")
++ if err != nil {
++ return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to setup tmpdir")
++ }
++ defer cleanupTmp(tmpdir)
++ tmpDir, err := ioutil.TempDir(tmpdir, "runctmpdir")
++ if err != nil {
++ return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to create tmpdir")
++ }
++ defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
++
++ // Configure the *host* tmpdir as if it's the container mount. We change
++ // m.Destination since we are going to mount *on the host*.
++ oldDest := m.Destination
++ m.Destination = tmpDir
++ err = mountPropagate(m, "/", mountLabel)
++ m.Destination = oldDest
++ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+- return nil
++ defer func() {
++ if Err != nil {
++ if err := unix.Unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
++ logrus.Warnf("tmpcopyup: failed to unmount tmpdir on error: %v", err)
++ }
++ }
++ }()
++
++ return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) (Err error) {
++ // Copy the container data to the host tmpdir. We append "/" to force
++ // CopyDirectory to resolve the symlink rather than trying to copy the
++ // symlink itself.
++ if err := fileutils.CopyDirectory(procfd+"/", tmpDir); err != nil {
++ return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to copy %s to %s (%s): %v", m.Destination, procfd, tmpDir, err)
++ }
++ // Now move the mount into the container.
++ if err := unix.Mount(tmpDir, procfd, "", unix.MS_MOVE, ""); err != nil {
++ return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to move mount %s to %s (%s): %v", tmpDir, procfd, m.Destination, err)
++ }
++ return nil
++ })
+ }
+
+ func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns bool) error {
+- var (
+- dest = m.Destination
+- )
+- if !strings.HasPrefix(dest, rootfs) {
+- dest = filepath.Join(rootfs, dest)
++ dest, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, m.Destination)
++ if err != nil {
++ return err
+ }
+
+ switch m.Device {
+@@ -329,46 +376,21 @@ func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
+ }
+ return nil
+ case "tmpfs":
+- copyUp := m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP
+- tmpDir := ""
+ stat, err := os.Stat(dest)
+ if err != nil {
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+- if copyUp {
+- tmpdir, err := prepareTmp("/tmp")
+- if err != nil {
+- return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to setup tmpdir")
+- }
+- defer cleanupTmp(tmpdir)
+- tmpDir, err = ioutil.TempDir(tmpdir, "runctmpdir")
+- if err != nil {
+- return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to create tmpdir")
+- }
+- defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
+- m.Destination = tmpDir
++
++ if m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP {
++ err = doTmpfsCopyUp(m, rootfs, mountLabel)
++ } else {
++ err = mountPropagate(m, rootfs, mountLabel)
+ }
+- if err := mountPropagate(m, rootfs, mountLabel); err != nil {
++ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+- if copyUp {
+- if err := fileutils.CopyDirectory(dest, tmpDir); err != nil {
+- errMsg := fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to copy %s to %s: %v", dest, tmpDir, err)
+- if err1 := unix.Unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err1 != nil {
+- return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err1, "tmpcopyup: %v: failed to unmount", errMsg)
+- }
+- return errMsg
+- }
+- if err := unix.Mount(tmpDir, dest, "", unix.MS_MOVE, ""); err != nil {
+- errMsg := fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to move mount %s to %s: %v", tmpDir, dest, err)
+- if err1 := unix.Unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err1 != nil {
+- return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err1, "tmpcopyup: %v: failed to unmount", errMsg)
+- }
+- return errMsg
+- }
+- }
+ if stat != nil {
+ if err = os.Chmod(dest, stat.Mode()); err != nil {
+ return err
+@@ -424,19 +446,9 @@ func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
+ }
+ }
+ default:
+- // ensure that the destination of the mount is resolved of symlinks at mount time because
+- // any previous mounts can invalidate the next mount's destination.
+- // this can happen when a user specifies mounts within other mounts to cause breakouts or other
+- // evil stuff to try to escape the container's rootfs.
+- var err error
+- if dest, err = securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, m.Destination); err != nil {
+- return err
+- }
+ if err := checkProcMount(rootfs, dest, m.Source); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+- // update the mount with the correct dest after symlinks are resolved.
+- m.Destination = dest
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+@@ -611,7 +623,7 @@ func createDevices(config *configs.Config) error {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+-func bindMountDeviceNode(dest string, node *configs.Device) error {
++func bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest string, node *configs.Device) error {
+ f, err := os.Create(dest)
+ if err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
+ return err
+@@ -619,24 +631,29 @@ func bindMountDeviceNode(dest string, node *configs.Device) error {
+ if f != nil {
+ f.Close()
+ }
+- return unix.Mount(node.Path, dest, "bind", unix.MS_BIND, "")
++ return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, dest, func(procfd string) error {
++ return unix.Mount(node.Path, procfd, "bind", unix.MS_BIND, "")
++ })
+ }
+
+ // Creates the device node in the rootfs of the container.
