diff --git a/SOURCES/01-CVE-2020-25654.patch b/SOURCES/01-CVE-2020-25654.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..135c4f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/01-CVE-2020-25654.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,803 @@
+From 975724044df52f558119008352a19b790ce874cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 15:05:47 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 01/10] Refactor: lrmd: functionize creating reply
+
+reduces duplication, and enforces consistency in reply XML and logging
+---
+ lrmd/lrmd.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lrmd/lrmd.c b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+index 2e8ea41..ceeb10b 100644
+--- a/lrmd/lrmd.c
++++ b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+@@ -373,23 +373,15 @@ schedule_lrmd_cmd(lrmd_rsc_t * rsc, lrmd_cmd_t * cmd)
+ }
+ }
+
+-static void
+-send_reply(crm_client_t * client, int rc, uint32_t id, int call_id)
++static xmlNode *
++create_lrmd_reply(const char *origin, int rc, int call_id)
+ {
+- int send_rc = 0;
+- xmlNode *reply = NULL;
++ xmlNode *reply = create_xml_node(NULL, T_LRMD_REPLY);
+
+- reply = create_xml_node(NULL, T_LRMD_REPLY);
+- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_ORIGIN, __FUNCTION__);
++ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_ORIGIN, origin);
+ crm_xml_add_int(reply, F_LRMD_RC, rc);
+ crm_xml_add_int(reply, F_LRMD_CALLID, call_id);
+-
+- send_rc = lrmd_server_send_reply(client, id, reply);
+-
+- free_xml(reply);
+- if (send_rc < 0) {
+- crm_warn("LRMD reply to %s failed: %d", client->name, send_rc);
+- }
++ return reply;
+ }
+
+ static void
+@@ -1396,23 +1388,24 @@ free_rsc(gpointer data)
+ free(rsc);
+ }
+
+-static int
+-process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
++static xmlNode *
++process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id)
+ {
+- xmlNode *reply = create_xml_node(NULL, "reply");
++ xmlNode *reply = NULL;
++ int rc = pcmk_ok;
+ const char *is_ipc_provider = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_IS_IPC_PROVIDER);
+ const char *protocol_version = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+
+ if (compare_version(protocol_version, LRMD_MIN_PROTOCOL_VERSION) < 0) {
+ crm_err("Cluster API version must be greater than or equal to %s, not %s",
+ LRMD_MIN_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protocol_version);
+- crm_xml_add_int(reply, F_LRMD_RC, -EPROTO);
++ rc = -EPROTO;
+ }
+
++ reply = create_lrmd_reply(__FUNCTION__, rc, call_id);
+ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_OPERATION, CRM_OP_REGISTER);
+ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_CLIENTID, client->id);
+ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+- lrmd_server_send_reply(client, id, reply);
+
+ if (crm_is_true(is_ipc_provider)) {
+ /* this is a remote connection from a cluster nodes crmd */
+@@ -1420,9 +1413,7 @@ process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
+ #endif
+ }
+-
+- free_xml(reply);
+- return pcmk_ok;
++ return reply;
+ }
+
+ static int
+@@ -1450,52 +1441,34 @@ process_lrmd_rsc_register(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+-static void
+-process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
++static xmlNode *
++process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(xmlNode *request, int call_id)
+ {
+ int rc = pcmk_ok;
+- int send_rc = 0;
+- int call_id = 0;
+ xmlNode *rsc_xml = get_xpath_object("//" F_LRMD_RSC, request, LOG_ERR);
+ const char *rsc_id = crm_element_value(rsc_xml, F_LRMD_RSC_ID);
+ xmlNode *reply = NULL;
+ lrmd_rsc_t *rsc = NULL;
+
+- crm_element_value_int(request, F_LRMD_CALLID, &call_id);
+-
+- if (!rsc_id) {
+- rc = -ENODEV;
+- goto get_rsc_done;
+- }
+-
+- if (!(rsc = g_hash_table_lookup(rsc_list, rsc_id))) {
+- crm_info("Resource '%s' not found (%d active resources)",
+- rsc_id, g_hash_table_size(rsc_list));
++ if (rsc_id == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+- goto get_rsc_done;
++ } else {
++ rsc = g_hash_table_lookup(rsc_list, rsc_id);
++ if (rsc == NULL) {
++ crm_info("Resource '%s' not found (%d active resources)",
++ rsc_id, g_hash_table_size(rsc_list));
++ rc = -ENODEV;
++ }
+ }
+
+- get_rsc_done:
+-
+- reply = create_xml_node(NULL, T_LRMD_REPLY);
+- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_ORIGIN, __FUNCTION__);
+- crm_xml_add_int(reply, F_LRMD_RC, rc);
+- crm_xml_add_int(reply, F_LRMD_CALLID, call_id);
+-
++ reply = create_lrmd_reply(__FUNCTION__, rc, call_id);
+ if (rsc) {
+ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_RSC_ID, rsc->rsc_id);
+ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_CLASS, rsc->class);
+ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_PROVIDER, rsc->provider);
+ crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_TYPE, rsc->type);
+ }
+-
+- send_rc = lrmd_server_send_reply(client, id, reply);
+-
+- if (send_rc < 0) {
+- crm_warn("LRMD reply to %s failed: %d", client->name, send_rc);
