From bbe33dbd43e6b562459624adb801f9b35d0f5211 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael S. Tsirkin Date: Wed, 14 May 2014 08:26:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/30] usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load RH-Author: Michael S. Tsirkin Message-id: <1400055942-6418-2-git-send-email-mst@redhat.com> Patchwork-id: 58854 O-Subject: [PATCH qemu-kvm RHEL7.0.z 2/2] usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load Bugzilla: 1095746 RH-Acked-by: Marcel Apfelbaum RH-Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann CVE-2013-4541 s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit this to load arbitrary data. setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure they are not negative. Cc: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela (cherry picked from commit 9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a) Brew build: http://brewweb.devel.redhat.com/brew/taskinfo?taskID=7450401 Tested: lightly on developer's box Bugzilla: 1095743 Note: the fix isn't complete upstream. there's a separate bugzilla to fix more issues upstream and in rhel. --- hw/usb/bus.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina --- hw/usb/bus.c | 4 +++- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/usb/bus.c b/hw/usb/bus.c index e0c3a77..9766b7f 100644 --- a/hw/usb/bus.c +++ b/hw/usb/bus.c @@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ static int usb_device_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id) } else { dev->attached = 1; } - if (dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) || + if (dev->setup_index < 0 || + dev->setup_len < 0 || + dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) || dev->setup_len >= sizeof(dev->data_buf)) { return -EINVAL; } -- 1.7.1