From 1f106b0811e3c76c84b0c2187513767fece030d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Nov 03 2020 11:42:57 +0000 Subject: import python-pip-9.0.3-18.el8 --- diff --git a/SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue-tests.patch b/SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue-tests.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f63467 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue-tests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +From 7917dbda14ef64a5e7fdea48383a266577484ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Orsava +Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 12:51:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] FIX #6413 pip install allow directory traversal + (tests) + +--- + tests/unit/test_download.py | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tests/unit/test_download.py b/tests/unit/test_download.py +index ee4b11c..15f99ec 100644 +--- a/tests/unit/test_download.py ++++ b/tests/unit/test_download.py +@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ + import hashlib + import os ++import sys + from io import BytesIO + from shutil import rmtree, copy + from tempfile import mkdtemp +@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ import pip + from pip.exceptions import HashMismatch + from pip.download import ( + PipSession, SafeFileCache, path_to_url, unpack_http_url, url_to_path, ++ _download_http_url, parse_content_disposition, sanitize_content_filename, + unpack_file_url, + ) + from pip.index import Link +@@ -123,6 +125,89 @@ def test_unpack_http_url_bad_downloaded_checksum(mock_unpack_file): + rmtree(download_dir) + + ++@pytest.mark.parametrize("filename, expected", [ ++ ('dir/file', 'file'), ++ ('../file', 'file'), ++ ('../../file', 'file'), ++ ('../', ''), ++ ('../..', '..'), ++ ('/', ''), ++]) ++def test_sanitize_content_filename(filename, expected): ++ """ ++ Test inputs where the result is the same for Windows and non-Windows. ++ """ ++ assert sanitize_content_filename(filename) == expected ++ ++ ++@pytest.mark.parametrize("filename, win_expected, non_win_expected", [ ++ ('dir\\file', 'file', 'dir\\file'), ++ ('..\\file', 'file', '..\\file'), ++ ('..\\..\\file', 'file', '..\\..\\file'), ++ ('..\\', '', '..\\'), ++ ('..\\..', '..', '..\\..'), ++ ('\\', '', '\\'), ++]) ++def test_sanitize_content_filename__platform_dependent( ++ filename, ++ win_expected, ++ non_win_expected ++): ++ """ ++ Test inputs where the result is different for Windows and non-Windows. ++ """ ++ if sys.platform == 'win32': ++ expected = win_expected ++ else: ++ expected = non_win_expected ++ assert sanitize_content_filename(filename) == expected ++ ++ ++@pytest.mark.parametrize("content_disposition, default_filename, expected", [ ++ ('attachment;filename="../file"', 'df', 'file'), ++]) ++def test_parse_content_disposition( ++ content_disposition, ++ default_filename, ++ expected ++): ++ actual = parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, default_filename) ++ assert actual == expected ++ ++ ++def test_download_http_url__no_directory_traversal(tmpdir): ++ """ ++ Test that directory traversal doesn't happen on download when the ++ Content-Disposition header contains a filename with a ".." path part. ++ """ ++ mock_url = 'http://www.example.com/whatever.tgz' ++ contents = b'downloaded' ++ link = Link(mock_url) ++ ++ session = Mock() ++ resp = MockResponse(contents) ++ resp.url = mock_url ++ resp.headers = { ++ # Set the content-type to a random value to prevent ++ # mimetypes.guess_extension from guessing the extension. ++ 'content-type': 'random', ++ 'content-disposition': 'attachment;filename="../out_dir_file"' ++ } ++ session.get.return_value = resp ++ ++ download_dir = tmpdir.join('download') ++ os.mkdir(download_dir) ++ file_path, content_type = _download_http_url( ++ link, ++ session, ++ download_dir, ++ hashes=None, ++ ) ++ # The file should be downloaded to download_dir. ++ actual = os.listdir(download_dir) ++ assert actual == ['out_dir_file'] ++ ++ + @pytest.mark.skipif("sys.platform == 'win32'") + def test_path_to_url_unix(): + assert path_to_url('/tmp/file') == 'file:///tmp/file' +-- +2.25.4 + diff --git a/SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue.patch b/SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6ef12d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/pip-directory-traversal-security-issue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 8044d9f2fbcb09f09a62b26ac1d8a134976bb2ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: gzpan123 +Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:25:45 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] FIX #6413 pip install allow directory traversal + +--- + news/6413.bugfix | 3 +++ + pip/download.py | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 news/6413.bugfix + +diff --git a/news/6413.bugfix b/news/6413.bugfix +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..68d0a72 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/news/6413.bugfix +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++Prevent ``pip install `` from permitting directory traversal if e.g. ++a malicious server sends a ``Content-Disposition`` header with a filename ++containing ``../`` or ``..