+- }
+-
+- free_xml(reply);
++ return reply;
+ }
+
+ static int
+@@ -1675,6 +1648,7 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ const char *op = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_OPERATION);
+ int do_reply = 0;
+ int do_notify = 0;
++ xmlNode *reply = NULL;
+
+ crm_trace("Processing %s operation from %s", op, client->id);
+ crm_element_value_int(request, F_LRMD_CALLID, &call_id);
+@@ -1685,13 +1659,15 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ #endif
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_REGISTER, TRUE)) {
+- rc = process_lrmd_signon(client, id, request);
++ reply = process_lrmd_signon(client, request, call_id);
++ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_REG, TRUE)) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_register(client, id, request);
+ do_notify = 1;
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_INFO, TRUE)) {
+- process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(client, id, request);
++ reply = process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(request, call_id);
++ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_UNREG, TRUE)) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_unregister(client, id, request);
+ /* don't notify anyone about failed un-registers */
+@@ -1727,7 +1703,17 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ op, client->id, rc, do_reply, do_notify);
+
+ if (do_reply) {
+- send_reply(client, rc, id, call_id);
++ int send_rc = pcmk_ok;
++
++ if (reply == NULL) {
++ reply = create_lrmd_reply(__FUNCTION__, rc, call_id);
++ }
++ send_rc = lrmd_server_send_reply(client, id, reply);
++ free_xml(reply);
++ if (send_rc < 0) {
++ crm_warn("Reply to client %s failed: %s " CRM_XS " %d",
++ client->name, pcmk_strerror(send_rc), send_rc);
++ }
+ }
+
+ if (do_notify) {
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 6ed12ce8ace8e0a1cc5b8ca233684ba4e70a021c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 09:56:03 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 02/10] Log: executor: show CRM_OP_REGISTER rc in debug message
+
+Previously, process_lrmd_signon() would add the rc to the client reply
+but not pass it back to process_lrmd_message(), which would always log "OK" in
+its debug message, even if the sign-on was rejected.
+---
+ lrmd/lrmd.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lrmd/lrmd.c b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+index ceeb10b..a20f165 100644
+--- a/lrmd/lrmd.c
++++ b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+@@ -1388,10 +1388,10 @@ free_rsc(gpointer data)
+ free(rsc);
+ }
+
+-static xmlNode *
+-process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id)
++static int
++process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id,
++ xmlNode **reply)
+ {
+- xmlNode *reply = NULL;
+ int rc = pcmk_ok;
+ const char *is_ipc_provider = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_IS_IPC_PROVIDER);
+ const char *protocol_version = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+@@ -1402,18 +1402,19 @@ process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id)
+ rc = -EPROTO;
+ }
+
+- reply = create_lrmd_reply(__FUNCTION__, rc, call_id);
+- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_OPERATION, CRM_OP_REGISTER);
+- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_CLIENTID, client->id);
+- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+-
+ if (crm_is_true(is_ipc_provider)) {
+ /* this is a remote connection from a cluster nodes crmd */
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
+ ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
+ #endif
+ }
+- return reply;
++
++ *reply = create_lrmd_reply(__func__, rc, call_id);
++ crm_xml_add(*reply, F_LRMD_OPERATION, CRM_OP_REGISTER);
++ crm_xml_add(*reply, F_LRMD_CLIENTID, client->id);
++ crm_xml_add(*reply, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
++
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ static int
+@@ -1659,7 +1660,7 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ #endif
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_REGISTER, TRUE)) {
+- reply = process_lrmd_signon(client, request, call_id);
++ rc = process_lrmd_signon(client, request, call_id, &reply);
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_REG, TRUE)) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_register(client, id, request);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From fd9ee715ce26a2bc2f7546afe8e7fbfb778cb861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 15:16:39 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 03/10] Low: executor: mark controller connections to
+ pacemaker-remoted as privileged
+
+Previously, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged was only set when local clients connected
+(as root or hacluster). Now, set it when pacemaker-remoted successfully
+completes the TLS handshake with a remote client (i.e., the controller on a
+cluster node).
