From 31d7d5079364726d5a048d96e1e368173b83ab80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Daniel P. Berrange" Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 11:10:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 17/20] ui: avoid sign extension using client width/height RH-Author: Daniel P. Berrange Message-id: <20180205111012.6210-17-berrange@redhat.com> Patchwork-id: 78889 O-Subject: [RHV-7.5 qemu-kvm-rhev PATCH v2 16/17] ui: avoid sign extension using client width/height Bugzilla: 1527404 RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek RH-Acked-by: Thomas Huth From: "Daniel P. Berrange" Pixman returns a signed int for the image width/height, but the VNC protocol only permits a unsigned int16. Effective framebuffer size is determined by the guest, limited by the video RAM size, so the dimensions are unlikely to exceed the range of an unsigned int16, but this is not currently validated. With the current use of 'int' for client width/height, the calculation of offsets in vnc_update_throttle_offset() suffers from integer size promotion and sign extension, causing coverity warnings *** CID 1385147: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) /ui/vnc.c: 979 in vnc_update_throttle_offset() 973 * than that the client would already suffering awful audio 974 * glitches, so dropping samples is no worse really). 975 */ 976 static void vnc_update_throttle_offset(VncState *vs) 977 { 978 size_t offset = >>> CID 1385147: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) >>> Suspicious implicit sign extension: "vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel" with type "unsigned char" (8 bits, unsigned) is promoted in "vs->client_width * vs->client_height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel" to type "int" (32 bits, signed), then sign-extended to type "unsigned long" (64 bits, unsigned). If "vs->client_width * vs->client_height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel" is greater than 0x7FFFFFFF, the upper bits of the result will all be 1. 979 vs->client_width * vs->client_height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel; Change client_width / client_height to be a size_t to avoid sign extension and integer promotion. Then validate that dimensions are in range wrt the RFB protocol u16 limits. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange Message-id: 20180118155254.17053-1-berrange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann (cherry picked from commit 4c956bd81e2e16afd19d38d1fdeba6d9faa8a1ae) Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina --- ui/vnc.c | 9 +++++++++ ui/vnc.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c index b303930..fec4f4c 100644 --- a/ui/vnc.c +++ b/ui/vnc.c @@ -672,6 +672,11 @@ static void vnc_desktop_resize(VncState *vs) vs->client_height == pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server)) { return; } + + assert(pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server) < 65536 && + pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server) >= 0); + assert(pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server) < 65536 && + pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server) >= 0); vs->client_width = pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server); vs->client_height = pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server); vnc_lock_output(vs); @@ -2490,6 +2495,10 @@ static int protocol_client_init(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) return 0; } + assert(pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server) < 65536 && + pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server) >= 0); + assert(pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server) < 65536 && + pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server) >= 0); vs->client_width = pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server); vs->client_height = pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server); vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_width); diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h index 0c33a5f..bbda054 100644 --- a/ui/vnc.h +++ b/ui/vnc.h @@ -278,8 +278,8 @@ struct VncState int last_x; int last_y; uint32_t last_bmask; - int client_width; - int client_height; + size_t client_width; /* limited to u16 by RFB proto */ + size_t client_height; /* limited to u16 by RFB proto */ VncShareMode share_mode; uint32_t vnc_encoding; -- 1.8.3.1