From e3dbec9458073f71290e226ede55734ac4fe7e5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>

Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 11:10:08 +0100

Subject: [PATCH 14/20] ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size

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RH-Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

Message-id: <20180205111012.6210-14-berrange@redhat.com>

Patchwork-id: 78890

O-Subject: [RHV-7.5 qemu-kvm-rhev PATCH v2 13/17] ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size

Bugzilla: 1527404

RH-Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>

RH-Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>

RH-Acked-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>

The previous patches fix problems with throttling of forced framebuffer updates

and audio data capture that would cause the QEMU output buffer size to grow

without bound. Those fixes are graceful in that once the client catches up with

reading data from the server, everything continues operating normally.

There is some data which the server sends to the client that is impractical to

throttle. Specifically there are various pseudo framebuffer update encodings to

inform the client of things like desktop resizes, pointer changes, audio

playback start/stop, LED state and so on. These generally only involve sending

a very small amount of data to the client, but a malicious guest might be able

to do things that trigger these changes at a very high rate. Throttling them is

not practical as missed or delayed events would cause broken behaviour for the

client.

This patch thus takes a more forceful approach of setting an absolute upper

bound on the amount of data we permit to be present in the output buffer at

any time. The previous patch set a threshold for throttling the output buffer

by allowing an amount of data equivalent to one complete framebuffer update and

one seconds worth of audio data. On top of this it allowed for one further

forced framebuffer update to be queued.

To be conservative, we thus take that throttling threshold and multiply it by

5 to form an absolute upper bound. If this bound is hit during vnc_write() we

forceably disconnect the client, refusing to queue further data. This limit is

high enough that it should never be hit unless a malicious client is trying to

exploit the sever, or the network is completely saturated preventing any sending

of data on the socket.

This completes the fix for CVE-2017-15124 started in the previous patches.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>

Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>

Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-12-berrange@redhat.com

Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>

(cherry picked from commit f887cf165db20f405cb8805c716bd363aaadf815)

Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>

---

 ui/vnc.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c

index 7f2210f..a7aff91 100644

--- a/ui/vnc.c

+++ b/ui/vnc.c

@@ -1521,8 +1521,37 @@ gboolean vnc_client_io(QIOChannel *ioc G_GNUC_UNUSED,

 }

+/*

+ * Scale factor to apply to vs->throttle_output_offset when checking for

+ * hard limit. Worst case normal usage could be x2, if we have a complete

+ * incremental update and complete forced update in the output buffer.

+ * So x3 should be good enough, but we pick x5 to be conservative and thus

+ * (hopefully) never trigger incorrectly.

+ */

+#define VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE 5

+

 void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)

 {

+    if (vs->disconnecting) {

+        return;

+    }

+    /* Protection against malicious client/guest to prevent our output

+     * buffer growing without bound if client stops reading data. This

+     * should rarely trigger, because we have earlier throttling code

+     * which stops issuing framebuffer updates and drops audio data

+     * if the throttle_output_offset value is exceeded. So we only reach

+     * this higher level if a huge number of pseudo-encodings get

+     * triggered while data can't be sent on the socket.

+     *

+     * NB throttle_output_offset can be zero during early protocol

+     * handshake, or from the job thread's VncState clone

+     */

+    if (vs->throttle_output_offset != 0 &&

+        vs->output.offset > (vs->throttle_output_offset *

+                             VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE)) {

+        vnc_disconnect_start(vs);

+        return;

+    }

     buffer_reserve(&vs->output, len);

     if (vs->ioc != NULL && buffer_empty(&vs->output)) {

-- 

1.8.3.1