+
+This has no effect as of this commit but will with later commits.
+---
+ lrmd/tls_backend.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lrmd/tls_backend.c b/lrmd/tls_backend.c
+index 8934ae3..509f4fa 100644
+--- a/lrmd/tls_backend.c
++++ b/lrmd/tls_backend.c
+@@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ remoted__read_handshake_data(crm_client_t *client)
+ client->remote->tls_handshake_complete = TRUE;
+ crm_notice("Remote client connection accepted");
+
++ /* Only a client with access to the TLS key can connect, so we can treat
++ * it as privileged.
++ */
++ set_bit(client->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
++
+ // Alert other clients of the new connection
+ notify_of_new_client(client);
+ return 0;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 755290ec01e0f955700e6e726461eca9cc27edab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 15:33:13 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 04/10] Low: executor: return appropriate error code when no
+ remote support
+
+---
+ lrmd/lrmd.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lrmd/lrmd.c b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+index a20f165..07f68ed 100644
+--- a/lrmd/lrmd.c
++++ b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+@@ -1403,9 +1403,11 @@ process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id,
+ }
+
+ if (crm_is_true(is_ipc_provider)) {
+- /* this is a remote connection from a cluster nodes crmd */
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
++ // This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
+ ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
++#else
++ rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+ #endif
+ }
+
+@@ -1657,6 +1659,8 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_IPC_FWD, TRUE)) {
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
+ ipc_proxy_forward_client(client, request);
++#else
++ rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+ #endif
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_REGISTER, TRUE)) {
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 540b7d4f5689b90ac466844f31fd161bdf446bed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 15:33:57 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 05/10] High: executor: restrict certain IPC requests to
+ Pacemaker daemons
+
+(partial fix for CVE-2020-25654 with two later commits)
+
+The executor IPC API allows clients to register resources, request agent
+execution, and so forth.
+
+If ACLs are enabled, this could allow an ACL-restricted user to bypass ACLs and
+execute any code as root. (If ACLs are not enabled, users in the haclient group
+have full access to the CIB, which already gives them that ability, so there is
+no additional exposure in that case.)
+
+When ACLs are supported, this commit effectively disables the executor IPC API
+for clients that aren't connecting as root or hacluster. Such clients can only
+register and poke now.
+---
+ lrmd/lrmd.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lrmd/lrmd.c b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+index 07f68ed..774b45b 100644
+--- a/lrmd/lrmd.c
++++ b/lrmd/lrmd.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+- * Copyright 2012-2019 the Pacemaker project contributors
++ * Copyright 2012-2020 the Pacemaker project contributors
+ *
+ * The version control history for this file may have further details.
+ *
+@@ -1404,8 +1404,12 @@ process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id,
+
+ if (crm_is_true(is_ipc_provider)) {
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
+- // This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
+- ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
++ if ((client->remote != NULL) && client->remote->tls_handshake_complete) {
++ // This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
++ ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ #else
+ rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+ #endif
+@@ -1653,12 +1657,26 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ int do_notify = 0;
+ xmlNode *reply = NULL;
+
++#if ENABLE_ACL
++ /* Certain IPC commands may be done only by privileged users (i.e. root or
++ * hacluster) when ACLs are enabled, because they would otherwise provide a
++ * means of bypassing ACLs.