+ func createDeviceNode(rootfs string, node *configs.Device, bind bool) error {
+- dest := filepath.Join(rootfs, node.Path)
++ dest, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, node.Path)
++ if err != nil {
++ return err
++ }
+ if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dest), 0755); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ if bind {
+- return bindMountDeviceNode(dest, node)
++ return bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest, node)
+ }
+ if err := mknodDevice(dest, node); err != nil {
+ if os.IsExist(err) {
+ return nil
+ } else if os.IsPermission(err) {
+- return bindMountDeviceNode(dest, node)
++ return bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest, node)
+ }
+ return err
+ }
+@@ -955,55 +972,43 @@ func writeSystemProperty(key, value string) error {
+ }
+
+ func remount(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string) error {
+- var (
+- dest = m.Destination
+- )
+- if !strings.HasPrefix(dest, rootfs) {
+- dest = filepath.Join(rootfs, dest)
+- }
+- return unix.Mount(m.Source, dest, m.Device, uintptr(m.Flags|unix.MS_REMOUNT), "")
++ return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
++ return unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, m.Device, uintptr(m.Flags|unix.MS_REMOUNT), "")
++ })
+ }
+
+ // Do the mount operation followed by additional mounts required to take care
+-// of propagation flags.
++// of propagation flags. This will always be scoped inside the container rootfs.
+ func mountPropagate(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string, mountLabel string) error {
+ var (
+- dest = m.Destination
+ data = label.FormatMountLabel(m.Data, mountLabel)
+ flags = m.Flags
+ )
+- if libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(dest) == "/dev" {
++ if utils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
+ flags &= ^unix.MS_RDONLY
+ }
+
+- copyUp := m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP
+- if !(copyUp || strings.HasPrefix(dest, rootfs)) {
+- dest = filepath.Join(rootfs, dest)
+- }
+-
+- if err := unix.Mount(m.Source, dest, m.Device, uintptr(flags), data); err != nil {
+- return err
+- }
+-
+- for _, pflag := range m.PropagationFlags {
+- if err := unix.Mount("", dest, "", uintptr(pflag), ""); err != nil {
+- return err
++ // Because the destination is inside a container path which might be
++ // mutating underneath us, we verify that we are actually going to mount
++ // inside the container with WithProcfd() -- mounting through a procfd
++ // mounts on the target.
++ if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
++ return unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, m.Device, uintptr(flags), data)
++ }); err != nil {
++ return fmt.Errorf("mount through procfd: %v", err)
++ }
++ // We have to apply mount propagation flags in a separate WithProcfd() call
++ // because the previous call invalidates the passed procfd -- the mount
++ // target needs to be re-opened.
++ if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
++ for _, pflag := range m.PropagationFlags {
++ if err := unix.Mount("", procfd, "", uintptr(pflag), ""); err != nil {
++ return err
++ }
+ }
+- }
+- return nil
+-}
+-
+-func mountNewCgroup(m *configs.Mount) error {
+- var (
+- data = m.Data
+- source = m.Source
+- )
+- if data == "systemd" {
+- data = cgroups.CgroupNamePrefix + data
+- source = "systemd"
+- }
+- if err := unix.Mount(source, m.Destination, m.Device, uintptr(m.Flags), data); err != nil {
+- return err
++ return nil
++ }); err != nil {
++ return fmt.Errorf("change mount propagation through procfd: %v", err)
+ }
+ return nil
+ }
+diff --git a/libcontainer/utils/utils.go b/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
+index 40ccfaa1..c1418ef9 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
++++ b/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
+@@ -2,12 +2,15 @@ package utils
+
+ import (
+ "encoding/json"
++ "fmt"
+ "io"
+ "os"
+ "path/filepath"
++ "strconv"
+ "strings"
+ "unsafe"
+
++ securejoin "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin"
+ "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+ )
+
+@@ -73,6 +76,57 @@ func CleanPath(path string) string {
+ return filepath.Clean(path)
+ }
+
++// stripRoot returns the passed path, stripping the root path if it was
++// (lexicially) inside it. Note that both passed paths will always be treated
++// as absolute, and the returned path will also always be absolute. In
++// addition, the paths are cleaned before stripping the root.
++func stripRoot(root, path string) string {
++ // Make the paths clean and absolute.
++ root, path = CleanPath("/"+root), CleanPath("/"+path)
++ switch {
++ case path == root:
++ path = "/"
++ case root == "/":
++ // do nothing
++ case strings.HasPrefix(path, root+"/"):
++ path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, root+"/")
++ }
++ return CleanPath("/" + path)
++}
++
++// WithProcfd runs the passed closure with a procfd path (/proc/self/fd/...)
++// corresponding to the unsafePath resolved within the root. Before passing the
++// fd, this path is verified to have been inside the root -- so operating on it
++// through the passed fdpath should be safe. Do not access this path through
++// the original path strings, and do not attempt to use the pathname outside of
++// the passed closure (the file handle will be freed once the closure returns).
++func WithProcfd(root, unsafePath string, fn func(procfd string) error) error {
++ // Remove the root then forcefully resolve inside the root.
