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Index: setuptools-1.1.7/setuptools/ssl_support.py
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===================================================================
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--- setuptools-1.1.7.orig/setuptools/ssl_support.py
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+++ setuptools-1.1.7/setuptools/ssl_support.py
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@@ -85,28 +85,69 @@ except ImportError:
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try:
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from ssl import CertificateError, match_hostname
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except ImportError:
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+ try:
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+ from backports.ssl_match_hostname import CertificateError
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+ from backports.ssl_match_hostname import match_hostname
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+ except ImportError:
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+ CertificateError = None
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+ match_hostname = None
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+
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+if not CertificateError:
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class CertificateError(ValueError):
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pass
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- def _dnsname_to_pat(dn, max_wildcards=1):
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+if not match_hostname:
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+ def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
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+ """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
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+
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+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
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+ """
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pats = []
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- for frag in dn.split(r'.'):
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- if frag.count('*') > max_wildcards:
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- # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
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- # than one wildcard per fragment. A survery of established
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- # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
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- # reasonable choice.
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- raise CertificateError(
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- "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
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- if frag == '*':
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- # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
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- # fragment.
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- pats.append('[^.]+')
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- else:
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- # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless fragment.
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- frag = re.escape(frag)
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- pats.append(frag.replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
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- return re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
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+ if not dn:
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+ return False
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+
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+ # Ported from python3-syntax:
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+ # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
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+ parts = dn.split(r'.')
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+ leftmost = parts[0]
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+ remainder = parts[1:]
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+
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+ wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
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+ if wildcards > max_wildcards:
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+ # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
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+ # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
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+ # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
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+ # reasonable choice.
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+ raise CertificateError(
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+ "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
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+
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+ # speed up common case w/o wildcards
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+ if not wildcards:
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+ return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
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+
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+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
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+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
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+ # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
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+ if leftmost == '*':
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+ # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
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+ # fragment.
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+ pats.append('[^.]+')
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+ elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
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+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
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+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
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+ # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
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+ # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
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+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
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+ else:
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+ # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
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+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
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+
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+ # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
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+ for frag in remainder:
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+ pats.append(re.escape(frag))
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+
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+ pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
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+ return pat.match(hostname)
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def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
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"""Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
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@@ -122,7 +163,7 @@ except ImportError:
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san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
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for key, value in san:
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if key == 'DNS':
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- if _dnsname_to_pat(value).match(hostname):
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+ if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
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return
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dnsnames.append(value)
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if not dnsnames:
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@@ -133,7 +174,7 @@ except ImportError:
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# XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
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# must be used.
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if key == 'commonName':
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- if _dnsname_to_pat(value).match(hostname):
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+ if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
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return
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dnsnames.append(value)
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if len(dnsnames) > 1:
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