++ */
++ bool allowed = is_set(client->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
++#else
++ bool allowed = true;
++#endif
++
+ crm_trace("Processing %s operation from %s", op, client->id);
+ crm_element_value_int(request, F_LRMD_CALLID, &call_id);
+
+ if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_IPC_FWD, TRUE)) {
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
+- ipc_proxy_forward_client(client, request);
++ if (allowed) {
++ ipc_proxy_forward_client(client, request);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ #else
+ rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+ #endif
+@@ -1667,35 +1685,63 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ rc = process_lrmd_signon(client, request, call_id, &reply);
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_REG, TRUE)) {
+- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_register(client, id, request);
+- do_notify = 1;
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_register(client, id, request);
++ do_notify = 1;
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_INFO, TRUE)) {
+- reply = process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(request, call_id);
++ if (allowed) {
++ reply = process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(request, call_id);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_UNREG, TRUE)) {
+- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_unregister(client, id, request);
+- /* don't notify anyone about failed un-registers */
+- if (rc == pcmk_ok || rc == -EINPROGRESS) {
+- do_notify = 1;
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_unregister(client, id, request);
++ /* don't notify anyone about failed un-registers */
++ if (rc == pcmk_ok || rc == -EINPROGRESS) {
++ do_notify = 1;
++ }
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_EXEC, TRUE)) {
+- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_exec(client, id, request);
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_exec(client, id, request);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_CANCEL, TRUE)) {
+- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_cancel(client, id, request);
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_cancel(client, id, request);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_POKE, TRUE)) {
+ do_notify = 1;
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_CHECK, TRUE)) {
+- xmlNode *data = get_message_xml(request, F_LRMD_CALLDATA);
+- const char *timeout = crm_element_value(data, F_LRMD_WATCHDOG);
+- CRM_LOG_ASSERT(data != NULL);
+- check_sbd_timeout(timeout);
++ if (allowed) {
++ xmlNode *data = get_message_xml(request, F_LRMD_CALLDATA);
++
++ CRM_LOG_ASSERT(data != NULL);
++ check_sbd_timeout(crm_element_value(data, F_LRMD_WATCHDOG));
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_ALERT_EXEC, TRUE)) {
+- rc = process_lrmd_alert_exec(client, id, request);
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = process_lrmd_alert_exec(client, id, request);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_reply = 1;
+ } else {
+ rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+@@ -1704,6 +1750,11 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
+ crm_log_xml_warn(request, "UnknownOp");
+ }
+
++ if (rc == -EACCES) {
++ crm_warn("Rejecting IPC request '%s' from unprivileged client %s",
++ op, crm_client_name(client));
++ }
++
+ crm_debug("Processed %s operation from %s: rc=%d, reply=%d, notify=%d",
+ op, client->id, rc, do_reply, do_notify);
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 34605b42d32e6f63eacd72e0ed971e8286102a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 11:16:43 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 06/10] Low: pacemakerd: check client for NULL before using it
+
+... to guard against bugs in client tracking
+---
+ mcp/pacemaker.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/mcp/pacemaker.c b/mcp/pacemaker.c
+index 05515c8..736c25c 100644
+--- a/mcp/pacemaker.c
++++ b/mcp/pacemaker.c
+@@ -567,9 +567,12 @@ pcmk_ipc_dispatch(qb_ipcs_connection_t * qbc, void *data, size_t size)
+ uint32_t id = 0;
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ const char *task = NULL;
++ xmlNode *msg = NULL;
+ crm_client_t *c = crm_client_get(qbc);
+- xmlNode *msg = crm_ipcs_recv(c, data, size, &id, &flags);
+
++ CRM_CHECK(c != NULL, return 0);
++
++ msg = crm_ipcs_recv(c, data, size, &id, &flags);
+ crm_ipcs_send_ack(c, id, flags, "ack", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
+ if (msg == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 3388b4f76dfb951f9d7e27e39f7cea6be63c3f5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 11:17:18 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 07/10] High: pacemakerd: ignore shutdown requests from
+ unprivileged users
+
+(partial fix for CVE-2020-25654 with one previous commit and one later commit)
+
+The pacemakerd IPC API supports a shutdown request, along with a
+command-line interface for using it (pacemakerd --shutdown).
+
+Only the haclient group has access to the IPC. Without ACLs, that group can
+already shut down Pacemaker via the CIB, so there's no security implication.
+
+However, it might not be desired to allow ACL-restricted users to shut down
+Pacemaker, so block users other than root or hacluster if ACLs are supported.
+---
+ mcp/pacemaker.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/mcp/pacemaker.c b/mcp/pacemaker.c
+index 736c25c..94ef949 100644
+--- a/mcp/pacemaker.c
++++ b/mcp/pacemaker.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+- * Copyright 2010-2019 the Pacemaker project contributors
++ * Copyright 2010-2020 the Pacemaker project contributors
+ *
+ * The version control history for this file may have further details.
+ *
+@@ -580,10 +580,26 @@ pcmk_ipc_dispatch(qb_ipcs_connection_t * qbc, void *data, size_t size)
+
+ task = crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_TASK);
+ if (crm_str_eq(task, CRM_OP_QUIT, TRUE)) {
+- /* Time to quit */
+- crm_notice("Shutting down in response to ticket %s (%s)",
+- crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_REFERENCE), crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_ORIGIN));
+- pcmk_shutdown(15);
++#if ENABLE_ACL
++ /* Only allow privileged users (i.e. root or hacluster)
++ * to shut down Pacemaker from the command line (or direct IPC).
