diff --git a/SOURCES/kvm-usb-fix-setup_len-init-CVE-2020-14364.patch b/SOURCES/kvm-usb-fix-setup_len-init-CVE-2020-14364.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e63299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/kvm-usb-fix-setup_len-init-CVE-2020-14364.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From feb16ff29a13a4286389bb8b9d4f541aab9b84f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 15:27:13 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: fix setup_len init (CVE-2020-14364)
+
+RH-Author: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
+Message-id: <20200903152713.1420531-2-jmaloy@redhat.com>
+Patchwork-id: 98271
+O-Subject: [RHEL-8.3.0 qemu-kvm PATCH 1/1] usb: fix setup_len init (CVE-2020-14364)
+Bugzilla: 1869710
+RH-Acked-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+RH-Acked-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
+RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+Store calculated setup_len in a local variable, verify it, and only
+write it to the struct (USBDevice->setup_len) in case it passed the
+sanity checks.
+
+This prevents other code (do_token_{in,out} functions specifically)
+from working with invalid USBDevice->setup_len values and overrunning
+the USBDevice->setup_buf[] buffer.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2020-14364
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Message-id: 20200825053636.29648-1-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit b946434f2659a182afc17e155be6791ebfb302eb)
+Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Danilo C. L. de Paula <ddepaula@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/core.c | 16 ++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/core.c b/hw/usb/core.c
+index 5abd128b6b..5234dcc73f 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/core.c
++++ b/hw/usb/core.c
+@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void usb_wakeup(USBEndpoint *ep, unsigned int stream)
+ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+ {
+     int request, value, index;
++    unsigned int setup_len;
+ 
+     if (p->iov.size != 8) {
+         p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+@@ -138,14 +139,15 @@ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+     usb_packet_copy(p, s->setup_buf, p->iov.size);
+     s->setup_index = 0;
+     p->actual_length = 0;
+-    s->setup_len   = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
+-    if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
++    setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
++    if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
+         fprintf(stderr,
+                 "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
+-                s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
++                setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
+         p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+         return;
+     }
++    s->setup_len = setup_len;
+ 
+     request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1];
+     value   = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2];
+@@ -259,26 +261,28 @@ static void do_token_out(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+ static void do_parameter(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+ {
+     int i, request, value, index;
++    unsigned int setup_len;
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+         s->setup_buf[i] = p->parameter >> (i*8);
+     }
+ 
+     s->setup_state = SETUP_STATE_PARAM;
+-    s->setup_len   = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
+     s->setup_index = 0;
+ 
+     request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1];
+     value   = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2];
+     index   = (s->setup_buf[5] << 8) | s->setup_buf[4];
+ 
+-    if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
++    setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
++    if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
+         fprintf(stderr,
+                 "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
+-                s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
++                setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
+         p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+         return;
+     }
++    s->setup_len = setup_len;
+ 
+     if (p->pid == USB_TOKEN_OUT) {
+         usb_packet_copy(p, s->data_buf, s->setup_len);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
diff --git a/SPECS/qemu-kvm.spec b/SPECS/qemu-kvm.spec
index da91b80..0e99a6f 100644
--- a/SPECS/qemu-kvm.spec
+++ b/SPECS/qemu-kvm.spec
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Obsoletes: %1-rhev
 Summary: QEMU is a machine emulator and virtualizer
 Name: qemu-kvm
 Version: 4.2.0
-Release: 33%{?dist}
+Release: 34%{?dist}
 # Epoch because we pushed a qemu-1.0 package. AIUI this can't ever be dropped
 Epoch: 15
 License: GPLv2 and GPLv2+ and CC-BY
@@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ Patch389: kvm-target-i386-sev-provide-proper-error-reporting-for-q.patch
 Patch390: kvm-target-i386-sev-fail-query-sev-capabilities-if-QEMU-.patch
 # For bz#1863034 - RHEL8.3 Beta - Secure Execution: Unable to start Qemu with "-no-reboot" option (qemu-kvm)
 Patch391: kvm-s390x-protvirt-allow-to-IPL-secure-guests-with-no-re.patch
+# For bz#1869710 - CVE-2020-14364 qemu-kvm: QEMU: usb: out-of-bounds r/w access issue while processing usb packets [rhel-8.3.0]
+Patch392: kvm-usb-fix-setup_len-init-CVE-2020-14364.patch
 
 BuildRequires: wget
 BuildRequires: rpm-build
@@ -1871,6 +1873,11 @@ useradd -r -u 107 -g qemu -G kvm -d / -s /sbin/nologin \
 
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Sep 08 2020 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula <ddepaula@redhat.com> - 4.2.0-34.el8
+- kvm-usb-fix-setup_len-init-CVE-2020-14364.patch [bz#1869710]
+- Resolves: bz#1869710
+  (CVE-2020-14364 qemu-kvm: QEMU: usb: out-of-bounds r/w access issue while processing usb packets [rhel-8.3.0])
+
 * Wed Aug 19 2020 Danilo Cesar Lemes de Paula <ddepaula@redhat.com> - 4.2.0-33.el8
 - kvm-Require-libfdt-1.6.0.patch [bz#1867847]
 - Resolves: bz#1867847