++ unsafePath = stripRoot(root, unsafePath)
++ path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
++ if err != nil {
++ return fmt.Errorf("resolving path inside rootfs failed: %v", err)
++ }
++
++ // Open the target path.
++ fh, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
++ if err != nil {
++ return fmt.Errorf("open o_path procfd: %v", err)
++ }
++ defer fh.Close()
++
++ // Double-check the path is the one we expected.
++ procfd := "/proc/self/fd/" + strconv.Itoa(int(fh.Fd()))
++ if realpath, err := os.Readlink(procfd); err != nil {
++ return fmt.Errorf("procfd verification failed: %v", err)
++ } else if realpath != path {
++ return fmt.Errorf("possibly malicious path detected -- refusing to operate on %s", realpath)
++ }
++
++ // Run the closure.
++ return fn(procfd)
++}
++
+ // SearchLabels searches a list of key-value pairs for the provided key and
+ // returns the corresponding value. The pairs must be separated with '='.
+ func SearchLabels(labels []string, query string) string {
+diff --git a/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go b/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go
+index 395eedcf..5b80cac6 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go
++++ b/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go
+@@ -140,3 +140,38 @@ func TestCleanPath(t *testing.T) {
+ t.Errorf("expected to receive '/foo' and received %s", path)
+ }
+ }
++
++func TestStripRoot(t *testing.T) {
++ for _, test := range []struct {
++ root, path, out string
++ }{
++ // Works with multiple components.
++ {"/a/b", "/a/b/c", "/c"},
++ {"/hello/world", "/hello/world/the/quick-brown/fox", "/the/quick-brown/fox"},
++ // '/' must be a no-op.
++ {"/", "/a/b/c", "/a/b/c"},
++ // Must be the correct order.
++ {"/a/b", "/a/c/b", "/a/c/b"},
++ // Must be at start.
++ {"/abc/def", "/foo/abc/def/bar", "/foo/abc/def/bar"},
++ // Must be a lexical parent.
++ {"/foo/bar", "/foo/barSAMECOMPONENT", "/foo/barSAMECOMPONENT"},
++ // Must only strip the root once.
++ {"/foo/bar", "/foo/bar/foo/bar/baz", "/foo/bar/baz"},
++ // Deal with .. in a fairly sane way.
++ {"/foo/bar", "/foo/bar/../baz", "/foo/baz"},
++ {"/foo/bar", "../../../../../../foo/bar/baz", "/baz"},
++ {"/foo/bar", "/../../../../../../foo/bar/baz", "/baz"},
++ {"/foo/bar/../baz", "/foo/baz/bar", "/bar"},
++ {"/foo/bar/../baz", "/foo/baz/../bar/../baz/./foo", "/foo"},
++ // All paths are made absolute before stripping.
++ {"foo/bar", "/foo/bar/baz/bee", "/baz/bee"},
++ {"/foo/bar", "foo/bar/baz/beef", "/baz/beef"},
++ {"foo/bar", "foo/bar/baz/beets", "/baz/beets"},
++ } {
++ got := stripRoot(test.root, test.path)
++ if got != test.out {
++ t.Errorf("stripRoot(%q, %q) -- got %q, expected %q", test.root, test.path, got, test.out)
++ }
++ }
++}
+--
+2.31.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/runc.spec b/SPECS/runc.spec
index f2dcddd..e6c9c90 100644
--- a/SPECS/runc.spec
+++ b/SPECS/runc.spec
@@ -26,13 +26,14 @@ go build -buildmode pie -compiler gc -tags="rpm_crashtraceback no_openssl ${BUIL
Name: %{repo}
Version: 1.0.0
-Release: 64.rc10%{?dist}
+Release: 66.rc10%{?dist}
Summary: CLI for running Open Containers
ExcludeArch: %{ix86}
License: ASL 2.0
URL: %{git0}
Source0: %{git0}/archive/%{commit0}/%{name}-%{shortcommit0}.tar.gz
Patch0: 1807.patch
+Patch1: 0001-rootfs-add-mount-destination-validation.patch
BuildRequires: golang >= 1.12.12-4
BuildRequires: git
BuildRequires: go-md2man
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ pushd GOPATH
popd
pushd GOPATH/src/%{import_path}
+export GO111MODULE=off
export GOPATH=%{gopath}:$(pwd)/GOPATH
export BUILDTAGS="selinux seccomp"
%gobuild -o %{name} %{import_path}
@@ -89,6 +91,14 @@ install -p -m 0644 contrib/completions/bash/%{name} %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/bash
%{_datadir}/bash-completion/completions/%{name}
%changelog
+* Wed May 19 2021 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-66.rc10
+- set GO111MODULE=off to fix build
+- Related: #1955651
+
+* Wed May 19 2021 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-65.rc10
+- fix CVE-2021-30465
+- Resolves: #1955651
+
* Thu Feb 13 2020 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-64.rc10
- address CVE-2019-19921 by updating to rc10
- Resolves: #1801888