++ *
++ * We only check when ACLs are enabled, because without them, any client
++ * with IPC access could shut down Pacemaker via the CIB anyway.
++ */
++ bool allowed = is_set(c->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
++#else
++ bool allowed = true;
++#endif
++ if (allowed) {
++ crm_notice("Shutting down in response to IPC request %s from %s",
++ crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_REFERENCE),
++ crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_ORIGIN));
++ pcmk_shutdown(15);
++ } else {
++ crm_warn("Ignoring shutdown request from unprivileged client %s",
++ crm_client_name(c));
++ }
+
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(task, CRM_OP_RM_NODE_CACHE, TRUE)) {
+ /* Send to everyone */
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 7babd406e7195fcce57850a8589b06e095642c33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 11:55:26 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 08/10] Fix: fencer: restrict certain IPC requests to
+ privileged users
+
+(partial fix for CVE-2020-25654 along with 2 previous commits)
+
+The fencer IPC API allows clients to register fence devices.
+
+If ACLs are enabled, this could allow an ACL-restricted user to bypass ACLs to
+configure fencing. If the user is able to install executables to the standard
+fencing agent locations, have arbitrary code executed as root (the standard
+locations generally require root for write access, so that is unlikely to be an
+issue).
+
+If ACLs are not enabled, users in the haclient group have full access to the
+CIB, which already gives them these capabilities, so there is no additional
+exposure in that case.
+
+This commit does not restrict unprivileged users from using other fencing API,
+such as requesting actual fencing.
+---
+ fencing/commands.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fencing/commands.c b/fencing/commands.c
+index 26952e9..a2abcdd 100644
+--- a/fencing/commands.c
++++ b/fencing/commands.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+- * Copyright 2009-2018 Andrew Beekhof <andrew@beekhof.net>
++ * Copyright 2009-2020 the Pacemaker project contributors
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License version 2
+ * or later (GPLv2+) WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY.
+@@ -2575,6 +2575,19 @@ handle_request(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, xmlNode * req
+ const char *op = crm_element_value(request, F_STONITH_OPERATION);
+ const char *client_id = crm_element_value(request, F_STONITH_CLIENTID);
+
++#if ENABLE_ACL
++ /* IPC commands related to fencing configuration may be done only by
++ * privileged users (i.e. root or hacluster) when ACLs are supported,
++ * because all other users should go through the CIB to have ACLs applied.
++ *
++ * If no client was given, this is a peer request, which is always allowed.
++ */
++ bool allowed = (client == NULL)
++ || is_set(client->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
++#else
++ bool allowed = true;
++#endif
++
+ crm_element_value_int(request, F_STONITH_CALLOPTS, &call_options);
+
+ if (is_set(call_options, st_opt_sync_call)) {
+@@ -2731,27 +2744,43 @@ handle_request(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, xmlNode * req
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_DEVICE_ADD, TRUE)) {
+ const char *device_id = NULL;
+
+- rc = stonith_device_register(request, &device_id, FALSE);
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = stonith_device_register(request, &device_id, FALSE);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_stonith_notify_device(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
+
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_DEVICE_DEL, TRUE)) {
+ xmlNode *dev = get_xpath_object("//" F_STONITH_DEVICE, request, LOG_ERR);
+ const char *device_id = crm_element_value(dev, XML_ATTR_ID);
+
+- rc = stonith_device_remove(device_id, FALSE);
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = stonith_device_remove(device_id, FALSE);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_stonith_notify_device(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
+
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_LEVEL_ADD, TRUE)) {
+ char *device_id = NULL;
+
+- rc = stonith_level_register(request, &device_id);
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = stonith_level_register(request, &device_id);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_stonith_notify_level(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
+ free(device_id);
+
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_LEVEL_DEL, TRUE)) {
+ char *device_id = NULL;
+
+- rc = stonith_level_remove(request, &device_id);
++ if (allowed) {
++ rc = stonith_level_remove(request, &device_id);
++ } else {
++ rc = -EACCES;
++ }
+ do_stonith_notify_level(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
+
+ } else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_CONFIRM, TRUE)) {
+@@ -2782,6 +2811,11 @@ handle_request(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, xmlNode * req
+
+ done:
+
++ if (rc == -EACCES) {
++ crm_warn("Rejecting IPC request '%s' from unprivileged client %s",
++ crm_str(op), crm_client_name(client));
++ }
++
+ /* Always reply unless the request is in process still.
