Blame SOURCES/0010-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2019-3822.patch

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From ab22e3a00f04b458039c21111cfa448051e5777d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
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Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer overflow
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Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html
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Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
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CVE-2019-3822
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Upstream-commit: 50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc
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Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
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---
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 lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++----
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 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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index b614cda..a3a55d9 100644
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--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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+++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
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@@ -777,11 +777,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_message(struct Curl_easy *data,
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   });
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 #ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES
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-  if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) {
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-    DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
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-    memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
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-    size += ntresplen;
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+  /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */
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+  if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) {
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+    failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big");
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+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
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   }
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+  DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
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+  memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
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+  size += ntresplen;
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   DEBUG_OUT({
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     fprintf(stderr, "\n   ntresp=");
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-- 
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2.17.2
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