\\``. +diff --git a/pip/download.py b/pip/download.py +index 039e55a..b3d169b 100644 +--- a/pip/download.py ++++ b/pip/download.py +@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ __all__ = ['get_file_content', + 'is_url', 'url_to_path', 'path_to_url', + 'is_archive_file', 'unpack_vcs_link', + 'unpack_file_url', 'is_vcs_url', 'is_file_url', +- 'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url'] ++ 'unpack_http_url', 'unpack_url', ++ 'parse_content_disposition', 'sanitize_content_filename'] + + + logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) +@@ -824,6 +825,29 @@ def unpack_url(link, location, download_dir=None, + write_delete_marker_file(location) + + ++def sanitize_content_filename(filename): ++ # type: (str) -> str ++ """ ++ Sanitize the "filename" value from a Content-Disposition header. ++ """ ++ return os.path.basename(filename) ++ ++ ++def parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, default_filename): ++ # type: (str, str) -> str ++ """ ++ Parse the "filename" value from a Content-Disposition header, and ++ return the default filename if the result is empty. ++ """ ++ _type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition) ++ filename = params.get('filename') ++ if filename: ++ # We need to sanitize the filename to prevent directory traversal ++ # in case the filename contains ".." path parts. ++ filename = sanitize_content_filename(filename) ++ return filename or default_filename ++ ++ + def _download_http_url(link, session, temp_dir, hashes): + """Download link url into temp_dir using provided session""" + target_url = link.url.split('#', 1)[0] +@@ -864,10 +888,7 @@ def _download_http_url(link, session, temp_dir, hashes): + # Have a look at the Content-Disposition header for a better guess + content_disposition = resp.headers.get('content-disposition') + if content_disposition: +- type, params = cgi.parse_header(content_disposition) +- # We use ``or`` here because we don't want to use an "empty" value +- # from the filename param. +- filename = params.get('filename') or filename ++ filename = parse_content_disposition(content_disposition, filename) + ext = splitext(filename)[1] + if not ext: + ext = mimetypes.guess_extension(content_type) +-- +2.25.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/python-pip.spec b/SPECS/python-pip.spec index e5b0663..317131b 100644 --- a/SPECS/python-pip.spec +++ b/SPECS/python-pip.spec @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Name: python-%{srcname} # When updating, update the bundled libraries versions bellow! Version: 9.0.3 -Release: 16%{?dist} +Release: 18%{?dist} Summary: A tool for installing and managing Python packages Group: Development/Libraries @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ BuildRequires: bzr # git clone https://github.com/pypa/pip && cd pip # git checkout 9.0.1 && tar -czvf ../pip-9.0.1-tests.tar.gz tests/ %if %{with tests} -Source1: pip-9.0.1-tests.tar.gz +Source1: pip-%{version}-tests.tar.gz %endif # Patch until the following issue gets implemented upstream: @@ -113,6 +113,14 @@ Patch7: CVE-2019-11324.patch # https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/4851 Patch8: CVE-2018-18074.patch +# Patch for pip install allow directory traversal, leading to arbitrary file write +# - Upstream PR: https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/6418/files +# - Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1868016 +# Patch9 fixes the issue +# Patch10 adds unit tests for the issue +Patch9: pip-directory-traversal-security-issue.patch +Patch10: pip-directory-traversal-security-issue-tests.patch + %global _description \ pip is a package management system used to install and manage software packages \ written in Python. Many packages can be found in the Python Package Index \ @@ -250,9 +258,14 @@ popd pushd pip/_vendor/requests %patch8 -p1 popd +%patch9 -p1 +%if %{with tests} +%patch10 -p1 +%endif # this goes together with patch4 rm pip/_vendor/certifi/*.pem +rm pip/_vendor/requests/*.pem sed -i '/\.pem$/d' pip.egg-info/SOURCES.txt sed -i '1d' pip/__init__.py @@ -371,6 +384,14 @@ py.test-%{python3_version} -m 'not network' %endif %changelog +* Wed Aug 19 2020 Tomas Orsava - 9.0.3-18 +- Patch for pip install allow directory traversal, leading to arbitrary file write +Resolves: rhbz#1868016 + +* Wed Mar 04 2020 Charalampos Stratakis - 9.0.3-17 +- Remove unused CA bundle from the bundled requests library +Resolves: rhbz#1775200 + * Mon Jan 13 2020 Lumír Balhar - 9.0.3-16 - Add four new patches for CVEs in bundled urllib3 and requests CVE-2018-20060, CVE-2019-11236, CVE-2019-11324, CVE-2018-18074