+ * If in progress, a reply will happen async after the request
+ * processing is finished */
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From 74f3866cc23dad76fe914c341924ed17ece6b80b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 20:38:16 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 09/10] Test: CTS: libqb shared memory creates directories now
+
+... so use "rm -rf" instead of "rm -f"
+---
+ cts/CTS.py | 2 +-
+ cts/CTSaudits.py | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cts/CTS.py b/cts/CTS.py
+index cca2697..28e0e9c 100644
+--- a/cts/CTS.py
++++ b/cts/CTS.py
+@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ class ClusterManager(UserDict):
+ if self.rsh(node, self.templates["StopCmd"]) == 0:
+ # Make sure we can continue even if corosync leaks
+ # fdata-* is the old name
+- #self.rsh(node, "rm -f /dev/shm/qb-* /dev/shm/fdata-*")
++ #self.rsh(node, "rm -rf /dev/shm/qb-* /dev/shm/fdata-*")
+ self.ShouldBeStatus[node] = "down"
+ self.cluster_stable(self.Env["DeadTime"])
+ return 1
+diff --git a/cts/CTSaudits.py b/cts/CTSaudits.py
+index d9fbeb9..572d3ab 100755
+--- a/cts/CTSaudits.py
++++ b/cts/CTSaudits.py
+@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ class FileAudit(ClusterAudit):
+ for line in lsout:
+ self.CM.debug("ps[%s]: %s" % (node, line))
+
+- self.CM.rsh(node, "rm -f /dev/shm/qb-*")
++ self.CM.rsh(node, "rm -rf /dev/shm/qb-*")
+
+ else:
+ self.CM.debug("Skipping %s" % node)
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
+
+From aa4ebe27b392a4b613d0ddd4480470659d89106f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 16:09:20 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 10/10] Test: CTS: ignore error logged by recent pcs versions
+
+... because it is expected when a node is fenced, and we should already see
+pacemaker errors if a node is unexpectedly fenced
+---
+ cts/patterns.py | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/cts/patterns.py b/cts/patterns.py
+index e908714..47a9067 100644
+--- a/cts/patterns.py
++++ b/cts/patterns.py
+@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ class BasePatterns:
+
+ # Logging bug in some versions of libvirtd
+ r"libvirtd.*: internal error: Failed to parse PCI config address",
++
++ # pcs can log this when node is fenced, but fencing is OK in some
++ # tests (and we will catch it in pacemaker logs when not OK)
++ r"pcs.daemon:No response from: .* request: get_configs, error:",
+ ]
+ self.BadNews = []
+ self.components = {}
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/pacemaker.spec b/SPECS/pacemaker.spec
index c243643..ab9dd35 100644
--- a/SPECS/pacemaker.spec
+++ b/SPECS/pacemaker.spec
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@
Name: pacemaker
Summary: Scalable High-Availability cluster resource manager
Version: %{pcmkversion}
-Release: %{pcmk_release}%{?dist}
+Release: %{pcmk_release}%{?dist}.1
%if %{defined _unitdir}
License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+
%else
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ Source0: https://codeload.github.com/%{github_owner}/%{name}/tar.gz/%{arch
Source1: nagios-agents-metadata-%{nagios_hash}.tar.gz
# upstream commits
-#Patch1: 01-xxx.patch
+Patch1: 01-CVE-2020-25654.patch
# patches that aren't from upstream (or at least not the 1.1 branch)
Patch100: lrmd-protocol-version.patch
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ Provides: pcmk-cluster-manager
%{?systemd_requires}
-ExclusiveArch: aarch64 i686 ppc64le s390x x86_64 %{arm}
+ExclusiveArch: aarch64 i686 ppc64le s390x x86_64
# Pacemaker targets compatibility with python 2.6+ and 3.2+
Requires: python >= 2.6
@@ -915,6 +915,10 @@ exit 0
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/pacemaker/nagios/plugins-metadata/*
%changelog
+* Thu Oct 29 2020 Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com> - 1.1.23-1.1
+- Prevent ACL bypass (CVE-2020-25654)
+- Resolves: rhbz#1892140
+
* Wed May 27 2020 Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com> - 1.1.23-1
- Improve help for clean-up option
- Avoid pending DC fencing getting "stuck" in status display